Problem of evil

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In the philosophy of religion and theology, the problem of evil is the problem of reconciling the existence of evil or suffering in the world with the existence of God, a force for infinite good.^[1] The problem is most often discussed in the context of the personal god of the Abrahamic religions, but is also relevant to polytheistic traditions involving many gods. A proposed solution to this dilemma is called a theodicy.

[edit] History

Epicurus is credited with first expounding the problem of evil. David Hume in his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779) cited Epicurus in stating the argument as a series of questions: "Is [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?"

[edit] Ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt

The problem of evil takes at least four formulations in ancient Mesopotamian religious thought, as in the extant manuscripts of Ludlul bēl nēmeqi (I Will Praise the Lord of Wisdom), Erra and Ishum, The Babylonian Theodicy, and The Dialogue of Pessimism.^[2] In this type of polytheistic context, the chaotic nature of the world implies multiple gods battling for control. In ancient Egypt, it was thought the problem takes at least two formulations, as in the extant manuscripts of Dialogue of a Man with His Ba and The Eloquent Peasant. Due to the conception of Egyptian gods as being far removed, these two formulations of the problem focus heavily on the relation between evil and people; that is, moral evil.

[edit] Epicurus

Epicurus is generally credited with first expounding the problem of evil, and it is sometimes called "the Epicurean paradox" or "the riddle of Epicurus." In this form, the argument is not really a paradox or a riddle, but is considered by some critics as being a reductio ad absurdum of the premises.^[3] Epicurus drew the conclusion that the existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of the gods, who care about the matters of mankind, assuming absolute concepts of benevolence, knowledge, and power. More generally, no paradox or problem exists for those who do not accept the premises, in particular the existence of a benevolent god or gods. The assumption of a benevolent divine principle, however, was not only a central concept for both classical and later schools of philosophy,^[4] but continues to be one of the essential assumptions of Christianity to this day.

"Either God wants to abolish evil, and cannot; or he can, but does not want to. If he wants to, but cannot, he is impotent. If he can, but does not want to, he is wicked. If God can abolish evil, and God really wants to do it, why is there evil in the world?" — Epicurus, as quoted in 2000 Years of Disbelief

Epicurus himself did not leave any written form of this argument. It can be found in Lucretius's De Rerum Natura and in Christian theologian Lactantius's Treatise on the Anger of God where Lactantius critiques the argument. Epicurus's argument as presented by Lactantius actually argues that a god that is all-powerful and all-good does not exist and that the gods are distant and uninvolved with man's concerns. The gods are neither our friends nor enemies. The stronger form most people know of Epicurus' problem of evil is actually David Hume's formulation of the problem of evil in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion:

"[Gods] power we allow [is] infinite: Whatever he wills is executed: But neither man nor any other animal are happy: Therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: He is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But the course of nature tends not to human or animal felicity: Therefore it is not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men?"

Marcion, the 2nd century sect leader, is presented by Tertullian in his Adversus Marcionem as presenting this puzzle: "Why does God, who is all powerful and has foreknowledge of the future, allow evil?" Marcion's answer is that god is in part evil himself.

[edit] Traditional Jewish Interpretations

[edit] Biblical Tradition

The biblical Book of Job is, perhaps, the most widely known formulation of the problem of evil in Western thought. Other books of note include Psalms 1 and 82, and Ecclesiastes (Koheleth).

An oral tradition exists in Judaism that God determined the time of the Messiah's coming by erecting a great set of scales. On one side, God placed the captive Messiah with the souls of dead laymen. On the other side, God placed sorrow, tears, and the souls of righteous martyrs. God then declared that the Messiah would appear on earth when the scale was balanced. According to this tradition, then, evil is necessary in the bringing of the world's redemption, as sufferings reside on the scale.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Traditional Christian Interpretations

[edit] Augustine and Pelagius

In the 5th Century, Pelagius denied the Augustianian answer to the paradox of original sin. Augustine's answer was the Limited Sovereignty argument, which stated that Adam and Eve had the power to change nature by bringing sin into the world, but that the advent of sin then limited mankind’s power thereafter (to evade the consequences). The problem of evil then asks: "Is God's creation still good?" Pelagius argued that death is a natural part of the universe. Both he and John Chrysostom believed that Christians, through their baptism, are free to make moral choices; that, although their wills cannot affect the course of nature, it can — and must — affect their moral decisions. This view, however, does not exclude the possibility that death came about as a result of human action. Pelagius' main argument was that God is just, and it would be unjust to punish many people for the sin of two people. Adam and Eve sinned, but universal mortality cannot be the result of their sin alone. Mortality must be the result of some other cause, which Pelagius held was simply the structure of nature. Pelagius' position is regarded by most Christian denominations as a heresy.^[5] Augustine's position on the issue is discussed further in the section on Criticisms and responses below.

[edit] Apocatastasis

Origen, an early Christian scholar and theologian, suggested that the problem of evil was a misnomer. Origen's response to this was the concept of Apocatastasis. Simply stated, the ends justify the means. That is, all of creation is reconciled by its purpose of facilitating freewill. This argument is still prevalent in Eastern Orthodoxy today. The concept can be traced in the works of St Clement of Alexandria, St Isaac of Syria, St Gregory of Nyssa, St Gregory the Great and St Maximus the Confessor. Modern versions of the argument can be found in some of the writings of Dostoevsky (see the Devil's conversation with Ivan in The Brothers Karamazov and in Stepan Verkhovensky's play in The Possessed) though Dostoevsky himself never expressed his endorsement of the idea.

[edit] Specific Arguments

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One example among many of a formulation of the problem of evil presented by Epicurus may be schematized as follows (this form of the argument is called 'the inconsistent triad'):

1. If a perfectly good god exists, then there is no evil in the world.
2. There is evil in the world.
3. Therefore, a perfectly good god does not exist.

This argument is of the logically valid form modus tollens (denying the consequent). In this case, P is "God exists" and Q is "there is no evil in the world". Other logical forms of arguments articulating the problem follow. One criticism of this argument is that it assumes that God is unable to exist with evil, but some religious texts on the description of God and evil are said to state otherwise, such as the Book of Job.

Logical problem of evil

1. God exists. (premise)
2. God is omnipotent and omniscient. (premise — or true by definition of the word "God")
3. God is all-benevolent. (premise — or true by definition)
4. All-benevolent beings are opposed to all evil. (premise — or true by definition)
5. All-benevolent beings who can eliminate evil will do so immediately when they become aware of it. (premise)
6. God is opposed to all evil. (conclusion from 3 and 4)
7. God can eliminate evil completely and immediately. (conclusion from 2)
   1. Whatever the end result of suffering is, God can bring it about by ways that do not include suffering. (conclusion from 2)
   2. God has no reason not to eliminate evil. (conclusion from 7.1)
   3. God has no reason not to act immediately. (conclusion from 5)
8. God will eliminate evil completely and immediately. (conclusion from 6, 7.2 and 7.3)
9. Evil exists, has existed, and probably will always exist. (premise)
10. Items 8 and 9 are contradictory; therefore, one or more of the premises is false: either God does not exist, evil does not exist, God is not simultaneously omnipotent, omniscient and all-benevolent, or all-benevolent beings who can eliminate evil will not necessarily do so immediately when they become aware of it.

Evidential problem of evil

As argued by Paul Draper in a seminal article^[6] in Noûs (1989), the evidential problem of evil goes as follows:

1. Gratuitous evils exist.
2. The hypothesis of indifference (HI), i.e., that if there are supernatural beings they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism.
3. Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists.

Argument from evil natural laws and processes

1. A god is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-benevolent.
2. If a god exists, then there exist no instances of ultimately evil natural laws or processes.
3. The laws of predation are ultimately evil.
4. There are instances of the laws of predation.
5. Therefore, no god exists.

Inductive argument from evil

1. All evil in the kinds of created entities are the result of the fallibility of one or more of its creators. (Premise)
2. The universe is a created entity. (Premise)
3. The universe contains evil. (Premise)
4. Evil is the result of the actions of a fallible creator(s) or is not the result of any creator(s). (From 1, 2 and 3 by predictive inference)
5. If god created the universe, then he is fallible. (From 4)
6. Therefore, god did not create the universe, is imperfect, or does not exist. (From 5)

Argument from the biological role of pain and pleasure

1. Consider the following observations:
   • Moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure we know to be biologically useful.
   • Sentient beings that are not moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure that we know to be biologically useful.
   • Sentient beings experiencing pain or pleasure that we do not know to be biologically useful.
2. The observations in 1 are more probably the result of natural law than a god.
3. Therefore, probably no god exists.

[edit] Criticisms and responses

In Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal, a well-known essay written in 1710, Leibniz introduced the term "theodicy" to describe the formal study of this subject. This term is also used for an explanation of why God permits evil to exist without it being a contradiction of his perfect goodness.

[edit] Definition of "evil" as an absence of good

The fifth century theologian Augustine of Hippo mounted what has become one of the most popular defenses of the existence of God against the Epicurean paradox. He, and before him the Platonists, maintained that evil was only privatio boni, or a privation of good, much like darkness is an absence of light. An evil thing can only be referred to as a negative form of a good thing, such as discord, injustice, and loss of life or of liberty. These are all defined in terms of a spectrum with its lowest absolute being zero (injustice being the absolute lack of just decision or action). If a being is not totally pure, evil will fill in any gaps in that being's purity. This is commonly called the Contrast Theodicy — that evil only exists as a "contrast" with good. However, the Contrast Theodicy relies on a metaphysical view of morality that few people, even theologians, agree with^{[citation needed]} (that good and evil are not moral judgments).

[edit] Definition of "evil" as a necessary opposite

The related concept of Yin and Yang (known as "Taiji") is used in Eastern thought to illustrate complementary opposing forces (positive/negative, light/darkness, male/female, heat/cold, good/evil) as an unchangeable and necessary law of nature. Such forces always exist and are opposite yet inseparable from each other by their very nature, because they can only be defined in terms of their opposite. This dualism is thus similar to Contrast Theodicy, but differs in that opposites are generally referred to as on opposite sides of a zero; thus, evil is an opposing force to good with a neutral equilibrium.

In addition, yin and yang are not only traditionally depicted as complementary, but comingling and incorporating the other. No force or object is perfectly yin or yang; the darkest night fills the sky with stars, while the brightest day creates that much more difference in the shade of a tree. Similarly, no action or person is perfectly good or evil; there is always some good inherent in evil, and some evil inherent in good.

A criticism of this thinking is that such dualism requires all opposites to be describable in an infinite spectrum, with "zero" as an equilibrium point between opposing forces that can have infinite effect. In physics light and heat are usually described quantitatively, with darkness and cold being their absence as is argued in Contrast Theodicy. They have no positive limit, but do have a finite negative absolute. Thus, many physical concepts used as metaphors for good and evil and described as similar according to Taiji in fact have no negative, only a complete absence. The counter is generally a difference in the definition of a "force" in terms of affecting change. Heat affects a positive change in temperature, while cooling affects a negative. Heat and cold therefore affect opposite change, and are thus opposing forces. Similarly, good as a metaphysical force acts in a constructive manner, while evil acts destructively. Both affect change in society towards order or chaos. In creating opposite effects, they are defined as opposing forces.

[edit] "Evil" suggests a moral law

Another response to this paradox argues that asserting "evil exists" would imply a moral standard against which to define good and evil (see also Argument from morality). Therefore, by using this argument one implies the existence of a moral law, which requires a law-maker. Most theists would assert that this law-maker is God, whilst many atheists would argue that morality can just as easily be reached through reason — that this law is in fact a social contract agreed to by all humans; subconsciously developed from social prisoner's dilemma and/or that this problem is more accurately described as a problem of physical suffering, which can be objectively defined against a standard (of zero physical suffering), or that morality can be reached by its ability to support humanity's means to attain life.

[edit] Misanthropy

The problem of evil is often phrased "Why do bad things happen to good people?" Some religions answer that good people simply do not exist. For example, some forms of Christianity teach that all people are inherently sinful and that only God is good [2]. Therefore, humans, being imperfect, must live in an imperfect world, and in an imperfect world, bad things happen, caused both naturally (eg disasters) and by humans (eg crimes)

[edit] Free will

St Irenaeus (circa 130 - 202AD) argued that God had to give us free will in order to become moral, but the side-effect of that necessary endowment was evil, both moral and natural.

• God’s aim when He created the world was to make humans flawless, in His likeness (as in Genesis)
• Genuine human perfection cannot be ready-made but must develop through free choice.
• Since God had to give us free choice, He had to give us the potential to disobey Him.
• There would be no such potential if there were never any possibility of evil. If humans were made ready-perfected, and if God policed His world continually, there would be no free will.
• Therefore, the natural order had to be designed with the possibility of causing harm (natural evil), humans had to be imperfect (moral evil), and God had to stand back from His creation (not police it - deism). Otherwise humans could not develop.
• Humans used their freedom to disobey God, causing suffering.
• God cannot compromise our freedom by removing evil.
• Eventually, however, evil & suffering will be overcome and everyone will develop into God’s likeness, living in glory in heaven. This justifies temporary evil.

This is part of what is known as process theology. It is endorsed by modern theologians such as John Hick and Peter Vardy.

Criticisms of this Irenaean theodicy include the denial of free will; the assumption that God exists in order to prove that he exists despite the existence of evil (begging the question fallacy); and the denial of the existence of evil itself (e.g. Nietzsche, Ayer).

In On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine of Hippo also argued that Epicurus had ignored the potential benefits of suffering in the world.

Some theists argue that God allows evil to exist so that humans can have free will. The argument runs as follows:

• Free will requires the potential to do anything one chooses. (premise, or by definition)
• Thus, free will requires the potential to do evil.
• Thus, removing the potential to do evil would remove free will.

Having concluded that capacity for evil is a prerequisite for free will, they argue that favoring the presence of free will over an absence of evil is consistent with the concept of a powerful, benevolent god.

[edit] Ditheism

Ditheistic belief systems (a kind of dualism) resolved the problem of evil by positing that there are two rival great gods, that work in polar opposition to each other. Examples of such belief systems include Gnosticism, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism and in a way those currents of Christianity and Islam comprising the Devil, although the latter tend to define some kind of asymmetry between the two deities' capabilities. While the concept of omnipotence is difficult to hold in ditheistic belief systems, "asymmetrically ditheistic" belief systems as described above can't logically adhere to the omnipotence of one of the opposing forces as the omnipotent one then could simply rid itself of the other. Thus generally, ditheistic belief systems are technically not subject to the problem of evil because its source is evident.

[edit] By religion

[edit] Hinduism

Main article: Problem of evil in Hinduism

In Hinduism, the problem of evil is present but does not exist per se as souls are eternal and not directly created by God. In Dvaita philosophy, jivas (souls) are eternally existent and hence not a creation of God ex nihilo (out of nothing). The souls are bound by beginningless avidya (ignorance) that cause a misidentification with products of nature (body, wealth, power) and hence suffering. In effect, Hinduism identifies avidya (ignorance) as the cause of evil and this ignorance itself is uncaused. Suffering from natural causes are explained as karmic results of previous births.

Moreover, even within the realm of avidya, "good" and "evil" are an individual's deeds and God dispenses the results of an individual's actions but has the power to mitigate suffering.(see Karma in Hinduism and Hindu answers to the problem of evil)

[edit] Buddhism

The problem of evil is generally considered in Buddhism as a basis for not believing in a benevolent creator God, which Buddhism considers to be self attachment to false concepts. For instance, in the Bhûridatta Jataka^[7] the Bodhisattva sings:

If the creator of the world entire
They call God, of every being be the Lord
Why does he order such misfortune
And not create concord? If the creator of the world entire
They call God, of every being be the Lord
Why prevail deceit, lies and ignorance
And he such inequity and injustice create? If the creator of the world entire
They call God, of every being be the Lord
Then an evil master is he, (O Aritta)
Knowing what's right did let wrong prevail!

[edit] Islam

[edit] Mutazilite view

Mu'tazilis identify evil as something that stems from free will and human imperfection, arguing that if man's evil acts were from the will of God then punishment would be meaningless. Mu'tazilis do not deny suffering from non-human sources such as natural disasters, and explain this "apparent" evil through the Islamic doctrine of taklif - that life is a test for beings possessing free will.

[edit] See also

• Apocatastasis
• Book of Job
• Devil
• The problem of Hell
• Tower of Siloam
• Qliphoth and Sephirah in Kabbalah
• The Problem of Pain
• Omnipotence paradox
• Existence of God
• Just-world phenomenon

[edit] Notes

[edit] References

• Beebe, James R. "Logical Problem of Evil," The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, James Fieser and Bradley Dowden (eds.).
• Crouch, William, "Is there a defensible argument for the non-existence of God?," On Philosophy, James Nicholson (ed.).
• Farrer, Austin. Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961.
• Haught, James A. (1996). 2,000 Years of Disbelief: Famous People with the Courage to Doubt. Prometheus Books. ISBN 1-57392-067-3.
• Hein, David and Henderson, Edward, Captured by the Crucified: The Practical Theology of Austin Farrer. New York and London: Continuum / T & T Clark, 2004. 100–118.
• Hick, John. Evil and the God of Love, first edition. London: Macmillan, 1966.
• Mackie, J. L. The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.
• Murray, Michael. "Leibniz on the Problem of Evil," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Plantinga, Alvin. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977.
• Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974.
• Swinburne, Richard. The Coherence of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
• Tooley, Michael, "The Problem of Evil," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Trakakis , Nick. "Evidential Problem of Evil," The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, James Fieser and Bradley Dowden (eds.).

[edit] External links

Philosophy Portal

• Does God Really Care About Us? If so, why does he permit suffering? (A Jehovah's Witness Perspective)
• In Defense of the Free Will Theodicy
• Problem of Evil Blog
• Gregory S. Neal: "The Nature of Evil and the Irenaean Theodicy" Grace Incarnate (1988)
• Putting God on Trial — The Biblical Book of Job A Hegelian theodicy.
• A Collection and Critique of Responses
• A debate between theist William Lane Craig and atheist Kai Neilsen regarding the problem of evil.
• A selection of articles on good and evil in Judaism from Chabad.org
• Apocatastasis article at Orthodoxwiki
• The Problem of Evils & Predestination, (Islam), Frithjof Schuon, retrieved 11 June 2007
• Bediuzzaman Said Nursî's Scriptural Approach to the Problem of Evil, (Islam), Yamine Mermer, retrieved 11 June 2007
• Evil, The Catholic Encyclopedia, A.B Sharpe, 1909, retrieved 11 June2007
• Beyond the Problem of Evil, A Graduate Level Research Paper
• thekingpin68: Secular PhD thesis to be completed 2008. Secular MPhil thesis and several related articles within blog