Battle of the Imjin River
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| Battle of the Imjin River | |||||||
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| Part of Korean War | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
| Commanders | |||||||
| General Matthew Ridgway | General Peng Dehuai | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 4,000 of the 29th Infantry Brigade (United Kingdom) | 70,000 | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 1,091 British | est. 10,000 | ||||||
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- For the similarly named battle during the Seven-Year War, see Battle of Imjin River (1592).
The Battle of the Imjin River took place 22 April – 25 April 1951 during the Korean War. The opposing forces were the attacking People's Volunteer Army of the People's Republic of China aiding North Korea and the defending British Force sent to aid South Korea and under the command of the United Nations.
In April 1951, the Chinese Spring Offensive, also known as the Fifth Phase Offensive, was launched. This was a major effort, involving 3 Field Armies (up to 700,000 men). The main blow fell on U.S. I Corps, but fierce resistance in battles at Kapyong and the Imjin river blunted its impetus, and the Chinese were halted at a defensive line north of Seoul (referred to as No-Name Line).
Contents |
[edit] Background
The battle took place during the Chinese Spring Offensive for which the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese and North Korean Communist Forces in the Field, General Peng Dehuai, issued an operational directive that summarizes the initial objective as follows:
- First of all, we will mass our forces to wipe out the 6th Division of the Puppet Army, the British 27th Brigade, the American 3rd Division (less one regiment), the Turkish Brigade, the British 29th Brigade and the 1st Division of the Puppet Army [...].[1]
Among the forces involved on the Chinese side was the 3rd Field Army, consisting of the 64th Army on the western flank, 63rd Army in the centre, and 65th Army in the east. These were positioned on the northern bank of the Imjin River but concentrated some way back, as was usual for Chinese forces at the time. Three divisions of 63rd Army, the 187th, 188th and 189th Division, were involved in the attack on the British 29th Infantry Brigade’s positions on the Imjin river from 22 April - 25 April 1951 in what became known as the Battle of the Imjin River.[2] 25 miles further to the east, other elements of the Chinese forces were involved in an attack on UN forces which included 27th British Commonwealth Brigade. That battle became known as the Battle of Kapyong.[3]
At the time of the Chinese attack, the British 29th Infantry Brigade (commanded by Brigadier Tom Brodie) consisted of the 1st Battalion, the Gloucestershire Regiment (also called "The Glosters"), under Lieutenant-Colonel James P. Carne, the 1st Battalion, the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (RNF) under Lieutenant-Colonel Kingsley Foster, the 1st Battalion, the Royal Ulster Rifles (RUR) under the temporary command of Major Gerald Rickord and the Belgian battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Crahay to which Luxembourg's contribution to the UN forces was attached.[4] 29th Brigade was one of two UN formations responsible for holding the western flank on the lower Imjin river, the other being 1st Republic of Korea (ROK) Division, which was positioned further to the west. Further to the east of 29th Brigade’s position stood the US 3rd Infantry Division (see map).[5]
The deployment of UN forces meant that 29th Brigade with its four battalions had to cover a front of twelve miles according to one source, seven and a half miles according to another.[6] Regardless of the exact front length, the consequence was that gaps between units had to be accepted because there was no possibility of forming a continuous line with the forces available. As a result, “Brigadier Brodie determinded to deploy his men in separate unit positions, centred upon key hill features”.[7] On the left flank, the Glosters were guarding a ford over the Imjin, known as Gloster crossing; the RNF were deployed in the centre and on the right flank, while the Belgians were the only element of 29th Brigade north of the river, occupying a feature called Hill 196, around the village of Tagampo. The Royal Ulster Rifles served as the brigade’s reserve.[8]
The scattered deployment was one aspect which complicated the defense of the position. Another aspect was the lack of heavy artillery. Fire support was provided by 45 Field Regiment, RA, equipped with 25 pounders and also by C Troop, 170 Heavy Mortar Battery, RA. No heavier artillery support was available.[9] In addition, defensive preparations were not carried out very extensively because the British expected to hold the position for only a short time. As a result, neither minefields, deeply dug shelters nor extensive wire obstacles existed. The British position on the Imjin river "was deemed safe" but vulnerable in case of an attack.[10]
[edit] Battle
[edit] The first Night of Attacks
The battle opened on the night of 22 April 1951; after a fierce bombardment, three Chinese divisions of the 63rd Army attacked along 29th Brigade's front. On the right, elements of 29th Brigade’s reserve, the 1st RUR, were deployed forward at about 10 p.m. in order to secure a ford over the Imjin which was known as Ulster crossing. Like all other battalions of 29th Brigade, the Ulsters were soon engaged by Chinese forces trying to cross the river and could not secure the ford although they managed to keep open the brigade’s main line of communication on the right.[11] However, the developments at Ulster crossing meant that the Belgian battalion on the north bank of the river was in danger of being isolated from the other elements of 29th Brigade.
To the left of the brigade’s line, the Glosters’ right and left forward companies, A and D company, engaged Chinese units trying to cross the Imjin. A forward deployed patrol under the command of Lieutenant Guy Ward managed to repel four Chinese attempts to cross the river but was eventually forced to fall back. By morning of the next day, A company had suffered severe casualties; only one officer remained in action. Casualties included the company commander, Major Pat Angier, who was killed during the night. Despite its losses, A company received the order to hold its position because a retreat at this stage would have threatened the positions of the entire battalion.[12]
In the centre and on the right of the brigade’s line, the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers tried to hold their positions but X company, the battalion’s left forward company had to withdraw. Chinese forces also managed to gain control of positions behind Y company, the right forward battalion. After unsuccessful British attempts to regain them, Y company’s position was abandoned, the retreat being covered by Centurion tanks of C Squadron, 8th Hussars, under the command of Major Henry Huth.[13]
[edit] The Glosters' Withdrawal to Hill 235
On 23 April, attempts by the Fusiliers and an American battalion to regain control of areas lost during the night failed. However, those attempts distracted Chinese forces and allowed the Belgian battalion to escape from its perilous position on the north bank of the river. With American tank support, the Belgians escaped to the east and took up new positions south of the Glosters and the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers.[14]
At around 8.30 p.m. on 23 April, the forward companies of the Glosters were withdrawn from their positions after suffering heavy casualties. Apart from A and D company, C company under Major Paul Mitchell retreated as well but because of enemy pressure it was impossible for B company under Major Denis Harding to join the battalion’s remaining elements on Hill 235, a position between the Imjin and the Seolmacheon stream that became known as Gloster Hill. The men of B company had to endure seven Chinese assaults on their position before they were also able to withdraw to Hill 235 the next morning. Only 17 men of B company remained in action after reaching the remainder of the battalion.[15]
During the night in which the Glosters’ B company faced numerous attacks, the Chinese 188th Division crossed the Imjin and attacked the Fusiliers and the Royal Ulster Rifles on the right of the brigade’s line. The 187th Division also engaged the brigade’s battalions on the right, while the 189th Division kept up the pressure on the left.[16] The Glosters were surrounded by Chinese forces on 24 April. An attempt by Centurions of the 8th Hussars supported by a Philippine infantry battalion of the US 3rd Infantry Division to make contact with the Glosters on Hill 235 failed when the leading tank of the relief column was hit, blocking the route and making any further advance impossible.[17]
[edit] The Retreat of 29th Brigade
In the night of 24/25 April, 29th Brigade received the order to disengage and to retreat to a new line of defense north of Seoul. The brigade began its retreat at 8 a.m. the next morning. Supported by C Squadron, 8th Hussars, and 55 Squadron, Royal Engineers, the 1st Battalion, the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, the 1st Battalion, the Royal Ulster Rifles, and the Belgian battalion tried to reach the safety of the next UN position. Their withdrawal while being under intense enemy pressure was made even more difficult by the fact that Chinese forces dominated parts of the high ground along the line of retreat and were thus able not only to observe their movements but also to inflict heavy casualties on the retreating units. Among those killed was the CO of the Fusiliers, Lieutenant-Colonel Foster, who died when his jeep was hit by Chinese mortar fire. In the words of Major Henry Huth of the 8th Hussars, the retreat was "one long bloody ambush".[18] At one stage of the retreat, two Centurions had to machine-gun each other in order to repel Chinese infantry which tried to climb onto their hulls. When B company of the Ulsters which had acted as rear guard during the retreat reached the safety of the UN line, all elements of 29th Brigade except for the Glosters had completed the withdrawal.[19]
[edit] The Glosters on Hill 235
The Glosters' situation on Hill 235 made it impossible for them to join the rest of 29th Brigade after it had received the order to retreat. Even before the failed attempt to relieve the battalion on 24 April, B and C company had already suffered such heavy casualties that they were merged to form one company. Attempts to supply the battalion by air drop or to evacuate the wounded by helicopter were unsuccessful. Despite their difficult situation, the Glosters held the positions on "their" hill throughout 24 April and the night of 24/25 April. In the morning of 25 April, 45 Field Regiment could no longer provide artillery support for the Glosters. Brigadier Brodie had left the decision whether to attempt a break out or to surrender to Lieutenant-Colonel Carne. The Glosters' CO "gave the order to his company commanders to make for the British lines as best as they could" on the morning of 25 April.[20] Only the remains of D company under the command of Major Mike Harvey escaped successfully from "Gloster Hill" and reached the safety of friendly lines after several days. The rest of the battalion were taken prisoner, including Lieutenant-Colonel Carne.[21]
[edit] Aftermath
[edit] Importance of the battle
Had the Chinese achieved a breakthrough in the initial stages of their assault, they would have been able to outflank the 1st ROK Division to the west and the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division to the east of 29th Brigade. Such a development would have threatened the stability of the UN line and increased the likelihood of success for a Chinese advance on Seoul. Although the Chinese benefitted from 29th Brigade's scattered deployment and a lack of defensive preparations, they were nevertheless unable to overcome the positions before UN forces could check further advances. In the 3 days of fighting, the determined resistance of the 29th Brigade severely disrupted the Chinese offensive, causing it to lose momentum and allowed UN forces in the area to withdraw to the No-Name Line, a defensible position north of Seoul, where the Chinese were halted.[22][23][24]
[edit] Casualties and Memorial
According to Anthony Farrar-Hockley, 29th Brigade suffered 1,091 casualties or 20 per cent compared to its strength on the eve of battle.[25] "169 of 850 Gloucesters mustered for rollcall with the brigade after the battle", according to Hastings.[26] 63 soldiers of the Gloucestershire Regiment were killed in action and about three times as many were wounded. 30 men died while in captivity.[27] Based on estimates, Chinese casualties in the Battle of the Imjin River can be put at around 10,000.[28]
Today, a memorial stands at the foot of Gloster Hill , beside the Seolmacheon stream and the British Embassy in Seoul organizes services for veterans on every anniversary of the battle.
[edit] Awards and Citations
The Gloucestershire Regiment has a long history of distinguished service since the Battle of Alexandria in 1801. Since then it has the distinction of wearing badges both at the front and at the back of their head-dress. In the Battle of the Imjin River two Victoria Crosses and one George Cross were awarded to soldiers of the Gloucestershire Regiment:
- Lieutenant-Colonel Carne, who commanded the battalion, was awarded the Victoria Cross. He was also awarded the U.S. Army's Distinguished Service Cross.[29]
- Lieutenant Curtis, who had recently learnt of his wife's death and who died in a lone counter-attack on enemy machine-guns, was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.
- Lieutenant Waters, who died in captivity, was awarded a posthumous George Cross for his conduct shortly after capture.
In addition, several soldiers were awarded the Distinguished Service Order:
- Captain Anthony Farrar-Hockley, 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment[30]
- Major Henry Huth, Officer Commanding, C Squadron, 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars[31]
- Major John Winn, Officer Commanding, Z Company, Royal Northumberland Fusiliers[32]
The Military Cross was awarded to:
- Captain Mike Harvey, 1st Battalion, the Gloucestershire Regiment, for his leadership of a group of 5 officers and 41 men of D Company who escaped and evaded the Chinese encirclement.
- Captain Peter Ormrod, 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars[33]
- Lieutenant Guy Temple, for his actions when a platoon from C Company, 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment stopped four attempts by Chinese Communist Forces to cross the river on 22 April, only withdrawing when the platoon ran short of ammunition.
Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Crahay received the U.S. Army's Distinguished Service Cross for his leadership of the Belgian battalion during the battle.[34]
Three Commonwealth Regiments were awarded the United States Distinguished Unit Citation for their part in the Battle of the Imjin River and the Batte of Kapyong:
- The 1st Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment, together with C Troop 170 Heavy Mortar Battery Royal Artillery
- The 3rd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, (Battle of Kapyong April 22-25, 1951).
- The 2nd Battalion of Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Regiment. (Battle of Kapyong April 22-25, 1951)
On the 8 May 1951, by the command of U.S. President Harry S. Truman, General James Van Fleet presented the President's Distinguished Unit Citation to the Glosters, together with C Troop 170 Heavy Mortar Battery, which had given invaluable support throughout the battle. The citation says:
- The 1st. Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, British Army and Troop C. 170th Independent Mortar Battery, Royal Artillery, attached, are cited for exceptionally outstanding performance of duty and extraordinary heroism in action against the armed enemy near Solma-ri, Korea on the 23rd, 24th, and 25th of April 1951.
- The 1st. Battalion and Troop C were defending a very critical sector of the battle front during a determined attack by the enemy. The defending units were overwhelmingly outnumbered.
- The 63rd Chinese Communist Army drove the full force of its savage assault at the positions held by the 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment and attached unit. The route of supply ran southeast from the Battalion between two hills.
- The hills dominated the surrounding terrain northwest to Imjin River. Enemy pressure built up on the battalion front during the day, 23 April. On 24 April, the weight of the attack had driven the right flank of the battalion back. The pressure grew heavier and heavier and the battalion and attached unit were forced into a perimeter defense on Hill 235. During the night, heavy enemy forces had by-passed the staunch defenders and closed all avenues of escape. The courageous soldiers of the battalion and attached unit were holding the critical route selected by the enemy for one column of the general offensive designed to encircle and destroy I Corps. These gallant soldiers would not retreat. As they were compressed tighter and tighter in their perimeter defense, they called for close-in air strikes to assist in holding firm. Completely surrounded by tremendous numbers, these indomitable, resolute, and tenacious soldiers fought back with unsurpassed fortitude and courage. As ammunition ran low and the advancing hordes moved closer and closer, these splendid soldiers fought back viciously to prevent the enemy from overrunning the position and moving rapidly on the south. Their heroic stand provided the critically needed time to regroup other I Corps units and block the southern advance of the enemy. Time and again efforts were made to reach the battalion, but the enemy strength blocked each effort. Without thought of defeat or surrender, this heroic force demonstrated superb battlefield courage and discipline. Every yard of ground they surrendered was covered with enemy dead until the last gallant soldier of the fighting battalion was overpowered by the final surge of the enemy masses. The 1st. Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment and Trop C. 170th. Independent Mortar Battery displayed such gallantry, determination, and esprit de corps in accomplishing their mission under extremely difficult and hazardous conditions as to set them apart and above other units participating in the same battle. Their sustained brilliance in battle, their resoluteness, and extraordinary heroism are in keeping with the finest traditions of the renowned military forces of the British Commonwealth, and reflect unsurpassed credit on these courageous soldiers and their homeland.
The Belgian United Nations Command, which was attached to the British 29th Brigade and replaced the 900 men of the Royal Ulster Rifles on 20 April 1951, initially held the brigade's right flank on the north bank of the river. It also included a Luxembourg platoon. It fought the Chinese there and then conducted a fighting withdrawal, supported by U.S. forces, before taking position in the center of the brigade's line, ahead of brigade headquarters, for the attempts to relieve the Glosters. The Belgian battalion was awarded the United States Distinguished Unit Citation and the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation for their conduct during the battle.
US citation:
- By decision of the President concurrent with the dispositions of the execution order 9396 (Sec. I, War Department Bulletin 22, 1943) etc. ... , the following unit is mentioned on the daily order as a public testimonial of deserved honor and distinction.
Citation
- The Belgian battalion with the Luxemburg detachment of the UN Forces in Korea is mentioned for exceptional execution of its missions and for its remarkable heroism in its actions against the enemy on the Imjin, near Hantangang, Korea during the period from 20 till 26 April 1951. The Belgian battalion with the Luxemburg detachment, one of the smallest units of the UNO in Korea, has inflicted thirty-fold losses on the enemy compared to its own, due to its aggressive and courageous actions against the Communist Chinese. During this period considerable enemy forces, supported by fire by machine guns, mortars and artillery, repeatedly and heavily attacked the positions held by the battalion but, Belgians and Luxembourgers have continuously and bravely repulsed these fanatic attacks by inflicting heavy losses to the enemy forces. When the Chinese troops had succeeded in occupying positions endangering the liaison with the allied neighboring units, The Belgian battalion with the Luxembourg detachment launched furious counter-attacks with the bayonet. The enemy, surprised by the tenacity of these attacks became disorganised and withdrew in disorder. Finally, the Belgian-Luxembourg battalion withdrew by order of higher authority, evacuated its wounded, was resupplied and requested to be put back in the line. Having arrived at the frontline again, numerous enemy infantry and cavalry units were observed heading south. When the enemy was sufficiently close, the Belgian-Luxembourg battalion launched a rain of mortar shells with the devastating effect that its front area was covered with bodies. When the Chinese communists continued to bring in fresh troops in the attack, the Belgian-Luxembourg troops fought a successful delaying battle which enabled the adjoining positions to be methodically evacuated with minimum losses. The Belgian battalion with the Luxemburg detachment has shown so much proof of courage, decision and esprit de corps in the accomplishment of its missions during these actions in difficult and hazardous circumstances, that it has to be placed above any other units participating in these actions. The extraordinary courage shown by the members of this units during this period has bestowed extraordinary honor on their country and on themselves.
- By order of
- General VAN FLEET.
- Henry I. HODES.
- Major general, US Army.
- Chief of Staff.
[edit] See also
[edit] Notes
- ^ Operational directive by Peng Dehuai, 18 April 1951, quoted in Farrar-Hockley: The Post War Army 1945-1963, p. 324.
- ^ Farrar-Hockley: The Post War Army 1945-1963, p. 325.
- ^ Hastings: The Korean War, p. 250.
- ^ Farrar-Hockley: The Post-War Army 1945-1963, p. 324.
- ^ Hastings: The Korean War, p. 250.
- ^ According to Hastings: The Korean War, p. 251, the front length was more than seven and a half miles, according to Farrar-Hockley: The Post War Army 1945-1963, p. 324, 29th Brigade had to cover a front of twelve miles.
- ^ Hastings: The Korean War, p. 251.
- ^ For the deployment of 29th Brigade compare Hastings: The Korean War, p. 251 and Farrar-Hockley: The Post-War Army 1945-1963, p. 324.
- ^ Hastings: The Korean War, p. 251, and Farrar-Hockley: The Post-War Army 1945-1963’’, p. 324.
- ^ Hastings: The Korean War, p. 253.
- ^ Farrar-Hockley: The Post-War Army 1945-1963, p. 326.
- ^ Hastings: The Korean War, pp. 256-257.
- ^ Farrar-Hockley: The Post-War Army 1945-1963, p. 326; Hastings: The Korean War, p. 256.
- ^ Farrar-Hockley: The Post-War Army 1945-1963, p. 327; Hastings: The Korean War, p. 258.
- ^ Hastings: The Korean War, p. 259.
- ^ Farrar-Hockley: The Post-War Army 1945-1963, p. 327.
- ^ Hastings: The Korean War, p. 260.
- ^ Quoted in Hastings: The Korean War, p. 264.
- ^ For the retreat of 29th Brigade compare Farrar-Hockley: The Post-War Army 1945-1963, pp. 327-328 and Hastings: The Korean War, pp. 263-267.
- ^ Hastings: The Korean War, p. 268.
- ^ For the Glosters last stand on "Gloster Hill" see Hastings: The Korean War, pp. 259, 267-269.
- ^ Brian Catchpole. The Korean War. London: Constance and Roninson Ltd, 2000. ISBN 1-84119-413-1
- ^ Anthony Farrar-Hockley. The British part in the Korean War: Vol 2, An honourable discharge. London: HMSO, 2000. ISBN 0-11-630-958-X
- ^ Col. E D Harding: The Imjin Roll. 3rd edition 2001. ISBN 0-9529597-6-3
- ^ Farrar-Hockley: The Post-War Army 1945-1963, p. 328.
- ^ Hastings: The Korean War, p. 270.
- ^ See Hastings: The Korean War, pp. 269-270 for a breakdown of casualties sufferd by the regiment.
- ^ Hastings: The Korean War, p. 270, refers to several "campaign histories" when he puts the number at around 10,000 but underlines that the number of Chinese casualties was "arbitrary" and based "upon the minimum that seemed credible".
- ^ Korean War Recipients of the Distinguished Service Cross - Citations
- ^ Hastings: The Korean War, p. xvii.
- ^ Hastings: The Korean War, p. 264.
- ^ Hastings: The Korean War, p. 256.
- ^ Colonel Peter Ormrod obituary - Times Online
- ^ Korean War Recipients of the Distinguished Service Cross - Citations
[edit] References
- 20th Century Battlefields: War in Korea. TV. Military Channel (formerly Discovery Wings)
- http://www.homeofheroes.com/valor/1_Citations/05_korea-dsc/dsc_18korea_foreign.html: provides citations for non-US recipients of gallantry awards
- Catchpole, Brian. The Korean War. London: Constance and Roninson Ltd, 2000. ISBN 1-84119-413-1
- Farrar-Hockley, Anthony. The British part in the Korean War: Vol 2, An honourable discharge. London: HMSO, 2000. ISBN 0-11-630958-X
- Farrar-Hockley, Anthony: The Post-War Army 1945-1963. In: Chandler, David G., and Beckett, Ian. The Oxford History of the British Army. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 316-342.
- Harding, E D (Colonel): The Imjin Roll. 3rd edition 2001. ISBN 0-9529597-6-3
- Hastings, Max. The Korean War. London: Pan Books, 2000.
[edit] Further reading
- Barclay, Cyril Nelson. The First Commonwealth Division: The story of British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950-1953. Aldershot U.K.: Gale & Polden, 1954.
- Cunningham-Boothe, Ashley, and Farrar, Peter (eds). British Forces in the Korean War. London: The British Korean Veterans Association, 1988.
- Farrar-Hockley, Anthony. The Edge of the Sword. London: Frederick Muller, 2007.(later edition ISBN 0-352-30977-6)
- Farrar-Hockley, Anthony. The British part in the Korean War: Vol.1, A distant obligation. London: HMSO, 1990. ISBN 0-11-630953-9
- Green, David. Captured at the Imjin River: The Korean War Memoirs of a Gloster. Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2003.
- Rottman, Gordon. Korean War Order of Battle. United States, United Nations and Communist Ground, Naval and Air Forces, 1950-1953. Praeger/Greenwood, 2002.
[edit] External links
- http://www.britains-smallwars.com/korea/Imjin.html: brief summary of the battle
- The Soldiers of Gloucestershire Museum , which holds the archives of the Gloucestershire Regiment including documents and artefacts related to the battle.
- The Royal Gazette: Obituary of Bernard Leroy Martin (one of three Bermudian Glosters at Imjin).
- http://www.geocities.com/peftok/10thbct3.html: takes a closer look at the actions of the Philippine contingent during the Korean War, including their efforts to relieve the Gloucestershire Regiment
- http://hendrik.atspace.com/eng/Bunc.html: complete story of the BUNC, with reports of the battles they participated in, unit awards and personal decorations (Belgian and foreign).
- Royal Engineers Museum Royal Engineers and the Cold War (Korean War)
- Royal Engineers Museum Royal Engineer pictures of the Korean War

