People's Volunteer Army

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The Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) (simplified Chinese: 中国人民志愿军; pinyin: Zhōngguó Rénmín Zhìyuàn Jūn) was the army deployed by the Chinese government during the Korean War. Although most soldiers were previously members of the People's Liberation Army, the People's Volunteer Army was separately constituted in order to prevent an official war with the United States. Chinese officials maintained from the first that the Chinese fighting in Korea were volunteers, while thousands of interrogations of Chinese prisoners and scores of captured Chinese documents by the US military show that at least in numerous cases the claim was false,[1] though the presence of some volunteers is indisputable.

Contents

[edit] Background

Although the Western forces were under American command, this army was officially a United Nations "police" force. In order to avoid an open war with the US and other UN members, China deployed what they termed a "volunteer army". [2] Technically the People's Liberation Army only manned supply depots and infrastructure in Manchuria during the conflict, and never crossed the Yalu, while units assigned to fight UN forces became units of the People's Volunteer Army.

The name also helped to delude the US intelligence about the size and nature of the Chinese army who entered Korea, as some Americans believed that the PVA was merely a rabble of untrained volunteers.

Others think it is not just a euphemism. During the Korean War, the PRC recruited many young men and women to fight the United Nations forces, citing the reason that their presence on the Korean Peninsula endangered the newly formed People's Republic of China. The popular view of this war outside the communist world is different however. For example, most of the troops were veterans of the recent civil war, and virtually all senior officers had fought the Japanese during World War II. Their high morale presumably was the result of effective political indoctrination, notwithstanding that former Nationalist Army members constituted much of the strength of the intervention force.[3]

The UN troops drove to the Yalu River bordering China. This greatly concerned the Chinese, who worried that the UN forces would not stop at the Yalu River, the border between the PRK and China, and had warned Western leaders that such an action would not be tolerated. Many in the West, including General Douglas MacArthur, thought that spreading the war to China would be necessary. However, President Harry S. Truman and the other leaders disagreed, and MacArthur was ordered to be very cautious when approaching the Chinese border. Eventually, MacArthur disregarded these concerns, arguing that since the North Korean troops were being supplied by bases in China, those supply depots should be bombed. However, except on some rare occasions UN bombers remained out of Northeastern China during the war.

MacArthur refused to believed that the Chinese would really enter the war and ignored warnings from the Indian ambassador.

[edit] Actions during the war

Peng Dehuai, Commander of the PVA
Peng Dehuai, Commander of the PVA

[edit] First campaign (October 18-October 25, 1950)

Chinese forces drove American and UN forces back near Yalu and promptly withdrew. The People's Republic of China had issued warnings that they would intervene if any non-South Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel, citing national security interests. Truman regarded the warnings as "a bald attempt to blackmail the UN". [1] On October 8, 1950, the day after American troops crossed the parallel, Chairman Mao issued the order for the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (actually regulars in the Chinese People's Liberation Army) to be moved to the Yalu River, ready to cross. Mao Zedong sought Soviet aid and saw intervention as essentially defensive: "If we allow the U.S. to occupy all of Korea… we must be prepared for the US to declare… war with China", he told Joseph Stalin. Premier Zhou Enlai was sent to Moscow to add force to Mao's cabled arguments. Mao delayed his forces while waiting for Soviet help, and the planned attack was thus postponed from 13 October to 19 October. Soviet assistance was limited to providing air support no nearer than 60 miles (96 km) from the battlefront. The MiG-15s in PRC colours would be an unpleasant surprise to the UN pilots; they would hold local air superiority against the F-80 Shooting Stars until newer F-86 Sabres were deployed. The Soviet role was known to the U.S. but they kept quiet to avoid any international and potential nuclear incidents. It has been alleged by the Chinese that the Soviets had agreed to full scale air support, which never transpired South of Pyongyang, and helped accelerate the Sino-Soviet Split.

On October 15, 1950, Truman went to Wake Island to discuss the possibility of Chinese intervention and his desire to limit the scope of the Korean conflict. MacArthur reassured Truman that "if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter."

On October 19, 1950, Pyongyang, North Korea's capital, fell to UN forces.

The Chinese assault began on October 25, 1950, under the command of General Peng Dehuai with 270,000 PVA troops (it was assumed at the time that Lin Biao was in charge, but this notion has been disproved). The Chinese assault caught the UN troops by surprise, despite the capture of Chinese soldiers and other evidence of the entrance of the PLA into Korea. In addition, the Chinese, employing great skill and remarkable camouflage discipline, concealed their numeric and divisional strength after the first engagement with the UN. After these initial engagements, the Chinese withdrew into the mountains; UN forces ignored the stern warning delivered by the Chinese government and continued their advance to the Yalu. In fact, many UN leaders interpreted this withdrawal as a show of weakness; they thought the Chinese initial attack had been all they were capable of.

[edit] Second campaign

PVA advanced across North Korea towards 38th parallel. In late November, the Chinese struck again. In the west, along the Chongchon River, the Chinese army overran several South Korean divisions and landed an extremely heavy blow into the flank of the remaining UN forces; the resulting withdrawal of the U.S. Eighth Army was the longest retreat of an American unit in history. In the east, at the Battle of Chosin Reservoir (November 26–December 13) a 3,000 man unit from the 7th Infantry Division, Task Force Faith, inflicted heavy casualties on the Chinese brigades, but were soon surrounded. They fought their way out of the encirclement, but in so doing lost 2000 of their 3000 men killed or captured. They also lost all of their vehicles and most other equipment. This was considered to be one of the largest defeats of American military in history. The Marines fared better; though surrounded and forced to retreat, they inflicted heavy casualties on the Chinese forces, who committed six divisions to trying to destroy the American Marines.

UN forces in northeast Korea withdrew to form a defensive perimeter around the port city of Hungnam, where a Dunkirk-style evacuation was carried out in late December 1950. Approximately 100,000 military personnel and material and another 100,000 North Korean civilians were loaded onto a variety of merchant and military transport ships, not always voluntarily as the South Korean military and police often conscripted military-age males, and were moved to ports in UN-held territory on the southern tip of Korea.

[edit] Third campaign (December 31, 1950 - ?)

The PVA drove to the 37th parallel and recaptured Seoul. On January 4, 1951, Chinese and North Korean forces recaptured Seoul. Both the 8th Army and the X Corps were forced to retreat. General Walker was killed in an accident. He was replaced by Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway, who had led airborne troops in World War II. Ridgway took immediate steps to raise the morale and fighting spirit of the battered Eighth Army, which had fallen to low levels during its retreat from North Korea.

[edit] Fourth campaign

The overextended PVA went on the defensive. In March 1951, in Operation Ripper, a revitalized 8th Army, restored by Ridgway to fighting trim, expelled the North Korean and Chinese troops from Seoul, destroying much of the city with aerial and artillery bombardments in the process.

MacArthur was removed from command by President Truman on April 11, 1951, due to a disagreement over policy. MacArthur was succeeded by Ridgway, who managed to regroup UN forces for an effective counter-offensive. A series of attacks managed to slowly drive back the opposing forces, inflicting heavy casualties on Chinese and North Korean units as UN forces advanced some miles north of the 38th parallel.

[edit] Fifth campaign

A US counterattack stabilized along the 38th parallel. The rest of the war involved little territory change, large scale bombing of the population in the north, and lengthy peace negotiations (which started in Kaesong on July 10 of the same year). Even during the peace negotiations, combat continued. For the South Korean and allied forces, the goal was to recapture all of what had been South Korea before an agreement was reached in order to avoid loss of any territory. The Chinese attempted a similar operation at the Battle of the Hook, where they were repelled by British forces. A major issue of the negotiations was repatriation of POWs. The Communists agreed to voluntary repatriation, but only if the majority would return to China or North Korea, something that did not occur. The war continued until the Communists eventually dropped this issue.

On November 29, 1952, U.S. President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower fulfilled a campaign promise by going to Korea to find out what could be done to end the conflict. With the UN's acceptance of India's proposal for a Korean armistice, a cease-fire was established on July 27, 1953, by which time the front line was back around the proximity of the 38th parallel, and so a demilitarized zone (DMZ) was established around it, still defended to this day by North Korean troops on one side and South Korean and American troops on the other. The DMZ runs north of the parallel towards the east, and to the south as it travels west. The site of the peace talks, Kaesong, the old capital of Korea, was part of the South before hostilities broke out but is currently a special city of the North. No peace treaty has been signed

[edit] Tactics

Similar to Europeans during the Mongol invasions, UN forces believed that Chinese victories were due to simple human wave tactics. In fact Chinese forces used rapid attacks on the flanks and rear and infiltration behind UN lines to give the appearance of vast hordes. This of course was augmented by the Chinese tactic of maximizing their forces for the attack, ensuring a large local numerical superiority than their opponent.[4][5] The PVA also instituted a much harsher form of discipline, where officers were empowered to shoot down immediately any man who violated orders.[6] The initial Chinese victory along the Yalu River was a great morale booster for the PVA and the first Chinese victory over the West in modern times. In addition the retreat from the Yalu to a line below Seoul was the longest retreat in American history[citation needed]. However by late 1951, superior UN firepower and Chinese meatgrinder tactics had forced a stalemate. The North Koreans that invaded in 1950 had been much better supplied and armed by the Soviets than the Chinese Army had been. The main arms of the PVA were captured Japanese and KMT arms.[citation needed]

Century China's Korean War FAQ written by Dongxiao Yue states that (edited somewhat for typos and grammatical errors):

"The PVA's tactics were designed to avoid the UN's advantage of air power and artillery. The PVA used night fighting tactics. It would start an attack when night fell, withdraw and went to cover at dawn, so US airplanes could not harass them. It also used close combat, threw its units into enemy lines, so the enemy artillery could not operate. Another PVA tactic was to infiltrate deep into enemy positions, attack their command posts and artillery positions directly from inside. During the truce talks, PVA invented the bunker war, they would dig very long and deep bunkers in the hills and stock supplies there, when enemy shells the hills, they would withdraw into the bunkers, when the shelling stopped, they came out to fire on the attackers, after the surface positions taken by enemy, they would withdraw back into the bunkers, then PVA artillery would shell the enemy on the surface and they came out the bunkers again to assist the retaking of the hill. PVA's main strategy at the beginning was the so-called "movement war", the main objective was to divide the enemy into isolated pieces and then use superior strength of force to annihilate the encircled enemy piecemeal before enemy reinforcement could be brought in, to do this, PVA uses frontal attacks and simultaneous penetrations to cut directly into enemy rear, cutoff MSR (main supply route) and withdraw routes, trap enemy units when they tried to redeploy. To understand PLA strategies, one must study the grand campaigns in which PLA wiped out 8 million KMT troops in 2 years, with small casualty of its own. During battles, western forces were usually incapable of correctly estimating the strength of PVA forces, often, they greatly exaggerated the number of attacking PVAs, such as taking a PVA regiment as a PVA division. PVA mostly attacked at night, blowing bugles and wistles, shouting thrills, even play "sweet music" to cause psychological stress, the PVA tactics made western forces feel that the enemy was everywhere from every direction. Moreover, PVAs were masters of infiltration, they often sneaked in and attacked directly on command posts, generating shock and chaos. Western combat history always referred PVA attacks as "swarm of Chinese", "human waves", "Chinese hordes", as if PVA simply threw its men into the fire and let itself slaughtered, such a description indicated a great misunderstanding of the PVA tactics. As some military analysts pointed out, PLA rarely use dense formation in their attacks, it seeks to inflict maximum damage with minimum casualty. At various stages of the Korean war, PVA never had a commanding numerical superioty against UN forces, in fact, during the 4th campaign, it was greatly outnumbered by UN (it was always outgunned), yet it could still outmaneuver UN forces and even managed to counter attack at X Corps. PVA could achieve all these with inferior firepower because it had smarter tactics and strategy[7]

Historian and Korean War veteran Bevin Alexander had this to say about Chinese tactics in his book How Wars Are Won:

"The Chinese had no air power and were armed only with rifles, machineguns, hand grenades, and mortars. Against the much more heavily armed Americans, they adapted a technique they had used against the Nationalists in the Chinese civil war of 1946–49. The Chinese generally attacked at night and tried to close in on a small troop position — generally a platoon — and then attacked it with local superiority in numbers. The usual method was to infiltrate small units, from a platoon of fifty men to a company of 200, split into separate detachments. While one team cut off the escape route of the Americans, the others struck both the front and the flanks in concerted assaults. The attacks continued on all sides until the defenders were destroyed or forced to withdraw. The Chinese then crept forward to the open flank of the next platoon position, and repeated the tactics."

Roy Appleman further clarified the initial Chines tactics as:

In the First Phase Offensive, highly skilled enemy light infantry troops had carried out the Chinese attacks, generally unaided by any weapons larger than mortars. Their attacks had demonstrated that the Chinese were well-trained disciplined fire fighters, and particularly adept at night fighting. They were masters of the art of camouflage. Their patrols were remarkably successful in locating the positions of the U.N. forces. They planned their attacks to get in the rear of these forces, cut them off from their escape and supply roads, and then send in frontal and flanking attacks to precipitate the battle. They also employed a tactic which they termed Hachi Shiki, which was a V-formation into which they allowed enemy forces to move; the sides of the V then closed around their enemy while another force moved below the mouth of the V to engage any forces attempting to relieve the trapped unit. Such were the tactics the Chinese used with great success at Onjong, Unsan, and Ch'osan, but with only partial success at Pakch'on and the Ch'ongch'on bridgehead.[8]

Historian Bruce Cumings noted that when Chinese soldiers and officers saw how Americans fought the war, they were surprised by how freely the Americans would resort to what they considered to be excessive and unnecessary force. One Chinese soldier stated that if the Americans encountered a single sniper hiding in a village or house, they would invariably call in massive artillery and air attacks, destroying the entire village and killing everyone in it. He asked, "Why do they do this instead of simply sending in soldiers to kill the sniper?" American superiority in military hardware had profound consequences for the Korean people on the peninsula as well as the soldiers fighting the war.

[edit] Aftermath

Propaganda in North Korea however still suggests that the war was won by Kim singlehandedly with minor Chinese help. But as with Egypt over the Suez War, the Chinese campaign was heralded as a great victory for China's prestige by the Chinese Communist authorities, in stark comparison to the dismal military performance of the Qing Dynasty against Europe, Japan and America.

The Soviets played a minor role in the war taking back their promise for air cover just as Chinese forces began crossing the Yalu. the aid they did provide came too late and was expensive. The Korean War was the decisive factor in ensuring that US-China relations remained sour and ensured that China would remain outside the UN.

[edit] Brainwashing and POWs

POWS played a major role in the continuation of the war past 1951. The US accused China of brainwashing US prisoners while China refused to allow the US to repatriate POWs to Taiwan. During the Panmunjeom Truce negiations, the chief stumbling block to the arrangement of a final armistice during the winter of 1951-1952 revolved around the exchange of prisoners. At first glance, there appeared to be nothing to argue about, since the Geneva Conventions of 1949, by which both sides had pledged to abide, called for the immediate and complete exchange of all prisoners upon the conclusion of hostilities. This seemingly straightforward principle, however, disturbed many Americans. To begin with, UN prisoner-of-war (POW) camps held over 40,000 South Koreans, many of whom had been impressed into Communist service and who had no desire to be sent north upon the conclusion of the war. Moreover, a considerable number of North Korean and Chinese prisoners had also expressed a desire not to return to their homelands. This was particularly true of the Chinese POWs, some of whom were anti-Communists whom the Communists had forcibly inducted into their army.[9][10]

During what the Chinese call the 5th campaign (May 1951), the CPV suffered its largest loss: the 180th Division of the 60th Army was totally destroyed. Roughly 3,000 men escaped earlier (including the division commander and other high ranking officers), but the majority of the division were killed or captured. During the final days of the 5th campaign, the main body of the 180th Division was encircled during a UN counterattack, and after days of hard fighting, the division was fragmented, and the regiments fled in all directions. Soldiers either deserted or are abandoned by their officers during failed attempts to wage guerilla warfare without support from locals. Finally, out of ammunition and food, some five thousand soldiers were captured. The division commander and other officers who escaped were subsequently investigated and demoted back in China.[11][12]

Most of those captured from the 180th Division are sent to Koje Island, 25 miles southwest of Pusan, including the Division Commissar Pei Shan. While there, a war breaks out amongst the Chinese prisoners along party lines. Supporters of Nationalist China openly slaughter prisoners who refuse to go to Taiwan, while Communist sympathizers hang one of their own in secret for betraying the identity of Commissar Pei to the Americans during an interrogation session. Those who decide to return back to China after the war, are ultimately regarded as disgraceful cowards who have betrayed the Communist Party and their country by not fighting to their last breath. Each soldier is expelled from the Chinese Communist Party, given a dishonorable discharge, and either jailed or sent to labor-reform camps.[13]

[edit] Chinese early involvement

One of the importance of Chinese People's Volunteer Army was that the Chinese communist government marked the People's Volunteer Army entering the war as the beginning of the Chinese involvement. However, this is rather out of political propaganda needs and there are debates on the beginning of Chinese involvement. Some scholars in the west had argued that the Chinese invovlement was much earlier, and at the North Korean invasion on June 25, 1950, out of the 135,000 North Korean invasion force, more than 38,000 were the former ethnic Korean soldiers of Chinese communist IV Field Army. An equal number of former ethnic Korean soldiers of Chinese communist IV Field Army who did not participate in the invasion also served in North Korean army in other regions of North Korea. The North Korean invasion force was consisted of two corps, the 1st Corps and the 2nd Corps. Jin Xiong (金雄), the commander-in-chief of the invasion force and the commander of the 1st Corps, was a veteran of Eighth Route Army, and a former member of Communist Party of China. Jin Wuting (金武亭), the commander of 2nd corps, even had more seniority than Jin Xiong (金雄), in that he participated in Guangzhou Uprising and Long March. All of these facts are agreed by the Chinese government.

The North Korean invasion force attacked the south on June 25, 1950 consisted of a total of ten divisions, an armored brigade, an armored regiment, and two independent regiments, 150 tanks, over 600 artilleries, and 196 aircraft (including 40 fighters and 70 bombers). The North Korean divisions included the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th (later renamed as the 12th), 10th, 13th, and the 15th Divisions. Out of these divisions, three were former Chinese communist IV Field Army divisions, each had the following structure: the division headquarter, a political directorate, a supply directorate, a medical directorate, a security battalion, an artillery battalion, a training / military police group, a propaganda /psychological warfare group and three infantry regiments. Each regiment was consisted of three battalions and each battalion was consisted of three infantry companies, a machine gun company, an engineering company, a security company, an artillery company, an antitank gun company, and a mortar company. Kim Il-sung spent over 13.8 million rubles to purchase Soviet weaponry to arm his invasion force, which was paid in the form of 9 tons of gold, 40 tons of silver and over 15,000 tons of minerals, but all former former ethnic Korean soldiers of Chinese communist IV Field Army carried their own weapons and additionally, the former units of Chinese communist IV Field Army were also transferred to North Korean with all of the weapons. The three former Chinese divisions were:

With the exception of the 2nd and 3rd divisions, which mostly consisted of former-Soviet Union trained North Korean troops, all other North Korean divisions had at least a former regiment of the Chinese communist IV Field Army, and in addition to the three former Chinese divisions, most of commanders were former commanders of the Chinese communist IV Field Army, such as:

  • Commander of the 2nd Division Cui Xian (崔贤) and chief-of-staff Xu Bo (许波)
  • Commander of the 3rd Division Li Yingdi (李英镝) and chief-of-staff Zhang Pingshan (张平山)
  • Commander of the 4th Division Li Quanwu (李权武)

Though Chinese government acknowledge these facts, these early Chinese invovlements were kept a secret for more than four decades in China and it was only until late 1990s when such information was finally allowed to be revealed on large scale. The Chinese government, however, argued that these troops were already transferred to North Korean and thus should be strictly considered as the internal affairs of Korea and the thus still asserts the Chinese invovlvement in the Korean War begun when Chinese People's Volunteer Army join the fight.

[edit] Legacy

See also the article on Juche for attitudes in North Korea.

[edit] People's Republic of China

By many Chinese the Korean war is generally seen as an honour in Chinese history. People's Volunteer Army is the first Chinese army in a century that was able to withstand a Western army in a major conflict. They had earned a name "who is the most lovable". Stories of heroism by members of the PVA (see Literature below) continue to be promoted by the People's Republic of China government even to this day, and appear in school textbooks. The willingness of China to assist North Korea against the United States, and the show of force they engaged in, heralded that China was once again becoming a major world power.

From official Chinese sources, PVA casualties during the Korean War were 390,000. This breaks down as follows: 110,400 KIA; 21,600 died of wounds; 13,000 died of sickness; 25,600 MIA/POW; and 260,000 more WIA. However, western and other sources estimate that about 400,000 Chinese soldiers were either killed in action or died of disease, starvation, exposure, and accidents with around 486,000 wounded, out of around 2.3 million deployed in the war. Mao Zedong's only healthy son, Mao Anying (毛岸英), was also killed as a PVA officer during the war.[14]

It also contributed to the decline of Sino-Soviet relations. Although Chinese had their own reasons to enter the war (i.e. a strategic buffer zone in the Korean peninsula), the view that the Soviets had used them as proxies was shared in the Western bloc. China had to use the Soviet loan, which had been originally intended to rebuild their destroyed economy, to pay for the Soviet arms.

[edit] Republic of China

After the war was over, 14,000 of the Chinese prisoners of war hostile to the People's Republic of China defected to the Republic of China (ROC) (in contrast, only 7,110 Chinese POWs opted to return to the PRC). The defectors arrived in Taiwan on January 23, 1954 and were referred to as "Anti-Communist volunteers"(反共義士). In Taiwan January 23 became World Freedom Day (自由日) in their honor.

The Korean War also led to other long lasting effects. Until the conflict in Korea, the U.S. had largely abandoned the government of Chiang Kai-Shek, which had retreated to Taiwan, and had no plans to intervene in the Chinese Civil War. The start of the Korean War rendered untenable any policy that would have caused Taiwan to fall under PRC control. Truman's decision to send American forces to the Taiwan strait further deterred the PRC from making any cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. The anti-communist atmosphere in the West in response to the Korean War and Cold War contributed to the unwillingness to diplomatically recognize the People's Republic of China by the West until the 1970s. Today, diplomacy between the Republic of China and mainland China remains strained, and mainland China continues to claim the sovereignty of Taiwan.

[edit] Literature

Who Is the Most Lovable? is the title of a book by Chinese writer Wei Wei about the Chinese People's Volunteers serving in the Korean War.

During the war, Wei released a series of stories, which then were collected and edited as the book Who is the most lovable? 《誰是最可愛的人》. One of the more notable books of its period, it glorifies the revolutionary spirit of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army serving in Korea.

It represents Wei's most significant work on Korea as well as an influential example from the period of the revolutionary theme. The book's success came from Wei's cautious choice of sources, brevity, and depth of detail.

In the book, Wei highlighted three particular examples. The first is Song gu feng War (松鼓峰戰爭), describing the courage of the soldiers and their hatred towards their enemies. The second is the story of Feng Yuxiang[citation needed] taking a big risk to rescue a Korean child, showing the spirit of "internationalism" (國際主義精神) of the volunteer soldiers. The third is a conversation between Wei and some soldiers, which reveals their patriotism. Although the three examples have different approaches, they all illustrate the theme "Who is the most lovable" (誰是最可愛的人).

War Trash is a novel by the Chinese author Ha Jin, who has long lived in the United States and who writes in English. It takes the form of a memoir written by the fictional character Yu Yuan, a man who eventually becomes a soldier in the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and who is sent to Korea to fight on the Communist side in the Korean War. The majority of the "memoir" is devoted to describing this experience, especially after Yu Yuan is captured and imprisoned as a POW. The novel captured the PEN/Faulkner Award and was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize.

Shangganling Battle (Shanggan Ling, Chinese: 上甘岭, BW-1956) is a Chinese movie. In the Korean war in early 1950s, a group of Chinese People's Volunteer soldiers are blocked in Shangganling mountain area for several days. Short of both food and water, they hold their ground till the relief troops arrive. d: Meng Sha, Lin Shan; C: Gao Baocheng, XuLIinge, Liu Yuru; M: changchun.

The Fight for Korea (决战朝鲜) is a computer game released on Mainland China in 1996. It is a turn-based strategy game where the Chinese volunteer army is put up against the American and South Korean armies. The player can conquer the entirety of Korea in the game.

[edit] Notable dead

Mao Zedong's oldest son was killed during the first campaign by American napalm bombs. This would later seal the fate of Peng Dehui during the Cultural Revolution where he was accused of deliberately causing the death of Mao Anying.

[edit] References

  • Spurr, Russell. Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against The U.S. In Korea, 1950-51. New York:Henry Holt & Company, 1989.
  • Hoyt, Edwin. The Day The Chinese Attacked: Korea, 1950 : The Story of the Failure of America's China Policy. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990.
  • Alexander, Bevin. Korea: The First War We Lost. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1986.
  1. ^ Appleman, Roy E. "South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu", pg 754
  2. ^ CenturyChina.com
  3. ^ Mossman, Billy C. "Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 1951", pg 57
  4. ^ GlobalSecurity.org - Korean War
  5. ^ Li Tso-Peng, "Strategy: One Against Ten, Tactics: Ten Against One." Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1966, pp. 4-5.
  6. ^ Appleman, Roy E. "South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu", pg 771
  7. ^ Korean War FAQ Korean War History Korean War History Korean War FAQ
  8. ^ Appleman, Roy E. "South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu", pg 719
  9. ^ The Korean War: Years of Stalemate, pg 17
  10. ^ Operation Big Switch
  11. ^ Korean War FAQ, from CenturyChina.com
  12. ^ Chinese Question Role in Korean War, from POW-MIA InterNetwork
  13. ^ Cultural Reviews, The Lament of a Chinese POW
  14. ^ The Cold War, The Korean War: An Overview

[edit] See also

[edit] External links