Shaw Report
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The Shaw Report was a British report of a Commission of Inquiry, chaired by Sir Walter Shaw, into the 1929 Palestine riots. The aim of the report was to look into the reasons for the violence that had occurred. The commission of enquiry took public evidence for several weeks. The main conclusions of the Commission were as follows.[1][Material not in brackets is verbatim.]
- The outbreak in Jerusalem on the 23rd of August was from the beginning an attack by Arabs on Jews for which no excuse in the form of earlier murders by Jews has been established.
- The outbreak was not premeditated.
- [The disturbances] took the form, in the most part, of a vicious attack by Arabs on Jews accompanied by wanton destruction of Jewish property. A general massacre of the Jewish community at Hebron was narrowly averted. In a few instances, Jews attacked Arabs and destroyed Arab property. These attacks, though inexcusable, were in most cases in retaliation for wrongs already committed by Arabs in the neighbourhood in which the Jewish attacks occurred.
- [In his activities connected to the dispute over the Holy Places] the Mufti was influenced by the twofold desire to confront the Jews and to mobilize Moslem opinion on the issue of the Wailing Wall. He had no intention of utilizing this religious campaign as the means of inciting to disorder.
- ...in the matter of innovations of practice [at the Wailing Wall] little blame can be attached to the Mufti in which some Jewish religious authorities also would not have to share. ...no connection has been established between the Mufti and the work of those who either are known or are thought to have engaged in agitation or incitement. ... After the disturbances had broken out the Mufti co-operated with the Government in their efforts both to restore peace and to prevent the extension of disorder.
- [No blame can be properly attached to the British government for failing to provide armed reinforcements, withholding of fire, and similar charges.]
- The fundamental cause ... is the Arab feeling of animosity and hostility towards the Jews consequent upon the disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic future. ... The feeling as it exists today is based on the twofold fear of the Arabs that by Jewish immigration and land purchases they may be deprived of their livelihood and in time pass under the political domination of the Jews.[not in citation given]
- In our opinion the immediate causes of the outbreak were:-
-
- The long series of incidents connected with the Wailing Wall... These must be regarded as a whole, but the incident among them which in our view contributed most to the outbreak was the Jewish demonstration at the Wailing Wall on the 15th of August. ...
- Excited and intemperate articles which appeared in some Arabic papers, in one Hebrew daily paper and in a Jewish weekly paper...
- Understanding of the developing situation amongst the Arab people of a character which infuriated them.
- The enlargement of the Jewish Agency.
- The inadequacy of the military forces and of the reliable police available.
- The belief...that the decisions of the Palestine Government could be influenced by political considerations.
The Commission recommended that the Government reconsider its policies as to Jewish immigration and land sales to Jews. This lead directly to the Hope Simpson Royal Commission in 1930.
The main victims of the rioting were Orthodox Jews, however the Orthodox community took a decision to boycott the Commission, possibly out of fear. Any assessment of the commission's findings needs to take into account that the principle victims did not testify.
A minority report asserted far more involvement on the Mufti's part. A 1937 reinvestigation concluded that the minority report was well-founded.[2]
[edit] Principal recommendations
In August 1947, the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations presented a summary of the principal recommendations made by the Shaw Commission[3] as follows:
(i) His Majesty's government should issue a clear statement of the policy they intend to pursue in Palestine. The value of this statement would be greatly enhanced if it defined the meaning they attached to the passages in the Mandate safeguarding the rights of non-Jewish communities, and if it laid down more explicit directives on such vital issues as land and immigration.
(ii) Immigration policy should be clearly defined, and its administration reviewed "with the object of preventing a repetition of the excessive immigration of 1925 and 1926" Machinery should be devised through which non-Jewish interests could be consulted on the subject of immigration.
(iii) A scientific enquiry should be made into the possibilities of land development in Palestine, having regard to "the certain natural increase in the present rural population." Meanwhile the "tendency towards the eviction of peasant cultivators from the land should be checked."
(iv) while making no formal recommendations on constitutional development, the commission observed that the difficulties of the administration were greatly aggravated by the absence of any measure of self-government.
[edit] Notes
- ^ Great Britain, 1930 : Report of the Commission on the disturbances of August 1929, Command paper 3530 (Shaw Commission report).
- ^ Ronald J. Rychlak. "Hitler’s Mufti: The Dark Legacy of Haj Amin al-Husseini", Crisis Magazine, December 05, 2005.
- ^ Aug 1947 - UK DELEGATION TO THE UN "summary of the principal recommendations made by the Shaw commission".
[edit] See also
- Peel Commission, 1937

