Beagle conflict

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The Beagle Conflict
Main Article: Beagle conflict
1881–1970: Beagle Channel cartography
1971–1977: Beagle Channel Arbitration
1977–1978: Direct Negotiations
1978: Operation Soberanía
1979–1984: Papal Mediation
1984: Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1984
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The Beagle Conflict (Spanish: Conflicto del Beagle) was a border dispute between Argentina and Chile over the possession of the Picton, Lennox and Nueva islands and sea located south of Tierra del Fuego which took both countries to the brink of war in 1978. The Beagle conflict is seen as the main reason for Chilean support to the United Kingdom during the Falklands War of 1982. The dispute ended in the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1984.

Contents

[edit] Background

Summary of Argentine cartography since 1881 in the Beagle Channel. The named maps can be looked in the Beagle Channel cartography since 1881
Summary of Argentine cartography since 1881 in the Beagle Channel. The named maps can be looked in the Beagle Channel cartography since 1881
See also: Beagle Channel cartography since 1881

With a strategic location south of the Beagle Channel and with a congruent maritime extension of 30,000 square miles, including fishing and mineral (presumably oil) rights, and possible Antarctic Peninsula territorial claims, the zone had been in contention since the early 20th Century.

Although the first agreement to limit weapons acquisitions dated from 1902, the two sides still had in 1984 nearly 50 boundary disputes along their common border of 5,308 kilometres, consequently making relations between them very cold.

[edit] Beagle Channel Arbitration

See also: Beagle Channel Arbitration

1971 Chile and Argentina sign an agreement formally submitting the Beagle Channel issue to binding arbitration under auspices of Britain's Queen Elizabeth II. The court that was to decide the controversy was composed of five selected judges from the International Court of Justice at The Hague. The court of arbitration's final decision would be submitted to the British Crown, which was then to recommend acceptance or rejection of the award of the court but not to modify it. On May 2, 1977 the court ruled that the islands and all adjacent formations belonged to Chile. See the Report and decision of the Court of Arbitration.

[edit] Issues

1978, during the accelerated military mobilization appeared on the agenda other latent problems between Chile and Argentina: the west and east limit of the Strait of Magellan, navigation rights and the projection over the Antarctic.

The disputed islands located south of Tierra del Fuego in the "Hammer" (ABCDEF). 1978 Argentina claimed also all territories west of Cape Horn

According to definition of the east limit of the Strait of Magellan, Chile gets a "Beach" at the Atlantic Ocean or Argentina gets the right to co-regulate the navigation in the Strait

Two visions of west mouth of the Strait of Magellan. The black line is the Chilean sight, the yellow line (a Delta) was the Argentine sight. The Boundary Treaty of 1881 established the free navigation through the strait

The nearness and the projection of the countries over the Antarctic can substantiate a claim over territories

[edit] Direct negotiations

See also: Direct negotiations between Chile and Argentina in 1977-78
See also: Operation Soberanía

The direct negotiations between Chile and Argentina began after the announcement of the binding arbitral award and finished with the Act of Motevideo on 9 January 1979, where both countries accept the papal mediation after Argentina aborted the Operation Soberanía.

On 25 January 1978 Argentina rejected the award and attempted to military coerce Chile into negotiating a division of the islands that would produce a maritime boundary consistent with Argentine claims and began to challenge the Chilean commitment to defend the territory.

Both countries made important military deployments moving to the brink of open warfare. Frenzied diplomatic activity occurred alongside the military preparations. This was the most dangerous phase of the Beagle Conflict and there was a real possibility of open warfare.

On 22 December 1978 Argentina started the Operación Soberanía, but few hours later was aborted. The junta in Buenos Aires accepted the Pope's mediation. They would allow the Pope to mediate the dispute through the good offices of Cardinal Antonio Samoré, his special envoy.

[edit] Papal Mediation

On January 9, 1979 the Act of Montevideo was signed in Uruguay pledging both sides to a peaceful solution and a return to the military situation of early 1977.

1980 Argentina rejected the Pope's proposal (already accepted by Chile).

The detention of prisoners on both sides of the border, the following border closing by Argentina, 28 April 1981, and the Argentine repudiation of the General Treaty on the Judicial Settlement of Disputes in January 1982 maintained the danger of war. Six weeks before the Falklands War Argentina provoked the ARA Gurruchaga incident with Chile at Deceit Island[1]..

[edit] The Falklands War

See also: Falklands War

In 1982, Argentina went to war against the United Kingdom in the Falklands War and again both countries deployed their respective militaries to the border.

In 1982 Argentina still officially considered Chile an enemy[2]. One of the reasons given for the absence of the Argentine Navy and higher numbers of soldiers during the Falklands War was to keep them in reserve in case they were needed against Chile. Chile denied support for Argentina at the TIAR due to its defensive nature while Argentina was the aggressor in this war, which prevented a later attack against Chile as a consequence of the Falklands war[3][4][5]. Anglo-Chilean interests were deteriorated due to the Sheila Cassidy Affair, the use of British made Hawker Hunter aircraft during the Coup d'État in 1973, and the violations of human rights by the Pinochet regime. During the war Chile provided the UK with ‘limited, but significant information’[6].

[edit] Treaty of Peace and Friendship

The Treaty of 1984 on the map.
The Treaty of 1984 on the map.

No significant reduction in tensions between Argentina and Chile occurred until the democratic government of Raúl Alfonsín took office in Argentina in December 1983.

Still isolated diplomatically due to the Falklands crisis, the Alfonsin administration made great efforts to stabilize the border situation.

Alfonsín called for a national plebiscite on 25. November 1984 and after 80 percent of the Argentine electorate voted to accept the Vatican-mediated compromise:[7]:

Alternative Percent Absolute
Yes to compromise 82% 10,391,019
No to compromise 16% 2,105,663
blank or null ballots 1,1%  

The voting was close only in the territory of Tierra del Fuego, which includes the Argentine sector of the disputed Beagle Channel and has many military personnel. The vote there was narrowly in favor of the treaty.

On 29 November, 1984 Argentina and Chile signed a protocol of agreement to a treaty at Vatican City giving the islands to Chile but maritime rights to Argentina.

The Treaty of Peace and Friendship (Spanish: Tratado de Paz y Amistad) was ratified by Argentina on March 14, 1985 and by Chile on April 12, 1985.

The Treaty also includes the exact delimitation of the Strait of Magellan, exchange of navigation rights between the Strait of Magellan and the Beagle Channel and a comprehensive body of legislation for the Judicial Settlement of Disputes

[edit] Aftermath

See also: Argentina-Chile relations

In spite of having a common history when they fought together for their independence and the other neighbouring countries (for further reading, check José de San Martín and Bernardo O'Higgins), Argentina and Chile suffered very difficult moments in their relations during the twentieth century but never a war.

During the 1990s, under the presidency of Carlos Menem in Argentina and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle in Chile, they resolved almost all of their disputes, e.g. Laguna del Desierto and both countries began to work together both economically and militarily.

[edit] Cultural impact

The mountain pass of Puyehue was renamed Cardenal Antonio Samoré Pass after Antonio Samoré one of the mediators from the Vatican state in the conflict.

In 2005 the Chilean movie Mi Mejor Enemigo (English: My best enemy. - the title is a oxymoron) was released. The film recreates the story of a simple recruit in late 1978 when both countries were on the brink of war.

Leon Gieco created the song "Sólo le pido a Dios"[8] (I only Ask of God) 1978 as a response to the warmongering in Argentina. Three years later, during the Falklands War, the Argentine Junta used the song against the Falklands War after the invasion[9].

[edit] Economic impact

The arms race at both sides of the border after the Argentine Refusal of the decision of the Court of Arbitration caused huge costs for the economy of the countries, until after the Falklands War[10]:

1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Chile
defense spending* 487 566 713 951 1.128 949
percentage of the GNP 3.5 3.5 4.1 4.6 5.2
Argentina
defense spending* 2.702 2.225 2.339 2.641 2.126 2.241
percentage of the GNP 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.0


* Costs in Millons of USA Dollars 1979.

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ See Newspaper "Convicción", Buenos Aires, 24 February 1982,pages 12 and 13. (Cited in Historia general de las Relaciones Exteriores Argentinas, note 57.)
  2. ^ The Informe Rattenbach, an Argentine official investigation over the war, confirms that. See §§ 718 inciso a) in Informe Rattenbach
  3. ^ Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 1996, 271 pages, ISBN 052157790X. See also here On page 160: Displaying the mentality of the Argentine military regime in the 1970s, as another example, there was "Plan Rosario" accordingto which Argentina would attack the Malvinas and then turn to settle the Beagle Channel problem by force. The sequence, according to the plan, could also be reversed.
  4. ^ "'En su lógica'", Rio Negro SA, 2005-09-01. Retrieved on 2005-09-05. (Spanish) 
  5. ^ See article of Manfred Schönfeld in La Prensa (Argentina) on 2. Juni 1982 about the Argentine Course of Action after the Falklands War: "Para nosotros no lo estará [terminada la guerra], porque, inmediatamente después de barrido el enemigo de las Malvinas, debe serlo de las Georgias, Sandwich del Sur y de todos los demás archipiélagos australes argentinos, ...", Tranlation: "". All articles of M. Schönfeld in "La Prensa" from 10. January 1982 to 2. August 1982 are in "La Guerra Austral", Manfred Schönfeld, Desafío Editores S.A., 1982, ISBN 950-0205-00-9
  6. ^ See Chilean connection
  7. ^ See The New York Times on 26. November 1984.
  8. ^ See youtube
  9. ^ See article in La Nación, Argentina, 18 September 2006
  10. ^ See Distribución de capacidades en el Cono Sur, Sabrina Melidoni, Buenos Aires, 2006 (p. 45).

[edit] Bibliography

  • Beagle Channel Arbitration between the Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Chile, Report and Decision of the Court of Arbitration
  • Mark Laudy: The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention and Forum Building in Words Over War of Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.
  • Alejandro Luis Corbacho: Predicting the Probability of War During Brinkmanship Crises: The Beagle and the Malvinas Conflicts, Universidad del CEMA, Argentina, Documento de Trabajo No. 244, September 2003, Spanish Language
  • Karin Oellers-Frahm: Der Schiedsspruch in der Beagle-Kanal-Streitigkeit, Berichte und Urkunden: Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, German Language
  • Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile: Relaciones Chileno-Argentinas, La controversia del Beagle. Genf 1979, English and Spanish Language
  • Andrea Wagner: Der argentinisch-chilenische Konflikt um den Beagle-Kanal. Ein Beitrag zu den Methoden friedlicher Streiterledigung. Verlag Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M. 1992, ISBN 3-631-43590-8, German Language
  • Karl Hernekamp: Der argentinisch-chilenisch Grenzstreit am Beagle-Kanal. Institut für Iberoamerika-Kunde, Hamburg 1980, German Language
  • Andrés Cisneros y Carlos Escudé, "Historia general de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina", Las relaciones con Chile, Cema, Argentina, Buenos Aires. Spanish Language
  • Annegret I. Haffa: Beagle-Konflikt und Falkland (Malwinen)-Krieg. Zur Außenpolitik der Argentinischen Militarregierung 1976-1983. Weltforum Verlag, München/Köln/London 1987, ISBN 3-8039-0348-3, German Language
  • Isaac F. Rojas und Arturo Medrano: Argentina en el Atlántico Chile en el Pacífico. Editorial Nemont, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1979, in spanischer Sprache.
  • Isaac F. Rojas, La Argentina en el Beagle y Atlántico sur 1. Parte. Editorial Diagraf, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Spanish Language
  • Carlos Escudé und Andrés Cisneros: Historia general de las relaciones exteriores de la República Argentina (here), in spanischer Sprache.
  • Fabio Vio Valdivieso: La mediación de su S.S. el Papa Juan Pablo II, Editorial Aconcagua, Santiago de Chile, 1984, Spanish Language
  • Alberto Marín Madrid: El arbitraje del Beagle y la actitud argentina. 1984, Editorial Moisés Garrido Urrea, id = A-1374-84 XIII, Spanisch Language
  • Luis Alberto Romero, Argentina in the twentieth Century. Pennsilvania State University Press, translated by James P. Brennan, 1994, ISBN 0-271-02191-8
  • Divisionsgeneral (a.D.) Juan E. Gugliamelli: Cuestión del Beagle. Negociación directa o diálogo de armas (Trans.:The Beagle-Question, direct Negotiations or Dialog of the Weapons), in Spanish Language. (Book compiled from articles of Argentine Magazin "Estrategia", Buenos Aires Nr:49/50, enero-febrero 1978, erschienen sind.
  • General Martín Antonio Balza und Mariano Grondona: Dejo Constancia: memorias de un general argentino. Editorial Planeta, Buenos Aires 2001, ISBN 9504908136, Spanish Language
  • Francisco Bulnes Serrano und Patricia Arancibia Clavel: La Escuadra En Acción. Chile, Editorial Grijalbo, 2004, ISBN 9562582116, Spanish Language

[edit] External links

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Territorial disputes involving Argentina