Akhbari

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Part of a series on Twelver Shi'a Islam The Twelve Imams‎ Ali · Hasan · Husayn al-Sajjad · al-Baqir · al-Sadiq al-Kadhim · al-Rida · al-Taqi al-Hadi · al-Askari · al-Mahdi Concepts‎ Twelve Imams Fourteen Infallibles The Four Deputies Martyrs of Karbala Occultation (Minor · Major) Akhbar · Usul · Ijtihad Taqleed · 'Aql · Irfan Usul al-Din · Furu al-Din Principles‎ Monotheism Judgement Day · Justice Prophethood · Imamate Practices‎ Prayer · Fasting · Pilgramage Charity · Taxes · Jihad Command Justice · Forbid Evil Love the family of Muhammad Dissociate from their Enemies Holy Cities‎ Mecca · Medina · Karbala Jerusalem · Najaf · Qom Samarra · Mashhad Kazamayn The Four Books‎ Book of Fundamentals The Book in Scholar's Lieu Civilization of Laws The Certainty Other Books‎ Peak of Eloquence The Pslams of Islam Book of Sulaym ibn Qays Oceans of Light Wasael ush-Shia Reality of Certainty Keys of Paradise Schools‎ Usuli · Shaykhi · Akhbari Scholars‎ Ayatollah · Marja Mujtahid · Hojatoleslam Allamah List of Ayatollahs List of marjas Movements‎ Nimatullahi · Safaviya Qizilbash · Alevism · Alawism Bektashi · Ahl-e Haqq This box: view • talk • edit

Akhbaris (traditionalists) are Twelver Shi'a Muslims who reject the use of reasoning in the creation of new laws, and believe only the Quran and hadith (the prophetic sayings, and recorded opinions of the imams) should be used as sources of law.^[1] They form a minority within Shiism, with Usulis making up the majority. Unlike the Usulis, Akhbari Shi'a do not follow Marjas who practice Ijtihad.

The Akhbari movement emerged in eighteenth-century Iraq, but is found today primarily in the island nation of Bahrain^[2], with the Usuli school being dominant elsewhere in the Shia world. Following the Iranian Revolution the Usuli school has gained popularity among previously Akhbari communities.^[3]

Contents 1 Background 2 The first transgression 3 The second transgression 4 The third transgression 5 The fourth transgression 6 The fifth transgression 7 Rejection of the Mujtahids 8 The arguments 8.1 Pro-Akhbari arguments 8.2 Anti-Akhbari arguments 9 References

[edit] Background

In addition to fatwa based on ijtihad, Akhbari also reject the permissibility of writing exegesis of the holy Qur'an without quoting the narrations of the infallible ahlulbayt; presenting in support of this belief, hadith ath thaqalayn and several authentic traditions of the infallible Imams which clearly prohibit the practice of tafsir (exegesis) of Quran by fallible ones. In short, the gist of Akhbari ideology is that nothing but Hadith of the infallibles can serve as authoritative evidence in Islam. Akhabris also differ from Usulis in their rejection of Wilayat al-Faqih, arguing that preachers of religion have no role in politics, as is evidenced by the lives of the infallible imams and their followers.

Usoolism evolved on the basis of hypothetical concepts and perceptions of some scholars, centuries after the major occultation. Among the earliest Shi'a Ulama such as Kulayni and Ibn Babawaiyya, the most important activity was transmission of hadith.^[4]

At this time Shi'a distinguished themselves from the Sunni law which employed such methods as qiyas (analogical reasoning) and ijtihad (innovative exegesis), Shi'a developed law directly from the traditions of the Imams.^[4]

Initially during the Buyid period it was considered by the Twelver ulama that since the Imam had gone into occultation and there was no longer present his Naib al-Khass, all the functions invested in the Imam had lapsed (saqit). The principal functions of the Imam were:

1. Leading the Holy War (jihad)
2. Division of the booty (qismat al-fay)
3. Leading the Friday Prayer (salat al-juma)
4. Putting judicial decisions into effect (tanfidh al-ahkam)
5. Imposing legal penalties (iqamat al-hudud)
6. Receiving the religious taxes of zakat and khums.^[5]

However, it soon became apparent that the situation caused by lapse of functions of the hidden Imam was extremely impractical and left the Twelver Shia community at a great disadvantage, with no leadership, no organization and no financial structure.^[5]

While most perceived this as beginning of the age of Ghaibah; some saw opportunity and some unknowingly created room for opportunities to come.

[edit] The first transgression

As early as 5th / 11th century (more than a 150 years after Ghaibah), Shaykhu-t-Ta'ifa reinterpreted the doctrine to allow delegation of the Imam's judicial authority to those who had studied fiqh. Although he implies in his writings that this function should only be undertaken by the ulama if there is no one else to do it. Shaykhu-t-Taifa considered the ulama as best people to act as agents of the donor in distributing the religious taxes since they knew to whom it should be distributed; but nevertheless individuals were free to do this themselves if they wished. He allowed fuqaha to organize the Friday prayers in absence of the Imam or his (Imam's) special representative.

The prominent Shia scholars who rejected this thesis were:

1. `Alam Al-Huda
2. Ibn Idris
3. Allamah Al-Hilli^[6]

It is to be noted that 'Alam Al-Huda was from among the Shaykhu-t-Taifa's group.

[edit] The second transgression

By 7th / 13th century (i.e., 200 years after the first transgression), Muhaqqiq Al-Hilli was able to advance these concepts very considerably. He extended the judicial role of the ulama to iqamat al-hudud the imposition of penalties by ulama themselves. In his writings it is possible to see the evolution in his thinking whereby the fuqaha develop from the deputies of the donor for the distribution of religious taxes in his early writings to being the deputies of the Hidden Imam for collection and distribution of the taxes in his later works.^[7] In effect, transgressing the limits set by Shaykh-u-Taifa (two centuries earlier) in his first transgression.

[edit] The third transgression

Muhaqqiq al-Karkhi (About 300 years after the second transgression) was the first to suggest, arguing from the hadith of Umar ibn Hanzala, that the ulama were the Na'ib al-'Amm (general representative) of the Hidden Imam. But he restricted his application of this argument to the assumption of the duty of leading Friday prayers.^[7]

[edit] The fourth transgression

It was Shahid ath-Thani who took the concept of Na'ib al-'Amm to its logical conclusion in the religious sphere and applied it to all of the religious functions and prerogatives of the Hidden Imam. Thus the judicial authority of the ulama now became a direct reflection of the authority of the Imam himself. It was now obligatory to pay the religious taxes directly to the ulama as the trustees of the Imam for distribution, and the donor who distributed these himself was considered to obtain no reward. (This is in direct contradiction to limits set by prior transgressions)

Furthermore, Shahid ath-Thani extended the range of those eligible to receive money from zakat to include the tullab (religious students) and the ulama themselves, who thus became the recipients of the money as trustees of students. Even in the field of defensive jihad, Shahid ath-Thani identified a role for the ulama. Only in the field of offensive jihad did he allow that the role of Hidden Imam had lapsed pending his return.^[7]

Although the aforementioned scholars were not mujtahids in their full capacity, they introduced innovative concepts into Shia theology which later formed the basis of the ijtihadi school. Their innovations were sharply criticized by prominent Shia scholars of their time and thus, remained mostly theoretical.

The ulama of this period were overshadowed by the towering figure of Allamah Muhammad Baqir Majlisi (1616-1698)^[8] Whose rejection of the emerging doctrine of ijtihad overwhelmed the attempts of the group of ulama with usooli tendencies (who were then in minority). However, after the death of Allamah Muhammad Baqir Majlisi, the influence of usooli way of thinking was increasing due to its promising nature towards the unconditional supremacy of ulama and the deal of freedom of practice it had to offer.

The traditional Shia doctrine was, by its nature, fatal to leadership of any regime except that of Imam Al-Mahdi since they believed that an Islamic state can be established only under the leadership of an infallible Imam. Thus, Shias had little role to play in supporting the decisions of the state, in contrast with the Sunni tendency of offering their full support to the Ottoman Empire. This caused a great deal of paranoia to the states where the Shia were in majority. By the end of Safavid era the situation had become intense due to the rise of imperialism on a global scale. It was necessary to develop an alternate ideology for the survival of Iranian state. This is when a group of ulama were encouraged to squeeze out the possibility of extending the state's control over the shia majority; by whatever means necessary.

The revival of Akbharism, or 'neo-Akbarism', as it became known, was under the dean of Karbala scholarship, Yusuf Al Bahrani (1695-1772), who led an intellectual assault on Usooli thought in the mid-eighteenth century. An Akhbari critique of Usoolism had emerged in Bahrain at the beginning of the eighteenth century, partly spurred by the weaknesses of the Usooli sponsoring Safavid empire^[9]. By succeeding to the role of dean of Karbala as one of the pre-eminent scholars of the age, Al Bahrani's extended this Bahrain-based debate to the rest of the Shi'i world. Historian Juan Cole summarises Al Bahrani's thought:

“

Al-Bahrani's neo-Akhbarism accepted only two sources for Imami jurisprudence, the Qur'an and the oral reports from the Imams. He did not, however, go so far as to say that no verse in the Qur'an could be understood without the interpretation of the Imams, a position held by the Safavid-era Akhbari revivalist Astarabadi which Shaykh Yusuf denounced as extremist. He rejected the Usuli principles of consensus (ijma`) and independent reasoning (`aql, ijtihad). Indeed, he questioned rationalist approaches to religion in general, quoting with approval a condemnation of reading philosophy and theosophy. But Shaykh Yusuf accepted the validity of Friday prayers in the Occultation and did not completely reject Usuli positions on other issues. His Bahrani neo-Akhbarism sought to be an intermediate path between extremist Usulism and extremist Akhbarism[10].

”

Under Al Bahrani, usooli scholarship was considered impure and it was not until the 1760s that an usooli cell was founded in Karbala. It was founded by Mohammad Baqir ibn Mohammad Akmal al-Wahid Bahbahani who challenged and eventually succeeded Al Bahrani as the most influential cleric in Karbala in 1772^[11]. He led a campaign for propagation of usooli tendencies and worked extensively to crystallize usoolism into a full fledged school to offer an alternative state-friendly version of shia fiqh. And earned the titles Mu'assis (founder of Usooli school), Murawwij (propagator) and Mujaddid.

The Qajar rulers perceived this innovation as the only hope for gaining full control over the Shia Majority in the country and offered their full support to Wahid Bahbahani's group.

Wahid Bahbahani surrounded himself with a corps of mirghadabs, servants who would carry out either corporal or capital punishment, and had his judgments carried out immediately and usually in his presence.^[12] In effect, gathering for his school a paramilitary force.

However, Bahbahani's deviation in theology was not welcomed by ulama who stood fast with the original Shia doctrines and rejected earlier transgressions too. This group of traditional Shia ulama came to be known as Akhbari or the traditionalists.

Although this controversy had begun as a minor disagreement on a few points, it eventually grew into a bitter vituperative dispute culminating in Bahbahani's declaration that the Akhbaris were infidels.^[8] Subsequently, ulama who did not accept Bahbahani's authority were executed for their infidelity.

At first the Akhbaris predominated at the shrine cities of Iraq but it was Bahbahani who, at the end of 18th century, reversed this and completely routed the Akhbaris at Karbala and Najaf. South Iraq, Bahrain and a few cities in Iran such as Kirman remained Akhbari strongholds for a few more decades but eventually the usooli triumph was complete and only a handful of Shia ulama remained Akhbari to the present day.^[8]

After the theological coup brought about by Wahid Bahbahani by military methods, the usooli school became instrumental to the Iranian regime. An example of its vital application can be seen below:

[edit] The fifth transgression

During the first Russo-Persian War (1804-1813), Fath Ali Shah's son and heir, Abbas Mirza (who was conducting the campaign) turned to the (new) ulama and obtained from Shayk Ja'far Kashiful Ghita and other eminent clerics in Najaf and Isfahan a declaration of jihad against the Russians, thus implicitly recognizing their authority to issue such a declaration – one of the functions of the Hidden Imam. Kashiful Ghita used the opportunity to extract from the state acknowledgment of the ulama's right to collect the religious taxes of Khums.^[13]

This followed the pattern of other transgressions by overthrowing the limits of its prior (fourth) transgression.

[edit] Rejection of the Mujtahids

Akhbaris reject and even curse at the mujtahids. They practice this based on the last letter Imam Mehdi (as) wrote to Ali son of Mohammad (4th deputy in smaller occultation).

In the letter Imam Zaman (AS) said:

“If someone claims himself as deputy of Imam (naiib-e- Imam) during occultation is a liar, ousted from Allah’s religion, calumniating Allah, he himself has gone astray and is leading others into error too. He will always be in loss. Be Curse unto him of mine, of Allah, of Allah’s Rasool (SW) and of his Progeny (AS) for every moment, and in all circumstances”.

(Bihar Al-Anwar by Allamah Majlisi (ra))

Akhbaris claim that the Imams (as) are the "ayatullahs" based on hadith-e-tariq (sermon of Imam Ali (as)) which is found in Nahj ul Israr (See Hadith Below). They say that no one else can ascribe themselves to this divine title. When you look at history, it wasn't until the early 1800s that the mujtahids started to call themselves "ayatullahs".

Hadith-e-Tariq:

O Tariq, Imam (as) is the Kalematullah (Word of Allah), Wajullah (Face of Allah), Hijabullah (Veil of Allah), Noorullah (Light of Allah), AYATULLAH (Sign of Allah)

[edit] The arguments

[edit] Pro-Akhbari arguments

1. It can be noticed that the Usuli ulama have usurped one by one all the functions of the Hidden Imam; virtually ascribing themselves with his Imamate.
2. Since Bahbahani's coup, the Usuli ulama have made countless transgressions from Wilayat al-Faqih to Ittihad Bayn al-Muslimeen (at the cost of Shia beliefs). The convergence of these trends can be seen heading towards the caliphate of mujahideen, although with a different naming scheme.
3. The Usuli allegation that Akhbari Shias were a movement that started four centuries ago and was intellectually defeated is a false and desperate attempt to hide the uninspiring past of the Usuli sect. Akhbarism was in fact strict adherence to the original Shia doctrines and rejection of far reaching opportunistic innovations.
4. It is established that generalization that causes a fallible man's decision to gain the status of divine law is against the gist of Shia Islam. The Usuli appeal to "reason" ('Aql) is in fact the Sunni qiyas under another name, though all early Shia authorities are unanimous in rejecting qiyas.

[edit] Anti-Akhbari arguments

Akhbaris claim to follow Hadith directly, without the need for generalisation, or of finding the reason for the decision. This, according to Usulis, is a logical impossibility. Hadith takes the form of case law, that is to say the narration of decisions taken in a concrete situation. To "follow" such a decision one must know which features of the situation are or are not relevant to the decision, as the exact same set of facts will never occur twice. Therefore some degree of generalisation is unavoidable, even on the most literal view: the choice is simply between mechanical generalisation and intelligent generalisation.

An example often cited in argument by Usulis concerns the practice of Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq, who buried his son Isma'il ibn Jafar in a winding-sheet containing the inscription "Ismail testifies that there is no God but God". Ever since, Akhbaris have traditionally buried their dead with that inscription, with the name "Ismail", regardless of the name of the deceased. Usulis point out that Ismail was actually the name of the son who was buried: their winding sheets therefore substitute the proper name of the deceased.^[14]

Regarding Islamic laws, there are various issues faced by Muslims in their daily lives. e.g. Doubts in Namaz and their corrections, Conditions which invalidate a fast and the relevant compensations, Rulings visavis correctness or incorrectness of various social and business practices e.g. Investing in Mutual Funds, Use of alcohol based perfumes and medicines, etc. Akhbari's have no basis on which to interpret hadith on these issues since a lot of them would not have been mentioned in any hadith. And secondly, it would require deep knowledge of the life histories of narrators of these hadith to separate strong hadith's from weak hadith's.

[edit] References