HMAS Voyager (D04)
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The second HMAS Voyager (D-04) was a Daring class destroyer laid down by the Cockatoo Docks and Engineering Company Limited at Sydney in New South Wales on 10 October 1949, launched on 1 May 1952 by Dame Pattie Menzies, wife of the Prime Minister, and commissioned on 12 February 1957. Voyager collided with the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne twenty miles south-east of Jervis Bay on the New South Wales coast on the night of 10 February 1964. She was cut in two by the impact and sank with the loss of 81 of her crew and one civilian dockyard employee.
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[edit] Accident
Melbourne and Voyager had been steaming together at 22 knots when Melbourne signalled Voyager to take station in routine preparation for night flying. Voyager, at that time ahead and to one side of Melbourne, swung away from Melbourne's track then unexpectedly turned back across her bows, leading to the collision. Both ships took last minute avoiding action but with little effect. The forward part of Voyager capsized, sinking minutes later, causing many casualties. All Voyager bridge officers perished, including her captain. In accordance with maritime 'rules of the road' with Melbourne at flying stations and showing the appropriate signal, it was Voyager's obligation to keep clear.
[edit] First Royal Commission
A Royal Commission under Judge John Spicer appointed to investigate the accident could not ascertain the reason for it, but inclined to the view that Voyager may have misunderstood an earlier signal from Melbourne, prompting her final turn.
[edit] Second Royal Commission
Subsequently, an ex-Voyager Executive Officer, Peter Cabban, recorded a statement to the effect that the captain of Voyager, Duncan Stevens, was a chronic alcoholic, citing numerous instances of the Captain's sickness on a voyage to South East Asia in 1963. In his book ' 'Breaking Ranks' ', Cabban stated Capt. Stevens never drank at sea, only whilst in port, but that his recovery sometimes took several days.
When the statement became public, a second Royal Commission was appointed in which it was testified that Capt. Stevens was regularly taking amphetamines. There was further testimony that he consumed a triple brandy on the evening of the collision. The Commission found this account may have been mistaken and, explicitly, that he was unimpaired by alcohol at the time of the collision. It also found that while Capt. Stevens had concealed a recurrence of stomach ulcers, which should have disqualified him from command, this had no bearing on the accident.
The second Commission found that the accident might have resulted from Voyager having been mistaken as to which side of Melbourne she was on during her final manoeuvre. It is notoriously difficult to judge a carrier's course at night by her lights and Melbourne was utilising experimental red deck flood lights which might have been deceiving. This wrong-side theory had been advanced by counsel for the captain of Melbourne and disorientation had some support from the Naval Board (ie naval headquarters).
[edit] Subsequent Investigations
In his comprehensive book on the collision, Where Fate Calls, the HMAS Voyager Tragedy Tom Frame* prefers a theory that onboard Voyager there was a double mix-up of a Melbourne signal. Though not the same as postulated by the first Commission, the effect would have been similar in leading her to misunderstand her instructions.
In a Summer 2004 article in the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, D. Ferry suggests it is most likely that the cause was a misjudged 'fishtail', which is also known as an 'even speed' manoeuvre and is a recognised means of changing station. In this case Voyager attained insufficient room for such a manoeuvre. The misjudgement and late avoiding action may have been caused by deception as to Melbourne's course or a procedural mistake. This theory has since been supported by an ex-Maritime (ie Fleet) Commander with intimate experience of these ships and the manoeuvre.
Frame describes how a Navy inquiry was by-passed by the Government setting up the Royal Commissions, the fear being that there might be otherwise the appearance of a cover-up. Ferry notes that the first's Commission's terms of reference were insufficient, its efforts were concentrated on blame identification/attribution and its findings received no thorough review. The second Commission allayed some public disquiet but neither realised fully the scope for identifying lessons learnt. He lists examples of such lessons (external links below). Frame indicates that a suitable military inquiry system is now established.
[edit] Compensation
Survivors and families of those who were killed in the sinking of HMAS Voyager fought ongoing legal battles with the Federal Government with some survivor's and victims' families still awaiting settlement of their compensation claims over 40 years after the tragedy.
[edit] References
- Reports of the Royal Commissions, 1964 and 1967
- Frame, Tom. (2005). The Cruel Legacy : the HMAS Vovager Tragedy (1st ed.). Crows Nest, N.S.W. : Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1-74114-421-3
- Frame, Tom. (1992). Where Fate Calls : the HMAS Voyager Tragedy Sydney : Hodder & Stoughton. ISBN 0-340-54968-8.
- Hickling, A (1965) One Minute of Time and (1969) Postscript to Voyager - the Melbourne Voyager Collision both published by A.H. & A.W. Reed
[edit] External links
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