Russian invasion of East Prussia

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The Russian invasion of East Prussia occurred during the First World War. The invasion itself lasted from August to September 1914. As well as being the natural course for the Russians to take upon the declaration of war with Germany, it was also an attempt to focus German military eyes on the Eastern Front, as opposed to the Western Front, where France was increasingly under the strain of her own German invasion.

The Germans initially planned to have only a few divisions to act as a bulkward against any Russian incursion. It was expected that the Russians would be slow to mobilise, leaving Germany to beat France in a few weeks, and allowing the victorious, battle-hardened German troops to transfer along Germany's superior transport network to fight the Russians on the Eastern Front. This was the basis of the Schlieffen Plan. However, quite unexpectedly, Russia was able to mobilise an invasion into East Prussia (Prussia being one of the integral states of the German union, and thus her invasion was a blow to the German morale, and her general state). As said, the Germans only had 10 divisions of the German Eighth Army under General von Prittwitz und Gaffron. The Russians had been able to mobilise the First Army, under General Rennenkampf, and the Second Army, under General Samsonov. They entered East Prussia on 7-9 August. They made great initial headway. They forced the Germans to retreat, perhaps with the intention of performing holding actions in Mazuria, or perhaps even retreating to the River Vistula, which would have fitted in with the plans made before the start of the First World War that these were the positions the Germans would retreat if they put up a much stronger fight than they had anticipated. Regardless of whatever preparations had been made, it still remained that the Germans couldn't let the Prussian capital, Konigsberg, to fall into Russian hands. The moral, symbolic and military (since it was a major military hub) value of the city meant to lose it was to invite disaster of the home, as well as the army and front. Also, it was very likely that the Russians would have used the upper hand they had now gained, gain more men for an attack, to overwhelm the static German defenses. In short, the Germans had to fight back immediately and force the Russians from East Prussia.

Moltke, who was Chief of the German General Staff from 1906 to 1914, on the 22nd August replaced Prittwitz with Hindenburg. Hindenburg along with his Chief of Staff, the formidable Ludendorff, would approach the crisis in East Prussia very differently from Prittwitz, who panicked when the Russian onslaught entered East Prussia, and planned to take the offensive.

On the Russian side, Rennenkampf and Samsonov, who commanded the First and Second Russian armies as stated before were having their own problems. In the Russo-Japanese War, the failure of these two generals to co-operate had led to a defeat on the battlefield. From then on, they vowed never to work together. This, coupled with Russian supply problems complicated by the fact that the Russian gauge of railway rolling stock was different from that of the German railways, convinced Hindenburg and Ludendorff to encircle one of the opposing armies. They chose to send eight divisions against Samsonov in the Battle of Tannenberg, resulting in over 92,000 captured and 18,000 killed. The Second Army had been annihilated, Samsonov had shot himself, and in the Battle of the Masurian Lakes, the Germans forced the First Army to retreat out of East Prussia.

The invasion had been a ghastly failure for the Russians. However, the crisis they caused in the German High Command forced them to send five German divisions from the West to attack the Russians. They didn't arrive in time for the twin battles; had they stayed, they could have been tremendously helpful to the precarious situation in the West. In Head of French Intelligence Colonel Dupont's words, "their debacle was one of the elements of our victory."