Tariqe Shallah Hassan Al Harbi

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Tariqe Shallah Hassan Al Harbi
Born: 1983 (age 24–25)
Medina, Saudi Arabia
Citizenship Saudi Arabia
Detained at: Guantanamo
Alias(s): Tariq Shallah Hasan Al Alawi Al Harbi, Tariqe Shallah Hassan Al Harbi, Tareq Shallah Hassan Al-Harbi
ID number: 265
Conviction(s): no charge, held in extrajudicial detention
Status repatriated to Saudi Arabia on June 25, 2006

Tariqe Shallah Hassan Al Harbi is a citizen of Saudi Arabia, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo Internee Security Number is 265. American counter-terrorism analysts estimate that Al Harbi was born in 1983, in Medina, Saudi Arabia.

Main article: minors detained in the global war on terror

Contents

[edit] Identity

The US Department of Defense was forced, by court order, to release the names of the captives taken in the "war on terror" who were held in Guantanamo. On April 20, 2006 they released a list of 558 names, nationalities and ID numbers, of all the captives whose status as "enemy combatants" had been reviewed by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[1] Twenty-five days later they released a list of 759 names, nationalities, ID numbers, dates of birth, and places of birth, of all captives who had been held in military custody in Guantanamo.[2]

The official documents from the US Department of Defense, and from the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington DC transliterate Al Harbi's name differently:

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed. The neutrality of this section is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007)Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.
Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.[5][6] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.[7]
The neutrality of this section is disputed.
Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007)
Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Tariqe Shallah Hassan Al Harbi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 30 August 2004.[8] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

[edit] Allegations

The allegations Tariqe faced, during his Tribunal, were:

The detainee is a Taliban fighter:
  1. In June 2001, the detainee voluntarily traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan for the purpose of fighting the Northern Alliance.
  2. After arriving in Afghanistan, the Detainee trained at Al Farouq training camp.
  3. At the Al Farouq training camp, the detainee received training on the Kalashnikov and pistols.
  4. In Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee sought to become a member of the Taliban.
  5. The detainee was apprehended by Pakistani police when he attempted to cross the Pakistani border. He was then transferred to U.S. custody.

[edit] Transcript

Al Harbi chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[9]

[edit] Response to the allegations

Tariqe's Personal Representative read from his notes Tariqe's response to the allegations. According to Tariqe's Personal Representative:

  • "Tariqe went to Afghanistan for religious reasons, to help the poor and needy. The Islamic religious leaders (Sheiks) told him that he had to go to Afghanistan to help the poor and needy or God would punish him. He did not go there voluntarily, he went there to avoid punishment by God. He did not go to fight against the Northern Alliance."
  • Tariqe acknowledged going to the al Farouq training camp. When he arrived in Afghanistan he went to an "Arabic guesthouse" because he couldn't speack any of the local languages. He said he was told there that it was mandatory for all visiting foreigners to get military training.
  • Tariqe grew disenchanted after two weeks at al Farouq: "...Tariqe did not go to Afghanistan to learn how to fight and shoot weapons. Tariqe went to Afghanistan to help poor and needy Afghanis. Thus, Tariqe decided to escape the Al Farouq training camp and go to Kandahar."
  • Tariqe denied going to Kandahar to join the Taliban. He said he went there to ask whether it was necessary for him to receive military training before he could engage in offering humanitarian aid.
  • Tariqe said that the Taliban told him he could get permission to offer humanitarian aid if he joined the Taliban first. However, all Taliban needed to have a beard, and Tariqe was too young to have a beard. So this option was closed to him. The Taliban told him he had three choices: he could return to al Farouq; he could wait until he grew a beard; or he could simply go home.
  • Tariqe said he chose to go home. But the border to Pakistan was closed because of the attacks of 9-11 before he was able to leave Afghanistan.
  • Tariqe said he sought out the Pakistani authorities, at the border, because he thought they would help him return to Saidi Arabia.

[edit] Response to Tribunal questioning

  • Tariqe said all the military training he had received before he left the camp had been theoretical. He hadn't handled any weapons.
  • Tariqe insisted he never engaged in any hostile acts, or helped anyone else engage in a hostile act.
  • Tariqe had a 2-way ticket, because he only planned a limited stay.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[10]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Tariq Shallah Hasan Al Alawi Al Harbi's Administrative Review Board, on 4 March 2005.[11] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. Through the internet, the detainee read about a fatwa issued by Sheik Hamood al Okla [sic] . The fatwa stated every Muslim should go to Afghanistan (AF) to fight the Northern Alliance troops. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan in order to obey the fatwa.
  2. Sheik Hamud al Uqqla [sic] is a Saudi Mufti who issued fatwas, including a fatwa calling for jihad in Afghanistan, and encouraged people to fight Jihad against Christians and Jews. Al Uqqla condoned the 11 Sep 01 attacks against the United States. In addition, he helped raise money for Usama Bin Laden until his death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.
  3. In June 2001, the detainee voluntarily traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan for the purpose of fighting the Northern Alliance.
b. Training
  1. The detainee was captured with a Casio F91W watch. This model has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.
  2. After arriving in Afghanistan, the detainee trained at the al Farouq training camp.
  3. At the al Farouq training camp, he received training on the Kalashnikov rifle and pistols.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. Detainee name [sic] was on a list of names of captured Mujahidin found on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member. The hard drive was seized on 1 March 2003 in Pakistan.
  2. Detainee’s name was found on a file recovered from a computer server hard drive seized in a suspected Al Qaida safehouse in Pakistan. His name was part of a list of Arabs incarcerated in Pakistan. The data was recorded sometime between 31 March 2001 and 22 January 2002.
  3. The detainee’s name was found on a document retrieved in Afghanistan in March 2002. The document listed the names of Al Qaida martyrs, those missing in action, those imprisoned, and those who had escaped to Pakistan.
  4. In Quetta, Pakistan, detainee met some Taliban on the street who led the detainee to a guesthouse in Qandahar, where he stayed for a week of questioning and was then sent to the “Faruk camp” for training.
d. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee was apprehended by Pakistani Police when he attempted to cross the Pakistani border. He was then transferred to U.S. custody.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee ended his training at al Farouq early because he disagreed with the training.
b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the U.S. or U.S. interests.

[edit] Transfer to Saudi Arabia

Al Harbi was one of 14 men transferred from Guantanamo to Saudi Arabia on June 25, 2006.[12][13]

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, April 20, 2006
  2. ^ a b list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  3. ^ Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Tariqe Shallah Hassan Al Harbi Administrative Review Board - page 66-67 - March 4, 2005
  4. ^ Fourteen Guantanamo detainees returned to the Kingdom. Royal Saudi Embassy, Washington DC (June 25, 2006). Retrieved on March 10, 2007.
  5. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
  6. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
  7. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
  8. ^ OARDEC (30 August 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Harbi, Tariqe Shallah Hassan page 3. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-09.
  9. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Tariqe Shallah Hassan Al Harbi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 7-20
  10. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
  11. ^ OARDEC (4 March 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Harbi, Tariq Shallah Hasan Al Alawi pages 66-68. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-09.
  12. ^ Thirteen Saudis and a Turkistani return to Saudi from Guantanamo, Middle East News, June 25, 2006
  13. ^ Anant Raut, Jill M. Friedman (March 19, 2007). The Saudi Repatriates Report. Retrieved on April 21, 2007.