Waiting period (Six-Day War)
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The waiting period (Hebrew: תקופת ההמתנה,Tkufat HaHamtana) is the name given in Israel to the period which began on May 15, 1967, with Egypt's crossing of the Suez canal into the Sinai peninsula, and ended on June 5, with the break of the Six-Day War.
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[edit] Early military moves
On May 17 Gamal Abdel Nasser demanded that the United Nations emergency force of about 4,000 men in Sinai and in the Gaza Strip withdraw. Despite efforts from Abba Eban, the UN forces did evacuate its troops a few days later. Israel military commentators and political officials nevertheless believed that Egypt would not open a front against Israel, due to its involvement in the North Yemen Civil War.[1]
However, when Nasser declared that his forces were withdrawing from Yemen and making their way to Sinai, Israel drafted every fit man, which led to an economic paralyzation. No emergency was felt on the Jordanian border. Tourists kept crossing the Mandelbaum Gate, although there were reports of Jordanian Legion forces moving from Amman to towards Judea and Samaria. Meanwhile, Egypt seized Sharm e-Sheikh.[1]
Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to passage of Israeli ships, as well as strategic materials delivered to Israel by non-Israeli ships. This was considered by Israel a Casus belli. Nasser's move was supported by Moscow, while the United States warned Israel and Egypt not to take military action. Speaking before the Knesset, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol tried to calm down the situation by assuring the Arab states that Israel wasn't seeking war. Still, Israel continued to prepare for war.[1]
Israeli scholar Avner Cohen has argued that this period was also crucial to Israel's nuclear policy, and that the anxiety led Israel to advance towards "operational readiness" of its nuclear option.[2]
[edit] Political moves
Calls were growing in Jerusalem for unity government, with the National Religious Party calling for an emergency government. Old rivals David Ben-Gurion and Menachem Begin met in Sde Boker, where Begin asked Ben-Gurion to join Eshkol's government. Although Eshkol's Mapai party initially opposed the widening of its government, it eventually changed its mind.[1]
On May 23, chief of general staff Yitzhak Rabin met with Ben-Gurion to ask for reassurance. Ben-Gurion, however, accused him of putting the country in mortal jeopardy by mobilizing the reserves and openly preparing for war against a coalition of Arab states, saying that at the very least, Rabin should have obtained the support of a foreign power as he himself had done during the Sinai Campaign 11 years earlier. Rabin was shaken by the meeting and took to his bed for 36 hours, in what became known as the 'nicotine poisoning' incident.[3] Rabin turned to Ezer Weizman and asked him to replace him as Chief of Staff. Weizman refused, saying that it would be a severe blow to the IDF.[4]
Meanwhile, Eban went to the US and met three times with Secretary of State Dean Rusk. However, Washington announced that it would intervene on Israel's behalf only if the USSR joined the fighting. President of the United States Lyndon B. Johnson asked Israel not to start a military operation, promising to provide Israel with oil.[1]
[edit] The national unity government and the drift to war
On the evening of May 28, Eshkol gave a radio address to the nation. During the preparation of the speech several versions were drafted after Eshkol had proofread it. When he reached the paragraph in which a correction was made, and the words "withdrawing forces" were changed to "moving forces", Eshkol began to hesitate, not understanding that a correction was made. The entire country heard him stammer in front of the live microphone.[1] This address became known as the "stammer address".
On May 29 the Haaretz newspaper wrote in the main editorial that "Mr. Eshkol is not built to be the prime minister and the security minister in the current situation". Eshkol speeched in the Knesset and tried to calm the public that "it is reasonable to expect that the states that support in the principle of the freedom of sailing, will do and will coordinate an efficient action in order to ensure that the straits and the bay will be open to the passage of the ships of all the nations without discrimination". But the internal pressure continued. On June 1 Eshkol didn't see a choice, and gave the security portfolio to Moshe Dayan. Also were joined to the government Gahal representatives Menachem Begin and Yosef Sapir, and were appointed to ministers without portfolio.[1] It was the first unity government that was established in the State of Israel, and in this time was called Memshelet Likud Leumi. Meanwhile, in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, people began digging trenches filled with sandbags.[1]
On June 2, Eshkol convened the security cabinet along with the IDF's General Staff at the Tel Aviv headquarters. Opposition to an attack came from Mapai's Zalman Aran and the NRP's Haim-Moshe Shapira, who said "I am ready to fight but not to commit suicide." Major-General Motti Hod tried to convince them that an Israeli Air Force attack is necessary. Moshe Peled wondered why Israel is waiting, while Major-General Ariel Sharon said "IDF forces are more prepared than they ever were" to "totally destroy the Egyptian forces". Eshkol remained unconvinced.[5][6]
On June 4, a cabinet session now led by Dayan, decided to embark on a war. On June 5, at 7:45 AM, the war broke.[5]
[edit] References
- ^ a b c d e f g h Druckman, Yaron. "The Six Day War - May 1967, one moment before", Ynetnews, 2007-04-06. Retrieved on 2008-05-23.
- ^ Cohen, Avner. "Going for the nuclear option", Haaretz, 2007-05-22. Retrieved on 2008-05-23.
- ^ Rabinovich, Abraham. "The War Nobody Wanted", Jerusalem Post, 1997-06-13. Retrieved on 2008-05-23.
- ^ In days of threat and waiting. Retrieved on 2008-05-23.
- ^ a b Sofer, Ronny. "Eshkol's steel nerves", Ynetnews, 2007-04-06. Retrieved on 2008-05-23.
- ^ Gluska, Ami. "Israel's Decision to Go to War". Middle East Review of International Affairs 11 (June 2007).

