Nuclear strategy

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Nuclear strategy involves the development of doctrines and strategies for the production and use of nuclear weapons.

As a sub-branch of military strategy, nuclear strategy attempts to match nuclear weapons as means to political ends. In addition to the actual use of nuclear weapons whether in the battlefield or strategically, a large part of nuclear strategy involves their use as a bargaining tool.

Some of the issues considered within nuclear strategy include:

• What conditions does it serve a nation's interest to develop nuclear weapons?
• What types of nuclear weapons should be developed?
• When and how should such weapons be used?

Many strategists argue that nuclear strategy differs from other forms of military strategy because the immense and terrifying power of the weapons makes their use in seeking victory in a traditional military sense impossible.

Perhaps counterintuitively, an important focus of nuclear strategy has been determining how to prevent and deter their use, a crucial part of mutual assured destruction.

In the context of nuclear proliferation and maintaining the balance of power, states also seek to prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons as part of nuclear strategy.

[edit] See also

Nuclear weapons
History of nuclear weapons Nuclear warfare Nuclear arms race Nuclear weapon design Nuclear testing (Underground) Effects of nuclear explosions Delivery systems Nuclear espionage Proliferation / Arsenals
Nuclear-armed countries
United States - Russia - United Kingdom - France - China - India - Israel - Pakistan - North Korea
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Weapons of mass destruction
By type
Biological warfare Chemical warfare Nuclear weapons Radiological weapons
Treaties
By country
Albania	Algeria
Argentina	Australia
Brazil	Bulgaria
Canada	PR China
France	Germany
India	Iran
Iraq	Israel
Japan	Netherlands
North Korea	Pakistan
Poland	Russia
South Africa	Syria
Taiwan (ROC)	United Kingdom
United States	v • d • e

• Assured destruction
• Counterforce, Countervalue
• Decapitation strike
• Deterrence
• Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations
• Fail-deadly
• Force de frappe
• First strike, Second strike
• Game theory & wargaming
• Massive retaliation
• Minimal deterrence
• Mutual assured destruction (MAD)
• No first use
• National Security Strategy of the United States
• Nuclear blackmail
• Nuclear proliferation
• Nuclear utilization target selection (NUTS)
• Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)
• Strategic bombing
• Tactical nuclear weapons

• Bernard Brodie
• Herman Kahn
• Stanley Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove (1964), a film satirizing nuclear strategy.

[edit] Further reading

Baylis, John, and John Garnett. Makers of Nuclear Strategy. London: Pinter, 1991. ISBN 1-85567-025-9.

Brodie, Bernard. The Absolute Weapon. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1946.

Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.

Dunn, Lewis A. Deterrence Today - Roles, Challenges, and Responses Paris: IFRI Proliferation Papers n° 19, 2007.

Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. ISBN 0-333-97239-2 .

Kahn, Herman. On Thermonuclear War. 2nd ed. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961.

Kaplan, Fred M. The Wizards of Armageddon. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. ISBN 0-671-42444-0.

Kissinger, Henry A. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper, 1957.

Rai Chowdhuri, Satyabrata. Nuclear Politics: Towards A Safer World, Ilford: New Dawn Press, 2004.

Rosenberg, David. "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960." International Security 7, 4 (Spring, 1983): 3-71.

Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

Smoke, Richard. National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993. ISBN 0-07-059352-3.

Wohlstetter, Albert. "The Delicate Balance of Terror." Foreign Affairs 37, 211 (1958): 211-233.