Operation Perch

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Operation Perch
Part of World War II, Western Front, Battle of Normandy

The area over which Operation Perch was fought
Date June 7 to June 19, 1944
Location Calvados, Normandy, France
Result Limited Allied gains
Belligerents
Flag of the United Kingdom United Kingdom Flag of Nazi Germany Germany
Commanders
Flag of the United Kingdom Bernard Montgomery
Flag of the United Kingdom Miles Dempsey
Flag of the United Kingdom Gerard Bucknall
Flag of Nazi Germany Erwin Rommell
Flag of Nazi Germany Friedrich Dollmann
Flag of Nazi Germany Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg
Strength
Flag of the United KingdomSecond Army

I Corps
XXX Corps

Flag of Nazi Germany Seventh Army

I SS Panzer Corps
III Flak Corps
XLVII Panzer Corps
LXXXIV Corps

Casualties and losses
5,625+ casualties[1] 1000-5042+ casualties[2]

130+ tanks lost[3]

Operation Perch was the second attempt by the British Second Army to capture Caen, after the first, a direct attack from Sword Beach failed. Caen had been a D-Day objective for the Second Army.

It is famous mostly for the ambush of 11 tanks and several halftracks and carriers by Michael Wittmann on the 13 June at Villers-Bocage, which has led many to believe that Operation Perch was the outflanking move made by the 7th Armoured Divisions to take that town.[4]

Contents

[edit] Intention of the operation

Tanks from the 4th County of London Yeomanry, 7th Armoured Division inland from Gold Beach, 7 June 1944
Tanks from the 4th County of London Yeomanry, 7th Armoured Division inland from Gold Beach, 7 June 1944

Operation Perch was the second major attempt to capture the city of Caen after the direct attacks by the 3rd Infantry Division on June 6June 7 failed. The plan envisioned I Corps and XXX Corps striking south to encircle the city and for the landing of the 1st Airborne Division, codenamed Operation Wild Oats. I Corps would form the eastern pincer, XXX Corps the western and the paratroopers would land between both Corps to complete the encirclement of the city and to prevent any German withdrawal from Caen.[5][6][7][8]

The 51st (Highland) Infantry Division, I Corps, was to push south out of the Orne bridgehead to capture the town of Cagny six miles southeast of Caen. 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division, XXX Corps, was ordered to strike south from their lodgement created on June 6 to capture the town of Bayeux (another D-Day objective which had not been captured) and then capture the town of Tilly-sur-Seulles. Once Tilly-sur-Seulles had been captured the 7th Armoured Division would pass through the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division and push south to capture the town of Villers-Bocage before turning east to capture the town of Evrecy.[5][6][7]

However the air force refused to drop the 1st Airborne Division south of Caen to support the next step of the operation, following the eventual fall of Tilly-sur-Seulles, due to the operation being too dangerous for the pilots and men involved. Regardless, General Montgomery decided to push ahead with the basic plan without the use of paratroopers.[5][6][7]

This was a mixed blessing as neither I Corps nor XXX Corps was able to fight through the German lines to the proposed landing zones.

[edit] Bayeux

Bayeux, which was one of XXX Corps D-Day objectives was captured on the 7th June without much resistance being put up to defend the town.

[edit] Tilly-sur-Seulles

Sherman and Cromwell tanks of the Royal Marines Armoured Support Group (RMASG) on the way to Tilly-sur-Seulles on 13 June
Sherman and Cromwell tanks of the Royal Marines Armoured Support Group (RMASG) on the way to Tilly-sur-Seulles on 13 June

The XXX Corps advance bogged down in front of the town of Tilly-sur-Seulles. The Panzer Lehr Division put up stiff resistance to halt both the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division and the 7th Armoured Division which were both thrown at them. The fighting which would become known as the Battle of Tilly-sur-Seulles would last until the 19th when the town fell.

[edit] "The right hook"

On the right flank of XXX Corps, the United States 1st Infantry Division was pushing the German 352nd Infantry Division back and was nearing the town of Caumont-l'Éventé slowly opening up a gap in the German lines at the junction of XXX Corps and the American V Corps, a gap which would stretch to 7.5 miles (12.1 km) in length.[9][10]

Conscious of the opportunity created by the American advance Lieutenant-General Dempsey, the commander of the Second Army, personally ordered Major-General Erskine[11][12], the commanding officer of the 7th Armoured Division, to disengage his division from fighting around Tilly-sur-Seulles[13][14][15] and prepare to exploit the gap created in the German front line. The 7th Armoured Division was ordered to push through the gap, circle around the Panzer Lehr Division then capture Villers-Bocage and the high ground beyond the town, called Point 213. It was hoped that the appearance of British armour in the rear of the Panzer Lehr Division occupying the high ground and important lines of communication would compel the German forces to withdraw from Tilly-sur-Seulle or to surrender and get the operation to capture Caen back on track.[16][17]

However there has been some controversy regarding who came up with the plan to have the 7th Armoured Division outflank the Panzer Lehr Division. Everyone from Montgomery down to Erskine have claimed or have been given credit for the idea.[10][18] More modern studies have supported the case that it was in fact Dempsey who gave the order[19]

However the Germans were also aware of the importance of this high ground and that the British would most likely want to capture it. They dispatched elements of the Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 to close any gaps on the Panzer Lehr Division's left flank and to keep the high ground out of British hands.[20] The first part of this force, Michael Wittmann's 2nd Company, down to only six serviceable tanks after a five day road march from Beauvais, France, [21] had only arrived in the area the previous night.[20]

[edit] Battle of Villers-Bocage

This map shows the direction of the 7th Armoured Divisions advance and the directions of the German attacks (One should note that there was no 901st Division on the German Order of Battle, however this is probably a slip for Panzergrenadier-Lehr Regiment 901 of the Panzer Lehr Division).
This map shows the direction of the 7th Armoured Divisions advance and the directions of the German attacks (One should note that there was no 901st Division on the German Order of Battle, however this is probably a slip for Panzergrenadier-Lehr Regiment 901 of the Panzer Lehr Division).

On the morning of the 13 June, the lead elements of the 22nd Armoured Brigade of the 7th Armoured Divisions arrived in the town of Villers-Bocage.

The Regimental Headquarters and A Squadron of the 4th County of London Yeomanry drove on through the town and A Squadron captured the hill beyond, however they were then ambushed by three Tiger tanks of the 2nd Company Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101, which resulted in the loss of 11 tanks, 2 Observation Point tanks (armed with only a machine gun), two anti tank guns and several halftracks for the loss of one Tiger.

With the town still in British hands, the 1/7 Queens of the 131 (Queens) Infantry Brigade, were moved up and took up positions in and around Villers-Bocage. During the afternoon they along with B and C Squadrons, 4th CLY fought a six hour-long battle against German forces now made up of elements of the Panzer Lehr Division, additional forces from the Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 and elements of the 2nd Panzer Division which resulted in many casualties on both sides including the loss of six more Tiger tanks before the British forces decided to withdraw, ending the battle.

[edit] Battle of the brigade box

With the British withdrawal completed from Villers-Bocage, elements of the division pulled back to Tracy-Bocage where they formed a divisional sized “brigade box”. The following day the 7th Armoured Division were subjected to several attacks from the Panzer Lehr Division, the 2nd Panzer Division and from the Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101.

Most attacks were beaten back with heavy loss however some of the German assaults broke through the British lines only to be thrown back during heavy hand to hand fighting during British counterattacks.

The 7th Armoured Division had not only their own divisional artillery assets to support them but were able to call upon fire support from the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division, XXX Corps and from the American V Corps, all which helped repel several German assaults.

The box after a full day of fighting was still intact and the men inside determined they could hold there position until relieved. However with the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division still unable to brake through at Tilly-sur-Seulles they were ordered to withdraw.

They did so under the cover of a bombing raid which had been organised to cover there withdrawal. It is estimated they killed or wounded up to 800 Panzergrenadiers from the attacking German formations and knocked quite a few enemy tanks.

[edit] Lingevres

With the 50th Division unable to break through the Panzer Lehr defences, they attacked a towns and villages on the flank of Tilly near the town of Lingevres. These attacks were a success enabling the British infantry to eat away at the German defence line with one commander stating this was his best battalion action of the war. In the resulting German counterattacks, Sergeant “Spit” Harris the commander of a Sherman Firefly destroyed several Panther tanks by himself.

[edit] Fall of Tilly-sur-Seulles

The Battle of Tilly-sur-Seulles ended on the 19th June[22]after the town had been lost and recaptured 23 times before it was finally liberated.[23]

British forces entered the town for the last time several hours after the Panzer Lehr Division began there withdrawal.

[edit] Aftermath

The significance of operation lies in the lost opportunity to take Caen early in the campaign. However while the operation had several tactical setbacks and was unable to achieve all its objectives it can be seen as a partial strategic success.[citation needed] Even though the Panzer Lehr Division retreated after the fall of Tilly-sur-Seulles it was still forced to commit itself in the frontline on the eastern end of the beachhead along with the 2nd Panzer Division, which was drawn onto the XXX Corps sector of the front.[citation needed]

According to General Montgomery and supported by the American General Omar Bradley own memoirs, the strategy for the Second Army was to draw the German Panzer reserve onto itself and do its upmost to keep them from committing to the American sector of the beachhead. Thus while XXX Corps failed to take Caen it succeeded in this, just as important goal.[24][25][26]

Although some historians do not agree that this was the campaign aims of the 21st Army Group or Montgomery's plan.

[edit] Myths

There are at least two major myths surrounding this operation.

The first is that the right hook around the Panzer Lehr was an attempt to directly take Caen and that this move itself was Operation Perch. Even though the information is out there in the official history, several books and in documents which clearly state to the contory, some authors and especially over the internet the myth still continues.[27][28][29]

The other is that Michael Wittmann himself practically halted the operation with some authors and websites stating that he halted the entire 7th Armoured Division and destroyed as many as 30 tanks. His tally is much lower at 9 tanks, 2 Observation Point tanks (armed with only their machineguns, their main weapon being replaced by a dummy wooden gun) and several halftracks; all but two tanks belonging to the regimental headquarters of the 22nd Armoured Brigade leading regiment.[30]

[edit] References

  • Ashley Hart, Stephen. Colossal Cracks: Montgomery's 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-45, Stackpole Books, (1 Feb 2007), ISBN 0811733831
  • Basley, Oliver. Tilly-sur-Seulles: Un Village au Milieu de l’Historie, Musee de Tilly-sur-Seulles, 2000
  • Bradley, Omar. A Soldiers Story, Random House USA Inc; Modern Library Pbk. Ed edition (15 Jun 1999), ISBN 0375754210
  • Clay, Ewart W. The path of the 50th: The story of the 50th (Northumbrian) Division in the Second World War, Gale and Polden, 1950
  • D'Este, Carlo, Decision in Normandy ISBN-13: 9781861053282
  • Major Ellis, L.F. (Author), (Author), Lt- Col Warhurst, A. E. (Author), Butler, James (Editor). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Official Campaign History, Victory in the West: The Battle of Normandy, Naval & Military Press Ltd (Sep 2004), ISBN 1845740580
  • Forty, George. Battle Zone Normandy: Villers Bocage. Sutton Publishing, London, 2004. ISBN 0750930128
  • Foster, R.C.G. History of The Queens Royal Regiment: Volume VIII 1924-1948, Gale and Polden, 1953
  • Graham, Andrew Sharpshooters at War, The Sharpshooters Regimental Association, 1964
  • Holmes, Richard. Imperial War Museum: The D-Day Experience from the Invasion to the Liberation of Paris: From Operation Overlord to the Liberation of Paris (Imperial War Museum) Carlton Books Ltd; 60th Annv edition (26 April 2004), ISBN 1844428052
  • Isby, David C. Fighting in Normandy: The German Army from D-Day to Villers-Bocage, Greenhill Books, 2001
  • Lindsay, Martin and Johnston, M.E. History of the 7th Armoured Division June 1943 – July 1945 first published by BAOR in 1945, reprinted in 2001 by DP & G for the Tank Museum
  • Montgomery, Bernard L. Normandy to the Baltic, BAOR, 1946
  • Neillands, Robin. The Desert Rats : 7th Armoured Division, 1940-1945, Aurum Press Ltd (29 Aug 2005), ISBN 2913903134
  • Major Ritgen, Helmut. The Western Front 1944, Memoirs of a Panzer Lehr Officer. Fedorowicz (J.J.),Canada (Mar 1996). ISBN 0921991282
  • Taylor, Daniel. Villers-Bocage Through the Lens of the German War Photographer. After the Battle, London 1999, ISBN 187006707X
  • Wilmot, Chester. The Struggle For Europe, Wordsworth Editions Ltd; New Ed edition (25 Sep 1997), ISBN 1853266779

[edit] External links

[edit] Footnotes

  1. ^ Forty, P. 100; Forty states this is the losses during all of June for the 7th Armoured Division and the 50th Infantry Division. Losses for other divisions involved and indy brigades is currently unknown.
  2. ^ Article, [1], claims Panzer Lehr losses during this period to be between 1-5,000 men. Meyer, p. 237. s.SS-Pz. Abt. 101 lost 42 men during this period
  3. ^ Article, [2], claims the Panzer Lehr lost 124 tanks during this period; Forty, p. 65. 101st lost at least 7 Tigers during the fighting at Villers-Bocage.
  4. ^ Forty Pg 139
  5. ^ a b c Major Ellis, Official History, Pg 247
  6. ^ a b c Forty, Pg 36
  7. ^ a b c Ford, Pg 32
  8. ^ WO 171/392
  9. ^ Weigley Pg 109-110
  10. ^ a b Major Ellis, Pg 253
  11. ^ Ashley Hart, Pg 134
  12. ^ Wilmot, Pg 308
  13. ^ 4CLY War Diary, entries following landing in Normandy shows the unit supporting the 50th Infantry Division and then being ordered to flank around the German frontline
  14. ^ Major Ellis, Official History, Pg 252, the official history of the campaign notes that the 7th and 50th divisions were mixed together and fighting north of Tilly
  15. ^ Forty, Pg 48-49 The map which covers these two pages show that several battalions and regiments from the Division were fighting alongside the 50th Division north of Tilly
  16. ^ Major Ellis, Pg 254
  17. ^ Major Clay, Pg 257
  18. ^ Forty, Pg 37
  19. ^ Ashley Hart, Pg 134
  20. ^ a b Forty, Pg 57
  21. ^ [3] SS101 Tiger Information Centre, 101 Battalion unit history
  22. ^ Major Ellis, Official History, Pg 261
  23. ^ Forty Pg 182
  24. ^ Forty, George. Villers-Bocage (Battle Zone Normandy) Sutton Publishing Ltd (22 Jul 2004) Pg 21-22 ISBN 0-75093-012-8
  25. ^ Ashley Hart, Pg 38 – “His theatre strategy for Normandy envisaged a series of holding attacks on the British sector designed to draw the bulk of the Germans forces to that front, thus permitting the Americans to advance West. His approach also strove to keep the initiative, thus forcing the Germans merely to react to Allied moves"
  26. ^ Bradley, Omar. A Soldiers Story Pg 241 - Bradley states: "...the British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front..." and "...while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labours, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race one the alarm was sounded..."
  27. ^ Operation Epsom
  28. ^ Waffen-SS: Villers Bocage, 1944
  29. ^ Villers-Bocage in Normandy 1944
  30. ^ Forty Pg 139