Iraq Resolution

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Not to be confused with Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists.
Not to be confused with Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 1991.

"Iraq Resolution" and "Iraq War Resolution" are popular names for the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,[1] a joint resolution (i.e. a law) passed by the United States Congress in October 2002 as Public Law No: 107-243, authorizing the Iraq War.

Contents

[edit] Contents

The resolution cited many factors to justify the use of military force against Iraq:

The resolution "supported" and "encouraged" diplomatic efforts by President Bush to "strictly enforce through the U.N. Security Council all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" and "obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion, and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq."

The resolution authorized President Bush to use the Armed Forces of the United States "as he determines to be necessary and appropriate" in order to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq."

[edit] Passage

The authorization was sought by President George W. Bush. Introduced as H.J.Res. 114[2] (Public Law 107–243), it passed the House on Thursday afternoon at 3:05 PM EDT on October 10, 2002 by a vote of 296-133,[3] and passed the Senate after midnight early Friday morning at 12:50 AM EDT on October 11, 2002 by a vote of 77-23.[4] It was signed into law by President Bush on October 16, 2002.

United States House of Representatives

Party Ayes Nays PRES No Vote
Republican 215 6 0 2
Democratic 81 126 0 1
Independent 0 1 0 0
TOTALS 296 133 0 3

United States Senate

Party Ayes Nays No Vote
Republican 48 1 0
Democratic 29 21 0
Independent 0 1 0
TOTALS 77 23 0

[edit] Amendments Offered to the House Resolution

[edit] The Spratt Amendment

Required U.N. Security Council authorization for any use of force against Iraq. In the event that the Security Council would not authorize use of force, the President would be required to come back to Congress for a second vote before acting unilaterally. Sponsored by Rep. John Spratt (D-SC).

Defeated 155 - 270.

[edit] The Lee Amendment

Urged the President to work through the United Nations to resolve the dispute peacefully. Sponsored by Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA).

Defeated 72 - 355.[5]

[edit] Amendments Offered to the Senate Resolution

[edit] The Byrd Amendment

Affirmed that no additional constitutional authority was being ceded to the President outside of that necessary to deal with the threat posed by Iraq[citation needed]. Sponsored by Sen. Robert Byrd (D-WV)

Defeated 14 - 86.

[edit] The Levin Amendment

Urged to U.N. Security Council to adopt a resolution demanding that Iraq grant immediate and unconditional access to U.N. weapons inspectors. Authorized U.S. use of force only if Iraq failed to comply with the U.N. resolution. Sponsored by Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI)

Defeated 24 - 75.

[edit] The Durbin Amendment

Restricted the use of force authorization to cover only an immediate threat from Iraq rather than a continuing threat. Sponsored by Sen. Dick Durbin (D-IL).

Defeated 30 - 70.

[edit] Criticism

Main article: Legitimacy of the 2003 invasion of Iraq

[edit] Weapons of Mass Destruction and Al-Qaeda

Further information: Iraq and weapons of mass destruction and Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda
Colin Powell holding a model vial of anthrax while giving a presentation to the United Nations Security Council.
Colin Powell holding a model vial of anthrax while giving a presentation to the United Nations Security Council.

Two of the arguments used to justify the invasion of Iraq — the capability to produce and/or the possession of weapons of mass destruction and active links to al Qaeda — have been found to be incorrect according to all subsequent official reports.[6][7][8] The post-invasion Duelfer Report stated that Hussein had still not given up on trying to produce WMD in 2003. His strategy was to first bring UN sanctions to an end by demonstrating that he was cooperating with weapons inspectors and, once sanctions were lifted, to then revive Iraq's WMD program, including nuclear weapons.[9] The report also stated that Hussein did not want to appear weak. To deter his enemies, he intentionally deceived the world into thinking he still had WMD. There was a "balancing act" between cooperating with the UN and keeping a "strategic deterrent".[10]

A 2007 report by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, declassified and released at the request of Senator Carl M. Levin (D-Mich), asserted that the claims of an operational working relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, as put forth by a key Pentagon office in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq, were based on dubious or unconfirmed reports.[11] President Bush has, since the invasion of Iraq, explicitly stated that that country was not involved in 9-11, which has also been concluded by subsequent reports,[12] and any alleged contacts with al-Qaeda were in areas outside of Saddam Hussein's control. Also, the day before she voted on the resolution, Senator Clinton said during a speech on the Senate floor that there was no dispute that Hussein was not involved in the September 11th attacks.[13] Neverless, BBC News, The Christian Science Monitor, the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Institute for Public Accuracy, and Media Matters for America contend that members of the administration repeatedly over the years made suggestive statements with the implied message there was a link between Saddam Hussein and the attacks.

[14]

The Bush administration initially suggested the discrepancy between the allegations and the subsequent findings was due to failure by the intelligence community. However, it became apparent that, prior to the invasion, these arguments had already been widely disputed,[15] which had purportedly been reported to the U.S. administration. An in-depth investigation into the nature of these discrepancies by the Senate Intelligence Committee was frustrated according to the New York Times.[16] The Robb-Silberman Commission stated that the President's Daily Briefs from the intelligence community tended to repeat information in a misleading way. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) provided to Congress was more "nuanced" and less "alarmist" than information given to the President.[17] However, the vast majority of Senators did not read the NIE and relied on briefings by the administration. Among those who have stated they did not read the NIE and voted positively for the Iraq Resolution are Democratic Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, Republican Presidential candidate John McCain, and former Senator John Edwards.[18]

The assertion such weapons posed a threat towards the U.S. was not supported by the available evidence at the time, according to subsequent reports.[19] The Bush administration asserted that two small trailers that had been found in Iraq were "weapons factories," despite the fact that U.S. intelligence officials possessed evidence to the contrary at that time.[20] Weapon inspectors were given access to the alleged weapon factories, despite statements to the contrary by the Bush administration. Continuing these inspections was made impossible by the U.S. led invasion of Iraq which forced the U.N. inspectors out while ignoring their requests for more time.[21]

Skeptics argue that the administration knowingly distorted intelligence reports or ignored contrary information in constructing their case for the war.[22][23] The Downing Street memo and the Bush-Blair memo are used to substantiate that allegation.[24] Congressional Democrats sponsored both a request for documents and a resolution of inquiry.[25]

[edit] Legality

Main article: Legality of the Iraq War

[edit] International law

Further information: United Nations Charter and International law

Debate about the legality of the 2003 invasion of Iraq under international law centers around ambiguous language in parts of UN Resolution 1441 (2002).[26] The UN Charter prohibits any war unless it is out of self-defense or when it is sanctioned by the UN security council. If these requirements are not met international law describes it a war of aggression.[27]

The position of the US and UK is that the invasion was authorized by a series of UN resolutions dating back to 1990. Resolution 1441 declared that Iraq was in "material breach" of the cease-fire under UN Resolution 687 (1991), which required cooperation with weapons inspectors. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that under certain conditions, a party may invoke a "material breach" to suspend a multilateral treaty. Thus, the US and UK claim that they used their right to suspend the cease-fire in Resolution 687 and to continue hostilities against Iraq under the authority of UN Resolution 678 (1990), which originally authorized the use of force after Iraq invaded Kuwait.[28] This is the same argument that was used for Operation Desert Fox in 1998.[29] They also contend that, while Resolution 1441 required the UNSC to assemble and assess reports from the weapons inspectors, it was not necessary for the UNSC to reach an agreement on the course of action. If, at that time, it was determined that Iraq breached Resolution 1441, the resolution did not "constrain any member state from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq".[30]

It remains unclear whether any party other than the Security Council can make the determination that Iraq breached Resolution 1441, as UN members commented that it is not up to one member state to interpret and enforce UN resolutions for the entire council.[31] In addition, other nations have stated that a second resolution was required to initiate hostilities.[32] John Conyers, Robert Parry and Marjorie Cohn assert that the Iraq war was a violation of the U.N. Charter and as such a war of aggression (a crime against peace) and therefore a war crime.[33] Kofi Annan too has said the war in Iraq is an "illegal act that contravened the UN charter."[34] Some scholars, including Columbia law professor Michael Dorf, have argued that treaties are binding on the U.S. under international law.[35]

[edit] U.S. law

Further information: Doe v. Bush, US Constitution, and US law

In early 2003, the Iraq Resolution was challenged in court to stop the invasion from happening. The plaintiffs argued that the President does not have the authority to declare war. The final decision came from a three-judge panel from the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit which dismissed the case. Judge Lynch wrote in the opinion that the Judiciary cannot intervene unless there is a fully-developed conflict between the President and Congress or if Congress gave the President "absolute discretion" to declare war.[36]

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (pdf)
  2. ^ H.J.RES 114
  3. ^ 107th Congress-2nd Session 455th Roll Call Vote of by members of the House of Representatives
  4. ^ 107th Congress-2nd Session 237th Roll Call Vote by members of the Senate
  5. ^ On Agreeing to the Lee of California Substitute Amendment
  6. ^ No weapons of mass destruction
  7. ^ No relation between Saddan Jussein and al-Qaeda
  8. ^ Link with Al Qaeda
  9. ^ Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD: Volume 1; Regime Strategic Intent Page 1. "Key Findings". Retrieved 8/31/2007. "He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections—to gain support for lifting sanctions—with his intention to preserve Iraq’s intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face." "Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities."
  10. ^ Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD: Volume 1; Regime Strategic Intent Page 34. "WMD Possession—Real or Imagined—Acts as a Deterrent". Retrieved 8/31/2007. "In order to counter these threats, Saddam continued with his public posture of retaining the WMD capability. This led to a difficult balancing act between the need to disarm to achieve sanctions relief while at the same time retaining a strategic deterrent. The Regime never resolved the contradiction inherent in this approach. Ultimately, foreign perceptions of these tensions contributed to the destruction of the Regime."
  11. ^ Hussein's Prewar Ties To Al-Qaeda Discounted - Pentagon Report Says Contacts Were Limited By R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, April 6, 2007
  12. ^ Key Bush Intelligence Briefing Kept From Hill Panel By Murray Waas, National Journal, November 22, 2005
  13. ^ Floor Speech of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton 10/10/2002. Retrieved 9/1/2007. "Now, I believe the facts that have brought us to this fateful vote are not in doubt. <...> He has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including Al Qaeda members, though there is apparently no evidence of his involvement in the terrible events of September 11, 2001. <...> Now this much is undisputed."
  14. ^ Linking Iraq and September 11
  15. ^ Blowing Cheney's Cover Ray McGovern, April 10, 2006
  16. ^ The Intelligence Business editorial, The New York Times, May 7, 2006
  17. ^ Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction: Overview Page 14. 3/31/2005. Retrieved 9/1/2007. "As problematic as the October 2002 NIE was, it was not the Community’s biggest analytic failure on Iraq. Even more misleading was the river of intelligence that flowed from the CIA to top policymakers over long periods of time—in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and in its more widely distributed companion, the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB). These daily reports were, if anything, more alarmist and less nuanced than the NIE."
  18. ^ Few senators read Iraq NIE report The Hill (newspaper) Published 6/19/2007. Retrieved 9/1/2007. "'It’s probably pretty hard to say with 100 percent certainty how many read it,' the senior staffer said. 'You can say with 100 percent certainty that it’s less than 10.'"
  19. ^ Decoding Mr. Bush's Denials The New York Times Editorial, November 15, 2005
  20. ^ Lacking Biolabs, Trailers Carried Case for War By Joby Warrick, The Washington Post, April 12, 2006
  21. ^ Weapons inspectors
  22. ^ Selectively disseminating information
  23. ^ Misrepresenting the facts surrounding Iraq
  24. ^ Downing Street memo
  25. ^ FOIA request
  26. ^ World Press: "The United Nations, International Law, and the War in Iraq" Retrieved 9/5/2007. "Resolution 1441 ultimately passed—by a vote of 15-0—because its ambiguous wording was able to placate all parties. <...> Resolution 1441 is ambiguous in two important ways. The first deals with who can determine the existence of a material breach. The second concerns whether another resolution, explicitly authorizing force, is needed before military action against Iraq may be taken."
  27. ^ Iraq impeachable offense?
  28. ^ ASIL: Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq's Final Opportunity to Comply with Disarmament Obligations November, 2002. Retrieved 9/5/2007. "The language of 'material breach' in Resolution 1441 is keyed to Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is the authoritative statement of international law regarding material breaches of treaties. Under Article 60 of the Vienna Convention, a material breach is an unjustified repudiation of a treaty or the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of a treaty. Article 60 provides that a party specially affected by a material breach of a multilateral treaty may invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting state. <...> Security Council Resolution 687, adopted at the end of the Gulf War, includes a provision declaring a formal cease-fire between Iraq, Kuwait and the member states (such as the United States) cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with Resolution 678 (1990). Resolution 678 authorized member states to use all necessary means to restore international peace and security in the area, and thus provided the basis under international law for the allies' military action in the Gulf War. The determination in Resolution 1441 that Iraq is already in material breach of its obligations under Resolution 687 provides a basis for the decision in paragraph 4 (above) of Resolution 1441 that any further lack of cooperation by Iraq will be a further material breach. If Iraq, having confirmed its intention to comply with Resolution 1441, then fails to cooperate fully with the inspectors, it would open the way to an argument by any specially affected state that it could suspend the operation of the cease-fire provision in Resolution 687 and rely again on Resolution 678."
  29. ^ World Press: "The United Nations, International Law, and the War in Iraq" Retrieved 9/5/2007. "[On Dec. 16, 1998], U.S. and British warplanes launched air strikes against Iraq after learning that Iraq was continuing to impede the work of UNSCOM, the weapons inspectors sent to Iraq at the close of the Gulf War, and thus was not in compliance with Resolution 687. When the Security Council met that night to discuss whether individual member states could resort to force without renewed Security Council consent, it was clear that the Security Council members did not all agree on the legality of the U.S. and British resort to force. According to the press release from that meeting, the U.S. representative claimed his country's actions were authorized by previous council resolutions (as many in the Bush administration are arguing again today). The British delegate similarly argued that because Iraq had not complied with the terms of Resolution 687, military force was justified."
  30. ^ World Press: "The United Nations, International Law, and the War in Iraq" Retrieved 9/5/2007. "At that time, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. John Negroponte said: 'This resolution contains no 'hidden triggers' and no 'automaticity' with respect to the use of force. If there is a further Iraqi breach, reported to the council by UNMOVIC, the IAEA, or a Member State, the matter will return to the council for discussion….[But] if the Security Council fails to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violations, this resolution does not constrain any member state from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq or to enforce the relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security.' The British ambassador, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, agreed."
  31. ^ US not allowed to speak for the entire council
  32. ^ ASIL: Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq's Final Opportunity to Comply with Disarmament Obligations November, 2002. Retrieved 9/5/2007. "[T]he representative of Mexico (a current member of the Security Council) said after the vote on Resolution 1441 that the use of force is only valid as a last resort and with prior, explicit authorization from the Council. Mexico does not stand alone in taking that position. <...> It would be argued that, in light of the emphasis in the Charter on peaceful dispute settlement, Resolution 678 could not be used as an authorization for the use of force after twelve years of cease fire, unless the Security Council says so."
  33. ^ War of aggression
  34. ^ Iraq war illegal, says Annan BBC News, September 16, 2004
  35. ^ WHEN AMERICAN STATES EXECUTE CITIZENS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES: The Case of Gerardo Valdez By MICHAEL C. DORF, FindLaw, July 24, 2001
  36. ^ Doe v. Bush Opinion by Judge Lynch 3/13/2003 Pages 3,4,23,25,26. Retrieved 8/7/2007.

[edit] External links

  • Floor speeches