Explanatory gap

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The basic idea of the explanatory gap is that human experience (such as qualia) cannot be fully explained by mechanical processes; that something extra, perhaps even of a different metaphysical type, must be added to "fill the gap". The explanatory gap has vexed and intrigued philosophers and AI researchers alike for decades and caused considerable debate.

To take a condition in which there is no gap, imagine a modern computer: as marvelous as these devices are, their behavior can be fully explained by their circuitry, and vice versa. By contrast, it is thought by some that consciousness constitutes a separate effect that demands another cause, and that this cause is either outside of the physical world (dualism) or due to as yet unknown physical phenomena (see for instance Quantum mind, Indirect realism).

A noted proponent of the Explanatory Gap is Joseph Levine, who fleshes out the theory in his papers Conceivability, Identity, and the Explanatory Gap and Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. Levine agrees that conceivability (as used in the Zombie and inverted spectrum arguments) is flawed as a means of establishing metaphysical realities; but he points out that even if we come to the metaphysical conclusion that qualia are non-physical, they still present an explanatory problem.

"While I think this materialist response is right in the end, it does not suffice to put the mind-body problem to rest. Even if conceivability considerations do not establish that the mind is in fact distinct from the body, or that mental properties are metaphysically irreducible to physical properties, still they do demonstrate that we lack an explanation of the mental in terms of the physical"

However, such an epistemological or explanatory problem might indicate an underlying metpahysical issue — the non-physicality of qualia, even if not proven by conceivability arguments is far from ruled out.

"In the end, we are right back where we started. The explanatory gap argument doesn't demonstrate a gap in nature, but a gap in our understanding of nature. Of course a plausible explanation for there being a gap in our understanding of nature is that there is a genuine gap in nature. But so long as we have countervailing reasons for doubting the latter, we have to look elsewhere for an explanation of the former".

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