Talk:Modularity of mind
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maybe some critics of this idea should be cited too, no? afaik it's a rather old (and obsolete?) idea. i'm not sure about references but maybe Gerald Edelman, Francisco Varela and John Searle could be some interesting reads for another point of view.
[edit] Old
The old part is correct since is goes back, in a different form, to phrenology and Franz Joseph Gall according to Fodor himself. But obsolete is certainly questionable. I'm not exactly sure how it is currentl viewed in the neurosciences but still has much currency in philosophy,linguistics and cog sci in general (see Pinker, at all). You are invited to add some criticism into the artcile though, instead of just ranting on the talk page.--Lacatosias 09:49, 23 January 2006 (UTC)
"Fodor (1983) states that modular systems must fulfill certain properties:"
Actually, he does not say this. What he says is that modules must fulfill ONE criterion ('informational encapsulation'), and also tend to display other characteristic properties (rigid ontogenetic development, cerebral localisation, etc.) "to some interesting extent". I suggest that the quoted sentence be rephrased.Ariosto 10:32, 11 September 2006 (UTC)
[edit] External Links to Critics
As a shortcut to and building block for having a Criticism section, why not have an external links section that goes to critics and opposing theories. DCDuring 11:56, 19 September 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Freud?
Would Freud be considered a proponent of modularity of the mind? It seems like this article puts a whole lot of emphasis on Fodor. What other important figures in the philosophical tradition can be thought of as supporters of this thesis? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.68.115.175 (talk) 08:53, 22 October 2007 (UTC)
- I don't think Freud would be considered a proponent of modularity of mind, but I guess it's debatable. Freud's ideas seem to indicate that his ontological view of the mind could support limited accessibility and perhaps obligatory firing or ontogeny, but the rest of the characteristics of modules really don't fit his picture. If you look at how he imagined the brain would work--as a conflict between multiple aspects of the subconscious--then you really get more of a generalized capacity outlook, rather than that of specialized capacities as with modularity. Freud definitely wouldn't have said, for instance, that the animus had shallow outputs, was based on a fixed neural architecture, or had domain specificity. I haven't read all of Freud's works, so it's possible he talked about some things that were modular in nature, but in general, it seems like a stretch. If there's one thing missing, it's massive modularity, a la Sperber. Elunah (talk) 03:39, 15 February 2008 (UTC)
