Kalam cosmological argument

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The Kalām cosmological argument is a more contemporary version of the cosmological argument derived from the Islamic Kalam form of dialectical argument.[citation needed] . It attempts to prove the existence of God by appealing to the principle of universal cause. Similar arguments are found in the theologies of Judaism (for example, in the work of Maimonides) and Christianity (for example in Thomas Aquinas), where it is known as the "uncaused cause" or "first cause" argument.

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[edit] The argument

Christian philosopher and apologist William Lane Craig has recently revived the argument and formulates it as follows:

Premise 1: Everything that begins to exist has a cause.

Premise 2: The universe began to exist.

Conclusion 1: Therefore, the universe must have a cause.

Craig asserts that the first premise is "relatively uncontroversial". He defines "begins to exist" as "comes into being," and argues that we know from metaphysical intuition that things don't just pop into being uncaused. According to Craig, this establishes premise 1.

The second premise is usually supported by the following argument:

  1. An actual infinite cannot exist.
  2. A beginningless series of events is an actual infinite.
  3. Therefore, the universe cannot have existed infinitely in the past, as that would be a beginningless series of events.

According to some authors, the definition of an actual infinite comes from set theory. However, there is little doubt that the concept of the actual infinite reached Arab scholars through the works of Aristotle. Aristotle's own account of actuality vs. potentiality is a fundamental part of his metaphysics. As actuality is often interpreted as the fulfillment of being, it is a short step in reasoning to reach the position that there is no actual being of infinite processes. The possibility of an actual infinite is often disputed, and is the focal point of this argument.

Craig describes the impossibility of an actual infinite like an endless bookcase. For example, imagine a bookcase that extends infinitely on which there is an infinite number of books, colored green and red, green and red, and so on. Obviously there would be an infinite number of books. But imagine you remove all red colored books. How many are left? An infinite number. Thus infinity divided by two equals infinity, which is illogical given standard definitions of division on finite, nonzero numbers (however, see Georg Cantor's analysis of infinities). Craig thus attempts to show that infinity, as he defines it, cannot be applied to operations in the world. One can imagine taking a finger and passing an infinite number of dimensionless points on a ruler from one end to the other, but time is not dimensionless or imaginary. According to Craig, there cannot be an infinite number of past events, because one cannot traverse an infinite set of events.

In summary, the Kalam Cosmological Argument rests on the premise that the universe is not infinite in the past, but had a finite beginning which necessitates a cause for its existence.

[edit] Objections and analysis

A more concise expression of this argument is known as the argument from contingency, which found recent articulation by the late Mortimer Adler. In any form this argument has its ultimate origin in Aristotle whose expression of the argument was reconstituted by Maimonides and Aquinas for their respective monotheisms as well as by Ibn Russhd (Averroes) for Islam during a time in history when each of these faith systems had to come to grips with the intellectually modernizing effects of Aristotlean thought.

An answer to the argument is to apply the Kalam argument itself to any case for a divinity: if a divine being exists, then by Premise 1 of the argument, that being must have a cause. This leads to an infinite regression of causes, which undermines the use of this argument to support the existence of one or more supreme divine beings. Bertrand Russell in his collection "Why I Am Not A Christian" raises this point. This argument is commonly answered by the fact that the creator of the universe does not conform to Premise 1, because the creator is either defined or proven to be infinite by the argument's proponent. What is being assumed here is that the existence of something which is infinite, "outside of time" or which "had no beginning" is not in need of any explanation. Were this the case, we could explain the existence of the universe by proposing the complex set of processes that caused it were outside of time, whatever they were, and be done with it. There are two fatal objections to this: 1) the existence of a set of process complex and specific enough to create a functioning universe are most certainly in need of an explanation, outside of time or not, and 2) there is no reason these processes need to resemble the God of the Abrahamic belief systems. In fact, if the Kalam cosmological argument were correct, all it would prove is that the origin of the universe was outside of time. It is therefore not an argument for the existence of the Abrahamic God at all.

One challenge to the argument would be to question why the first premise is the most natural to come out of the normal laws and practical experience of causation. One could build similar arguments from any number of inferences from the human experience of causality and reach different conclusions: the Universe does not have a cause (causation requires antecedence) or God, or any cause for the Universe, requires a cause (any thing that exists has a cause). There is no self-evident justification for accepting the validity of the Kalam argument's first premise than any other similar supposition one might make. Indeed there are arguments that could be made against it: a beginning is only has bearing on causal matters as a guarantee of antecedence - there could be gradual processes that have no defined beginning, yet allow for antecedence, and still require causation. These objections, though not logically demonstrating the argument as invalid, reduces the force of the argument as a whole considerably.

Another challenge to the argument would be to question whether finite objects can self-cause. Philosopher Quentin Smith states that "the universe...both caused itself to exist and caused the later states of the universe to exist."[1] He says that the whole universe does not need an extra cause; if all parts of the universe cause each other to exist, that logically implies that the whole exists. Smith claims that "the first state of the universe consists of an indefinitely or infinitely long chain of simultaneous events that are causally connected to each other." This view may rely on two controversial concepts: that of a physically existing actual infinite; and that of a cause simultaneous with its effect.

The Big Bang theory, though generally held to be committed to a finite age of the universe, does not commit to a view of infinity that supports the Kalam argument. Mathematical models of the Big Bang generally end in a singularity that has a location in time that is a finite distance from any given event. However, there is also an infinite number of events between this singularity and any given point. This behavior of space and time is allowed by the differential geometry and topology underlying general relativity, the physical theory on which the Big Bang theory is based. Additionally, some Big Bang models are infinite in spatial extent or have an infinitely long past, such as some models devised by Georges Lemaître or Sir Arthur Eddington. However, as Phillip James Edwin Peebles writes, in his "Principles of Physical Cosmology" as well as other publications, the Big Bang theory does not really concern itself with universal origins (cosmogony).

Another objection concerns whether or not the Kalam argument's conclusion, "the universe must have a cause," points to the existence of God. That is, why must the cause of the universe, if there is one, be God? This objection does not question the validity of the syllogism itself, but of the soundness of its application to infer theism based solely on the underlying validity.

For example, while ordinary cosmology does not contemplate universal origins, there are scientific approaches to universal origins that seek a "mechanism" for that origin. No assumption is made that the mechanism is supernatural in a spiritual sense or otherwise Divine. Thus, when we consider the possible varieties of unknown mechanisms extant either (a) at the original Planck time that brought about cosmic inflation or the Big Bang or alternatively (b) we postulate other universes existing in branes that spread apart, then come back together again, collide and create new universes or (c) we postulate that there are simply many universes, one of which is our own, existing unaware of each other on some sort of inter-universal substance, itself not subject to our universe's laws - in all such cases, we are postulating a naturalistic dualism, in contrast to the supernatural dualism required to presume the Divinity of the original uncaused cause.

Thus it is possible to preserve the original dualism of both the standard cosmological argument (minus theistic extensions to input the "Prime Mover" with the quality of Divinity) as well as its Kalam form, without appeal to the supernatural. Each of these cosmological hypotheses assumes that the natural, human-experienced universe, experienced by the five senses, consisting minimally of 3 spatial dimensions and a fourth time dimension, is of one "natural" "substance" or "essence", and then goes on to postulate an alternative substance, whether that substance is a mechanism, force, set of super-universal laws or conditions, but in any case a substance that exists outside the experience of the 5 senses. The substance can be said to be "supernatural" but is in no sense "spiritual" in character; but it is, nonetheless, fundamentally dualist, in perfect logical parallel to the cosmological argument.

Craig responds to objections that strip the divine from the Kalam argument by stating that, "the simple syllogism lying at the heart of the Kalam cosmological argument should be supplemented by a conceptual analysis of what it is to be a cause of the universe, an exercise which serves to recover many of the traditional divine attributes." [2] However, it is not clear how this addresses the mechanisms proposed by the cosmological hypotheses above.

We may conclude that true or not, the Kalam cosmological argument as a case for dualism, whether a natural or supernatural dualism, appears to meet the criteria of being a valid syllogism: its conclusions of a dualistic non-natural source of origin for the universe are validly drawn from its premises. That leaves for people to disagree with its soundness on account that one or more of its premises are false, or to agree that it is both valid and sound. For those who accept that the syllogism is both valid and sound, it still remains a subject of considerable and perfectly legitimate debate whether one is led from there to belief in a Divinity of any kind. Neither empirical data nor logic force either conclusion.

[edit] Further reading

  • Derrick Abdul-Hakim. God's Paradox: A Comment on William Lane Craig's Cosmological Argument (2006) Presented at San Jose State University Philosophy Conference
  • Imran Aijaz. Does God Exist?(Debate with Bill Cooke) (2002)

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