Talk:Demarcation problem

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This should be 'Demarcation problem" - wiki policy doesn't like caps

OK. It's done.

Contents

[edit] Kuhn

The discussion is unclear. Kuhn thought he could provide a demarcation criterion. But I suggest that it is generally accepted that he failed to do so. Non-sciences also work within paradigms. The talk of "naturalistic" explanations is not from Kuhn, and should be separated from the discussion of his work. Banno 19:19, Aug 12, 2004 (UTC)

Yes. I think some work is required on this. As it happens I purchased the 'Structure' book yesterday with such a thing in mind. -- Chris 07:44, 13 Aug 2004 (UTC)
Excellent. Most comment appears to be based on secondary reports. Now there will be two of us who have read it. Enjoy. Banno 21:07, Aug 13, 2004 (UTC)
I had planned to make some changes to the Kuhn section after reading the book, this is now a year ago. I remember reading a rather explicit formulation of a demarcation criterion, something like, 'when there are no more puzzles to solve then the business of science ends'. It was worded better no doubt but that's the gist of it. Damned if I can find it again; does anyone else remember reading this? --Chris 17:51, 26 July 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Conclusion

The last para is just too full of weasels. Unless it can be re-worded to say something, it would be better to leave the discussion hanging… Banno 19:22, Aug 12, 2004 (UTC)

What would you say is wrong with the paragraph you removed? I would argue that is does say something. For one thing it leaves the discussion hanging, as you wished, only explicitly. It's also provocative to both sides of the debate, on the one hand suggesting that the problem might be solved, on the other that it is in tatters. -- Chris 07:41, 13 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Last Para: The problem of demarcation is considered solved by some, for others there is no such thing as an autonomous scientific method, no definitive philosophy of science and no clear and agreed-upon distinction between science and pseudoscience.

See Wikipedia:WikiProject Philosophy/Proposal for criticisms. Mainly, I find the weasel words problematic. But in addition, the thrust of the article is, as it should be, that the demarcation problem is unresolved. The first sentence of this paragraph stands in strange contrast to the remainder of the article. If someone claims that the problem is resolved, then their argument should be presented here, instead of this oblique reference. Banno 21:43, Aug 13, 2004 (UTC)

I started to revise the paragraph and came up with something completely different. Take a look. -- Chris 23:19, 14 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Very interesting. Like the idea of including the judgement. Need to think about it for a bit... Banno 09:32, Aug 15, 2004 (UTC)

The final sentence of this article used 'all' to mean 'those under the juristiction of the United States Supreme Court'. It's been deleted. --Eienmaru 21:43, 17 May 2005 (UTC)

Although I am the one responsible for the final sentence, I would be the first (as in fact I am) to admit that your change is an improvement. Chris 20:20, 19 May 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Partial solutions

There is no discussion of the possiblity of partial solutions to the problem. A total solution decides between either science and unscience. Whereas, a partial solution can also decide something is 'maybe science'. I don't know if there is any literature out there on this, but it seems probable that I am not the first to consider it. An example of a partial criterion is Kuhn's paradigm criteria- every science must operate according to a paradigm. An example of a fairly uncontroversial partial criteria is a theory must make at least one prediction about reality. The latter is just a much more inclusive version of falsifiability. Also, it is merely equivalent to the statement that sciences are ontologies, so that rejecting it as a criteria risks an incoherently antirealist stance where even instrumentalist interpretations would be dismissed since instruments do not exist. Such a position quickly leads to a pathological cynicism so bad that one must reject one's own existance. --Intangir 14:38, 30 December 2005 (UTC)

Something like Wittgenstein's families of meanings would offer a partial solution. Just as in Philosophical Investigations we are led to the conclusion that the word 'game' has no analytic definition, we might say the same of science, i.e. that the things we consider to be science are not so because they share some essential commonality but because they are connected by a ‘family resemblance’. But you’ll notice that this is not so much a partial solution as a denial that the problem even exists. I don’t think that it will be difficult to find a partial solution or even a number of partial solutions. So I put it to you that it was never really a problem to do so and that a partial solution is in fact no solution. --Chris 22:46, 10 January 2006 (UTC)

[edit] More demarcation problems?

I thought that demarcation problem would apply (1) between protoscience and pseudoscience and (2) between science and protoscience (e.g. for both, at what point in history did astrology go from being protoscience to pseudoscience?) — Dunc|☺ 15:22, 30 December 2005 (UTC)

I guess it depends who's talking. When philosophers such as Feyerabend or Lakatos talk about the demarcation problem they usually mean demarcation between science and pseudoscience. Popper's demarcation was between science and non-science but amounts to more or less the same. I wouldn't be surprised if other authors have used the phrase "demarcation problem" in other contexts. Do you know of any? --Chris 22:55, 10 January 2006 (UTC)
Personally, I think that since Demarcation means the process of drawing boundaries around something, the "Demarcation problem" (of Science) should refer to all of these. These boundaries get the most attention, however, since they're haziest. It's a lot easier to distinguish Science from Religion than Pseudoscience. However, the most common other boundary I've heard being debated is with the "Social Sciences" (in debating whether they fall inside of outside the realm of science). ---DrLeebot 13:30, 31 July 2006 (UTC)
The demarcation problem can also be between science and metaphysics - or philosophy generally. I think this was what Popper had in mind; in any event, it is an important issue, and quite distinct from the demarcation between science and pseudoscience. Metamagician3000 02:45, 19 November 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Distinct

Just reading the article over and I was curious: What is the difference between a "paradigm" and a "model"? It look a little bit like Kuhn has exchanged the word model for the fancier "paradigm" and made a bunch of controversial statements, que money.

In science all the things he describes as "paradigms" are called "models", so you can see my confusion. It might be of help to the article if we can describe the proper distinction. Jefffire 10:15, 23 August 2006 (UTC)

Paradigms are more encompassing—they are not just the scientific theories (or models) themselves, they are also a form of pedagogical practices, methodological approaches, laboratory techniques, etc. At least, that's my understanding of it. A model would be only the intellectual component of a paradigm, whereas the paradigm itself covers more than just the intellectual, if that makes sense. --Fastfission 12:42, 23 August 2006 (UTC)
I'm afraid I don't fully understand how that description applies in practice. Also your usage here appears to be slightly different to that detailed in the article where the word is used as being simply synonymous with model. I think the article may be oversimplifying (or mabey Kuhn was oversimplifying...). Jefffire 12:50, 23 August 2006 (UTC)


[edit] Dumb this down a little

I think the following explanation should be dumbed down a little i.e. de-jargonized:

(Robust as in "stable" in the statistical sense, i.e., not very sensitive to occasional outlying data points.)

Specifically the "outlying data points" part. Maybe replace with "not very sensitive to external input." or something like that (but preferably something evem less pretentious sounding). I'm not even really sure its a pureley statistical concept. I see what the person was saying, but I suspect robustness is a more abstract term (and also not so tidy a concept as this contributor made it out to be. Its kind of like "elegance", just something not strictly defined but generally felt to communicate some real quality.) Brentt 06:34, 2 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Some additions to be made

I'll try and make these at some point when I have more time but I thought I'd just list them here for the moment...

  • Two basic approaches to the demarcation issue are the essentialist approach and the constructivist approach (one attempts to define demarcation, the other attempts to describe it)
  • The term "demarcation problem" originates with Popper, Popper's motivations include trying to determine why he thought Marxism and psychoanalysis were different than physics
  • Falsification is interesting because it is an epistemic attempt to answer the problem
  • Robert K. Merton was clearly concerned with demarcation as well, concerned with why Aryan Science was bunk, offered up a sociological/methological approach to the question
  • Kuhn's approach can be summarized a bit cleaner (as relevant to demarcation) in that while he explicitly avowed trying to find demarcation criteria, he essentially set up the difference between the hard and social sciences as being one of the presence of a paradigm, which is itself a essentialist statement about demarcation, though one rooted in conceptual/historical conditions (Popper rejected him for this reason)
  • Constructivist criticisms of Popper like "experimenter's regress"

...just some thoughts. More to come later. --Fastfission 00:49, 15 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Some Historians' Perspectives

This is a nice topic. Some historians of science tend to define science in such broad terms that the demarcation problem almost vanishes. (As someone who has studied the astronomies of primitive cultures, which can be very precise while finding expression in mythological terms, I admit to being attracted by such approaches). Here are a few examples:

For our purpose, science may be defined as ordered knowledge of natural phenomena and of the relations between them.
William Cecil Dampier-Whetham, "Science", Encyclopædia Brittanica, 11th ed. (1911).
Science comprises, first, the orderly and systematic comprehension, description and/or explanation of natural phenomena and, secondly, the [mathematical and logical] tools necessary for the undertaking.
Marshall Clagett, Greek Science in Antiquity, (1955).
Science is a systematic explanation of perceived or imaginary phenomena, or else is based on such an explanation. Mathematics finds a place in science only as one of the symbolical languages in which scientific explanations may be expressed.
David Pingree, "Hellenophilia versus the History of Science," Isis, 83 (1992): 554-563.

I think a section on those who seek a broad definition of science to avoid putting limits on our understanding of the ways people have done science in the past or in other cultures would be helpful. --SteveMcCluskey 03:50, 21 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] trope

Please disambiguate the trope link in the article. I can't do it, because I don't understand it well enough. ike9898 20:38, 12 January 2007 (UTC)

I understand the word according to this definition from Merriam-Webster 'a common or overused theme or device'. Given that definition, I'm not sure any of the alternatives is entirely accurate. --Chris 23:05, 12 January 2007 (UTC)