Talk:Dialetheism
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I'm pretty sure the conditional Rules: MP, MT, and Disjunctive Syllogism are the same-- meaning there's a more basic rule that governs them. Maybe I'm wrong 'though. But if this is correct, and MP and MT can be transformed into DS, Priest and Dialetheism has a significant problem.
MP: premise P → Q premise P therefore Q = premise ¬P v Q premise ¬¬P therefore ? by Implication and Double Negation = premise (¬)¬¬P v Q premise(¬)¬P therefore (¬)Q by Disjunctive Syllogism which reads: premise P v Q premise ¬P therefore Q
Now here's MT: premise P → Q premise ¬Q therefore ¬P = premise ¬Q → ¬P premise ¬Q therefore ? by Transposition = premise ¬¬Q v ¬P premise ¬Q therefore ? by Implication = Path One: premise (¬)¬Q v ¬P premise (¬)Q therefore ? = premise (¬)Q → ¬P premise (¬)Q therefore (¬)¬P
or Path Two after Implication: premise Q v ¬P [by Double Negation of Q] premise ¬Q therefore ¬P by Disjunctive Syllogism
Rosa L wrote:
Whoever posted the interesting logic above: could you re-type it more clearly so that what you are saying can be assessed?
At present there are too many ambiguities, and (possibly?) missing letters.
RL 24/06/06.
Rosa L writes:
It is worth noting that, for all his undoubted sophistication, Graham has to change the meaning of "not" to make his theory work, which means that 'dialetheic contradictions' are only true because of linguistic juggling.
Naturally, this leaves it open whether ordinary contradictions are 'true', just as it 'solves' the paradoxes by ignoring them.
And it is worth adding this to your reading list:
Hartley Slater: 'Dialetheias are Mental Confusions' translated into Romanian by D. Gheorghiu, editor, with I. Lucica, Ex Falso Quodlibet, Editura Tehnica, Bucharest.
[If you can get hold of a copy! I obtained mine from the author himself.]
And other papers at:
http://www.philosophy.uwa.edu.au/staff/slater/publications
Also, check out my site:
http://www.anti-dialectics.org
where dialectical materialism is taken apart from a Marxist angle.
Rosa Lichtenstein 07/03/06
- "Truth in linguistic juggling" is somewhat like saying the truth in an end result has to be conveyed in an intelligible form, to one side of something or another. Transmuting a meaning by means of perception. This really only says that the entrenched mode of human thinking is very dualistic, rather than that contradictions must by nature be resolved into one postulate or the other (which are only molds we've made for them by our own considerations of what we believe in as intelligible). Maybe rather than "solving paradoxes by ignoring them" what is really happening is one is not accepting a fact because it doesn't fit into something we haven't categorized for ourselves as 'non-contradictive'. In fact, needing to separate what is posited into either one of two, mutually exclusive, integrable consistencies; so that it works in relation to your cohesive comprehension of a whole logic, is a very dialectical stance to take. Nagelfar 23:12, 30 April 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Bivalent prerequisite?
I don't see why there is a implication of dialeth(e)ism as bivalent. As a philosophical concept and not a formal logic, one could imagine a dialetheia under several possible multi-valued logics. Also the connotations used e.g as in the Achilles' heel reference or pragmatic replacement of burden-of-proof are quite negative. Scierguy 22:05, 7 March 2006 (UTC)
Rosa Lichtenstein wrote:
Nagelfar:
""Truth in linguistic juggling" is somewhat like saying the truth in an end result has to be conveyed in an intelligible form, to one side of something or another."
I note your incapacity to quote me correctly.
I actually said:
"It is worth noting that, for all his undoubted sophistication, Graham has to change the meaning of "not" to make his theory work, which means that 'dialetheic contradictions' are only true because of linguistic juggling."
The rest of what you say is unintelligible.
Is English not your first language?
I also note that because dialectics is such a jellyfish of a 'theory', those held in its grip can claim anything they like as an example of it, even if the latter is incoherent:
"In fact, needing to separate what is posited into either one of two, mutually exclusive, integrable consistencies; so that it works in relation to your cohesive comprehension of a whole logic, is a very dialectical stance to take."
Eh??
Rosa Lichtenstein 20:21, 4 May 2007 (UTC)
Readers might like to know that Hartley Slater's paper has now been published here:
Slater, H. (2007a), The De-Mathematisation Of Logic (Polimetrica).
Slater, H. (2007b), 'Dialetheias Are Mental Confusions', in Slater (2007a), pp.233-46. This can also be found in Béziau, Carnielli and Gabbay (2007), pp.457-66.
Slater, H. (2007c), 'Response To Priest', in Béziau, Carnielli and Gabbay (2007), pp.475-76.
Béziau, J-Y., Carnielli, W., and Gabbay, D. (2007) (eds.), Studies In Logic Volume Nine: Handbook Of Paraconsistency (College Publications).
Also well worth consulting:
Berto, F. (2007), How To Sell A Contradiction. The Logic And Metaphysics Of Inconsistency (College Publications).
Rosa Lichtenstein (talk) 20:23, 9 March 2008 (UTC)
