Talk:Madhyamaka

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Needs Renaming This article should be renamed as Madhyamika, which literally translates as "The middle path". Madhyamaka appears to be a mispronounciation of the same.

Deepak23

The school of thought and its subsidiaries are called "Madhyamaka"; those who follow it are called "Mādhyamikas."
It's a Sanskrit thing. The article should NOT be renamed. 20040302

[edit] Shentong/Rangtong and prasangika/yogacara

Is it correct to identify yogacara with shentong, and prasangika with rangtong? These terms certainly aren't translations of one-another. My (limited) understanding is that shentong/rangtong is a question of view, as in how you "see", whereas yogacara/prasangika is concerned with philosphical reasoning. So my opinion is that it is possible to be a prasangika philosophically, and a shentongpa for the purposes of meditation practice.

I further understand that *all* important tibetan lamas profess adherence to the prasangika school of reasoning. If prasangika is to be construed as being in opposition to shentong view, then that would mean that there are no more shentongpas. Since this is counterfactual, I find myself somewhat confudledoo (madhyamaka thinking is supposed to lead to clarity, so I'm obviously doing it wrong!).

I haven't tried to fill-in the missing article on Rangtong, in the hope that someone who is philosophically opposed to Shentong view will help to clarify this question. --MrDemeanour 12:24, 18 September 2005 (UTC)

Well, from what I understand of the Shentong issue, it certainly is in no way cognate with yogacarya. However, the actual specific details of what shentong is, is much harder to understand. I am guessing, but I think they were asserting that there is one mode of emptiness - shentong - which merely meant 'empty of other' - ie empty of being something other than itself. This could be construed to indicate an essentially existing substrate similar to 'God', and is probably why the Jonangpas were accused of holding non-buddhist views. I may be completely mistaken, not being a scholar, and not being too familiar with this rather antique long-standing debate. (20040302 13:34, 18 September 2005 (UTC))

"Empty of something other than itself" - this is correct, and has indeed been construed in the way you say. I believe the accusations against the Jonangpas, however, were leveled for political reasons, and the doctrinal issue was a pretext. But this debate isn't "antique", and the shentong view is not just a historical footnote; the Rimay masters were shentongpas, as are many of their their contemporary lineal descendants. I'd like to add a cite from Jamgon Kongtrul to emphasize this; but I'm unable to check it (it's a second-hand citation). Kongtrul apparently says in Encyclopaedia of Knowledge that rangtong is for establishing certainty through listening, studying and reflecting; shentong is for meditation practice.

--MrDemeanour 16:07, 19 September 2005 (UTC)

Thank-you for your correction - I did not mean to demean the issue by calling it antique - though I see now that it is easier to read it that way than otherwise - I was merely saying that it has an old history. My understanding of Madhyamaka holds that, if I am right in my understanding of shentong, this would be objectionable to views held by Candrakirti and indeed Nagarjuna - both of whom tried pretty hard to deny any form of essence whatsoever. It is possible that the shentong/rangtong debate continues to have a political facet to it also, though I would feel that such areas are outside of the scope of a general presentation of Madhyamaka (ie this article). (20040302 17:01, 19 September 2005 (UTC))
Continuing this discussion, at the risk of repeating myself, I do not think it is correct to identify the Shentong/Rangtong division as being the same as the Prasangika/Yogacara division. Following MrDemeanour's statements that
  1. The Rimay masters are shentongpas and
  2. All Tibetan lamas profess adherence to the prasangika,
We have to either state that there is a contradiction, or that both Shentong and Rangtong views belong to those who claim to be Prasangikas. The Yogacarya school has plenty of distinguishing features: one of them is (from what I understand) that the Yogacarya assert that e.g. a table appears to be a different substantial entity from the eye consciousness apprehending it but is not - therefore in Yogacarya, a table is said to be empty of being a different entity from a valid consciousness. This mode of emptiness is (in my limited understanding) in direct contrast to the shentong position, if it is as above-stated: empty of being something other than itself.
With these thoughts in mind, and until someone cares to express a clear rationale for their union, I am removing the sentence Tibetan adherents of this school refer to it as the Shentong view, whereas Prasangika Madhyamaka is known as the Rangtong view.
Further to this, I am deeply intrigued as to how someone can actually be a Prasangika and express the shentong position of "empty of being something other than itself" - what does this position mean, in light of Candrakirti: "Atman" is an essence of things that does not depend on others; it is an intrinsic nature, understanding that according to the Madhyamikas this 'intrinsic nature' exists solely as a cognitive obscuration - the root obscuration responsible for all suffering? What I am curious about is how one can derive an understanding of the essencelessness of a thing from meditating on the emptiness of being something other than itself? (20040302 13:46, 5 October 2005 (UTC))
Shentong/Rangtong not the same as Prasangika/Yogacara: I'm sure this is correct. Specifically, my understanding is that the terms Shentong and Rangtong are not translations of any Sanskrit terms, and the ideas behind them were Tibetan developments.
Could it be that the problem is the result of confounding a view with a system of reasoning? Prasangika and Yogacara are ways of establishing certainty. I don't think the "emptiness" that they each asserts is a different kind of emptiness.
Shentong and Rangtong are "views", i.e. ways of seeing, not of reasoning. Shentong view, in particular, can only be acquired as the result of being shown (pointing out). It's not a type of logic, nor is it the kind of thing that could be proved by some system of logic. And as far as I can understand, the Shentong view is pretty meaningless, outside the context of Rangtong insight. This is really difficult stuff to discourse about, I think; words definitely get in the way. but my understanding is that Shentong is really a sort of Rangtong-plus, and that the two are not really opposed to one-another, despite this being the way the story is usually presented. One would need to have acquired Rantong insight, for Shentong view to become accessible. That's why one might profess to be both a prasangika and a shentongpa. --MrDemeanour
Thanks for the comment - regarding shentong/rangtong - I am ignorant, and have offered the best I can without more research. However, I completely disagree about Prasangika and Yogacarya both as merely ways of establishing certainty (for a start the schools are both concerned with Prajnaparamita, not Pramana) secondly, for a Prasangika, the Yogacarya view is basically an essentialist view: The yogacarya assert the necessity of things like 'mind-basis-of-all' and other phenomena, whereas the Prasangika tend to avoid substance doctrine at all cost. (20040302)

Ringu Tulku about Shengtong/Rangtong: "Rangtong and Shentong

There has been a great deal of heated debate in Tibet between the exponents of Rangtong, (Wylie, Rang-stong) and Shentong, (Wylie, gZhen-stong) philosophies. The historic facts of these two philosophies are well known to the Tibetologists. This is what Kongtrul has to say about the two systems:

"Rangtong and Shentong

Madhyamika philosophies have no differences in realising as 'Shunyata', all phenomena that we experience on a relative level. They have no differences also, in reaching the meditative state where all extremes (ideas) completely dissolve. Their difference lies in the words they use to describe the Dharmata. Shentong describes the Dharmata, the mind of Buddha, as 'ultimately real'; while Rangtong philosophers fear that if it is described that way, people might understand it as the concept of 'soul' or 'Atma'. The Shentong philosopher believes that there is a more serious possibility of misunderstanding in describing the Enlightened State as 'unreal' and 'void'. Kongtrul finds the Rangtong way of presentation the best to dissolve concepts and the Shentong way the best to describe the experience."

Does this help?

Austerlitz -- 88.75.91.43 (talk) 20:28, 8 January 2008 (UTC)

quotation from *Ringu Tulku: The Rimé (Ris-med) movement of Jamgon Kongtrul the Great

Austerlitz -- 88.75.91.43 (talk) 20:31, 8 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Prasangika Madhyamaka Paragraph

The Prasangika Madhyamaka paragraph is a misrepresentation of the school's views on every single issue.

  1. Prasanga is not their sole avowed technique
  2. The views of the Prasangika Madhyamaka are NOT held solely for the purpose of defeating all views.

There is no doubt at all that the PM have their own views, and that they do not solely use Prasanga. Tsongkhapa has written eloquently and at length on these specific issues - as the misrepresentation is a traditional one. In fairness, one could argue that some who claim to be PM themselves also state this - what Tsongkhapa does is to show that these two points are not representative of the views of Nagarjuna or Candrakirti. At some point I shall work on a revised paragraph that is more adequate. (20040302 17:31, 26 October 2005 (UTC))

[edit] Still no distinction between dependent designation and dependent origination

I have noticed that there is still no mention of the (M.Pra.) division of Pratītyasamutpāda into the two clases of dependent designation (eg Nagarjuna: 'nivṛtam abhidhātavyaṁ nivṛtte cittagocare') and dependent origination, here, on the Prasangika page, or on the Pratītyasamutpāda - let alone anywhere else.

I am not a scholar, and since the obsession with references from published books, I have lost some interest in being a wiki editor. However, the omission is large, especially as it is dependent designation which prevents the M.Pra view from establishing an essence in causality.

In fact, and it may just be my reading of them, these articles appear to me to be dumbing down the Madhyamaka view so much that it begins to sound like some sort of 'everything is interconnected' view, which doesn't even begin to present a view which assists in liberation. It's only one premise of a syllogism that begins to establish the view based on dependant origination:

everything is interconnected (OR dependent on causes/designation - therefore not independent)
interconnected things are essenceless (only independent things have essence)
therefore everything is essenceless

Also (relating the view to the afflictions)

(afflictive) grasping depends on a view that phenomena essentially exist
as everything is essenceless, any view that differs from that is false
therefore a view that phenomena essentially exist is afflictive (ignorance)

It is because of the purpose of the Madhyamaka view - to directly undermine the afflictions, that we can measure the success of our own understanding. If we have substantially eliminated grasping, afflictive attachment and aversion, then our view is successful.

As one of the masters [can't remember who or where] points out that syllogisms themselves are only of value if such rational methods are accepted by the student. This is important, as the disclosure of the Madhyamaka view can only be effective within the language of the audience itself (a necessary feature of reductio arguments in general). (20040302 (talk) 10:23, 10 June 2008 (UTC))