Talk:United Kingdom general election, 1931

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[edit] Gains/Losses

The modern practice is to ignore changes in both by-elections and sitting MPs alleigances and show the difference from the previous general election (or notional results where there were boundary changes). However the old practice was to regard an MP changing party during the Parliament and holding the seat in their new colours as a "hold". (Complicating things further some MPs, including all the Independent Liberals elected here, changed party after the dissolution and The Times guide seems to regard those as gains.)

Currently the table seems to have a mix - National Labour is shown in the new format with 13 gains, whilst the Liberals and Liberal Nationals are shown in the old format with both having sitting MPs. I think we sould go with the modern convention, although I can see a case for using the old one, but this tables and other elections need a single format to be workable. Timrollpickering 21:12, 4 March 2007 (UTC)

Accepting the points you make about showing gains and losses from the previous general election, the case for not doing so in this instance is to give a far clearer indication of how the particular parties performed. I can understand a case for consistency from one election to the next. To accomodate such a desire, perhaps the way forward would be to ignore changes from by-elections but not to ignore changes in description. (Graemp 12:27, 5 March 2007 (UTC))

[edit] George Orwell

In his essay, The Lion and the Unicorn, George Orwell made some very interesting comments about the 1931 general election (--220.238.136.81 05:04, 19 August 2007 (UTC)):

Up to a point, the sense of national unity is a substitute for a ‘world-view’. Just because patriotism is all but universal and not even the rich are uninfluenced by it, there can be moments when the whole nation suddenly swings together and does the same thing, like a herd of cattle facing a wolf. There was such a moment, unmistakably, at the time of the disaster in France. After eight months of vaguely wondering what the war was about, the people suddenly knew what they had got to do: first, to get the army away from Dunkirk, and secondly to prevent invasion. It was like the awakening of a giant. Quick! Danger! The Philistines be upon thee, Samson! And then the swift unanimous action - and, then, alas, the prompt relapse into sleep. In a divided nation that would have been exactly the moment for a big peace movement to arise. But does this mean that the instinct of the English will always tell them to do the right thing? Not at all, merely that it will tell them to do the same thing. In the 1931 General Election, for instance, we all did the wrong thing in perfect unison. We were as single-minded as the Gadarene swine. But I honestly doubt whether we can say that we were shoved down the slope against our will.

Thanks for the quote. Many electors at the time might have claimed that they were shoved down the slope against their will. This was because many voters had their choices limited by the decision of many local associations not to contest these elections and support candidates from a party that they had previously opposed. The electoral arguement in this election was effectively won by Neville Chamberlain on 'close of nominations day' and what electors thought between then and 'polling day' was largely immaterial. (Graemp)

Well that's one argument, but to be absolutely honest it's doubtful many electors would have had much choice anyway. The Liberal Party was not in the greatest of strengths in 1931, already coming apart over its support for the Labour government and whether to maintain the traditional opposition to tariffs, and it's questionable as to whether there would have been anywhere near the number of three way elections that there were in 1929.

I'd have to check but whilst the National Government certainly had a lot of seats won on nomination day (either unopposed or straight Conservative-Liberal/Liberal National fights) I don't think it had anywhere near the number for an outright majority.

Parties are voluntary organisations and there is no law that says they must fight every seat. They have the right to consider how best to deploy limited resources in the pursuit of their cause - and sometimes the best option is to not fight particular seats but instead support a candidate who can win and is sufficiently agreeable. If voters in particular seats were given little alternative to the National Government then it was the fault of Labour - who in some seats stood down in favour of Samuelite Liberals (and also to conserve resources). Whilst in some seats the result saw little change other than the Conservative and Liberal shares of the vote pooling, in others there was a decisive shift against Labour because voters decided to support the National Government - the shift in opinion Orwell refers to. Timrollpickering 11:12, 21 August 2007 (UTC)

You make some interesting points on the Liberal strength and the consequence of the emergence of a Liberal candidate. The Liberal Party was not as finacially well resourced as 1929, but that is not the reason why few Liberal candidates came forward. Immediately the election was called, a letter went out from Liberal HQ to Liberal Associations advising them to support sitting MPs who backed the National Government. Many Liberal Associations did not put forward candidates as they feared a repeat of 1918 when their candidates had been undercut by the coupon. There were a large number of constituencies where the Liberal candidate who had stood in 1929, stood again in 1935 even though no Liberal candidate stood in 1931. Clearly there were a number of Liberal candidates who would have stood in 1931.

Whilst it was still mathematically possible for the National Government to lose the election after close of nominations, it probably marked the point at which voters had their choice significantly limited. The biggest issue at the time of the election was the debate between Free Trade and Protection. Whilst the Labour party had in the past come down on the side of Free Trade, it was not going to be the issue on which they would go to the wall. Voters were denied the opportunity by the Liberal leadership of voting for Liberal candidates committed to Free Trade.

However, I would be very surprised if Orwell was thinking about Free Trade when he made his comment, which is probably why he made the comment in the first place. (Graemp 19:46, 23 August 2007 (UTC))

I think he's referring to the way the National Government issued a patriotic call and a large part of the nation responded to it. I've read that even the King was not totally impartial in that election - he reminded his private secretary to go and vote for the government. When has any other British sovereign ever canvassed a vote?! As for the biggest issue, the National Government (and I stress the government rather than individual parties in it) really fought seeking a "doctor's mandate" to sort out the economic problems, rather than overtly seeking a mandate for particular remedies like tariffs (although individual parties and especially candidates went much further). Lloyd George, the nominal Liberal leader (it's a little messy to say who precisely was the official Liberal leader - formally the chair of the parliamentary party in the Commons - especially as Lloyd George seems to have fallen out with his colleagues once Parliament was formally dissolved and national parties were not as clearly defined then, with not all leaders having a formal role in their extra-parliamentary national aparatus; but as the outgoing chair in the later parliament Lloyd George would have as strong a claim as any) did call for voters who had no free trade Liberal candidate to vote Labour, so most voters would theoretically have had both options available to them (but how voters were able to tell just which of the three groups the local Liberal candidate was, with very free use of the words "Liberal" and "National", and even Herbert Samuel's election address calling him "the Liberal and National candidate", is a mystery). 1929 was a rarity in that all three parties contested over 500 seats - I don't think there were anything like that many three cornered contests either before or again until 1974 - rather than a rule that was broken in 1931. The Liberals didn't run that many candidates in 1924, another bad year and another time when they'd been splitting and losing blood over support for a Labour government. I forget which Liberal party historian wrote it, but the problems the party and supporters had in the 1929-1931 Parliament were not really debates over "what is the Liberal approach to the problems of the day?" but "would I prefer a Conservative government or a Labour government?" - deadly to a third party and likely to give it a pasting at a normal election without National Governments or coupon style agreed candidacies. Timrollpickering 22:06, 23 August 2007 (UTC)

I think your are right in pointing to what Orwell was probably talking about. I would have thought that despite the National Government's name, it did not really make much of a traditionally 'patriotic' call to the voter (compared to say 1918 or 1945) but as you mentioned, it asked for a blank cheque, I mean a Doctors Mandate. Raising the issue of Lloyd George is interesting as not even at the times when he was at his most Liberal was he particularly bothered about the issue of Free Trade. However, he did understand a key political issue when he saw one. I suspect that if he had not had to temporarily (due to ill health) hand the party leadership over to Samuel, the Liberals would have left the National Government prior to the 1931 election. Then again, had he not fallen ill, Samuel would not have been in the position to initiate with George V the introduction of a National Government. For George Vs main political contribution at this time was not to advise his staff how to vote but to persuade Ramsay Macdonald to continue as PM at the head of a National Government and persuade Baldwin of the merits of the Conservatives joining him. Of course, Baldwin was later to get his own back on the royal family's interference in politics by interfereing in the royal succession! (Graemp 17:16, 24 August 2007 (UTC))

I'm not sure I agree - in the political discourse of the time a "National Government" meant a government of unity to tackle a national crisis. So by its very name the government was making a patriotic call. And also the attacks on Labour for deserting office were a charge of dereliction of duty - an unpatriotic act.

You're right that given his track record Lloyd George chose a very strange cause to go into total wilderness on, although the split between him and Samuel was really whether the introduction of tariffs was best opposed from the opposition benches of the Commons or in Cabinet - an issue that would not matter in the long run, allowing for reunification. As for what Lloyd George would have done if he'd been well - who knows? It's possible he might have successfully pushed for the premiership himself in the negotiations, equally it's possible that his presence would have made it much harder for Baldwin and the Conseratives to come in, or that the National Government would have remained the short term expediency of a few weeks that it was announced as. But as for Baldwin it's not clear that he felt he was being pushed into second place by the King - splitting off the leading Labour figures from the party was good for the Conservatives electorally, whilst the National Government could also serve to marginalise the die-hard wing of the Conservatives - throughout the 1930s many in that part of the party agitated for a "return to party politics" as they thought they'd have more influence in a party government. Timrollpickering 18:03, 24 August 2007 (UTC)

Fortunatly for Baldwin, he was not experiencing many problems with his right wing at this point. However, there were more than enough reasons to enable Chamberlain and George V to persuade Baldwin of the merits of a National Government. I erred in my 'what would Lloyd George have done' analysis; Had Lloyd George not been ill, I doubt if the National Government would have come about in the first place. I also made the mistake of belittleing Lloyd George's position and I think you followed suite. He was, with the possible exception of one or two Labour Ministers, the only politician at the time to dispute the so-called professional but traditionally orthodox economic advice being offered by civil servants backed by Snowden. It is ironic that the three most politically dynamic individuals of the time, with the necessary drive to follow an alternative economic course (namely Lloyd George, Mosley and Churchill) were all for various reasons 'out of the loop' and instead, the three main parties were all being led (however, in Labour's case they chose not to follow) by uninspiring economic conservatives; Snowden, Samuel and Chamberlain. (Graemp)

Baldwin was experiencing massive problems with the right of the party over support for Home Rule for India and this became the big battle in the 1931-1935 Parliament.

On economic policy, the major problem was a confidence crisis and it's questionable as to whether a government following a radical untested course would have maintained that confidence to keep the pound going or maintain borrowing. 1931 was a little early to try such a course.

As for the lack of dynamism, a dynamic force is not necessarily a great thing. Especally as Oswald Mosley was repeatedly a poor team player - a government including both him and Lloyd George may well have foundered on disagreements. As for Churchill, he'd just been Chancellor for nearly five years and not exactly displayed a dynamic alternative course. Again he was not the easiest of colleagues to work with in government. Timrollpickering 18:19, 2 September 2007 (UTC)

Baldwin did have his problems with his right wing in the Autumn of 1931. I would say they were 'not many' rather than 'massive' as collectively, the threat he had to his general leadership and specifically for his decision to back a National government rather than go it alone, was not large enough to warrant any breakaway group appearing either just before, during or in the immediate aftermath of the election. Even at a local level, fewer Conservative candidates opposed sitting MPs supporting the National government in 1931 than those who opposed sitting MPs in receipt of the coupon in 1918. One of the reasons for Conservative unity was that Baldwin had managed to see off the challenge to his leadership from Lord's Rothermere and Beaverbrook six months earlier. Lloyd George/Samuel/Macdonald would have bitten off their right arms to have been in Baldwin's secure leadership position. Yes, it would be hard to imagine Lloyd George, Churchill and Mosley sitting round a Cabinet table pulling in the same direction. However, it would be easy to imagine all of them pulling in some direction even if it was not the same direction. What characterises the formation of the National government was a particularly unique set of circumstances that existed for a short period of time. Had the financial crisis come to a head, say 6 months earlier or 6 months later, we would certainly have seen different outcomes, few of which could have resulted in a National government. (Graemp 18:43, 3 September 2007 (UTC))

Furthermore, on the issue of the financial crisis, a 'radical' and tested course of running a budget deficit was at the time practiced by all the other leading industrial countries. As regards maintaining financial confidence, by tieing the £ to the Gold Standard, just 8 days after the National government agreed on a balanced budget, the Bank of England had lost £33m. And 28 days after the National government was formed the Gold Standard was abandoned anyway. So much for financial confidence. (Graemp 20:02, 3 September 2007 (UTC))