DPP v Armstrong

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DPP v Armstrong
High Court Of Justice (Queen's Bench Division)
Date decided: 5 November 1999
Full case name: Director of Public Prosecutions v Andrew Armstrong
Citations: 1999 EWHC QB 270
Judges sitting: Lord Justice Tuckey, Mr Justice Moses
Cases cited: R v Quail 1866 4 F & F 1976
R v Fitzmaurice 1983 76 Cr App R 17
Legislation cited: common law
Case history
Prior actions: None
Subsequent actions: None
Keywords
Incitement; impossibility

DPP v Armstrong 1999 EWHC QB 270, 2000 Crim LR 379 is an decision of the English Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice dealing with incitement when the offence incited is impossible, in the circumstances, of commission. It was ruled that this impossibility is irrelevant to the incitement itself and therefore a conviction is sustainable.

Contents

[edit] Facts

A police informer received an approach from Armstrong seeking child pornography and referred him to a police officer acting undercover. Armstrong contacted the officer and arrangements were made for a transaction; he was later arrested and charged with inciting the officer to distribute indecent photographs of children contrary to common law. In fact the police officer had no intention of providing Armstrong with child pornography.

[edit] Argument

The case was heard by a stipendiary magistrate. It was argued before him that because Armstrong and the officer lacked a shared intention to commit an offence, Armstrong should be acquitted. He was referred to the cases of R v Shaw 1994 Crim LR 365 and R v Curr 1968 2 QB 944, 1967 51 Cr App R 113 and ruled that on these authorities, the lack of an intention by the police officer to supply child pornography was fatal to the prosecution case, and acquitted. The prosecutor appealed.

[edit] Decision

Lord Justice Tuckey, having reviewed the common law and academic opinion, considered that neither implied a requirement to prove shared intention as contended by Armstrong. Turning to the authorities, he further stated that there was nothing in either to imply such a requirement. Ruling that

...it was not necessary for the prosecutor to show that the officer intended to supply child pornography to the respondent. His intention was irrelevant. The offence of incitement was committed when he was asked to commit the offence of supplying child pornography with the intention on the part of the respondent that in doing so he would be committing a criminal offence.

the court rejected the defence of impossibility and the magistrates' ruling was quashed.

[edit] References