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The Stedeford Committee was a special advisory group appointed in April 1960 by the United Kingdom Conservative Minister of Transport, Ernest Marples, to recommend what part the railways should play in the future economic life of the country and how they should be administered. The recommendations of the Committee, which eventually formed the basis of the Transport Act 1962, were never revealed by the Government, nor were the Committee's terms of reference. It is generally believed, however, that [...] and, in so doing, led to the Beeching Axe
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[edit] Background
By the late 1950s the BTC found itself deeply in debt, as rising costs, road competition and strikes resulted in losses of £22m (about £400m today). Despite an injection of investment under the 1955 Modernisation Plan, the Commission's working deficit continued to grow from £16.5m (£xxxx today) in 1957 to £67.7m in 1960. Such results caused the Conservative Government great concern and matters were finally brought to a head in March 1960 with the publication of the Guillebaud Report on railwaymen's pay which took the view that they were underpaid as compared with workers in other nationalised industries and recommended pay increases of between 8 and 18 per cent. If implemented, the report's recommendations would cost around £40m.[1]
The Government accepted the obligation to see that fair and reasonable wages were paid to railwaymen. In return, railway workers, the BTC and the general public would have to accept corresponding obligations to make it possible for the railways to be reorganized to operate on a reduced scale without placing an intolerable burden on the national economy. As the Prime Minister Harold Macmillan explained in a statement to the House of Commons:
| “ | [T]he railway must be of a size and pattern suited to modern conditions and prospects. In particular, the railway system must be remodelled to meet current needs and the Modernisation Plan must be adapted to its new shape. | ” |
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—Harold Macmillan, 10 March 1960 |
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In July of the same year the House of Commons Select Committee on the Nationalised Industries published its two-year report on the activities of the BTC. The lengthy study, which had been commissioned by the BTC's Chairman Sir Brian Robertson, identified passenger services and above all the stopping trains on branch lines as the main causes of the losses. It was critical of the financial management of the BTC and commented in particular that it was unable to determine where the £42m working deficit accumulated in 1959 had been lost.[2]
[edit] Announcement
On Wednesday 6 April 1960 Ernest Marples gave the first statement in the House of Commons as to the remit and membership of the Stedeford Committee. He declared that:
| “ | the task of the advisory body will be to examine the structure, finance and working of the organizations at present controlled by the commission and to advise the Minister of Transport and the British Transport Commission as a matter of urgency how effect can best be given to the Government's intentions as indicated in the Prime Minister's statement. | ” |
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—Ernest Marples, 6 April 1960 |
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He proceeded to read out the names of the Committee's members, which was notable for the absence of any person with railway experience. The BTC would not be represented, nor would the trade unions. This was seized upon by Tony Benn, the Labour Shadow Transport spokesman, who recalled that Marples had previously pledged that the BTC would be represented; he also queried whether the Committee would have executive responsibility or would be allowed to reach conclusions other than those contained in the Prime Minister's statement. Marples replied that he had rejected the idea of involving the BTC since he wished to keep it small and that the presence of trade unions would inhibit a frank exchange of views; the Committee would be purely advisory with "extremely wide" terms of reference.
Other reactions were more critical of the Government's real intention in setting up the committee; Alfred Robens MP called it "a screen which the Government had put up to cover their own desire to carve up the railways and to denationalize everything but that non-profit making part - the running of the railways themselves."[3]
[edit] The Committee
[edit] Membership
The Committee was to be chaired by Sir Ivan Stedeford, aged 63, the chairman and managing director of Tube Investments Ltd, with an engineering background. Other members were: C.F. Kearton, aged 49, the joint managing director of Courtaulds, Henry Benson, aged 51, a chartered accountant and partner in the accountancy firm Cooper Brothers & Co, Richard Beeching, aged 47, technical director of ICI,
[edit] Terms of Reference
As revealed by Ernest Marples, the Committee would have "extremely wide" terms of reference enabling to make any recommendation it wished; however, should the Committee have felt inhibited by its terms of reference, Marples indicated that "he would be happy to meet their wishes."[4]
It is understood that their task would be to report how British Railways management could be decentralised, particularly in the regions, and how each individual BTC undertaking could be made more fully self-accounting and responsible for its own affairs.
[edit] Report
Although the Committee's advice was never made public, certain authors have surmised, in the light of subsequent events, what it must have been. The Stedeford Committee was strongly critical of both the BTC's organisation and policies[5];
[edit] Organisation of the BTC
In terms of its organisation, the BTC was huge and unweldy, presiding over its various constituent parts rather like a parent company over its subsidiaries. These diverse entities - from London Transport to British Waterways and Thomas Cook & Son - were generally managed by their own chief executives with one notable exception - British Railways - the central management of which lay with the BTC which acted as a controller and coordinator of the six Area Boards and Regional managements.[6] The BTC's Chairman, Sir Brian Robertson, adopted somewhat of a military approach to management; he regarded the BTC as an administrative machine within which each employee carried out his designated tasks, demanding no more from them than competence and loyalty.[7] He had encouraged the Area Boards to make their own commercial decisions, believing that a return to the regional loyalties which had existed before nationalisation would recreate a certain esprit de corps which would otherwise have been stifled by the unwieldy management system of the BTC.[8]
[edit] Policies of the BTC
The BTC could, the Committee advised, be run as a commercially profitable undertaking provided that the right mentality was instilled in managers. Out would go the "public service mentality" personified by the BTC's Chairman, , a distinguished public servant due to retire in May 1961 who perceived the railways as a primarily public service, and in would come external managers with a background in business.[9]
[edit] Proposed solution
The Stedeford Committee recommended the breaking-up of the BTC and the creation of a Board which would oversee the railways and be directly responsible to the Minister of Transport. The Board would be driven by commercial considerations and operate much like the board of a commercial undertaking.[10]
[edit] Aftermath
The Committee's recommendations were incorporated into a White Paper presented by Marples to Parliament in December 1960 which set out the changes in organisation needed to run the railway on business lines. The Paper eventually became the Transport Act 1962.
[edit] Criticism
The Committee was criticised for having delivered its recommendations after only six months deliberation. Even among Conservative quarters, there was incredulity as to how such a massive and complex problem such as the railways could be addressed within such a short period by individuals with no previous experience in the industry.[11]
[edit] References
- ^ The Times, "Railway pay finding would cost £40m; Guillebaud Report calls for 8-18 p.c. rises", 4 March 1960, p. 12, col. A.
- ^ Bonavia, Michael Robert (1981). British Rail the first 25 years. Newton Abbot, Devon: David & Charles, p.110-111. ISBN 0-7153-8002-8.
- ^ The Times, "Railway Advisers Meet: Invitation to BTC and Unions", 14 April 1960, p.4 col C.
- ^ The Times, "Railway Advisers Meet", 14 April 1960, p. 4, Col. C.
- ^ Bonavia, M.R., op. cit. p.112}}
- ^ Bonavia, M.R., op. cit., p. 112.
- ^ Ibid.
- ^ Henshaw, David; Lehan, Bill (1994). The Great Railway Conspiracy. Hawes, North Yorkshire: Leading Edge Books, p. 72. ISBN 978-0-948135-48-4.
- ^ Bonavia, M.R., op. cit., p. 113.
- ^ Bonavia, M.R., op. cit., p. 113.
- ^ Freeman Allen, Geoffrey (1966). British Rail After Beeching. London: Ian Allan Ltd, p. 16.

