Operation Riviresa

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Operation Riviresa
Part of Sri Lankan Civil War
Date 17 October 1995 - December 1995 Location Jaffna, Sri Lanka Result Sri Lankan Military victory.
Belligerents
Sri Lankan Military	LTTE
Commanders
Major General (later General) Rohan Daluwatte, Brigadier (later Major General) Janaka Perera	Velupillai Pirabakaran
Strength
20,000	Unknown
Casualties and losses
500[1]	2,000[1]

Operation Riviresa (Operation Sun rays) was a combined military operation launched by the Sri Lankan Military in Jaffna. Starting on the 17 October 1995 the primary objective of the operation was the capture of the town of Jaffna and rest of the Jaffna peninsula from LTTE terrorists. It is believed that Operation Riviresa was the largest and most successful military operation of the Sri Lankan Military in recent times.^[2]

Contents 1 Background 2 Operation 3 Battle for Jaffna 4 References 5 External links

[edit] Background

The preparations for the offensive began with the resumption of hostilities after peace talks failed following the LTTE attack on the Trincomalee naval base. The administration of President Chandrika Kumaratunga ordered active military operations against the LTTE following this attack. Planning and preparations for the operation where conducted by the Major General (later General) Rohan Daluwatte who was Overall Operations Commander, and under the purview of Lt. Col. (later General) Anuruddha Ratwatte who was the deputy-minister of Defence. The planning for the Operation started in June 1993 under the Command of Major General Gamunu Kulatunge assisted by Colonel Lucky Rajasinghe and Colonel Mohan Rockwood as a response to the asissination of the President Premadasa by LTTE on 01st May 1993. Though Sri Lanka Army was keen in launching an operation to Capture Jaffna, then President D B Wijetunga did not agree in launching of the operation, as he felt that SL Forces may further alienate Tamil population that was suffering under LTTE. LTTE knowing the plans were afoot to capture the City of Jaffna, launched a pre-emptive strike on SL Army and Naval positions in Kilali area and overran the positions in Poonaryn in November 1993.

Loss of Poonaryn left the Sri Lankan Military with Palaly, Elephant Pass and Kyts areas leaving rest of the areas in Jaffna to LTTE. Since the main staging area for the attack was the SLAF Palaly a small scale operation, code name operation leap forward (Planned and conducted by Majaor General Srilal Weerasooriya and Colonel Hiran Halangoda) was launched to expand the perimeter of the air base prior to Operation Riviresa expanding the holding area west of Karrainagar.

[edit] Operation

'Operation Thunder Strike', an initial Operation to Capture the required staging area was launched on 28 of September 1995 with the 532 Brigade under the Command of Colonel Lucky Rajasinghe to capture Achchuweli area, supported by rest of the 53 Division (Commanded by Brigadier Janaka Perera) resources. As the 53 Division was consolidating in the Achchuweli area on the 31 October night LTTE launched a major counter attack on the positions. This was repelled by the troops of 53 Division (as anticipated by Brigadier Janaka Perera) resulting a large number of casualties to LTTE cadres. This was the 'key moment' of the battle as this defeat demoralized the LTTE cadres and SL Army troops realized the vulnerability of LTTE tactical operations, increasing their morale. Operation 'RIVIRESA-I' was launched on 17 of October 1995 with the aim of wresting control over the Valikamam area of the Jaffna peninsula. Major General (later General) Rohan Daluwatte and Brigadier (later Major General) Janaka Perera are two key military personnel who where instrumental in the leadership and the success of the Operation Riviresa. 20,000 troops of the Sri Lanka Army were deployed at the out set of the attack and they were supported by the Sri Lanka Air Force and the Sri Lanka Navy. The operation was commanded by Major General Rohan Daluwatte the Overall Operations Commander, (OOC), which involved three divisions : the 51 Division commanded by Brigadier Neil Dias (Later Major General )(deputy commander Brigadier (Later Lt. General) Sarath Fonseka) and 52 Division commanded by Brigadier P.A. Karunathilaka )(deputy commander Brigadier (Later Major General)Anton Wijendra) advanced astride axes Jaffna - Point Pedro and Jaffna - Palaly Road respectively up to line joining Kopay and Kondavil. This advance was met with stiff resistance from LTTE and took almost a month to cover the 12 miles stretch. From this lateral line 53 Division consisting of Special Forces commanded by Brigadier Janaka Perera (Deputy Commander, Colonel (Later Major General) Gamini Hettiarachchi), consisting of the 534 Independent Brigade (Commanded by Colonel Percy Fernando), 531 Air Mobile Brigade (Commanded by Colonel Hiran Halangoda), 533 Armored Brigade (Commanded by Colonel Gamini Balsooriya) and 532 Infantry Brigade (Commanded by Colonel Lucky Rajasinghe) broke out. The 53 division launched a narrow front attack that headed directly to East of the town of Jaffna capturing key crossroads along the way. The LTTE had prepared for the attack in advance by mining all roads into the peninsula and by creating defenses in depth with additional cadres from the eastern province. 531 Brigade met with stiff resistance on the 18th of November, but managed to maneuver the trrops east to avoid the heavily mined built-up areas. On the 19th of November 534 Brigade stepped into the attack and fought one of hardest battles as they sped to cut off the main road linking Jaffna from rest of the peninsula. Brigadier Janaka Perera ordered 532 Brigade in to action without giving LTTE any opportunity to regroup and 532 Brigade reach waters of Colombuthurai thus on the 22nd of November 1995, Valikamam was cut off from Vadamarachchi and Tenamarachchi areas. However an intense battle had to be fought to evict the remaining cadres from the Jaffna town.

[edit] Battle for Jaffna

Main article: Battle of Jaffna (1995)

On 29 November 1995, 53 Division Commanded By Brigadier Janaka Perera launched the assault on the LTTE positions guarding City of Jaffna. Brigadier Perera decided to launch the operation on a narrow front to minimize the civilian casualties. He launched the 532 Infantry Brigade (Commanded by Colonel Lucky Rajasinghe) from the east to penetrate and probe the defenses held by LTTE. As the infantry Brigade ran into a tight defense by LTTE on Navalar Road, Brigade Commander Colonel Lucky Rajasinghe ordered 532 Brigade to make a 'turning movement' from the North moving around the LTTE Defenses and capturing Nullur Area. Brigadier Janaka Perera sizing the gap created by the infantry brigade, simultaneously launched Air Mobile 531 Brigade (Commanded by Colonel Hiran Halangoda) to Capture Jaffna Fort. At the same time Independent 534 Brigade (Commanded by Colonel Percy Fernando) was launched along the East coast to Capture the Jaffna Jetty. With three Brigades attacking simultaneously from 3 different sides, LTTE was unable to coordinate their defenses. By evening of 01st of December three Brigades breached the defenses of LTTE causing confusion. During the night of December 01st, LTTE cadres taking advantage of the dark night, escaped in boats across Kilali Lagoon abandoning the defenses of the City. On the morning of December 2, 1995, troops of 53 Division entered Jaffna City almost un-opposed. After an intense battle of 50 days the Sri Lanka Army was able to capture the city of Jaffna. The LTTE before retreating had stripped the town of every thing including the equipment of Jaffna Teaching Hospital

Though there were very little military intelligence throughout the battle, timely understanding and the anticipation of the LTTE tactical planning and reactions to the battle by SL Army Divisional and Brigade Commanders and their sheer determination to get the job done was the key to the overwhelming success of the operation. This operation was the best example in modern Sri Lanka military history, how a highly successful campaign can be conducted when there is a unified political will combined with extraordinary military leadership at all levels of command. Political leadership against the advice from the military planners, expected the LTTE to collapse after the loss of the Jaffna city. But LTTE fell back (which has such a startegic leadership) to gain time to re-group and was back in little time more fierce than ever. Unfortunately for Sri Lanka five of the key brigade commanders who mattered the most were lost within the next one year - three were killed in battle and two left the Army disgruntled by dissatisfied planning by political and military leadership. SL Forces were unable to hold on to the subsequent gains (Navatkuli to Killinochchi from North and Vavuniya to Mankulum from the South) made into the LTTE areas beyond the immediate vicinity of Jaffna City. Political leadership continue to drive the military leadership (against the advice of the military commanders) to stretch their forces beyond the practical limits of defense as they continue to believe that LTTE will collapse after the fall of the Jaffna City. Whole concept of conduct of operations changed from ‘execution of political (National) aim planned and conducted by military leadership' to political leaders stepping in to the shoes of military commanders in their fanaticism to gain cheap popularity (objective of destroying LTTE) sacrificing the long term political and military aim of 'winning the hearts and minds of the Tamil population'.^[3][4]

[edit] References

[edit] External links

Official websites

• Ministry of Defence, Sri Lanka
• Government of Sri Lanka Peace Secretariat

News reports

• Sundaytimes
• Sundaytimes