Comparison of the Amundsen and Scott Expeditions

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The reasons for Amundsen's success and for Scott's failure in returning from the South Pole have always been the subject of discussion and controversy. The contrasting fates of the two teams, despite the fact that they were both carrying out the expedition around the same time, were a major reason behind the strong interest from historians. Views from publishing authors on this subject tended to be extreme, with some attributing Scott's failure to sheer bad luck while others describing the tragedy to be a result of his downright ignorance and incompetence. This article focuses on some common points that have been raised in the literature.

Contents 1 Difference in objectives of the respective expeditions 2 Different camping sites 3 Man-hauling and ponies versus dogs 4 Unusually poor weather 5 Planning errors in food and fuel 6 Different clothings 7 References

[edit] Difference in objectives of the respective expeditions

Neither Scott nor his financial backers saw the expedition as having as its sole purpose simply getting to the South Pole and it was necessary to stress this aspect to gain funding and public support. The scientific aspect was important in selling the expedition to institutions and business, who might see little commercial benefit in journeying to the frozen pole, but who could see profit in the advancement of knowledge of animal and mineral resources on the reasonably accessible coast. (This was of course long before the concept of a non-commercial Antarctica, where no country had claim to any part of the continent.) Even as they were dying, Scott and Wilson continued to haul over 14 kg of rock samples. Scott could have left the samples at one of the cairns along the way to be picked up later, or not taken them at all, accepting that his mission was not primarily scientific, and his failure to do so might have been due to his desire to salvage some 'immediate result' to show for his otherwise failed journey to the South Pole - or simply due to lack of clear thinking brought on by exhaustion. The present-day Antarctic explorer Ranulph Fiennes though has suggested that the extra weight would not have been a major handicap, even when they were short of food at the end of the trek.

Scott and his financial backers had made geological exploration a significant component of the expedition's work. Amundsen's base camp at the Bay of Whales, a small notch in the immense Ross Ice Shelf, hundreds of miles from land, was unsuitable as a base for geological work, even if it was an ideal base for launching a 'dash' to the South Pole. Scott's base at Cape Evans on Ross Island, with access to the Trans-Antarctic mountain range to the west was a better base for geological exploration.

[edit] Different camping sites

Amundsen had camped on the Ross Ice Shelf 60 miles (96 km) closer to the Pole but there was no known route up to the polar plateau near there.^[1] Amundsen was fortunate in finding a route closer to his base. Though some have said the Heiberg Glacier is an "easier" route, it is merely shorter. It has been described by explorers as a tumult, a "catastrophe of ice." Scott, on the other hand, had made a trial expedition south across the Ice Shelf during his Discovery Expedition, learning much about the difficulties of Antarctic travel. It was Shackleton in his 1908 attempt who pioneered the route up the Beardmore Glacier to the central plateau and the Pole. Scott followed in Shackleton's footsteps and learned from his expedition.

Scott did not have a ship to equal the immensely strong purpose-built Arctic exploration ship Fram, and had no funds to build one. Nor was the Fram available for hire - it had been contracted by Amundsen in order to make an attempt on the North Pole in 1909-1910. Knowing that the Terra Nova was not as strong a ship as the Fram, or even his previous ship Discovery, Scott did not wish to risk taking it into seas further south than Ross Island where it might be trapped in sea ice for the duration of the Antarctic winter, as Discovery had been. Scott instead had plans for the Terra Nova to run resupply missions between Ross Island and New Zealand. Amundsen on the other hand, having diverted his efforts from the North to the South Pole, had an ideal ship in the Fram for penetrating to the Bay of Whales on the southernmost shore of the Ross Sea, closer to the South Pole, and for over-wintering there on board.

[edit] Man-hauling and ponies versus dogs

Much has been said in the literature regarding Scott's reluctance to use dogs as transport in his planning of the expedition. Scott believed from his and Shackleton's previous experiences that it would not be possible to get dogs up the Beardmore, and so laid all of his plans around man-hauling sleds above the Beardmore. Pilots flying over the region showed that the slope of the Beardmore to be longer than the Heiberg, for which they must use their maximum rate of climb to overcome. Though man-hauling would inevitably mean slower progress, during the many months of planning his assault on the Pole, Scott never would have appreciated that he would become involved in a 'race', and therefore would be choosing as sure a method of reaching his goal as possible. He would have felt confident man-hauling would achieve that goal, but with his lack of experience of dog-handling he would have considered this as a risk.

Amundsen's use of Samoyed dogs to haul his sledges, on the other hand, allowed him to head south some three weeks earlier in the Antarctic summer season than Scott who used mainly Manchurian ponies. After reaching the Polar Plateau, over half of the dogs were killed and fed to the remaining dogs, reducing the weight of dog food required for the entire trip.

Scott did not have Amundsen's experience of the Arctic and particularly lacked Amundsen's intimate knowledge of the Inuit and their way of life, which included an understanding of the proper selection and management of dog teams. Amundsen had also ensured that he would have the first choice of any available sled dogs if Scott should try to obtain them, Scott however did not and was barely convinced to take any dogs at all. Scott did not have Amundsen's supreme confidence in the ability of dogs, and used them only as part of his strategy below the Beardmore Glacier. He took two motorised sled/tractors and Siberian ponies as well, the advantage the motorised sleds provided was swiftly nullified however, when one of the sleds fell through thin ice into the sea. Scott did consult Nansen, who had Arctic experience, and on Nansen's recommendation took with him Tryggve Gran, an expert Norwegian skier who had been planning his own expedition to the North Pole. Scott's growing confidence in the dog teams was evidenced by the vital role he gave them in the follow-on depot resupply that he would need on his return journey. However, Scott had castigated Meares, the dog driver, to the point to where Meares left the expedition at first chance, leaving only Dmitri, a young Russian dog handler, as the only one left who understood dog driving. Scott had left four orders concerning the resupply effort, the last of which was given verbally to Lt. Evans, who succumbed to scurvy, failing to pass along the most urgent request. Dr Atkinson assigned Apsley-Garrard to take Dmitri and two dog teams to resupply the One Ton Depot and to go as far beyond as he saw fit. Apsley-Garrard was pinned down at the depot for several days by a blizzard, and could not go farther due to the limited amount of dog food that remained. Turning around at that point, he and Dmitri barely survived the return trip.

Scott's polar party relied primarily on "man hauling" and it is untrue that Scott did not use sled-dogs nor that he did not use skis effectively. Tryggve Gran later commented that Scott's skiing ability matched that of the average Norwegian. Of Scott's final polar team of five men four were on skis, the fifth was not simply because, initially, it was not intended that five men go to the pole so his skis had earlier been stowed on a dog sled, that had returned to base, to save overall weight. As Scott's party neared the exit from the top of the Beardmore glacier there was a phased withdrawal of the dog team, and killing of their ponies for food[citation needed]. The dog team headed back to base with the intention of later heading south again to meet and help the returning polar party at some point in the future.

[edit] Unusually poor weather

On their return to the Ross Ice Shelf, Scott's group experienced prolonged blizzards and low temperatures which have only been matched in one year since continuous records began to be kept in 1985 [1]. Scott and Shackleton's experience in 1903 and 1907 gave them first-hand experience of normal conditions in Antarctica. Simpson, Scott's meteorologist 1910-1912, did a huge amount of research into the weather during the time of their expedition, often taking two readings a day, every day. More recent weather records have shown that March 1912 was particularly cold being 15 - 20°F below the average for the time of year[2]. None of these suggested the extreme weather conditions they encountered on their return journey and a severe blizzard cemented the fate of the Scott team. The exceptional severity of the weather meant that they could not leave the confines of their tent and thus they were prevented from reaching the final food and fuel depot. In the previous year, at the time they were laying their food and fuel depots, weather conditions frustrated them and they had to place their One-Ton Depot at 79° 29', 36 statute miles short of its planned location at 80°. Scott perished 11 statute miles from One-Ton Depot.

It is now known that the route up the west side of the Ross Ice Shelf that Scott used is subject to worse weather than Amundsen's easterly route. However, Scott endured weather conditions that may occur only once every 16 years, on average 20°F colder with blizzards for long periods. The low temperatures they encountered on the Ross Ice Barrier meant that their sledge would not slide easily over the snow in the familiar way.^[2] Scott and his meteorologist, Simpson, had estimated that the temperatures would be high enough to allow the sledge to slide more easily. The bottom line, however, is that Scott acknowledged his margin of safety in respect of the weather was very narrow^{[citation needed]}.

[edit] Planning errors in food and fuel

Scott calculated the supply requirements based on a number of expeditions, both by members of his team and by those of Shackleton, on this basis Scott's planning was more than adequate to his needs[citation needed]. The shortage of food and fuel that eventually killed Scott's team was due to the unexpected prolonged and exceptionally severe weather and the injuries of members of the team slowing their progress and a leakage of fuel from the cans stored in the depots (Scott's record shows that apparently sealed cans of fuel from the depots were completely or partially empty). Amundsen did not experience this fuel loss due to his practice of soldering the fuel tins until they were to be used[citation needed]. Scott used fuel storage vessels with leather washers, a method which had been known by both Amundsen and Scott in earlier expeditions.

Some have suggested that Scott underestimated the effect of changing his original plan to take only four men to the South Pole in terms of food consumption. Scott's diary though, records that the party ran short of food only when beset by blizzards, well after they had descended the plateau and had replenished their supplies at several of the depots. As Scott approached the South Pole he would have been increasingly aware - because of their rate of travel during the earlier part of the expedition climbing the Beardmore glacier - that they had little margin for error on their return journey. However, by the end they did get to within eleven miles of a food depot which would have meant safety, only failing having been forced to remain in their tents by blizzards for seven or eight days.

[edit] Different clothings

It has been often raised that Scott's team were inappropriately dressed in the man-made fibred clothing that he chose and that Amundsen was better prepared in wearing furs (as was the Inuit practice of Amundsen's experience). The fact is that each was best dressed for their circumstances. Amundsen used dog-sleds and as such his team generated much less body heat and perspiration and needed the superb insulation of fur clothing. Scott's team, who exclusively man-hauled on the high polar plateau as expected, sweated much more profusely and needed clothing that would allow the evaporation of that perspiration^{[citation needed]}. If Scott had worn furs the subsequent freezing of that perspiration close to the skin would have been disastrous^{[citation needed]}.

[edit] References