History of Brazil (1964–1985)
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The period between 1964 and 1985 of the Brazilian history was popularly[who?] known as the "lead years " ("anos de chumbo") due to the military dictatorship that followed the 1964 Brazilian coup d'état. It began with the sequence of events known as the 1964 Brazilian coup d'état on April 1, 1964, and officially ended with the inauguration of President José Sarney on March 15, 1985.
[edit] Divisions within the officer corps
Right after the April 1 coup, the army did not find any civilian politician acceptable to all the factions that supported the ouster of João Goulart. On April 15, 1964, fifteen days after the coup, the army chief of staff, Marshal Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco became the appointed president, with the intention of overseeing a reform of the political-economic system. He refused to remain in power beyond the remainder of Goulart's term or to institutionalize the military in power. However, competing demands radicalized the situation; military hard-liners wanted a complete purge of left-wing and populist influences, while civilian politicians obstructed Castello Branco's reforms. The latter accused him of hard-line actions to achieve his objectives, and the former criticized him for not being hard enough. To satisfy the military hard-liners, he recessed and purged Congress, removed objectionable state governors, and decreed the expansion of the president's (and by extension, the military's) arbitrary powers at the expense of the legislative and judiciary branches. His gamble succeeded in giving him the latitude to repress the populist left but provided the follow-on governments of Artur da Costa e Silva (1967–69) and Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969–74) with a legal basis for authoritarian rule.
Castelo Branco in his own right tried to maintain a degree of democracy. His economic reforms were credited as paving the way for a Brazilian economic "miracle" of the next decade, and his restructuring of the party system that had existed since 1945 shaped the bipartisan system of government-opposition relations for the next two decades. Through extra-constitutional decrees dubbed "Institutional Acts" (Portuguese: "Ato Institucional" or "AI"), Castelo Branco both gave the executive the unchecked ability to change the constitution and remove anyone in office ("AI-1") as well as to have the presidency elected indirectly through a bipartisan system of a government-backed National Renewal Alliance Party (ARENA) and an opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) party ("AI-2"). In effect, anyone who opposed the government politically was removed from office, and the parties were known as either the "Yes" party in the case of ARENA, and the "Yes, sir" party in the case of the MDB.
As in earlier regime changes, the armed forces' officer corps was divided between those who believed that they should confine themselves to their professional duties, and the hard-liners who regarded politicians as willing to turn Brazil to communism. The victory of the hard-liners dragged Brazil into what political scientist Juan J. Linz called "an authoritarian situation". However, because the hard-liners could not ignore the counterweight opinions of their colleagues or the resistance of society, they were unable to institutionalize their agenda politically. In addition, they did not attempt to eliminate the trappings of liberal constitutionalism because they feared disapproval of international opinion and damage to their alignment with the United States. As the pole of anticommunism during the Cold War, the United States provided the ideology that the authoritarians used to justify their hold on power. But Washington also preached liberal democracy, which forced the authoritarians to assume the contradictory position of defending democracy by destroying it. Their concern for appearances caused them to abstain from personalist dictatorship by requiring each successive general-president to hand over power to his replacement.
[edit] Resistance
The fall of João Goulart resulted in a radicalization of student groups by cultural freedom and other left-wing ideologies as they began to look for alternative ways to the status quo. Unable to mobilize the apathetic lower-class Brazilians, they began to look for forms of direct action, much like the contemporary Red Army Faction in Germany.
The first signs of resistance were seen in 1968, with the appearance of widespread student protests. In response to this upsurge, the government issued Institutional Act Number Five in December of 1968, which suspended civil rights such as habeas corpus, increased the power of the executive by shutting down the other branches of government, and declared a nationwide state of siege. Protest were suppressed with unrestrained violence. This was the point when the anti-military movement descended into the political underground and eventually armed action.
By the end of the decade there were some twenty organizations involved in the urban guerrilla movement. The old-left, particularly in the shape of the Brazilian Communist Party, was seen as irrelevant and outdated, as Marxist-Leninist, Maoist, Trotskyist, Castroist, and all the other shades of left-wing ideology competed for the loyalty of the young militants, especially in places like Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Recruitment drives were carried out in schools and universities, initially with lectures in Marxist theory. Bit by bit the most determined were drawn deeper into activism, some taking the decision to leave their families and go underground altogether.
In 1969 Charles Burke Elbrick, the US ambassador to Brazil, was kidnapped in Rio, in an action carried out by the Revolutionary Movement 8th October. In response more brutal measures of counter-insurgency were adopted, leading to the assassination of Carlos Marighela, one of the most important of the guerrilla leaders, two months after Elbrick's kidnapping. This marked the beginning of the decline of the armed resistance.
According to a government-sponsored truth and reconciliation commission in 2007, by the end of the dictatorship there were at least 339 documented cases government-sponsored political assassinations or disappearances. Countless more were questioned, tortured or jailed. [1]
[edit] Diplomacy
- Further information: Foreign relations of Brazil
The military regime introduced new domestic political restrictions, sharpened during the second mandate in 1967, under the command of Marshal Costa e Silva. In 1967 the name of the country was changed from Republic of the United States of Brazil to Federative Republic of Brazil. Meanwhile, Brazil's international agenda incorporated new perceptions. With nationalist military segments — who were also State-control devotees — in power, there was increased scope for the return of concerns questioning the disparities of the international system.
Interest in expanding state presence in the economy was accompanied by policies intended to transform Brazil's profile abroad. The relationship with the United States was still valued, but alignment was no longer comprehensive. Connections between Brazilian international activity and its economic interests led foreign policy, conducted by foreign minister José de Magalhães Pinto (1966–67), to be labeled "Prosperity Diplomacy".
This new emphasis of Brazil’s international policy was followed by an appraisal of relations maintained with the United States in the previous year. It was observed that the attempted strengthening of ties had yielded limited benefits. A revision of the Brazilian ideological stand within the world system was added to this perception. This state of affairs was further enhanced by the momentary emptying of the bipolar confrontation in view of détente.
In this context, it became possible to think of substituting the concept of limited sovereignty for plain sovereignty. Development was made a priority for Brazilian diplomacy. These conceptual transformations were supported by the younger segments of Itamaraty, identified with the tenets of the independent foreign policy that had distinguished the early 1960s.
Based on the priorities of its foreign policy, Brazil adopted new positions in various international organizations. Its performance at the II Conference of UNCTAD in 1968, in defense of non-discriminatory and preferential treatment for underdeveloped countries' manufactured goods, was noteworthy. The same level of concern distinguished the Brazilian stand at the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) meeting in Viña del Mar (1969). On this occasion, Brazil voiced its support of a Latin American union project.
In the security sphere, disarmament was defended and the joint control system of the two superpowers condemned. Brazil was particularly judgmental of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with a view to guarantee the right to develop its own nuclear technology. This prerogative had already been defended previously, when the Brazilian government decided not to accept the validity of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TNP) in Latin America and the Caribbean. Brazil's position on the TNP became emblematic of the negative posture that it would, from then onwards, sustain regarding the power politics of the United States and the Soviet Union. Its initial detailing was influenced by the presence of Araújo Castro as ambassador to the UN and president of the Security Council in the years 1968-69.
Simultaneously, Brazil tried to strengthen its position with nuclear cooperation negotiated settlements with countries such as Israel (1966), France (1967), India (1968) and the United States (1972).
The changes in Brazilian diplomacy were to be also reflected in other matters on the international agenda, such as the balanced stance taken with regard to the "Six-Day War" between Arabs and Israelis, and the condemnation of the racist governments of South Africa and Rhodesia. In the multilateral sphere, the country championed the cause of the reform of the United Nations Organization charter.
[edit] 1969-1974
With the third military government (1969–74), led by general Emilio Garrastazu Médici, Brazil's international policy intensified the transformation process, guided by directives already adopted in the previous period. Nevertheless, as the domestic context witnessed increased political hardening, the scope of the country's foreign influence was restricted.
The decreeing of Institutional Act #5 (AI-5, 1968) marked a new phase of restrictions in the country's political freedom. The succession of kidnappings of foreign ambassadors in Brazil created embarrassments for the military government. The anti-government manifestations and the action of guerilla movements generated an increase in repressive measures. In this scenario, the "ideological frontiers" of Brazilian foreign policy were reinforced.
At the same time, the results of the economic policy consolidated the option for the national-development model. Because of these results, the country’s foreign economic connections were transformed, allowing its international presence to be broadened.
In the military milieu, a series of geopolitical formulations inspirated by the ideas of general Golbery do Couto e Silva reached their pinnacle. The valorization of the country's territorial attributes was accompanied by an increase in its defensive capacity. The need for a more effective occupation of the Amazon was given priority. The construction of the Transamazon Roadway (1970) began, as part of the National Integration Plan (PIN). In this spirit, Brazil’s territorial sea was extended to 200 miles (370 km) off-shore.
In 1973, French General Paul Aussaresses, a veteran of the Algerian War who had put in place "counter-revolutionary warfare" methods during the Battle of Algiers (including the systemic use of torture, death squads and death flights) and had later trained US officers, went to Brazil where he gave military courses for the military intelligence. He later admitted having maintained very close links with the military [2]
Included among the "emerging powers", together with others – such as Mexico, Nigeria and India — the Brazilian government tried to dilute its identity as a Third World country. Its foreign policy began to be labeled "national interest diplomacy", based on the expectation that Brazil was becoming a power to be reckoned with.
The expansion of Brazil's international agenda coincided with the administrative reform of the Ministry of External Relations. Its move to Brasília, in 1971, was followed by measures that had the modernization of its internal structure in view. New departments were created, responding to the diversification of the international agenda and the increasing importance of economic diplomacy. Examples are the creation of a trade promotion system (1973) and the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (1971) to develop studies and research on foreign policy themes.
Foreign policy, during the Gibson Barboza mandate (1969-74), united three basic positions. The first one, ideological, defended the presence of military governments in Latin America. To achieve that, the OAS should fight terrorism in the region. The second one criticized the distension process between the two superpowers, condemning the effects of American and Soviet power politics. The third requested support for development, considering that Brazil, with all its economic potential, deserved greater responsibility within the international system.
New demands and intentions appeared, related to the idea that the nation was strengthening its bargaining power in the world system. At international forums, its main demand became "collective economic security". The endeavor to lead Third World countries made Brazil value multilateral diplomacy. Efforts in this direction can be observed at the UN Conference on Environment (1972), the GATT meeting in Tokyo (1973) and the Law of the Sea Conference (1974).
This new Brazilian stance served as a base for the revisal of its relationship with the United States. Differentiation from other Latin American countries was sought, to mean special treatment from the United States. Nevertheless, not only was this expectation not fulfilled but military assistance and the MEC-USAID educational cooperation agreement were interrupted.
Washington held itself aloof at the time of President Médici’s visit to the United States in 1971. In response, especially in the military and diplomatic spheres, nationalist ideas were kindled and raised questions about the alignment policy with the United States.
The presence of J A de Araújo Castro, as ambassador to Washington in this period, contributed to the re-definition of relations with the American government. The strategic move was to try to expand the negotiation agenda by paying special attention to the diversification of trade relations, the beginning of nuclear cooperation, and the inclusion of new international policy themes.
In 1971 the military dictatorship helped rig the Uruguayan elections, which were lost by the left-wing Frente Amplio [3]. It then participated in Operation Condor, which involved various Latin American security services (including Pinochet's DINA and the Argentine SIDE) in the assassination of political opponents.
During this period, Brazil began to devote more attention to the less developed countries. Technical cooperation programs were initiated in Latin America and in Africa, accompanied in some cases by State company investment projects – in particular in the fields of energy and communication. With this pretext, an inter-ministerial system was created by Itamaraty and the Ministry of Planning, whose function it was to select and coordinate international cooperation projects. To foster these innovations, in 1972 foreign minister Gibson Barboza visited a number of African nations (Senegal, Togo, Ghana, Dahomey, Gabon, Zaire, Nigeria, Cameroon and Ivory Coast).
However, the prospect of economic interests and the establishment of cooperation programs with these countries were not followed by a revision of the Brazilian position on the colonial issue. Traditional loyalty was still towards Portugal. Attempts were made to consolidate the creation of a Portuguese-Brazilian community.
In the Middle East, there was a greater attunement of Brazil to the Arab nations. At this time, Brazilian diplomacy began to support the demands of the Arab League in the Arab-Israel conflict.
[edit] The role of the United States of America
An anti-Goulart press campaign was conducted throughout 1963, and in 1964 the Johnson administration gave moral support to the campaign.[citation needed] Ambassador Lincoln Gordon later admitted that the embassy had given money to anti-Goulart candidates in the 1962 municipal elections and had encouraged the plotters, that many extra United States military and intelligence personnel were operating in Brazil, and that four United States Navy oil tankers and the carrier Forrestal, in an operation code-named Brother Sam, had stood off the coast in case of need during the 1964 coup. A document from Gordon from 1963 to the US president also describes the ways João Goulart should be put down, and his fears of a communist intervetion by Cuba[4]. Washington immediately recognized the new government in 1964 and hailed the coup d'état as one of the "democratic forces" that had allegedly staved off the hand of international communism. In retrospect, it appears that the only foreign hand involved was Washington's, although the United States was not the principal actor in these events.[citation needed] Indeed, the hard-liners in the Brazilian military pressured Costa e Silva into promulgating the Fifth Institutional Act on December 13, 1968. This act gave the president dictatorial powers, dissolved Congress and state legislatures, suspended the constitution, and imposed censorship.
In 1968 there was a brief relaxation of the nation's repressive politics. Experimental artists and musicians formed the Tropicalia movement during this time. However, some of the major popular musicians of this time were arrested; some of them (Gilberto Gil and Caetano Veloso) left the country, in self proclaimed exile.
[edit] The Geisel administration, distensão, and the 1973 oil shock
It was in this atmosphere that retired General Ernesto Geisel (1974-79) came to the presidency with Médici's approval. There had been intense behind-the-scenes maneuvering by the hard-liners against him and by the more moderate supporters of Castelo Branco for him. Fortunately for Geisel, his brother, Orlando Geisel, was the minister of army, and his close ally, General João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo, was chief of Médici's military staff.
Although not immediately understood by civilians, Ernesto Geisel's accession signaled a move away from oppression toward democratic rule. Geisel replaced several regional commanders with trusted officers and labeled his political program distensão, meaning a gradual relaxation of authoritarian rule. It would be, in his words, "the maximum of development possible with the minimum of indispensable security."
President Geisel sought to maintain high economic growth rates, even while seeking to deal with the effects of the oil shocks. He kept up massive investments in infrastructure — highways, telecommunications, hydroelectric dams, mineral extraction, factories, and atomic energy. Fending off nationalist objections, he opened Brazil to oil prospecting by foreign firms for the first time since the early 1950s.
Brazil suffered drastic reductions in its terms of trade as a result of the 1973 world oil shock. In the early 1970s, the performance of the export sector was undermined by an overvalued currency. With the trade balance under pressure, the oil shock led to a sharply higher import bill. Thus, the Geisel government borrowed billions of dollars to see Brazil through the oil crisis. This strategy was effective in promoting growth, but it also raised Brazil's import requirements markedly, increasing the already large current-account deficit. The current account was financed by running up the foreign debt. The expectation was that the combined effects of import-substitution industrialization and export expansion eventually would bring about growing trade surpluses, allowing the service and repayment of the foreign debt.
Brazil shifted its foreign policy to meet its economic needs. "Responsible pragmatism" replaced strict alignment with the United States and a worldview based on ideological frontiers and blocs of nations. Because Brazil was 80 percent dependent on imported oil, Geisel shifted the country from a pro-Israeli stance to closer ties with oil-rich Saudi Arabia and Iraq. His government also recognized the People's Republic of China and the new governments of Angola and Mozambique, and moved closer to Latin America, Europe, and Japan. The 1975 agreement with West Germany to build nuclear reactors produced confrontation with the Carter administration, which was also scolding the Geisel government for the human rights abuses that it was fighting to stop. Frustrated with what he saw as United States highhandedness and lack of understanding, Geisel renounced the military alliance with the United States in April 1977.
In 1977 and 1978, the succession issue caused further confrontations with the hard-liners. Noting that Brazil was only a "relative democracy", Geisel attempted in April 1977 to restrain the growing strength of the opposition parties by creating an electoral college that would approve his selected replacement. In October he dismissed the far-right minister of army, General Sylvio Cueto Coelho da Frota. In 1978 Geisel maneuvered through the first labor strikes since 1964 and through the repeated electoral victories of the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro — MDB). He allowed the return of exiles, restored habeas corpus, repealed the extraordinary powers decreed by the Fifth Institutional Act, and imposed General João Figueiredo (1979-85) as his successor in March 1979.
[edit] The Figueiredo administration and abertura
The last military president, João Figueiredo, said that he took over the presidency more out of a sense of duty than political ambition[citation needed]. He signed a general amnesty into law and turned Geisel's distensão into a gradual abertura (the "opening" of the political system), saying that his goal was "to make this country a democracy, and that he'd beat and incarcerate those who disagree". The hard-liners reacted to the opening with a series of terrorist bombings. An April 1981 bombing incident confirmed direct military involvement in terrorism, but Figueiredo proved too weak to punish the guilty. The incident and the regime's inaction strengthened the public's resolve to end military rule. Moreover, Figueiredo faced other significant problems, such as soaring inflation, declining productivity, and a mounting foreign debt.
[edit] Stagnation, inflation, and crisis
Political liberalization and the declining world economy contributed to Brazil's economic and social problems. In 1978 and 1980, huge strikes took place in the industrial ring around São Paulo. Protesters asserted that wage increases indexed to the inflation rate were far below an acceptable standard of living. Union leaders, including the future three-time presidential candidate and president Luís "Lula" Inácio da Silva, were arrested for violation of national security laws. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed a painful austerity program on Brazil. Under that program, Brazil was required to hold down wages to fight inflation. In the North, Northeast, and even in relatively prosperous Rio Grande do Sul, rural people seized unused, private land, forcing the government to create a new land reform ministry. Tension with the Roman Catholic Church, the major voice for societal change, peaked in the early 1980s with the expulsion of foreign priests involved in political and land reform issues.
To attack the soaring debt, Figueiredo's administration stressed exports — food, natural resources, automobiles, arms, clothing, shoes, even electricity — and expanded petroleum exploration by foreign companies. In foreign relations, the objective was to establish ties with any country that would contribute to Brazilian economic development. Washington was kept at a certain distance, and the North-South dialogue was emphasized.
In 1983 the economy floundered as GDP declined by 5.0%, the impact of which was accelerated by rising inflation and the failure of political leadership. Figueiredo's heart condition led to bypass surgery in the United States, removing him from control of the situation. In an impressive display, millions of Brazilians took to the streets in all the major cities demanding a direct vote (Diretas Já!) in the choice of the next president. In April 1984, Congress failed to achieve the necessary numbers to give the people their wish, and the choice was left to an electoral college. Figueiredo did not act forcefully to back a preference, so it became a scramble as candidates pursued the collegial votes.
[edit] Footnotes
- ^ Livro do governo culpa ditadura por tortura e mortes. Folha de S. Paulo. Retrieved October 9, 2007.
- ^ Marie-Monique Robin in Escadrons de la mort - l'école française (See here, starting at 24 min)
- ^ NIXON: "BRAZIL HELPED RIG THE URUGUAYAN ELECTIONS," 1971, National Security Archive
- ^ O Globo (Portuguese).
[edit] Further reading
- The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a "Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime, 1964–1970, by Ronald M. Schneider (1973).
- The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil, by Alfred Stepan (1974).
- Brazil and the Quiet Intervention: 1964, by Phyllis R. Parker (1979).
- Mission in Mufti: Brazil's Military Regimes, 1964–1985, by Wilfred A. Bacchus (1990).
- Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers, by Wendy Hunter (1997).
[edit] Film documentaries
- Beyond Citizen Kane by Simon Hartog (1993)
[edit] See also
[edit] External links
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