Talk:Omnibenevolence

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I think the 99 names of God in Islam scetion should be moved to an Islam-related page.

[edit] This article

I'm pretty sure the term, and definitely the concept, do not originate in 1980. Omnibenevolence is one of the traditional attributes of the abrahamic God (at least), along with omnipotence and omniscience. Killtacular 17:47, 5 February 2007 (UTC)

A few years ago I noticed the word "omnibenevolent" creeping in to undergraduate essays on the problem of evil; as it doesn't exist, I was surprised, but checked the literature to see where they'd got it from, and couldn't find it anywhere (I suspect it's Web-spawn). it seems to have been invented on the model of "omnipotent" and "omniscient", but whereas they are both clearly perfections (in the original sense of being completed or maximised properties), "benvolence" needs no such qualifier. Nothing in this article justifies the use of the neologism — nothing is said of "omnibenevolent" that couldn't be said of "benevolent". I'd like to make this a redirect to benevolence; can anyone make a case against that? --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 13:18, 4 October 2005 (UTC)


Mel,

I tried the usual Internet encyclopedias like those listed at Meta-Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but I couldn’t come up with anything for “omnibenevolence” or “benevolence”! Then I walked over to the University library to look at some “paper” encyclopedias of philosophy and religion, and came up empty on both terms again! Then the librarian tipped me off to an online database search service available by subscription, “The Philosophers Index.” I finally came up with some hits in “legitimate” sources. Perhaps the assertion that the term, “omnibenevolence” is a “neologism” may be becoming “archaic.” ;-) Consequently, I really don’t support turning this article into a redirect to benevolence. I would prefer some sort of comment about usage of the terms, but I don’t have a strong opinion about what that should say.

Examples of sources that use the term, “omnibenevolence,” follow. — RDF talk 15:42, 4 October 2005 (UTC)

About The Philosopher's Index [1]

"The Philosopher's Index provides indexing and abstracts from books and journals of philosophy and related fields. It covers the areas of ethics, aesthetics, social philosophy, political philosophy, epistemology, and metaphysic logic as well as material on the philosophy of law, religion, science, history, education, and language."

Search on “Omnibenevolence” or “Omnibenevolent” TI: = Title; AU: = Author; SO: = Source; AB: = Abstract

TI: IN WHAT SENSE MUST GOD BE OMNIBENEVOLENT?
AU: BASINGER,-DAVID
SO: International-Journal-for-Philosophy-of-Religion. 1983; 14: 3-16
AB: WHAT ARE GOD'S CREATIVE OBLIGATIONS? I FIRST ARGUE THAT EVEN IF THERE IS NO 'BEST POSSIBLE WORLD', THERE IS STILL A MEANINGFUL SENSE IN WHICH AN OMNIBENEVOLENT GOD IS OBLIGATED TO MAXIMIZE THE QUALITY OF LIFE FOR THOSE BEINGS HE CREATES. I THEN DEFEND THIS CONCEPT OF OMNIBENEVOLENCE AGAINST ROBERT ADAMS' CONTENTION THAT AN OMNIBENEVOLENT GOD NEED ONLY INSURE THAT THE BEINGS HE CREATES LEAD LIVES WHICH ARE ON THE WHOLE WORTH LIVING.

TI: INTRINSIC MAXIMA AND OMNIBENEVOLENCE .
AU: WIERENGA,-EDWARD
SO: International-Journal-for-Philosophy-of-Religion. 1979; 9: 41-50
AB: C D BROAD CLAIMED THAT THE CONCEPT OF THE GREATEST POSSIBLE BEING IS INCOHERENT, SINCE THERE IS NO INTRINSIC MAXIMUM TO A NUMBER OF PROPERTIES MAXIMAL POSSESSION OF WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO BEING THE GREATEST POSSIBLE BEING. IN THIS PAPER A SERIES OF DEFINITIONS IS PROPOSED, CULMINATING IN A DEFINITION OF 'X HAS P TO THE INTRINSIC MAXIMUM IN WORLD W'. A STRATEGY IS SUGGESTED FOR SHOWING THAT A GIVEN PROPERTY HAS AN INTRINSIC MAXIMUM WHICH IS POSSIBLE EXEMPLIFIED. FINALLY, OBJECTIONS ARE RAISED AGAINST WILLIAM MANN'S ATTEMPT ("THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES" "AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY", 1975) TO DEFINE OMNIBENEVOLENCE IN TERMS OF PREFERENCES OVER POSSIBLE WORLDS.

TI: Petitionary Prayer to An Omnipotent and Omnibenevolent God
AU: Masek,-Lawrence
SO: Proceedings-of-the-American-Catholic-Philosophical-Association. 2000; 74: 273-283
AB: This paper argues that the efficacy of petitionary prayer--including prayer for oneself, for others, and through saints--does not contradict the doctrines of divine omnipotence and omnibenevolence . The paper refers to Aquinas and his discussion of divine omnipotence in order to argue that God leaves part of the job of making the world a better place up to creatures by giving them the power to cause goodness in others. It then argues that petitionary prayer allows creatures to exercise that power.

TI: THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.
AU: MANN,-WILLIAM-E
SO: American-Philosophical-Quarterly. AP 75; 12: 151-159
AB: THE CONCEPT OF GOD AS THE GREATEST CONCEIVABLE BEING WOULD BE A LOGICALLY INCOHERENT CONCEPT IF ANY ONE OF THE DEGREED PROPERTIES WHICH CONTRIBUTE ESSENTIALLY TO GOD'S GREATNESS HAS NO "INTRINSIC MAXIMUM." I ARGUE THAT THREE OF THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES--OMNISCIENCE, OMNIPOTENCE, AND OMNIBENEVOLENCE --ARE THE INTRINSIC MAXIMA OF THE DEGREED PROPERTIES OF BEING KNOWLEDGEABLE, BEING POWERFUL, AND BEING BENEVOLENT, RESPECTIVELY. THE CONCEPT OF OMNIBENEVOLENCE IS THE MOST DIFFICULT TO ASSESS. IN ORDER TO DEFINE IT, I INTRODUCE THE NOTION OF ONE POSSIBLE WORLD'S BEING A "BRUNO-IMPROVEMENT" OVER ANOTHER. FINALLY, I DISCUSS SOME OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF MY DEFINITIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF OMNIBENEVOLENCE.

TI: DIVINE PERFECTION.
AU: SCHLESINGER,-GEORGE-N
SO: Religious-Studies. JE 85; 21: 147-158
AB: MANY ARGUMENTS HAVE BEEN ADVANCED TO SHOW THAT THERE ARE CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES WITH A VARIETY OF DIVINE ATTRIBUTES, E.G., THAT THERE IS AN INHERENT INCONSISTENCY IN THE NOTION OF OMNIPOTENCE; THAT OMNIPOTENCE IS LOGICALLY INCOMPATIBLE WITH OMNISCIENCE OR OMNIBENEVOLENCE; THAT OMNISCIENCE IS IRRECONCILABLE WITH IMMUTABILITY, ETC. ALL THESE PROBLEMS DISAPPEAR WHEN WE REALIZE THAT GOD POSSESSES EACH ENNOBLING CHARACTERISTIC TO NO LESS AND TO NO MORE DEGREE THAN TO WHICH IT ENHANCES HIS EXCELLENCE.

TI: The Problem of Evil: A Solution from Science
AU: Williams,-Patricia-A
SO: Zygon-. S 01; 36(3): 563-574
AB: In this essay, I attempt to solve the problem of the existence of evil in a world created by an omniscient, omnibenevolent, omnipotent God. I conclude that evil exists because God wanted to create moral creatures. Because choice is necessary for morality, God created creatures with enormous capacities for choice--and therefore enormous capacities for evil. Material creatures are subject to pain and death because, for such creatures, moral choices are deeply serious. The laws that underlie the material world and from which material life arises are such that, from their workings out on a planet that can support life, natural evils happen.

TI: Can There Be Alternative Concepts of God?
AU: Bishop,-John
SO: Nous-. Je 98; 32(2): 174-188
AB: The question of alternatives to the philosophically dominant concept of God as the omnipotent omnibenevolent creator is raised by means of a "functionalist" approach to (realist) belief in God which reveals criteria for a God-concept to be adequate to the theist tradition. The role of belief in God as warranting certain types of "nontriumphalist" hope is explored. The paper challenges the view that the only way to remain sensibly within the theistic tradition is to adopt an antirealist interpretation of talk about God, and concludes that there are reasonable prospects for a realist radical theology.

TI: FREE WILL, OMNIPOTENCE, AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.
AU: BURGESS-JACKSON,-KEITH
SO: American-Journal-of-Theology-and-Philosophy. S 88; 9: 175-185
AB: How is it possible for an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscent God to coexist with evil? This is the well-known problem of evil (logical version), which I frame by reconstructing J.L. Mackie's 1955 argument. Then I sketch the free-will "solution" to this problem. I argue that postulating freely willing beings solves the problem of evil only if (1) God is at most weakly omnipotent (meaning capable of doing only that which is logically possible) and (2) free will is construed as requiring actual choice (as opposed to the mere possibility of choice). But construing free will as requiring actual choice is problematic for other reasons. I conclude that the problem of evil (logical version) has not been solved.

TI: IN WHAT SENSE MUST GOD DO HIS BEST: A RESPONSE TO HASKER.
AU: BASINGER,-DAVID
SO: International-Journal-for-Philosophy-of-Religion. 1985; 18: 161-164
AB: IN A PREVIOUS ARTICLE, I ARGUED THAT AN OMNIBENEVOLENT BEING MUST DO ALL THAT IT CAN TO MAXIMIZE THE QUALITY OF LIFE FOR ALL INHABITANTS IN ANY WORLD IT CREATES. IN RESPONSE, WILLIAM HASKER ARGUED THAT THIS ETHICAL REQUIREMENT IS TOO STRONG. WE SHOULD, HE BELIEVES, ALLOW THAT GOD CAN PERMIT VERY CONSIDERABLE AMOUNTS OF GRATUITOUS EVIL WHILE PURSUING HIS OVERALL PLAN FOR THE WORLD. IN THE PRESENT ARTICLE, I ARGUE THAT HASKER'S SUGGESTION CREATES MORE PROBLEMS THAN IT RESOLVES.

TI: THE PROBLEM OF DIVINE FREEDOM.
AU: FLINT,-THOMAS-P
SO: American-Philosophical-Quarterly. JL 83; 20: 255-264
AB: THIS ARTICLE NOTES THAT ANSELMIAN LIBERTARIANS--ROUGHLY, THOSE WHO ENDORSE BOTH THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AND THE FREE WILL DEFENCE--FACE A HERETOFORE UNEXPLORED DIFFICULTY: HOW CAN A GOD WHO IS ESSENTIALLY OMNISCIENT AND OMNIBENEVOLENT BE CONSIDERED FREE IN THE LIBERTARIAN SENSE? BY CONSIDERING THE TYPES OF COUNTERFACTUALS REGARDING FREE CREATURELY ACTIONS WITH WHICH GOD MIGHT FIND HIMSELF PRESENTED, IT IS SUGGESTED, THE ANSELMIAN LIBERTARIAN CAN PROVIDE AN ANSWER TO THIS DIFFICULTY.

TI: IN WHAT SENSE MUST GOD BE OMNIBENEVOLENT?
AU: BASINGER,-DAVID
SO: International-Journal-for-Philosophy-of-Religion. 1983; 14: 3-16
AB: WHAT ARE GOD'S CREATIVE OBLIGATIONS? I FIRST ARGUE THAT EVEN IF THERE IS NO 'BEST POSSIBLE WORLD', THERE IS STILL A MEANINGFUL SENSE IN WHICH AN OMNIBENEVOLENT GOD IS OBLIGATED TO MAXIMIZE THE QUALITY OF LIFE FOR THOSE BEINGS HE CREATES. I THEN DEFEND THIS CONCEPT OF OMNIBENEVOLENCE AGAINST ROBERT ADAMS' CONTENTION THAT AN OMNIBENEVOLENT GOD NEED ONLY INSURE THAT THE BEINGS HE CREATES LEAD LIVES WHICH ARE ON THE WHOLE WORTH LIVING.

TI: AN ATHEISTIC ARGUMENT FROM THE IMPROVABILITY OF THE UNIVERSE.
AU: PERKINS,-R-K
SO: Nous-. MY 83; 17: 239-250
AB: THE AUTHOR ATTEMPTS TO REHABILITATE A VERSION OF THE OLD ARGUMENT FROM EVIL SO AS TO MEET VARIOUS OBJECTIONS INCLUDING PLANTINGA'S FREE WILL DEFENSE. THE MAIN IDEA IS THAT THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IS INCOMPATIBLE, NOT WITH THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL, BUT WITH THE IMPROVABILITY OF THE UNIVERSE, I.E., WITH THE FACTS THAT THIS UNIVERSE COULD HAVE BEEN BETTER THAN IT IS AND THAT SUCH IMPROVEMENT COULD HAVE BEEN EFFECTED BY AN OMNIPOTENT, OMNISCIENT, OMNIBENEVOLENT BEING.

TI: CAN GOD DO EVIL?
AU: HOFFMAN,-JOSHUA
SO: Southern-Journal-of-Philosophy. SUM 79; 17: 213-220
AB: THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF GOD SEEMS TO GIVE RISE TO THE FOLLOWING DILEMMA: IF GOD CAN DO EVIL, HE IS NOT OMNIBENEVOLENT, BUT IF HE CANNOT DO EVIL, HE IS NOT OMNIPOTENT. IF WE DENY THE FIRST PREMISE, WE ARE OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT THE TRADITIONAL GOD IS ESSENTIALLY OMNIBENEVOLENT, WHICH IMPLIES IT IS "NOT" WITHIN HIS POWER TO DO EVIL. THUS, TO RESOLVE THE DILEMMA WE MUST DENY THE SECOND PREMISE. THIS WE CAN DO BECAUSE WHEN WE CONSIDER "ALL" OF GOD'S PROPERTIES WE SEE THAT EVIL IS "IMPOSSIBLE" IF HE EXISTS, AND AN OMNIPOTENT BEING IS NONETHELESS OMNIPOTENT FOR BEING UNABLE TO DO THE IMPOSSIBLE.

TI: CACODAEMONY.
AU: CAHN,-STEVEN-M
SO: Analysis-. JA 77; 37: 69-73
AB: THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IS: COULD A WORLD CONTAINING EVIL HAVE BEEN CREATED BY AN OMNIPOTENT, OMNISCIENT, OMNIBENEVOLENT BEING? THE PROBLEM OF GOODNESS IS: COULD A WORLD CONTAINING GOODNESS HAVE BEEN CREATED BY AN OMNIPOTENT, OMNISCIENT, OMNIMALEVOLENT BEING? THEODICY ATTEMPTS TO VINDICATE THE GOODNESS OF GOD IN THE FACE OF EVIL. CACODAEMONY ATTEMPTS TO VINDICATE THE MALEVOLENCE OF A DEMON IN THE FACE OF GOODNESS. I ARGUE THAT BOTH ATTEMPTS FAIL FOR ANALOGOUS REASONS. IN PARTICULAR, I CONSTRUCT A CACODAEMONY ALONG THE IDENTICAL LINES OF THE THEODICY CONSTRUCTED BY JOHN HICK, AND THE WEAKNESSES OF BOTH THESE CONSTRUCTIONS ARE DEMONSTRATED.

TI: The Argument from Unfairness
AU: Schoenig,-Richard
SO: International-Journal-for-Philosophy-of-Religion. Ap 99; 45(2): 115-128
AB: According to reward/punishment theology, God rewards and punishes humans according to how well they live in conformance with His will. Reward/punishment theology gives rise to a question about the postmortem fate of humans who die without reaching moral accountability. Four interpretations of reward/punishment theology describe theists' most common answers to this question. The argument from unfairness aims to demonstrate that God would act unfairly in determining the postmortem fate of humans according to any of the four reward/punishment theology interpretations. This unfairness would compromise God's omnibenevolence. Hence, the argument from Unfairness concludes that no God exists who is associated with reward/punishment theology.

TI: In Defense of Secular Humanism
AU: Grunbaum,-Adolf
SO: Free-Inquiry. Fall 92; 12(4): 30-39
AB: Prompted by recent attacks on secular humanism made in the political arena in the USA, this paper examines the conceptual relations between the theological and moral components of theistic creeds. It argues that theism is morally sterile as such no less than atheism as such is morally barren. Thus, neither doctrine itself imposes any concrete prohibitions on human conduct. The doctrine of divine omnibenevolence is shockingly permissible morally, to the point of sanctioning the justice of the Holocaust. There is no morally asymmetry between theism and atheism.

TI: Seymour Cain's Jeremiad: A Rejoinder
AU: Grunbaum,-Adolf
SO: Free-Inquiry. Wint 93-94; 14(1): 58-62
AB: Seymour Cain's critical response ("Free Inquiry", vol.14, No. 1, 1993/1994) to the author's "In Defense of Secular Humanism" prompted this Rejoinder. Now the author argues that Cain did not come to grips with his contention that the notion of divine omnibenevolence is "shockingly permissive", to the point of sanctioning the justice of the Holocaust. Indeed, some world-renowned orthodox rabbis have offered Holocaust theodicies, which are abominable.

TI: Omnibenevolence, Omnipotence, and God's Ability to Do Evil
AU: Tierno,-Joel-Thomas
SO: Sophia-. S-O 97; 36(2): 1-11

TI: OMNIBENEVOLENCE AND EVIL.
AU: FLEMMING,-ARTHUR
SO: Ethics-. JA 86; 96: 261-281


  • Well, I could say (with some justification) that the usage seems to be limited to a certain area of the literature, but I'll accept that it's becoming more used. I still hold that it means no more than "benevolence", though, so that the article should redirect to benevolence, and a note about the alternative usage be added there.
  • Benevolence#Definition, "Benevolence characterises the true goodness of the mind, the unbiased kindness to do good. It confers thought and regard for the welfare of other people, and finds expression in sympathy and kindly gentleness and compassion, with charitableness and kindness. A weak Benevolence stands for little, if any, thought or regard for others, and a tendency to help oneself, in neglect of others." After reading this, I'm hard pressed to agree this remotely reflects an attribute of an Absolute Supreme Being. I still don't support redirecting this article. — RDF talk 16:42, 4 October 2005 (UTC)
  • But this is odd — for centuries (and continuing in most work today) philosophers and theologians have used "benevolence" to refer to god — I've just gone through many of the books on my own shelf (I teach and write on the philosophy of religion, so I have rather a lot), and failed to find a single use of "omnibenevolence". Even if it's used by a few writers – even if its use is increasing – it's difficult to see how it does anything that "benevolence" doesn't, or on what grounds you think that all that history of philosophy and theology had been making an obvious mistake. --Mel Etitis (Μελ Ετητης) 07:10, 5 October 2005 (UTC)
  • If you update the Benevolence article so that it conveys something more than a state of mind for human beings - that it is a fundamental attribute of the Absolute Supreme Being - I'll withdraw my objection. Otherwise, that term clearly is "limited" as it is defined there. Also, since I've established Omnibenevolence is something more than a simple case of "Web spawn," I reserve the right to use that term as well. ;-) — RDF talk 11:29, 5 October 2005 (UTC)

Omnibenevolence does seem to be a new word. Its is not indeed to be found in Summa Theologica or works I have see of that time frame. The closest I can see to that word is the phrase summum bonum. Usually translated as supremely good. For example in Augustine's city of God, book twelve,chapter 3 Augustine writes "Can anybody deny that god is supremely good?".
Summum bonum.

Anslem deals with the concept of God's supreme goodness in his Monologian, since concepts like good can have differing levels, such a concept has its higest attainable level of good that must be an attribute belonging solely to god, the highest existance. Here would be the attempt to associate god with maximum good explicitly, and an attempt to prove it logically also.

But I suspect the root of concept goes back to Plato who asserted the gods are good. Epicurus is credited with the problem of evil which seems to be misquoted widely everywhere, God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent. Actually the correct quotation is gods, not god, but I do not know what words he used that are usually translated omnipotent. I would not be surprised if it was summum bonum, and by Augustine's time was meant in that fashion, all good, doing no moral evil. I suspect the word omnibenevolent was coined because it was more emphatic than such phrases as supremely good.
It also may have grown out of the allied concept of god's perfection.
W.C. Barwell

[edit] Etymology of Omnibenevolence

The first instance I can find for usage of this word in the English language is in "Atheism: The Case Against God (Skeptic's Bookshelf) by George H. Smith (Prometheus Books; 1st Paperback Ed edition (June 1980))" It looks increasingly likely that the author may have just made up this word in order to create a straw man arguement. I can't even find Church usage for it. He has no cite for it either which is odd considering the amount of citations he does use. I am skeptical that it is even a real word. It might even be impossible which is exactly what Smith ends up concluding hence the straw man arguement(Simonapro 21:04, 22 August 2006 (UTC))

Somebody thought this a POV violation. The reference is there as Smith, George H. "Atheism: The Case Against God'" (Skeptic's Bookshelf) Prometheus Books (June 1980). If you can find the word or phrase being used before that then the cite is wrong but you need to WP:CITE the use of the phrase or word before and outside of Smith's work. (Simonapro 18:51, 22 October 2006 (UTC))

  • I'm not sure what "popular dictionaries" we're using here, but the Oxford English Dictionary has an entry for 'omnibenevolence.' First use: "1679 W. PENN Addr. Protestants II. 182 What an Omniscient and Omnipotent God did know and could do for Man's Salvation, an *Omnibenevolent God..would certainly have done." Maybe this article could use some major revision? (Tweedy7736 06:45, 13 December 2006 (UTC))
  • Furthermore, I don't think that Smith's conclusion that omnibenevolence is "illogical and impossible" has much bearing on whether or not it's a word in the first place. Remember, his book is titled Atheism and the Case Against God… In any case, I'm taking this bit out now. (Tweedy7736 06:50, 13 December 2006 (UTC))

[edit] Controversy???

I deleted the controversy section. Omnibenevolence is not an atheist invention, it is used by many Christian philosophers of religion; I included a few authors, but the list is so ridiculously long to include here. Therefore I ask instead, are there any sources that question the validity of this term, or is this objection to a perfectly valid term in the philosophy of religion just based on original research? --Merzul 18:04, 24 February 2007 (UTC)

Anyway, I over-reacted a bit, but here is my understanding of the issue. Omnibenevolence can be understood as whatever properties of God that would seem contradictory with the existence of evil. Basically its just a convenient term to avoid dealing with intricate details of theology and focus on the philosophical arguments. One could call this a straw man, but then, even terms like omnipotence and omniscience require more careful understanding. I think in the very technical discussion on the problem of evil, the term omnibenevolence is properly understood by both sides; and they can focus on discussing its implications. Outside such contexts, I can fully agree that the use of this term is inappropriate. --Merzul 11:53, 27 February 2007 (UTC)
It does not appear in modern dictionaries. Oxford seems to have included it but I would like to know when they added it. It doesn't appear to have any Catholic usage. It seems to have some usuage by a Protestant in 1697. Smith does not cite a source for it. If you have other publications that source it then that would be much better. Right now if they don't source it I would suspect that these comments in other publication are a knee-jerk response to the Smith critic rather than an actual examination of the term. The historical record for the term pre-1980, I feel, is poor at best. I still think that the fact that it does not appear in popular dictionaries makes it highly suspect. (Runwiththewind 21:53, 28 February 2007 (UTC))
Still, the people who use this term are not exactly amateurs, the whole Catholic and Protestant issue is irrelevant to modern usage. This is a term that should never be used in theology; it has a limited and I think precisely understood meaning in the philosophy of religion; e.g. like this. In any case, the cited sources are Oxford and Cambridge University Press monographs, these are hardly knee-jerk responses to Smith. Still, this article could be moved to something like "perfect goodness", as in the phrase "all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good". I think this is how most sources introduce the problem of evil. --Merzul 22:32, 28 February 2007 (UTC)

I edited the lead section now to say that even in philosophical context, the phrases "perfect goodness" are preferred; but note that we don't have any sources for this linguistic analysis. This is all based on my web search and by looking at books. All we know is that many notable philosophers do use the term, and well I don't think that anyone would disagree that the other more precise phrases are preferred. I will just add one citation for the use of the term "perfect goodness". --Merzul 23:17, 28 February 2007 (UTC)

I really can't say more than the etymology is suspect which is probably the reason why it lacks representation in popular dictionaries. The Catholic example is important because we are saying that the world-wide global Christian Church with a historical record that runs right through to today, does not appear to use it or even make statements on it. It appears first, as you point out, in parts of Protestant reformed theology which appears to be very limited. In terms of the philosophical context you mention, fine, we can attribute the condition to a person by saying that somebody is never bad or something hypothetical like that. In fact it seems that the term has very little to do with God or theology except that some theological characters, such as some Prophets and some Saints can be part of those people who are not bad. I suppose God can be added to that too. Its the OMNI part that probably sounds more God-ish that what the term actually really implies. (Runwiththewind 18:28, 4 March 2007 (UTC))