Talk:Critical rationalism

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[edit] Falsificationism

  • Critical rationalism is not a generalization of Popper's falsificationism (but a kind of transfer).
  • Falsificationism is applicable only to scientific theories: A falsification is the contradiction between theoretical prediction and experience.
  • Falsificationism must not be mixed up with fallibilism.
  • What Popper wrote about critical rationalism (e.g. in his The Open Society) is based on his fallibilism...
  • All sections in this article "critical rationalism" can only be understood from the view of an ubiquitous fallibilism. Therefore there is a general problem of justification, therefore his and Bartley's concept of universal criticism even in the non-scientific fields (where no scientific predictions are possible) of politics, moral, social life, and so on.

If nobody has the time to make corrections, I will be glad to do so and to return to this entry as soon as possible.--hjn 12:04, 22 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Popper & Miller thesis is controversial if not invalid

The second so-called pitfall should be taken out of the text as it misleads the reader. A number of authors discussed against that thesis of Popper and Miller (P & M) and showed that the implication of the proof of P & M [1983] was not the same as it was interpreted by P & M (see Elby (1994) and its references).

Andrew Elby (March 1994): "Contentious Contents: For Inductive Probability" in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45(1): 193--200.

Kayaalp 18:37, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

Unfortunately, Popper died just as he was about to finish the reply to Elby and before he could publish it. You can find correspondence and typescript in his box 583:23; "On Excess Content: A Reply to Elby" (co-authored with David Miller; August 26, 1994). Here is an incomplete list of replies and counter-replies about the issue:

  • Karl R. Popper, David W. Miller: A proof of the impossibility of inductive probability. Nature 302 (1983), 687–688;
  • Karl Popper: Logic of Scientific Discovery, new appendix *XIX;
  • Nature 310 (1984), 433–434
    • R. C. Jeffrey: Letter concerning Popper and Miller
    • I. Levi: The impossibility of inductive probability
    • I. J. Good: The impossibility of inductive probability
    • Karl R. Popper, David W. Miller: The impossibility of inductive probability.
  • G. Blandino: Critical Remarks on an Argumentation by K. Popper and D. Miller. Discussion about Induction. Epistemologia 7 (1984), 183–206;
  • I. Levi: Probabilistic Pettifoggery. Erkenntnis 25 (1986), 133–140
  • Nature 315 (1985), 461
    • J. Wise, P. T. Landsberg: Has inductive probability been proved impossible?
    • Karl R. Popper, David W. Miller: Has inductive probability been proved impossible?
  • J. Wise, P. T. Landsberg: On the possibility of inductive probability. Nature 316 (1985), 22
  • M. L. G. Redhead: On the Impossibility of Inductive Probability. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (1985), 185–191
  • I. J. Good: Probabilistic Induction Is Inevitable. Journal of Statistical Computation and Simulation 20 (1985), 323–324, C216
  • H. Gaifman: On Inductive Support and Some Recent Tricks. Erkenntnis 22 (1985), 5–21
  • D. Gillies: In Defense of the Popper-Miller Argument. Philosophy of Science 53 (1986), 110–113
  • J. M. Dunn, G. Hellman: Dualling: A Critique of an Argument of Popper and Miller. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (1986), 220–223
  • Karl R. Popper, David W. Miller: Why probabilistic support is not inductive. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 321A (1987), 569–591
  • A. Rivadulla: On Popper-Miller's Proof of the Impossibility of Inductive Probability. Erkenntnis 27 (1987), 353–357
  • I. J. Good: A Restatement, in Response to Gillies, of Redhead's Argument in Support of Induction. Philosophy of Science 54 (1987), 470–472
  • E. Eells: On the alleged impossibility of inductive probability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1988), 111–116
  • N. C. A. da Costa, S. French: Pragmatic Probability, Logical Omniscience and the Popper-Miller Argument. Fundamenta Scientiae 9 (1988), 43–53
  • C. S. Chihara, D. A. Gillies: An Interchange on the Popper-Miller Argument. Philosophical Studies 54 (1988), 1–8
  • C. Howson: On a Recent Objection to Popper and Miller’s 'Disproof' of Probabilistic Induction. Philosophy of Science 56 (1989), 675-680
  • D. Zwirn, H. Zwirn: L'argument de Popper et Miller contre la justification probabiliste de l'induction, L'âge de la science 2 (Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob, 1989), 59–81
  • C. Howson: Some Further Relections on the Popper-Miller Disproof of Probabilistic Induction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1990), 221-28
  • I. J. Good: Discussion: A Suspicious Feature of the Popper/Miller Argument. Philosophy of Science 57 (1990): 535–536
  • David W. Miller: Reply to Zwirn & Zwirn. Cahiers du CREA 14 (1990), 149–153
  • A. Mura: When Probabilistic Support is Inductive. Philosophy of Science 57 (1990), 278–289.
  • A. Boyer: Une logique inductive probabiliste est-elle seulement possible? Cahiers du CREA 14 (1990): 123-145
  • G. Dorn: Popper's Laws of the Excess of the Probability of the Conditional over the Conditional Probability. Conceptus 26 (1992/1993): 3-61
  • Andrew Elby: Contentious contents: For inductive probablitiy. Brit. J. Phil. Sci 45 (1994), 193–200
  • G. Dorn: Inductive Countersupport. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 26 (1995), 187–189
  • J. Cussens: Deduction, Induction and Probalistic Support. Synthese 108 (1996): 1–10
  • E. Eells: Popper and Miller, and Induction and Deduction. Proceedings of the Seventh Asian Logic Conference (1999)

--rtc 04:54, 22 June 2007 (UTC)

Can anyone provide an electronic version to the box that Rtc referenced? Karl R. Popper, David Miller: On Excess Content: A Reply to Elby. Hoover Institution Archives Box 583:23 (August 26, 1994). I'm very interested in this issue because I'm trying to decide on switching from a run-of-the-mill positivist to critical rationalist, and further information would be helpful. Any recommendations on material that gives a good overview of the latest state of the discussion on this topic (post the 1999 papers referenced)? I also have some questions, if one of you gentlemen would be kind enough to help out a layman, my email is EimacDude_at_aol_dot_com

ThVa 11:00, 18 December 2007 (UTC)