Talk:Battle of the Java Sea

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[edit] Casualties

The text says that 4 loaded Japanese troop transports were sunk. But the table said "0 sunk". This reference http://www.geocities.com/dutcheastindies/java_sea.html agrees that troop transports were sunk. So I changed 0 sunk to 4 loaded troop transports sunk. If the troop transports aren't significant enough to be on the table, then remove my change, but "0 sunk" is still misleading. Art LaPella 16:48, Sep 2, 2004 (UTC)

According to www.combinedfleet.com Japanese losses in the night battle of Sunda strait were friendly-fire casaulties, victims of some of 88 Long-Lances (type 93 oxygen torpedos) fired at USS CA Houston and HMAS CL Perth by the convoy protection (HIJMS CA Mikuma, HIJMS CA Mogami, HIJMS CL Natori, HIJMS DDs Shikinami, Shirakumo, Murakumo, Shirayuki, Hatsuyuki and Asakaze (see TROM of HIJMS CA Mogami or HIJMS CA Mikuma)

Veljko Stevanovich 25. 11. 2005. 19:10 UTC+1

[edit] Sunda Strait

The entry on the USS Houston has more info on the Battle of the Sunda Strait than is given here. Shouldn't this entry have more detail? CFLeon 07:06, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
Yes, please feel free to jump-in and improve the article. I've provided what I think is a fairly extensive list of references to the article to help whoever wants to get involved with it. It's probably going to be awhile before I get to this article as I've got several others above this one on my "to do" list. Cla68 14:44, 18 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] US Destroyers

Someone asked in the UK Daily Mail on 27 April 2007, "Why did the 4 US destroyers abandon the British and Dutch ships...?" Anyone know? What was the command structure of this multinational fleet? "On their own initiative"? What does that mean?Emrys2 21:18, 27 April 2007 (UTC)

It means they decided it was time to go, so they went. Xyl 54 08:40, 5 June 2007 (UTC)
Emrys, see American-British-Dutch-Australian Command. One of the main problems with ABDACOM was that it was hastily assembled, the forces of the four partners lacked enthusiasm for it, distrusted each other and were unwilling to follow orders from officers whom they didn't know, were inexperienced and who didn't command respect. Doorman seems to have exacerbated this poor relationship with his ignorance/disregard of conventional naval tactics, i.e. the doctrine that destroyers should act as a mobile screen between cruisers and the enemy fleet. If they apprehended that US Admirals would not punish them for leaving Doorman's fleet, its not hard to see why the destroyer commanders left the scene. Grant | Talk 12:28, 5 June 2007 (UTC)
Emrys: more information; Morison, the US Navy historian, says about this that they were out of torpedoes, and under previous instructions from Doorman to leave in such an instance; on the other hand, they had no order to do so at the time, it was their own decision to go; and its not at all clear they told anyone they were going either. The article on USS Alden is the most comprehensive; it says they left independently.
Grant: are you saying it was Doormans fault? I think he made the best of a pretty bad hand, and showed a lot of guts as well. Xyl 54 16:01, 6 June 2007 (UTC)

Thanks! Still rather obscure, but perhaps it'll never be clear. Emrys2 08:07, 23 June 2007 (UTC)

xyl1: The naval historian Vincent P. O'Hara says, quoting Walter G. Winslow: "'Such an unorthodox deployment of forces suggested Doorman knew little about proven naval tactics...'(-7-) Generally destroyers would be positioned to screen the main body and deliver torpedo attacks while the light cruisers would proceed the heavies in the column, grouping guns by range ("Battle of the Java Sea: 27 February 1942")." Grant | Talk 17:08, 23 June 2007 (UTC)
Sorry for the delay:Thanks for the source; so Winslow thinks it was Doorman’s fault? And you’ve taken his word for it?
I know the best practice is to use destroyers in this way; a text-book example would be Vian’s use of them at the Second Battle of Sirte. But on the other hand, for example, Scott kept his destroyers on a tight leash at the Battle of Cape Esperance, presumably for the same reasons as Doorman. But as Scott won, whilst Doorman lost, maybe he attracted more understanding.
I also know other authors have been less scathing, and more appreciative of the difficulties involved. Xyl 54 09:12, 2 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] USS Pope

I've deleted USS Pope from the list of ships involved; she was at Surabaya,according to my book, with engine trouble Xyl 54 15:49, 6 June 2007 (UTC)