Talk:Battle of Villers-Bocage/Archive 1

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This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.

Contents 1 early discussions 2 DMorpheus version 3 Propaganda 3.1 What was "unusual" about it? 3.2 Why take credit away from the man? 4 Description of the battle 5 Casualties and strength 6 "Uncommitted Brigades" 7 Context 8 Propaganda section 9 Operation Perch 10 Intro Section 11 Normandy Strategy 12 Controversy 13 New tags 14 Yves Buffetaut source 15 And how is this a "disaster area"? 16 website of possible interest 17 British unit names 18 Problematic paragraph 19 website of possible interest

early discussions

I added some context so folks can see why this battle was important - not just the 'Wittman legend' stuff but the actual effect on the campaign. Also deleted some of the Wittman details (awards and so forth) since they are not gemane to the battle and there is a separate Wittman page anyway. DMorpheus 16:03, 1 December 2005 (UTC)

actualy, records show at most 6-16 brith tanks were knocked out. and the german lost all but one tiger tank. plus it could not be realy attributed to montogomerys failure in normandy. on 6th june 10 us sherman tanks were knocked out by 2 tigers, and the shermans got no kills. the tigers ran out of ammo. plus you nead to remember the uk at this point was facing about 4 fiths of the german armoured forces. and one of the 2 armoured divisions facing the americans was considered not fit for frontline duty, and was equiped with no heavy tanks and alot of outdated tanks i.e panzer 3's/. plus if operation cobra was actualy planned by monty its a bit of a harsh comment. it is likely had the campaign been left in the hand s of patton it would have failed. - rich tea man.

I would like to make a couple of points on the main page. There are a few points worth noting. TWO tanks were in the initial attack on the column. Wittman turned LEFT from the connecting road (From Les Hauts Vents)between the old road and the new one. The second tank turned RIGHT and fired the first 88mm shot, towards point 213. Although not noted anywhere, Wittman would have done this as any armour/troops to the LEFT of his point of entry were an unknown quantity having been shielded by hedges etc ! He also knew his back was covered, and, the armour to the right all had their guns trained AWAY from him.(Facing East, towards point 213)

(These points were given to me by a RB man who was on a carrier. He was close to Wittman's entry point on the main road).

Wittman's tank was NOT left in the town, but near the water tower by the RECCE HONEY tanks. (Well EAST of the Dyas tank! Which was on the extreme East fringe of the town). There is a photograph of it being towed away from that position which I believe to be correct. This shows the left track intact! I would surmise that it was the right hand track which was damaged as the 6pounder was on that side of the road. His demise could also be better explained. He was not engaged in battle but was caught out in a field by well hidden troops, who let him come out into the open past the point of no return. The British troops who destroyed his, and the two tanks with him, did not know who was in the tanks at the time. Wittman's body was only identified through dental records after being found by chance during road widening in the late 60s ?

Wittman and two of his crew were reburied in a War Cemetery plot, being placed in the ground as they were in the tank. With Wittman on top !

Montgomery was well aware of the fine balance of the invasion and there is some evidence to show 50 Div. 30 Corps. were placed to cover retreating troops. Who could have then boarded ships from beaches under the protection of 50 Div. It is also worth noting that the losses incurred on the 13th caused the 4th CLY to be merged with the 3rd CLY to become 3/4 CLY about a month later. My notes come from the half-track position destroyed in the first moments of the attack just after the RECCE Honey tanks. Carpiquet. 86.135.202.26 21:07, 8 November 2005 (UTC)

DMorpheus version

I feel the version by DMorpheus is unencylopaedic - grammar is poor, the use of dates and military terminology is inconsistent with other military history pages, and the tone is conversational rather than encylopaedic. Have attempted to clean this up; any errors of fact can be changed but please don't revert the entire page without considering why the changes were made.Michael Dorosh 06:13, 4 March 2006 (UTC)

• DMorpheus version: consisted of a reinforced tank company, a mechanized Infantry rifle company and supporting vehicles
• Revised version: British tank units were divided into squadrons, and the infantry component of armoured divisions in 1944 were referred to as Motor battalions, which were divided into companies. Mechanized Infantry was not a common term in the Second World War.

Concrete examples:

• DMorpheus version: the British 17-pounder, 6-pounder, and 75mm guns were all capable of killing Wittman's tank:
• Revised version:the British 17-pounder, 6-pounder, and 75mm guns were all capable of defeating the armour on Wittman's tank.

"killing" is colloquial and imprecise; any gun could "kill" a tank if a hit is achieved in the right spot such as an unarmoured vision port or shot trap. The real point is armor penetration capabilities.

• DMorpheus version: but the appallingly poor small-unit tactics employed by the 7th Armored Division.
• Revised version: but poorly executed tactics and battle procedure on the part of the 7th Armoured Division.

The correct spelling of Armoured is with a "u" when discussing British units (it is a proper noun, "armor" would be acceptable in other spots but not in proper names. As well, "battle procedure" is the correct military term for the British shortcomings, in addition to tactics. They failed to do a proper appreciation of the situation, did not recce adequately, and came up short - this is part of battle procedure, not tactics. Also, "appallingly" is a judgement call, probably not accurate in this case, and not what one would expect in an encyclopedia. I don't think any examples of "appalling small-unit tactics" are given in the article, in fact, few examples of small-unit tactics seem to be given at all - the problems were with battle procedure and the plan of action, not tactics - though the tactical move of the Shermans does seem to have been problematic. :)

These are just three; look forward to a discussion of other points.Michael Dorosh 06:23, 4 March 2006 (UTC)

I agree with many of the grammar edits; thanks for making them. I reverted because there were so many factual inaccuracies in it. I haven't got time at the moment for all of them, but let's start with the fact that there was no British I Corps in Normandy. Caen was a D-Day objective. The whole significance of the battle was the fact that Villers-Bocage is a road hub leading (among other places) northeast to Caen *behind* what was then the German front. This whole emphasis on Wittman is just missing the whole point of the battle. While I agree the British terms may be more rpesicse they are very confusing for peopkle who don't already know them. It's worth debating, I suppose, but I chose to use terms anyone could understand. More later DMorpheus 01:52, 5 March 2006 (UTC)

I British Corps was the assault formation that landed on D-Day - it included the 3rd Division and 50th Division among others - you may have seen it referred to as 1st British Corps, but the proper nomenclature is with a Roman Numeral - ie a capital "i" or I. Sorry for the confusion, but that is the proper way of writing a corps number - it is the same in US and German military writing.Michael Dorosh 02:39, 5 March 2006 (UTC)

Correct ( I erred in saying there was no I Corps) however the I Corps was not involved in Villers-Bocage. It was the XXX (30th) Corps throughout. I know how to write Corps numbers, thank you. I have observed in many books that roman numbers are consistently used for US and German Corps, and arabic for British Corps.

I also think that if the British military terms are used then they either need to be explained with their equivalents or at least referenced. Most armies use battalions, companies, and platoons. I used the most commonly-understood terms.

Finally I think the Dempsey quote should be in there. DMorpheus 14:44, 5 March 2006 (UTC)

Ah, I was not sure what your objection to I Corps was - I thought it was nomenclature - by all means change the formation names - I see you've changed it to 2nd British Army. I'm certainly no expert on this engagement and tried not to change the meaning of anything written, my edits were mostly reorganization - if I've changed meaning, they should obviously be changed back. Some awkwardly written phrases were smoothed out, I may have smoothed the proper meaning out of them!Michael Dorosh 17:14, 5 March 2006 (UTC)

Re: The 7th Armoured Div's tactics: I think "appalling" is a pretty good description. I gave at least three examples. Others are probably available. The first was the failure to establish local security in Villers-Bocage town. Second was the failure to send out any recon towards point 213. Third was the halt of a tank company on a road, bumper-to-bumper, in the face of terrain that has not be reconnoitered, and then sitting there while the infantry passed by in their halftracks. This goes beyond "poorly executed" and strays into some other term -"incompetent" would work just as well. I'm not chained to the word, but somehting needs to be said about this. I understand that wiki is not the place for opinions. However, I also think it is important to explain the very poor dispositions of the British unit and the series of errors they made in order for the reader to understand what happened. Otherwise this becomes the "Legend of Michael Wittman" all over again. That's why Dempsey's quote is so important to the article. The fact that both the Division and Corps commanders were relieved shortly thereafter also speaks volumes.

I'd argue the first is not poor tactics, but poor procedure. You make a good case for the second two. a) Failure to establish security - seems to be poor procedure. The wikipedia definition of tactics is vague and seems to include procedure; I've always thought tactics were those things you did to close with and destroy the enemy. I may be too specific with my own understanding. b) failure to send reconnaissance towards point 213 - I'd agree this was a tactical error. c) halting the tanks to let the infantry pass through - I'm not sure this is an error - do we know why the armour stopped on the road? From the description here they were probably bunched up way too much and we can see later the exposed positions all were in, however, it wasn't unheard of for infantry to go in first - in fact, leading with the tanks would have been unusual then, no?Michael Dorosh 17:14, 5 March 2006 (UTC)

I would be glad to see British spellings used with British units and US spellings used with US units. How I wish it were so throughout wiki. Intstead it seems to be tied to whoever wrote the article. I would be happy to see such a consensus. I'd also be glad to work with you to re-do a correct article. DMorpheus 14:58, 5 March 2006 (UTC)

I think if the goal is to educate people, then using the terminology of the force in question is correct, and it has been discussed at the Military History task force talk page. It is done for other armies, ie the Germans, Poles, etc. I agree with you that a quick definition after each possibly unfamiliar term is in order, I see you've done that with the Motor battalion reference - good work.Michael Dorosh 17:14, 5 March 2006 (UTC)

"Tactics" , when I learned it in the US Army, is simply a term that encompasses the procedures used to fight battles at the unit level. It does not include individual tasks such as, say, loading or aiming a weapon, nor does it include operational or strategic actions such as, say, planning the Normandy invasion. It does include all the issues noted in this article. The "procedures" for how a tank company fights, for example, are tactics. I think most editors, and most folks who've served in the military, would agree that things like local security, patrolling, reconnaissance, movement-to-contact, etc. are all tactics. So "tactics" and "procedures" are the same thing at this level.

Whether "the infantry go in first" is not the issue with the approach to point 213. The advance could have been led by a scout element, by Infantry, or by tanks depending on what the local commander thought best. I can imagine scenarios where you'd lead with tanks - for example, if the scout element reported the hill unoccupied or very weakly held, a valid tactic would have been to send a tank platoon (sorry, "troop" ;) charging up the hill in hopes of quickly taking it. But if the scouts tell you the hill is strongly held, that tactic would be suicidal. The tactical error was to send the tanks out of town, advance part way up the hill on a sunken road, and then stop on the road without deploying while the infantry passed by. That was the point in time when the Germans (correctly) chose to attack. It was obvious to them that the British had no idea anyone was there, because they failed to do their recon.

Point 213 overlooks Villers-Bocage. There are several things the British could have done differently. I admit hindsight is 20/20, but there are standard things most units will do in a situation like this that were not done and which led directly to the debacle. A scout element should have gone immediately to point 213 to determine if it was occupied, even before they consolidated in the town. Local security in the town should have been established. If Point 213 was to be taken, the force taking it should have approached in some kind of tactical formation. Had they taken any *one* of these normal actions, they probably would have lost a few tanks as they approached Point 213 but nothing like what they actually lost.

Just as a comical aside, I see that someone changed a US spelling to a British spelling on another article that was about neither US nor British armor. I agree with your point on this, by the way, its just funny sometimes to see people do battle on this issue. DMorpheus 15:08, 6 March 2006 (UTC)

Recent edits look good, well done. I suppose the think to remember is it doesn't matter what you or I think of their tactics, but what superiors at the time, and historians in general, thought of them.:) Michael Dorosh 16:24, 6 March 2006 (UTC)

Propaganda

The old paragraph stated that the 6 pounder and 75mm guns could kill Wittmann's Tiger. While this is true, it was only possible while firing the best sorts of ammunition (APDS) or at ideal ranges and angles. I found this worth noting, and slightly changed that section. (209.7.38.8 12:45, 6 June 2006 (UTC))

Thanks... at the extreme close range this engagement was fought, any of those weapons could have penetrated the sides or rear of the Tiger. Six-pounders knocked out Tigers in Africa long before they had APDS. Didn't all Cromwells mount a 75mm? The article currently states that the Cromwells could have had 6-pounders. DMorpheus 15:05, 6 June 2006 (UTC)

Yes, the armament for the Cromwell Mk. I through Mk. III was the 6 pounder. However, many if not most featured QF 75mm guns, 6 pounders bored out to fire 75mm shells. The idea was that all tanks in British service, aside from Fireflies and exluding some scout cars, would use the same (Sherman) ammo. The same thing happened to the Churchill series of tank. It is worth mentioning that the QF 6 pounder was a better ant-armor piece, and that mounting the 75 on the Cromwell and Churchill actually made them less effective against tanks (but more against unarmored targets and buildings).

http://wwiivehicles.com/unitedkingdom/cruiser/mk_viii_a27m_cromwell.html

Given the very geographical nature of north Africa, close in engagements between tanks was a rather rare occurance. The only tanks that mounted the 6 pounder were the Valentine Mks. VII-X, Crusader Mk. III, Churchill III/IV, and the Crusader Mks. I-III. Of those four, only the first three saw service in North Africa. The first was too slow to outflank the Tiger, and it's once great armor was no match for even the KwK 40 mounted on the tank killing Panzer IVs. The Churchills, though they could stand up to 75mm fire, could be stopped by the KwK 36 of a Tiger before they got into firing positions. The Cromwell was fast, but terribly underarmored, even the 60 caliber 50mm guns on tanks like the Panzer III Ausf. J special could penetrate it quite easily. All tanks mounted with the 6 pounder suffered from deficiency in optics, none were even beyond 4x magnification, the Tiger had no such obsticle to surmount. As such, the majority of instances in which a 6 pounder (mounted on a tank) killed a Tiger could be likely attributed to foolishness on the Tiger's part, or even luck. The only time when a Tiger could be reliably killed by 6 pounder fire was after the introduction of APDS, and only then if the sabot properly disconnected with the KE bolt.

There, now I'm registered too. (USMA2010 16:14, 6 June 2006 (UTC))

Whilst it's undeniable that the Cromwell was inadequately armoured in the face of the 75mm L70 and 88mm guns, the armour base was quite reasonable for the time. It was cetainly proof aginst 50mm guns and could resist the 75mm L43/48 at reasonable ranges. The problem was, of course, that the poor performance of the QF 75mm against armour forced them to close with the enemy if they wanted any chance of striking back. The Cromwell was certainly better protected than the Sherman from all aspects, and had a lower silhouette too. Cheers, Getztashida 10:39, 22 September 2006 (UTC)

What was "unusual" about it?

Surely you don't want to argue that it was 'usual' for a single tank to stop a Division? Put another way: Was it usual or common for a Division's main effort to be stopped by a counterattack of this small scale? DMorpheus 02:14, 15 August 2006 (UTC)

There were 13 Tiger tanks in total that mauled the British Brigade, destroying 48 vehicals. As apposed to one tank taking on a Division.Motorfix 02:50, 15 August 2006 (UTC)

I couldn't prove that it wasn't - strange things happen in war; all battles are unusual, aren't they? Even if we can agree the battle was unusual, I think it needs to be more explicitly explained, if not in the intro, then in the conclusion of the article. As it is, the "unusual" monicker is left to dangle and the uninitiated reader is left wondering why...no? As for the latter question - yes, I think entire advances were commonly held up by small scale resistance. A single sniper, for example, can stop a battalion cold in the right circumstances - I have no examples near to hand. But wouldn't be wiser to let the reader come to the "unusual" conclusion on his own? I am thinking it would be. Your thoughts?Michael Dorosh 02:51, 15 August 2006 (UTC)

Why take credit away from the man?

I think this part is heavily biased: "It may be concluded that the real reason for Wittmann's success was not so much technical superiority or individual skill, but poorly executed tactics and battle procedure on the part of the 7th Armoured Division." 'It may be concluded'... by whom? This is the typical "I don't like the Nazis so I must blame all their success on outside circumstances"-attitude that's in many of these pages. Wittmann was a skilled tank commander and had scored 88 tank victories before this particular instance. Of course there's more to this extraordinary victory than just his skill, but it sure as hell played a very imposrtant part in it.

I find it funny that the paragraph is titled "The propaganda of Villers Bocage"... because the paragraph itself is exactly that: propaganda.

Feel free to edit it. But the facts are that the British chain of command was mostly sacked after the battle, even though in some instances it took a few weeks. The Army commander, Dempsey, was appalled at the performance of his own units. The British made many mistakes (summarized and debated above in this talk page) that invited agressive enemy action. After the initial attack on the road leading out of V-B, the Germans then chose to give battle inside the town istelf. This gave away the Tiger's range advantages.

This has nothing to do with "liking" Nazis or not, although I'm happy to acknowledge I don't ;). There has been a kind of 'worship' of Wittman, who was after all, a skilled but human commander in a much better-armed and better-protected tank, given a terrific opportunity by his foes. This Wittmanphilia tends to overshadow the real significance of the battle, which was a lost opposrtunity for the Allies to break the German front over a large area very early in the Normandy campaign. Remember at the time of the 7th AD attack there was almost nothing stopping the 7th AD from unhinging much of the German front southwest of Caen. Had they held V-B, wheeled northeast and kept moving, the german front between Caumont and Caen would probably have broken. The fact that it didn't is the real story - not how many tanks Wittman's tiger destroyed. I don't think this is 'propoaganda - it is putting things in perspective. DMorpheus 14:49, 16 October 2006 (UTC)

Description of the battle

In the box in the top right the casualties listed do not agree with the narrative description of the battle. According to the section on the battle itself it appears that one Tiger was disabled and a score of British armour was disabled / destroyed, but according to the box the engagement was larger, with eleven axis and thirty allied vehicles disabled / destroyed. I suspect it's because the battle reads from Wittman's point of view and we can't tell what else happened. I don't actually know the specifics but I'm sure someone does so it'd be nice to see this fixed up. 121.45.153.167 22:44, 28 April 2007 (UTC)

Is anyone going to act on this? 121.45.58.138 10:34, 3 June 2007 (UTC)

Why don't you? That's how wikipedia works. DMorpheus 15:44, 4 June 2007 (UTC)

Casualties and strength

We have the British armoured casulties down pretty well and am pretty sure the figures for the men are correct although i did worry after typing them in if they covered the fighting in the brigade box the following day - although since there was no figures for the other battalions involved i think it was mindless worrying.

What i do think we need to strengthen is the German losses.

Battle Zone Normandy states 6 Tiger tanks knocked out in the afternoon fighting and Wittmanns in the morning for a total of 7. In The Struggle For Europe, Chester Wilmot quotes Fitz Bayerlin stating the loss of 6 MK IV. So it would appear thats that part sorted.

But then we have no information present which states if the 2nd Panzer Division lost any tanks. Did they?

Other then that, we need some sort of figure in regards to how many men the Germans lost on the 13th during the morning and afternoon fighting around the town.

On top of that, i believe we need to get a definate figure or at least a good guess at the total number of tanks and men involved on both sides throughout the day so the strength section is even more accurate. --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:23, 8 January 2008 (UTC)

Although I have used Hubet Meyer for information regarding how many men the 101st lost killer and captured I would rather have another source to back him up, does anyone know of any other sources which state the losses for the formation in terms of men on that day?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:17, 11 January 2008 (UTC)

"Uncommitted Brigades"

It appears that author who has been used as the source for this information is wrong.

7th Armoured Division on the day and in line with British regulations was made up of two brigades.

Before i go further into what 7th was made up, the closest brigade sized formation would be based around Tilly-sur-sulles and be part of or attached to the 50th (Northumbrian) infantry division and thus completly unable to take part in the action since the Panzer Lehr was sitting between the two of them (one should note that the plan for the 50th was to smash its way south to Villers-Bocage, the 7th was only there due to an open flank).

Back to the 7th, the division was made up of the 22nd Armoured Brigade and the 131st Queens Infantry Brigade. Both of whom were basically mixed together.

1/7 Queens and some other units from the 131st with elements of the 22nd Armoured Brigade held Villers-Bocage during the afternoon. One of the other battalions of the 131st along with the sole remaining uncommitted 22nd Armoured Brigade regt was keeping the road open in the division rear.

The only possible reinforcement would then be the other remaining battalion of the 131st and to be honest I don’t know what they were doing at the time (either the 1/5 or the 1/6 Queens Regt).

Hence the author is wrong. In regards to the author stating American arty support was provided, the only account of American arty support being given to the 7th Armour I have seen was during the 14th during the defence of “the Island”, the brigade boxed formed in the Tracy-Bocage area after they pulled out of the town.

To be honest, how could the Corps commander or even the Army commander effect the battle? It took the division over a day to make its way there so reinforcements would not be able to just up shoes and get there in a moments notice, not to mention they were essentially behind enemy lines.

I believe the author has overly simplified matters and in some cases got it completely wrong so I don’t think we should include this part of D'Este text. --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:43, 8 January 2008 (UTC)

Since the content is referenced to a published work, if you disagree with it, provide additional published, cited content that contradicts it, and we'll note the disagreement between historians as best we can.

IMO it is important to recognize that the battle of V-B is not synonymous with Wittman's actions, it's a much more complex situation than that. I'd also like to revisit the order of events, since the previous version of the article had the US 1st ID's opening of the Caumont gap as the key initiating event, but now we're showing that as incidental to an ongoing operation (Perch). Without reviewing the references on this point it isn't clear to me yet.

Corps and other commanders get paid to influence battles. ;) Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 17:11, 8 January 2008 (UTC)

As Simmonds, the II Canadian Corps commander said, people have the wrong idea what a general does, once the planning is made there is little he can do to influcence the battle until reports are filtered back to them.

With the time line the action took place in, it wouldnt make sence for Monty to be attempting to influcnce events nor Dempsey. The Corps commander and the Division commander yes but again what could they do in the situation - 7th Armour basically behind enemy lines with no reinforcements.

The 7th Armoured Division order of battle is widly available. How the British organised there armoured divisions is also widly available. It was a 2 brigade organisation and with the other information available and also in the article we know it was committed alone. Although after the 15th when the net is back up at home ill be able to provide more referance :)

In regards of orders of events, of course the big red one taking Coumont was a major point in the events and led to the left hook, we must also note that there was ongoing operations which allowed this event to be taken advantage of.

I also agree that the battle is not soley about Wittmann thats why i feel we need to expand the afternoon section and get as accurate as possible figures for the casulties and strength section. --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 09:32, 9 January 2008 (UTC)

Context

Russell Weigley in "Eisenhower's Lieutenants, pp. 109, has the US 1st ID opening up the Caumont gap on June 10-11. On P 110 he describes the gap as 12 km in width.

D'Este, "Decision In Normandy, p. 176, has the 7th Armoured Div striking through this gap on June 12. Their personnel (CPT Pat Dyas) are quoted as "driving unmolested" to V-B and meeting "little resistance".

Weigley further has US V Corps artillery providing supporting fire to Brit 7th Arm'd on June 13th when they were under attck by elements of 2nd Pz Div. D'Este concurs, p. 188, saying the German attack was "...crushed, largely as a result of timely artillery fire from US artillery units supporting the 1st Infantry Division around Caumont." Finally, he says Bucknall reinforced 50th Div rather than 7th Armoured Div...so reinforcements were available. Weigley, p. 112

D'Este states Wittman's unit was "surprised by the astonishing degree of unconcern displayed by the British". p. 180. Crews were dismounted, no local security was in place, no recon had been done of nearby features.

D'Este, p. 187-8, states that reinforcements for 7th AD could have come from 50th (151st Infantry Bde, which were in Corps reserve) Div or the just-landed 49th Div.

D'Este faults Bucknall for lacking agressiveness and Dempsey and Montgomery for failing to firmly direct the battle, p. 192. MG Armitage called 7th AD's "local tactics....poor". Erskine himself said "I will not try to excuse what was undoubtedly poor local tactics...", p. 193. D'Este again, "...the Battle of Villers-Bocage, one of the most decisive moments in the battle of Normandy, literally cried out for a firm and forceful leader." He calls the official British history a "marvel of obfuscation"

Dempsey, postwar, "This attack by 7th AD should have succeeded. My feeling that Bucknall and Erskine would have to go started with that failure. ...the whole handling of that battle was a disgrace." quoted in D'Este, p. 196. —Preceding unsigned comment added by DMorpheus (talk • contribs) 23:34, 8 January 2008 (UTC)

Will get back to you soon about this, cant bring books into work lol :(--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 09:42, 11 January 2008 (UTC)

“Russell Weigley in "Eisenhower's Lieutenants, pp. 109, has the US 1st ID opening up the Caumont gap on June 10-11. On P 110 he describes the gap as 12 km in width.”

Correct, however Battle Zone Normandy: Villers Bocage and the OH state quite clearly that Operation Perch was already underway and that it was combat operations undertaken by XXX Corps after landing to capture Bayuex, strike south towards Tilly, head south to capture Villers-Bocage, then head southeast to capture Evercy and then head towards the Orne to envelop Caen. The US opened the gap, Dempsey ordered it to be exploited but Operations had already been underway but where bogged down at Tilly - this was Perch

“D'Este, "Decision In Normandy, p. 176, has the 7th Armoured Div striking through this gap on June 12. Their personnel (CPT Pat Dyas) are quoted as "driving unmolested" to V-B and meeting "little resistance". “

He is basically correct, will provide page reference number when I get home later, the 7th Armour was commited around Tilly where ordered to brake contact and head for the gap to outflank the Panzer Lehr.

“Weigley further has US V Corps artillery providing supporting fire to Brit 7th Arm'd on June 13th when they were under attck by elements of 2nd Pz Div. D'Este concurs, p. 188, saying the German attack was "...crushed, largely as a result of timely artillery fire from US artillery units supporting the 1st Infantry Division around Caumont." “

From the OH, Battlezone Normandy and some book on the rats wrote via personal accounts they make no note of American arty support on the 13th. All accounts ive read make note of it being used on the 14th. Am pretty sure Weigley has the dates confused.

“Finally, he says Bucknall reinforced 50th Div rather than 7th Armoured Div...so reinforcements were available. Weigley, p. 112 “

The 7th were ordered to brake contact on 11/12 (ill get date later and edit it in here), arrived somewhere near Caumont late on the 12th and completed there march on the 13th to Villers-Bocage but where still strung out across the road. 50th Division with attached armour brigade were committed around Tilly, the 49th were in the process of landing so what was in reserve – a brigade of the 50th … how would they be able to catch up with the 7th Armour in less then a day if it took the 7th longer then that to get to Villers-Bocage?

“D'Este states Wittman's unit was "surprised by the astonishing degree of unconcern displayed by the British". p. 180. Crews were dismounted, no local security was in place, no recon had been done of nearby features. “

Will address this point later when am home.

“D'Este, p. 187-8, states that reinforcements for 7th AD could have come from 50th (151st Infantry Bde, which were in Corps reserve) Div or the just-landed 49th Div. “

Not to sound harsh, but we have to be logical here, 49th was in the process of landing and Villers-Bocage is many miles inland, how could they reinforce the 7th in less then a day? How could the 50th Division brigade in reserve help the 7th in less then a day?

To be extremely fair, how could the 7th be reinforced other then by other units from within the division, which were strung out along the road to Villers-Bocage and some of which had other missions?

“D'Este faults Bucknall for lacking agressiveness and Dempsey and Montgomery for failing to firmly direct the battle, p. 192. MG Armitage called 7th AD's "local tactics....poor". Erskine himself said "I will not try to excuse what was undoubtedly poor local tactics...", p. 193.”

The battle is not within the scope of Army or Army Group command, if Dempsey or Monty had attempted to take personal control of the battle they would have been hounded like mad etc It wasn’t even a division sized battle, the Brigadier i/c and the Divisional commander are really the only ones who should be directing it and Corps informed of whats going on so they can make tactical decisions outside the scope of Erskine.

Tactics wise will comment and quote sources later when am home.

“D'Este again, "...the Battle of Villers-Bocage, one of the most decisive moments in the battle of Normandy, literally cried out for a firm and forceful leader." He calls the official British history a "marvel of obfuscation" “

The OH for the campaign does not obscure or misrepresent any information, it along with most post war books focuses primarily on the ambush gives casualties which are pretty accurate and then glosses over the rest. However this is inline with the way the Official Histories have been wrote, the campaign involved so many men, divisions etc that they cannot go into massive detail on battles and the only time they do so is when there is only a few units within the theatre for example the OH for the early African campaigns have quite some detail due to the few units taking part.

However i agree it should be noted that this was a lost opporunity.

“Dempsey, postwar, "This attack by 7th AD should have succeeded. My feeling that Bucknall and Erskine would have to go started with that failure. ...the whole handling of that battle was a disgrace." quoted in D'Este, p. 196. “

Here Dempsey shows it was not his reasonability to direct the battle. Now what he says about how the battle was handled is a fair enough comment since Bucknall ordered the 7th out of there the next day and one of those two ordered them to advance without recon however – will also provide reference to this latter on – that the men on the ground gave it there best and in doing so over two days inflicted nearly 1000 casualties on the Germans along with a bunch of tanks. This should also be noted. —Preceding unsigned comment added by EnigmaMcmxc (talk • contribs) 11:50, 16 January 2008 (UTC)

Please don't substitute your OR for published sources. If you have a published source that disagrees with the ones I've cited, great, we will put both sources' views in the article and note the disagreement. DMorpheus (talk) 13:16, 16 January 2008 (UTC)

Its not original research, everything stated above is via published sources bar my opinion on Monty and Dempsey not being to blame for the outcome of the battle (although Dempsey basically agrees with me there, shown in that last quote from him).

Later on today I will adjust the background section to quote the OH and the book BattleZone Normandy as on what Operation Perch was, tie it in with what is already here regarding the US infantry capturing Caumont etc so its more accurate so its not suggesting Perch was the outflanking move.

I think we should iron disagreements here in the discussion in regards to what authors have said rather then adding them into the article. I will post some of the quotes etc here later today, the books are at home and am not.

Some of the stuff in the sources include a possible second Tiger shooting up the Rifle Brigade carriers (personally I think that should have a passing note made to it in the article) and bailed out tankers being machine gunned at via German troops who had entered the town – ill post the quote and book ref later but unless you have something to back that up personally I wouldn’t add it in.

Anyhoo till later. --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:58, 16 January 2008 (UTC)

"I think we should iron disagreements here in the discussion in regards to what authors have said rather then adding them into the article." Agreed, that's a legitimate way to deal with this. But what you've in fact just done is simply put back most of what you wrote days ago, omitting important context again and omitting cited material again. DMorpheus (talk) 20:11, 16 January 2008 (UTC)

What important context would this be? That it was a road hub, that the target was Caen, that the Right Hook was Operation Perch?

These are the things i have removed and corrected, i have published sources i.e. the Official History of the campaign and Villers-Bocage wrote by the guys at Sandhusrt which state what exactly Perch was and what exactly the Right Hook intentions where.

Further more i have corrected that it was Dempsey not Monty who issued the orders, since we have the man himself stating he told the Divisional commander what to do.

As for omitting cited material, nothing prior to my edits iirc have had any footnotes within the article. I have also used the information you have supplied in one area as well.

Operation Perch was underway, the American Corp on there flank captured Caumont and Dempsey ordered the 7th to outflank the Panzer Lehr to attempt to force them to withdraw.

Thats the basic jist of the background information ... so what i have omitted? --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:37, 16 January 2008 (UTC)

Propaganda section

This section states that Wittmann due to German propaganda was given credit of 27 of the 30 destroyed tanks. Am slightly confused, from British sources I’ve seen the losses being 27 max, do we know were the other 3 came from? --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:55, 9 January 2008 (UTC)

Operation Perch

After reading through the Official History of the campaign and Battle Zone Normandy Villers Bocage (wrote by the dude from Sandhurst) it is clear that Operation Perch was not the "right hook" to outflank the Panzer Lehr but was the fighting XXX Corp was undertaking.

Ill type up the exact workding or a shortend down version next week when the net is back up at home but what i had typed into the article was essentially correct.

Now i understand we need to referance what we type into Wiki articles i can do this at a slightly later date but i dont think we should keep up the myth that Perch was just the Right Hook by the 7th Armour to take Villers-Bocage. --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 09:45, 11 January 2008 (UTC)

Intro Section

Needs updating, Wittmann did not:

"charged his vehicle into the lead British column, splitting it, and then engaged the British forces at very short range before passing along and across the British line into the village."

British forces was already split up, A Squadron halted up on the hill, RHQ and the recon troop etc on the outskirts of town and the rest of the formation on the other side of town. —Preceding unsigned comment added by EnigmaMcmxc (talk • contribs) 11:14, 11 January 2008 (UTC)

Normandy Strategy

US Commander on the ground, Omar Bradley has this to say in A Soldiers Story, Pg 241

"...the British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme edge of the allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride, this decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labours, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race one the alarm was sounded"

Stephen Ashley Hart: Colossal Cracks:

"His theater strategy for Normandy envisaged a series of holding attacks on the British sector designed to draw the bulk of the Germans forces to that front, thus permitting the Americans to advance West. His appraoch also strove to keep the initiative, thus forcing the Germans meerly to react to Allied moves"

Bluecoat was speeded up and launched to support the American brakeout which when it happened faced little opposition tank wise since most of them were sitting facing the Anglo-Canadian Front. D'Este is wrong.

--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:53, 16 January 2008 (UTC)

It is not our place here to say that a source is "wrong" unless you can prove some factual statement is incorrect. It is more helpful and productive to show that they disagree and explore why.

In this case you have several respected sources questioning the entire 'Normandy story'. This article may not be the place to have that debate, but D'Este and Weigley are two obvious places to start, and the contested issues ought not to be stated in this article as settled fact.

"The Caen fight was a failure. Monty thought up excuses later...We would be at Caen yet but for the American advance on the right. The truth will probably never be told. ...so we will have a legend." Air Vice Marshal Sir Philip Wigglesworth, 1947.

"Nearly forty years later the debate over Normandy continues..." "In the period after D-Day reverse followed upon reverse as the Second Army either failed to take advantage of priceless opportunities like Villers-Bocage or was forced to engage in debilitating battles such as EPSOM and CHARNWOOD. The keys to achieving the goals of the master plan were retention of the initiative and flexibility, and it was at Caen that Montgomery lost both." D'Este

Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 04:11, 17 January 2008 (UTC)

While I don’t think this article is the right place to discuss strategy it is the only place to do so until an article for Perch itself is started. However I think we can safely say if an author is wrong or not. If in a book the author stated 50 000 tanks were destroyed during this battle we would omit it as it is clearly wrong.

Here is another case of this, Monty stated what is strategy was before the invasion, Bradley agreed that this was the strategy in use and stated so in his own book (reference to this posted in article), books such as Colossal Cracks which discuss the strategy and the overall plan used by Monty also backs this position up (again reference to this in the article). Many post war authors also tend to agree that this was the strategy to be used (The Battle of Normandy 1944: 1944 the Final Verdict - Robin Neillands, Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy - R Hart). The fact an American general, who was subordinate to Monty during this time states this was the ground plan is the critical thing for me here.

appears to be half and half go with either this was his strategy or not. The fact we have a subordinate of Montys, and an American at that supports this was the ground plan should cement it as fact.

D'Este states Monty lost the initiative, flexibility and were forced to commit to debilitating attacks, that doesn’t match up with what happened. If the initiative had been lost the Germans would not be the ones reacting to all attacks, if flexibility had been lost, divisions, brigades etc would not have been able to be shifted around and attacks launched were ever the commanders decided. Debilitating wise, even though casualties were heavy, they were expected to be so, but inflicted series losses upon the German forces which they could not replace.

What I find odd is that D’Este also agrees that this was the strategy in use: it was nevertheless a strategic failure at Caen and the consequences of this were far too grave for it to be dismissed as merely a 'local setback.' To achieve the protective shield Montgomery considered so vital, the capture of Caen and the surrounding key terrain was not merely desirable, as has been suggested by Montgomery himself, it was vital.

For other examples, orders for Operations Goodwood and Totalise do not make any mention of brake out. --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 12:04, 17 January 2008 (UTC)

I think it is far to say that the Normandy campaign in general and V-B in particular remain controversial today and we might as well acknowledge that. I don't think it's productive to edit war or to try to create an article that states something as accepted fact when it is obvious the historians disagree. It is germane that you raise GOODWOOD, another controversial battle. Montgomery's messages to SHAEF do not match his operations orders to his units, which he changed just prior to the battle. This raises the possibility that he was deliberately miscommunicating. There's no way to prove it one way or the other; it is enough to say the possibility exists and leave it at that.

For V-B, the usal error made is to describe it at the tactical level only, leaving aside the operational significance of the battle. Thus the accounts of Wittman's tank-killing are quite well known, (even if in flawed form) even though they are merely small-unit tactical achievements. I am glad we've gotten the article past that stage.

However, another error we could make is to assume equality between PERCH and the battle of V-B. They are not the same, although I will agree that a focus on PERCH is better than the "Michael Wittman story". By analogy, a common error is to equate the Kursk-Orel campaign with the German Operation CITADEL; they are not synonymous, and assuming they are leads to serious errors in analysis (and wikipedia edit wars ;).

The sources for this article do not agree on the significance of the battle nor on the basic allied strategy for the Normandy campaign; at least one (D'Este) has questioned the veracity of another (the Offical British history). The best approach is to include both interpretations and acknowledge the controversy. It is not our place as editors to simply say "This source is right and this one here is wrong". That's original research.

I've put in a weasel-word placeholder till we sort this out, or, alternatively, we can spin off a separate article on the topic and reference it. I thik that would be odd but it beats constant revision of this article.

Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 14:22, 25 January 2008 (UTC)

The simple fact is that the battle was a result to force the Panzer Lehr division out of Tilly so the 50th division could carry the advance south as part of Operation Perch after the big red one opened up a hole in the German line.

Discussing theatre strategy, weather you want to believe the Official History, modern historians, Sandhurst and Omar Bradley or people like D’Este and other historians has no place here. Is mentioning there is controversy surrounding the strategy of the entire Normandy campaign in this article add to it, the answer is no hence my I removed what you had typed in as well as what I had typed.

When we return to why the 7th Armour Division was ordered to swing around the flank of the Panzer Lehr to capture Villers-Bocage it was to attempt to force the Panzer Lehr out of the Tilly area. We have established that fact from several sources in other sections so we know it was not a direct attempt to capture Caen by the 7th Armour Division … the significance lays in they didn’t force the Panzer Lehr to retreat, that they stayed in position for a further week before they withdrew etc etc what we have now at the end of the intro section is a cop out!--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:48, 25 January 2008 (UTC)

Controversy

I have suggested on several occasions that the V-B engangement and indeed much of the ground strategy of the Normandy campaign are controversial. By that I mean simply that the historians disagree about what the basic strategy was; some of the participants share in this disagreement; some of the authors take shots at each others' work. Thus the notion of adding a sentence stating the fact that a controvery exists is appropriate. An even better approach is to actually describe the controversy and the views of the various authors and participants. But - since this is indeed a controversial subject, no consensus is possible on what that description ought to be! That's the second piece of evidence that this is a controversial topic.

The removal of any reference to the controversy merely pushes the POV that no controversy exists.

As I posted elswhere "Nearly forty years later [writing in the 1980s-DM] the debate over Normandy continues unabated...the Montgomery master plan is as much of an enigma now as it was in 1944." p. 476 "As Dempsey's papers consistenty reveal, the object of the Second Army was to keep the initiative so as to prevent the British front from congealing around Caen; but congeal it did, forcing Montgomery into a head-on and costly confrontation in order for the Second Army to gain more favorable terrain and the space for 21st Army Group to maneuver. ." p. 478 "The Normandy controversies were brought into sharp focus during the post-war years when many of the principals published their versions and when the first of the official histories appeared. The great disparity between these accounts, no matter how well intentioned, served only to thoroughly blur and exacerbate these unresolved questions....The most controversial account to appear about Normandy was not written by Montgomery, but by the British government...Ellis [author of the British offical history-DM] had done his fellow historians...a disservice by sweeping controversy and unpleasantness under the rug..." "Decision In Normandy, Carlo D'Este, ISBN 0-7607-5512-4 When we write these Normandy articles while ignoring this debate, we are not only doing a poor job of encyclopedia-writing, we are perpetuating the disservice of "sweeping controversy...under a rug".

I will restore the sentence, which is well-supported by sources and, obviously, by the edit-warring that has taken over this article. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 16:42, 1 February 2008 (UTC)

But none of that has anything to do with the Battle of Villers-Bocage! That’s why I have removed it. What the Normandy strategy was and weather controversy surrounds it has no place here in an article about a tactical battle which was part of larger operation - where strategy would be more appropriate to discuss but even then I doubt it would be appropriate in the article about the Operation.

I find it funny when you state were doing a poor job at encyclopaedia-writing if we omit this from the article or if do include it we plaster D’Este and his opinion all over it which is what you have done. If you are going to literally name and quote him the article, why not quote and name the Official History, Omar Bradley, Monty, Wilmot, Ike (who actually states the Anlgo-Canadians did a good job at holding the flank) or people like Ashley-Hart who book was published in more recent times.

The "Edit-War" which is taking place is because you don’t like the fact I have massively updated the article. Before I started adding to this article it was full of inaccuracies, myths, had little information regarding casualties, no footnotes what so ever, did no include many of the Commanders but spoke of company commanders instead, blew Wittmann and his role out of all proportions, basically neglected the fact that fighting went on all through the day, had a tiny list of books which covered the subject etc etc etc

You have fought me at every point during these updates, especially when I have tried to show the British were not as incompetent as you or your source would like to make out.

Omitting or not attempting to fix these problems was doing a “poor job at encyclopaedia-writing”.

Your sentence, stating that a controversy surrounds this battle is incorrect, it surrounds the Normandy strategy, which has no place being here. Your sentence stating we do not know the significance of the battle is incorrect, we know exactly why the 7th Armoured Division was sent to that town and what the intention of the entire operation and battle was. --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:27, 1 February 2008 (UTC)

Sorry, the sources disagree. Please be mindful to discuss edits, not editors. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 17:50, 1 February 2008 (UTC)

Again your doing what you did the other day, compeltly avoiding the question at hand.

If you want to put a discussion into the article on the Normandy strategy am asking you why dont you also include nameing and fully quoting these other sources which contridct D'Este.

Am asking you what is the point of having such a section in an article about a single battle when it is not an article on Normandy strategy.

Am asking you why you have fought tooth and nail agaisnt improvements being made agaisnt this article and your answer is just that? Am sorry thats a cop out! —Preceding unsigned comment added by EnigmaMcmxc (talk • contribs) 18:17, 1 February 2008 (UTC)

New tags

So what historical events are now disbuted within the article and what exactly is confusing, would you care to add some form of discussion to why you have added them? --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 23:52, 7 February 2008 (UTC)

I'm truly sorry to say the article has become a mess. There is no strategic context. Disputed issues are presented as uncontested fact. The article relies heavily on a source that has been trashed by at least one other source. The grammar is appalling, and that is one of the sources of confusion. I started to fix it but it is more than I care to take on; new errors are coming in faster than I can fix them. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 03:44, 8 February 2008 (UTC)

“I'm truly sorry to say the article has become a mess.”

No its became a hell of allot better then it was before hand, it at least now covers the battle in more detail, has more information on casualties, correct background information and shows that the battle did not revolve around Michael Wittmann like it basically did two months back.

“There is no strategic context.”

Operation Perch is covered, showing what the Strategic background was. However if you are referring to weather or not the battle was a tactical or strategic victory support the position then!

“Disputed issues are presented as uncontested fact.”

We have covered this, what the Normandy strategy was does into belong here hence why I removed referenced to it in the opening sentence.

“The article relies heavily on a source that has been trashed by at least one other source”

The Official History by any chance? The source which D’Este trashes for glossing over the battle, if you have ever read it or any other of the official histories you will see that it covers the battle in the same amount of detail as other battles. It provides the background information including why the 7th Armour Division was ordered to take Villers-Bocage in the first place. Should I note this was not mentioned in the article before many edits?

If you have a problem with Fortys book, then please mention what these problems are.

“The grammar is appalling, and that is one of the sources of confusion. I started to fix it but it is more than I care to take on; new errors are coming in faster than I can fix them.”

If you are going to make personal attacks and remove any mention of why you are putting up such an attitude towards me then you should be able to take some criticism yourself.

So am sorry that I miss out the apostrophe on the end of some words and get the wrong “there” but you admit yourself that you have trouble with even the simplest words.

If you want to talk about errors, I have removed large amounts of errors from this article without complaint so why don’t you back off on this point? If you delete this I will add it back in because I have had enough of this attitude of yours – personal attacks through the edit history and having you fight very improvement made to this article and you wanting me to essentially put very admit I make through you. --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 08:50, 8 February 2008 (UTC)

Yves Buffetaut source

In "Normandie 1944: Le Choc des Blindes" ISBN 2-908182-10-6, page 46, the result of the battle is described as follows: "Tactiquement, le succes allemand est donc plutot mitige, mais strategiquement, Wittman a remporte une victoire eclatante en mettant en echec une brilliante manoeuvre de Montgomery. Sans son intervention, il est probable que la Panzer-Lehr-Division, se trouvant envelloppe, aurait du se retirer vers l'est, ouvrant de ce fait une breche telle que Caen aurait ete abandonnee des le 14 ou le 15 juin...". This is not consistent with the mere "tactical victory" with which the article credits the Germans. Indeed the tactical level is trivial; what counts is the strategic setback the Allies suffered. The lost opportunity to take Caen early in the campaign is what this battle is about. Multiple sources make this point clear. DMorpheus (talk) 04:05, 8 February 2008 (UTC)

== 2nd Panzer Division ==

Some sources make mention of the 2nd Panzer Division playing a small role in the fighting during the late afternoon while others imply they only took part in the fighting the next day during the Brigade Box action.

Does anyone have other sources regarding this issue of if they where there or not? --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:44, 9 February 2008 (UTC)

I have a few other sources now which state the 2nd Panzer were involved so will write this into the article were appropriate at a latter date.

Although the more sources the better, we are still missing strength and casualty information for them--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:16, 15 February 2008 (UTC)

And how is this a "disaster area"?

DMorpheus since you consider the article now to be a complete disaster, which in my opinion is just point of view pushing by you as you have already shown to be somewhat bias about this article, would you care to follow up your opinion with some reasoning instead of just slapping tags over the article (at least when i did so, it was for good reason)?

As I have stated before and can be noted through the edit summaries (id like to thank the others who have helped with the structuring of this article and improved the grammar etc) which have been made:

• The article is now more historically accurate i.e. large sums of historical errors removed
• The article is now more grammatically correct
• Massive amounts of unneeded links have been removed
• Accurate casualty figures have been placed into the article
• Everything, which has been stated to have happened, as a footnote to back it up
• The reference section has been increased considerably
• Photos and other illustrations added to support the article, i.e. a map of where the battle took place instead of a photo of a destroyed Cromwell
• Quotes have been added to support the article, some maybe big but imo they add allot to the article by being here
• Article expanded considerably to cover the battle in more detail instead of writing the entire battle off to a 15 minute ambush in the morning and two paragraphs covering the rest of the day. Article also covers the lead up the battle, planning etc (Still some things to add in)
• Article now covers both sides of the battle (still a work in progress, a few things to iron out) then simply focusing on the German side
• Article uses more then one main source were possible and does not relay heavily on bias material
• Sections of the article now read more like an encyclopaedia rather then a narrative

The article now attempts to balance out both views from the battle instead of being a pro-German article

• Article now shows that the British were not as incompent as some sources or people would like to state, it is also a dishonour to the people (German and British alike) who fought there to write off half the battle.

I could simply just refer you back to the list of faults I listed for you on your talk page which you deleted as you will not admit there was flaws in the original.

So how is this now a disaster area, please explain?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:14, 15 February 2008 (UTC)

I am not sure what I can say that hasn't been said already.

• The historical context is missing. It used to be there but user EnigmaMcmxc has repeatedly deleted it.
• There is no way to describe the historical context, the outcome of the battle or indeed the scope of what to include without reference to the larger issue of the Normandy strategy. Various authors disgaree about this. We can reference that, or we can suppress it as is now the case.
• The grammar is so appalling it is difficult in many places to understand what is meant.
• There is no attempt to show important disagreements among different sources as to the operation's intentions, the course of the battle, the casualties, etc. It is much more intellectually honest to openly describe where sources disagree than it is to simply declare that one source is wrong and another isn't.
• The organization of the article could be improved.
• Some edits betray an ignorance of military operations.

In no way do I claim the article has some past "perfect" version that is without flaws. Every article on wikipedia can be improved. This one, however, has gone over the cliff in the last two months. There is no point in trying improve it at this time because it will simply lead to wasteful edit wars. I am at a loss as to how to improve this article except by tagging it to encourage others to participate, and working on an alternative version. When that's ready I will propose it as a replacement.

regards, DMorpheus (talk) 18:08, 15 February 2008 (UTC)

“The historical context is missing. It used to be there but user EnigmaMcmxc has repeatedly deleted it. “

What “historical context” would this be. Again like when you just reverted my edits without any just reason this is the cop out line you would throw. Would you care to describe what it is exactly which I removed?

Why don’t you address that you set reverting edits which entered a correct version of events, i.e. Operation Perch, Tilly-sur-Suellles, the entire reason why the Right Hook was launched and why Villers-Bocage was important i.e. to force the Panzer Lehr to withdraw and to enable to the British divisions to carry the advance to encircle Caen.

“There is no way to describe … the outcome of the battle or indeed the scope of what to include without reference to the larger issue of the Normandy strategy.”

So your saying you cant describe that the British wanted to capture Caen, that they failed to do so, that this battle was an important part of Operation Perch which was attempting to do so without going into an in-depth analysis and comparison of weather or not D’Este is correct or weather or not, Monty, Bradley, Ike, Sandhusrt and countless other authors since the war till now are correct?

“Various authors disgaree about this. We can reference that, or we can suppress it as is now the case.”

As already discussed, discussing what the Normandy strategy was – Dempsey or Bradley to brake out – what does that have to do with this battle? The battle wasnt even a brakeout attempt, neither was the operation, its goal was to capture caen.

“The grammar is so appalling it is difficult in many places to understand what is meant.”

Really now, why don’t you give some examples. Considering the grammar is being improved on a constant basis, what is it you are finding so hard to understand?

“There is no attempt to show important disagreements among different sources as to the operation's intentions, the course of the battle, the casualties, etc. It is much more intellectually honest to openly describe where sources disagree than it is to simply declare that one source is wrong and another isn't.”

Have you actually read the current version of the article? One which has within the main text in several places stating that some sources state something to the contory? Or footnotes which reference this? If you have new information on the casualties why don’t you post them here or edit them into the article. So far ive used several sources to get to the casualty figures we currently have, its not like I can do any more, however if figures are clearly wrong even if they are in a book am not going to blindly follow them and write them in.

For an example, when editing the casualties for the Second El Alamien article, one sources states that over 1000 axis guns were lost – should I post that because a source states so? Or should I use my own judgment and note that other sources state lower numbers of guns destroyed and one source states quite clearly there was never that many there?

Do you think i should really go into a detailed rant to show that Forty states an extra man was a causalty in comparison to the 4CLY war dairy which shows one less? Would you even care to suggest where the casualties are wrong or in disbute?

“The organization of the article could be improved.”

Care to make a suggestion then?

“Some edits betray an ignorance of military operations.”

Care to provide an example?

“In no way do I claim the article has some past "perfect" version that is without flaws.”

Funny how you claim the past version is the “Valid Version” on your userpage...

“This one, however, has gone over the cliff in the last two months. There is no point in trying improve it at this time because it will simply lead to wasteful edit wars.”

Why because its been improved an expanded upon, because it isn’t so bias no more, because the mounds of errors have been removed… Should it be noted as well that most of these wasteful edits was because you refused to allow any improvements be made to this article?

How about you provide some indeapth examples, i did for the "valid version" on your userpage but you deleted it ...

“I am at a loss as to how to improve this article except by tagging it to encourage others to participate, and working on an alternative version.”

Tagging it, lets discuss these then: Neutrality: I agree it should be there for a short while until the article is no more anti British and provides view points from all angels. “All or part of this article may be confusing or unclear.” Article is being improved upon all the time, grammar is being improved upon all the time and unneeded text and links are being removed, this tag appears to have no use here … apart from yourself stating the grammar is atrocious and you don’t understand anything … although you haven’t actually provided any examples of this. “factual accuracy”: The entire article is factually correct, more could be added however but that doesn’t warrant this tag. Unless of course you don’t believe and have evidence to prove to the contory that, Operation Perch happened, orders were given to capture the town to force the Panzer Lehr to withdraw, the events which happened on both sides up to the fighting in the town, that Wittmann attacked, the events which happened on the hill, the afternoon fighting etc etc “This article needs additional citations for verification.” Well it use too … when there was absolutely nothing in this, however now there are multiple sources and footnotes for practically everything so why is this needed?

“This article or section is in need of attention from an expert on the subject.” This is the only one I agree should be there, so that the article can be even more improved upon. --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:02, 15 February 2008 (UTC)

Thanks, you've confirmed the accuracy of my comments on this page. Cheers. DMorpheus (talk) 20:26, 15 February 2008 (UTC)

Once again you just dismiss everything and address nothing, once again reverting edits to add back in what are now redundent tags and is essentially vandilism. Is there any point in even attempting to work with you, every attempt i have made you just ignore. Above i have asked you to provide some examples to support your critasims and you provde nothing other then a cope out sentance in which you state i have confirmed what you have said....--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:50, 15 February 2008 (UTC)

I've tried engaging you in a discussion of this but yes, you are correct, I've failed utterly. It's sort of like the Monty Python 'argument' skit. I pose an issue and you say "no it's not". This isn't discussion, it's simple contradiction. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 21:01, 15 February 2008 (UTC)

If you are unable to answer the most basic questions, as in ... back up what you are saying with an example (i.e you saying the grammar is rubbish, give an example of where. You saying extremely critical information is missing, give some sort of example) then yes your right there is no point in continuing in discussing anything--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:09, 15 February 2008 (UTC)

website of possible interest

Hi have you seen this one it covers the earl days of june 44 http://www.dickinsons-of-whitfield.org/NBL_Hussars.html js1 19:26, 2 April 2008 (UTC)

British unit names

Is it 'Queens' or 'Queen's' Royal Regiment? I am seeing it both ways in various references (and in the article). Likewise is it 131 Infantry Brigade or 131 (Queen's) Brigade? Anyone have an authoritative reference? DMorpheus (talk) 18:58, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

The full title of the regiment is the Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey), shortend to the Queen's Royal Regiment or the battalion number and the word Queens i.e. 1/5 Queen's. You will see most sources refer to it as the latter two. Likewise the brigade is the 131st Infantry Brigade, however while the 3 battalions of the Queen's Regiment were what comprised it, sources call it the 131st (Queen's) Infantry Brigade.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:07, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

Just doublechecking - you've got it both ways in your response. Which is correct? Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 19:35, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

As far as i currently understand and i have not seen anything to condradict this, the terms are essentially interchangable for the regiment. Somewhat confusing the OH refers to them as the Queens Regiment, which to add to the confusion was iirc another regiment entirley formed after the war when the Queens Royal Rgt merged with some other one :S

Likewise from what i have seen, the term 131st Brigade or 131st (Queen's) Brigade are used interchangeably for the period the Brigade was made up of battalions from that regiment.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:42, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

Problematic paragraph

"The four tanks of the command group parked in the town and the crews dismounted. The men and vehicles of the battle group did not form an all-around defence as doctrine demanded; local security was poor and no proper reconnaissance of Point 213 was done. [56]"

I have noted this several times in the edit summaries however you appear to be ignoring them so here it is.

The end of the section is summing up the locations of the formations at 0900 and then you decide to throw this piece of information on at the end, making the end of the section not flow correctly into the next section. I have repeatly stated that the reconnaissance portion has already been mentioned further up within the Opening Moves section, why not move it there and write it in and the same with the men dismounting from there vechiles etc

On top of that, is there evidence from British training pamphlets to support this claim by D'Este that for a temporaty stop the men should dig in and form all round defence?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:15, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

Please refrain from personal attacks.

Tactics for armor/mech units in this sort of situation are pretty standard and have been since before V-B. Standard steps include reconnaissance to at least the next terrain feature. Indeed a large recon element from Corps was attached to 22 Bde group as you've noted. If they were ordered *not* to perform recon (which is not noted in the war diary of the 11th Hussars but....) that would simply be another error made that day. I have nowhere written "digging in". All-round defense is standard in a halt also. For mounted units that can be as simple as locating your vehicles in firing positions covering all likely avenues of approach. Note Wittman's comments that he couldn't believe the relaxed, unalert state of the British units; the fact that no warning was provided to the main element of the attack; the Division and Army commanders' own admission of their units' poor tactics. All of this us quoted elsewhere in the article and in the sources. I.e., it is all very, very well supported. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 19:34, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

Am not making personal attacks am noting i have attempted to bring this to your attention however you have up to now not followed up.

The general fault with your line of thought in your reply there is, the Hussars were not tasked with recon into Villers-Bocage they were out on the flanks. The 4CLY, whom you have stated conducted no recon have evidence to support they were ordered not to do so and get the objective ASAP as noted within the article.

What am saying is, plonking this on the end of the seciton is rather probamatic for the flow of the article and should be moved further up and wrote in with what is already there.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:48, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

I have removed the paragraph from the end of the section and wrote it into the article, as well as using the citation to support other paragraphs instead of going over the same thing again.

However am still unsure on this claim that the Rifle Brigade did not follow doctrine and form all round defence. First off, the first Sabre Squadron of the Yeomanry had taken up hull down positions on the ridge so there front was covered. Behind them were the headquarters and recce sections along with the other Sabre Squadrons of the Yeomanry so there rear was covered. Flanking them was tall hedges and they moved off to the side of the road to allow passage of the 4CLY when they were going to carry on the advance presumably after the officer’s conference.

With flanks, front and rear presumably secure and ordered to the side of the road is it not harsh to criticise their actions? I guess the second question would be, where were they suppose to take such action?

With a bit of look there official history will cover this which i should be getting my hands on very soon--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 10:54, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

The Division commander said himself that he would not attempt to defend their poor tactics. The Army commander called the conduct of the battle "appalling". Wittman wrote that the British were unready. It doesn't really matter what I think, those three are enough. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 14:32, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

That doesn’t answer the question however.

To counter it, considering Wittmann thinks the British were unready for battle: the tanks on the hill took up hull down positions and had engaged a German staff car. The regiments commander was sent up there to ensure the squadron was in as best a position as possible and an officers meeting was being undertaken to plan the next steps. On top of that within 15 minutes his attack was repulsed, as the men on the ground were on the ball. You may have a quote from Dempsey saying the battle was handled appalling but the facts are, the town was held all day and serious losses were inflicted upon the German forces. --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:43, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

On the contrary, I have answered the question in the only way that matters. The published sources are pretty consistent in saying that the 7th Armoured Division handled this whole encourter very badly. Whether you or I agree doesn't matter; that's OR. When a brigade has the incredible opportunity the British had, and squanders it because of a handful of enemy tanks, that's "appalling" and a "disgrace" in Dempsey's own words. As other sources have shwon, there were *dozens* of vehicles present capable of knocking out Wittman's tank but they didn't until a lot of damage had been done. And nothing that happened on the 13th compelled the British to withdraw. The British chose to reinforce failure in the 50th Div instead of potential success in the 7th AD. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 15:48, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

No you’re jumping all over the place and not answering the question. Does your response there have anything to with the initial actions of the Rifle Brigade?

What does Corps decisions regarding weather to carry the attacks behind the 7th or 50th have to do with the Rifle Brigades position? Your still sticking to the Wittmann myth: "squanders it because of a handful of enemy tanks" the Brigade group retreated from Villers-Bocage because they were under attack from elements of two divisions and a heavy armoured battalion not a handful of tanks.

This is where again i question your POV on this subject, there is enough quotes and published material which shows that the men on the ground fought well, inflicted heavy losses on the Germans ... consecutively for two whole days ... yet you would rather stick with a quote from a man who was not there as that keeps up the appearance that the British were incompetent and fought like pants.

As for Fireflys and 6 pounders, your splitting hairs now ... B Squadrons Firefly was brought up as quickly as possible and A Squadrons were cut off along with at least one destroyed. The fact the men rallied and got a 6 pounder set up to engage Wittmanns tank on the way out, that Fireflys were brought forward ASAP shows that they didn’t sit there and act "appalling" or in a "disgraceful" way--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:24, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

You asked "What does Corps decisions regarding weather to carry the attacks behind the 7th or 50th have to do with the Rifle Brigades position?"

Everything. Read Weigley, who explicitly points out that, rather than reinforce the 7AD's success at V-B, the Corps commander reinforced failure in the 50ID's area instead. Weigley goes on to say that the Corps commander (Bucknall) could have viewed 7AD as vulnerable, stuck out on a limb at V-B.... *or*, with equal logic, as a spearhead stuck into an open German flank, i.e., a great opportunity. He chose the less aggressive option. That Corps chose to reinforce 50ID instead of 7AD directly created the situation in which V-B had to be given up due to lack of reinforcements. Had they reinforced, they might have held and gone on to continue offensive action. By the way, this also proves that reinforcements were available, as I've noted before.

You asked: "Your still sticking to the Wittmann myth: "squanders it because of a handful of enemy tanks" the Brigade group retreated from Villers-Bocage because they were under attack from elements of two divisions and a heavy armoured battalion not a handful of tanks."

Let's back up. The Caumont gap opened beginning June 10 or so. On the night of June 12, 22 Bde group halted for the night at 8pm rather than pressing on although they were only about 5km from their main objective. When they arrived, instead of scouting ahead or driving north-east, they relaxed. Wittman attacked with one tank in the morning and a reinforced platoon-sized element in the afternoon. In the critical period, the British attack was stopped by lack of aggressiveness (see Hansen, Weigley, D'Este, Dempsey for instance) and a few german tanks. Later, yes, weak elements of two divisions reinforced. By the time that happened, the best opportunity had already slipped away. Nevertheless, additional units could have been sent to reinforce the right hook at V-B instead of continuing to feed a losing cause in the 50ID area.

On the 14th you have elements of additional units on both sides involved. The British chose to give up their advantage rather than press it.

You wrote: "This is where again i question your POV on this subject, there is enough quotes and published material which shows that the men on the ground fought well, inflicted heavy losses on the Germans ... consecutively for two whole days ... yet you would rather stick with a quote from a man who was not there as that keeps up the appearance that the British were incompetent and fought like pants."

Obviously each of us has a POV. The point is to show what the published sources say. I have quoted the British commanders themselves saying their tactics were awful; that they should have succeeded and didn't because of their own "disgrace"-ful conduct of the battle (Dempsey). If you substitute your opinion for those, that is the definition of POV and OR. The issue is not how many men or tanks were lost, it is the operational situation. Once the Caumont gap opened, there was *nothing* stopping US or British units from charging forward, taking V-B, and turning northeast to Caen. That's exactly the situation armored divisions are created for - exploiting a gap to create operational success. A great opportunity to cave in a German divisional front and possibly take Caen was thrown away. That's the point; that is why the German achievement matters. It is immaterial how many tanks anyone knocked out.

You wrote: "As for Fireflys and 6 pounders, your splitting hairs now ..."

I have no idea what you mean. The 22Bde group was equipped with Sherman fireflies, Cromwells, Stuarts, M10s and towed 6-pounders. With the exception of the Stuarts, all those vehicles could knock out a Tiger in the flank at the extreme short range this battle was fought. The fireflies could do it at long range.

You wrote: "B Squadrons Firefly was brought up as quickly as possible and A Squadrons were cut off along with at least one destroyed. The fact the men rallied and got a 6 pounder set up to engage Wittmanns tank on the way out, that Fireflys were brought forward ASAP shows that they didn’t sit there and act "appalling" or in a "disgraceful" way

Dempsey and Erskine both disagree with you. There was a Firefly in every platoon (troop) not one per company (squadron)....so where were all the others? Had they deployed correctly at least one would have been in firing position already when Wittman appeared.

Given the comments of their own commanders, as well as their opponents, there is simply no escaping the conclusion that 7AD and the Corps commander screwed up badly for several days climaxing on the 13th-14th. That's not a comment on the courage of the men, it is a well-supported assessment of their officers' decisions that day. Dempsey relieved both shortly afterward, again supporting this conclusion both with his words and his deeds.

Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 14:24, 20 March 2008 (UTC)

You are again ignoring the question asked regarding the Rifle Brigade. What does the decision made by the Corps commander or the Divisional commander have to do with the decision for the Rifle Brigade to park up along side the road? This is what I questioned you about and you harp on about other things. Same with the orders for no recon of the hill and ridgeline, you come back with evidence showing the Hussars had no orders to not conduct recon … they weren’t there!

Regarding the Fireflys, no where did I state there was one per squadron. A Squadron was on the ridgeline with there rear Firefly taken out blocking the route back to town. Fireflys from B Squadron were brought up ASAP to combat the Tiger and the men in the Cromwells attempted it themselves along with a 6 pounder being set up to combat it. That counters the nonsense that the men on the scene sat there and methodically took it up the rear end.

Regarding Point of View pushing, I would rather talk about the truth … your pushing one sided opinions. You have done so since this has begun, you would rather have quotes and text which show the men of the 7th Armoured Division fought like crap then provide some text or quotes which show the opposite. Anything to the contrary of they fought like a bag of shit and you claim it is original research.

“On the night of June 12, 22 Bde group halted for the night at 8pm rather than pressing on although they were only about 5km from their main objective. When they arrived, instead of scouting ahead or driving north-east, they relaxed.”

They relexed? They had just fought for control of a village and then formed up for the night so they wouldn’t be marching through the dark to the town, which iirc is agaisnt doctrine is it not? They were also strung out and it took them until after midnight to form up. The decission for which, Hinde states was so they would be able to retain the initative the next morning. It was also more like 8km away not five and took them several hours to get there when they moved off during the morning. EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:04, 20 March 2008 (UTC)

website of possible interest

Hi have you seen this one it covers the early days of June 44 in what appears to be an area you have an interest in http://www.dickinsons-of-whitfield.org/NBL_Hussars.html , js1 19:28, 2 April 2008 (UTC)

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