Edict of Restitution

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Edict of Restitution (copy)

Thirty Years' War Map of Europe in 1648, after the Peace of Westphalia. Small German states within the Holy Roman Empire are shown in grey. Date 1618 –1648 Location Europe (primarily Germany) Result Peace of Westphalia Belligerents Sweden  Bohemia Denmark-Norway[1] Dutch Republic France Scotland England Saxony Transylvania  Holy Roman Empire Catholic League Austria Bavaria Spain Commanders Frederick V Duke of Buckingham Earl of Leven Gustav II Adolf † Johan Baner Piet Pieterszoon Hein Cardinal Richelieu Louis II de Bourbon Vicomte de Turenne Christian IV of Denmark Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar Johann Georg I of Saxony Gabriel Bethlen Johann Tserclaes, Count of Tilly † Albrecht von Wallenstein Ferdinand II Ferdinand III Franz von Mercy † Johann von Werth Maximilian I Count-Duke Olivares Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand Strength ~495,000, 150,000 Swedes, 20,000 Danish, 75,000 Dutch, ~100,000 Germans, 150,000 French ~450,000, 300,000 Spanish, ~100-200,000 Germans

v • d • e Thirty Years' War Plzeň – Záblati – Dolní Věstonice – White Mountain – Bergen-op-Zoom – Wiesloch – Wimpfen – Höchst – Fleurus – Stadtlohn – Breda – Dessau Bridge – Lutter am Barenberge – Groenlo – Stralsund – Wolgast – Frankfurt – Magdeburg – Werben – 1st Breitenfeld – Rain – Fürth – Alte Veste – Lützen – Oldendorf – Nördlingen – Wittstock – Rheinfelden – Breisach – Chemnitz – The Downs – La Marfée – Honnecourt – 2nd Breitenfeld – Rocroi – Tuttlingen – Freiburg – Jüterbog – Jankov – Hulst – Mergentheim – 2nd Nördlingen – Zusmarshausen – Lens – Prague

The Edict of Restitution, passed eleven years into the Thirty Years' Wars on March 6, 1629 following a very litany of Catholic successes at arms, was an much belated ex post facto attempt by Ferdinand II, Holy Roman Emperor to impose (and restore the status quo ante) religious and territorial situations reached in the settlement known as the Peace of Augsburg (1555). From the pro-Catholic viewpoint, the "Ecclesiastical Reservation" of the Augsburg treaty had further forbade the secularization of Catholic lands after 1555, so no further Catholic lands could be converted to Protestant control. However, over several decades of weaker willed emperors the "Ecclesiastical Reservation" was not enforced against the Protestant viewpoint.

This lack of decisive or effective authority in opposition taken together with the Protestant view of the legal interpretation (follows) taken together with the relative value of the land, as well as the characteristic dislike during the times for all things Catholic (Remnant Catholic institutions were seen as seditionary influences) led several princes to secularize the Catholic lands under the treaty established and customary practice of Cuius regio, eius religio—this usually occurred when a Catholic head of the church converted to Lutheranism, so was seen (by some prone to legal hairsplitting) still within the accords of the Peace of Augsburg (The management changed, and so could too the land, as possession is 9/10ths..., etc.).

The Peace of Augsburg (1555), signed by Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, confirmed the result of the 1526 Diet of Speyer ^[2]which had by agreeing to disagree ended with this principle as a prime result. With that pirinciple confirmed by the Treaty at Augsburg, the violence of that earlier day between the Lutherans and the Catholics in Germany ended —at least for the generation until renewed tensions brought about the Thirty Years' Wars.

Behind all this and typical of a medieval mindset as alien as it is to the modern era's thought processes— and at its true heart were the inheritance practices in Europe as a whole and in particular the German states within the Holy Roman Empire. Land and control over it was both power and wealth, and the noble families mostly each sought to control as much land within the extended family as was possible, as many younger sons could be appointed as price-bishops or prince-abbots, and so forth.^[3]

The "Edict of Restitution" was an attempt to ensure that the "Ecclesiastical Reservation" of the Augsburg treaty was retroactively enforced. It had a tremendous polarizing effect causing the 1800 or so states of the Holy Roman Empire to shatter into disparate blocks of opposed interests.

If fully effected, it would have affected the already secularized archbishoprics of Bremen and Magdeburg, 12 bishoprics and over 100 religious houses around the Germanies. The Edict resulted in a great transfer of power and property away from the Protestants to the Catholics, and in effect broadened a divisive religious struggle into that plus a dynastic struggle for power or survival, as seen from the viewpoint of many smaller German princes, who'd otherwise might have stayed neutral.

Additionally, since the Edict discriminated against the free practice of the Protestant religion within the affected German states by authorizing attempts to forcibly convert Protestants back to Catholicism in direct contradiction to the Treaty of Augsburg, other states the mercenary armies marched through or ravaged by foraging expeditions were greatly affected. Thousands of Protestants fled to Protestant controlled states, generally broadening the war, and central Germany was ravaged repeatedly, by some estimates loosing between 25%–50% of its pre-war population because the competing armies continually took the food—the majority of civilian deaths being caused by the twin side-effects of famine, and deaths from endemic diseases under famine weakened populations.

The greatest impact was in north-east Germany. It was here that Ferdinand’s power was at its weakest. Ferdinand appointed Imperial administrators to take over the secularized states and cities, re-establishing Imperial authority in an area that had been free of Imperial rule for nearly 100 years. Ferdinand's actions were not well received by the princes. It was a move that alarmed the French and led to the French intervention in the war.

The German princes could do nothing. They had seen the Coalition destroyed. Wallenstein had a massive army of 134,000 troops in the field to enforce Imperial authority.

Ironically, Wallenstein disliked the Edict as it trespassed into the region he considered his own but he played his part for the emperor to the full. He stated that "he would teach the Electors manners. They must be dependent on the emperor, not the emperor on them.". The response of the princes was to rally behind Maximillian of Bavaria to pressure Ferdinand into dismissing Wallenstein.

Their chance came in 1630 when Ferdinand called a meeting of the Electors in Regensburg because he wanted his son, Ferdinand III, elected King of the Romans. According to the law, the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire was selected by a vote from the Electorate of German princes. Therefore, Ferdinand needed their cooperation to approve his son as successor. Ferdinand also hoped to persuade the Electors to approve greater Imperial involvement in the European wars.

John George I of Saxony and George William of Brandenburg (both Protestant) stayed away to protest the Edict of Restitution. Those Electors present realized that they had little to gain from additional involvement in the wars. However, Maximillian still asked Ferdinand for the dismissal of Wallenstein.

To win over the Electors, Ferdinand sacked Wallenstein on August 1630 though Wallenstein argued that he was allowed to resign to save face. The dismissal of the most powerful military figure in Europe was a major victory for the Electors and Regensburg must be seen as a defeat for Ferdinand.

All of this was overshadowed in July 1630 — Gustavus Adolphus landed in Pomerania with 4,000 men in response to the persecution of the Protestants. Without Wallenstein, Ferdinand had to turn to Maximillian and Tilly to stop the new threat.

[edit] References

This article does not cite any references or sources. (January 2007) Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unverifiable material may be challenged and removed.