Talk:Biological warfare

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I removed the yellow rain section, because it was chemical, not biological warfare.

There is difficulty in classifying toxins, such as tricothenes ("yellow rain") or botulinus toxins as strictly chemical or biological. The US CDC Select Agent Program for controlled laboratory use of biological warfare does include botulinus toxin, ricin, and staphylococcus enterotoxins. I would leave in yellow rain; the reports I have seen suggested it was produced biologically rather than by chemical synthesis. Howard C. Berkowitz 11:16, 2 November 2007 (UTC)

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I believe the following diseases are likely to be considered for use as biological weapons

tularemia, brucellosis, Q. fever, VEE, SEB, ricin, botulism toxin, mycotoxins

May you explain why you do think they should not ?

Besides, why did you remove low visibility, high potency, accessibility, and easy delivery, these are important


There was an editting conflict, so I probably did not notice that you added the above to the list. My bad. I removed low visibility, high potency, accessibility, and easy delivery, first, because it is way to long for a section title, and second because "easy delivery" flatly contradicts the section below it which claims that delivery is the main difficulty in producing bio-weapons. Maybe it needs re-wording?
You are confusing caracteristics of a "good" weapon and real situation, where delivery is indeed difficult. Ideally, the biological weapon sould be easy to deliver. Hence, it needs rewording, not deletion.

wikipedia:pages needing attention reckons this should be watched for NPOV - but I think it's probably ok at the mo. Opinions? Martin

For national militaries, as opposed to terrorists, large-scale production and delivery is indeed the toughest part. The US and USSR both had very large test chambers, such as the "Eight-Ball" One Million Liter Sphere at Ft. Detrick. Even so, before things were considered weaponized, they were tested in large open areas like Dugway or areas in the Pacific Ocean. The anthrax experiments on Gruinard Island certainly contaminated an area, but a small one. Is there evidence that large-scale delivery is easy? Howard C. Berkowitz 11:16, 2 November 2007 (UTC)

Removed since this doesn't have much to do with bioweapons....

Contents

[edit] New technological threats

New technologies such as genetics, proteomics, molecular engineering, artificial intelligence and robotics led to new concerns. Robotics and (limited) artificial intelligence have been used in war, in particular by the United States. Proteomics and genetics have both been used in research into new chemical and biological weapons - again, the US has led the way here, researching "crowd control" chemical weapons that are permitted under the relevant treaties, and also pursuing "defensive" research into biological weapons. Molecular engineering has yet to be used in warfare, but has yet to be used in anything besides research into molecular engineering.

Supported by these concerns, some claim "NBC" weapons should now include genetic, proteomic, robotic and AI threats as well.

For example, one concern met with each of the "NBC" types is that the different treaties applicable had legal loopholes, due to confusion about the line between chemical and biological weapons (e.g. prions which are not organisms but simple single-molecule proteins, and could thereby be considered either chemical or biological), and the spread of "dual use" technology through commercial channels that could easily be put to military use.

Another concern was that most "NBC" treaties predated the ability to DNA-sequence and genetically modify biological entities (to be, make or carry poisonous substances, virus or prion), e.g. altering the well-understood e. coli bacterium to generate prions).[1]

[edit] Impact of new technologies of mass destruction

Some of these technologies could have impacts far beyond a single generation of the human species in one place on Earth, and so are generally considered to be wholly inappropriate for conflict between nation-states. The only use of such weapons seems to be threatening human extinction (as North Korea began to do starting early in 2003) or mutual assured destruction of an opponent who attacks first - perhaps including other populations innocent in the conflict.

Miniaturization, mastery of genomes and proteomes, and adaptive software, all seem to have the potential to be combined to create pseudo-life-forms that may compete successfully with natural life. Indeed, some scientists in the artificial life field believe it is desirable to do so. The dangers of these technologies in combination, and of loss of human control over biological or robotic runaways, is a major reason that the United Nations seek to control their spread, especially to non-state actors such as terrorist groups, that typically have no population to defend, and so can be quite reckless, and are not concerned with the threat of retaliation against a nation.

In a small town in Oregon, followers of the Rajneesh Yoga attempted to control a local election by infecting a salad bar with salmonella. The attack caused about 900 people to get sick, and was thus quite effective.

So how did the election turn out? --Andrew 20:30, Apr 28, 2004 (UTC)

[edit] Historical bio-warfare and smallpox

Dropped this paragraph:

Several colonists settling in North and South America are now infamous for waging biological warfare by distributing items infected with smallpox to indigenous populations. Francisco Pizarro distributed clothing infected with smallpox to South American peoples in the 16th century; Hernán Cortés infected the Aztec population in the early 16th century; Jeffrey Amherst distributed smallpox infected blankets to Native Americans sympathetic to France during the French and Indian War; and Captain Ecuyer of the Royal Americans distributed blankets and handkerchiefs to Native Americans in 1763.

This is disputed, see smallpox. Ellsworth 23:58, 18 Mar 2005 (UTC)

  • Fair enough. Thanks. Courtland 12:58, 2005 Mar 19 (UTC)

[edit] French and Indian War Smallpox attack

Dropped this sentence:

During the French and Indian War, British troops handed out smallpox-infected blankets to Native Americans aligned with the French. It is estimated that up to 20,000 Native Americans died from smallpox, as the disease was unknown in North America previously, and the natives therefore had no natural immunity.

This is in conflict with the smallpox article - the French and Indian war began in 1756, and smallpox was certainly not "unknown in North America" before then. Ellsworth 16:11, 21 Mar 2005 (UTC)


From article on Pontiac's Rebellion: On 24 June 1763, in a now infamous incident, the commander of Fort Pitt gave representatives of the besieging Delawares two blankets that had been exposed to smallpox, in hopes of spreading the disease to the Indians in order to end the siege. Modern polemical accounts of Indian/white relations often cite this incident as an example of genocide. However, although Indians in the area did contract smallpox, it is impossible to verify how many people (if any) contracted the disease as a result of the Fort Pitt incident; the disease was already in the area and may have easily reached the Indians through other vectors. Jeffrey Amherst’s name is usually associated with this incident, although the first record of Amherst suggesting trying to spread smallpox to the Indians is from the summer of 1764, after the commander at Fort Pitt had already made this attempt, apparently on his own initiative.

A number of discussion pages in Wiki have been debating this controversial issue. See Kevin Myers' recent edit on the Smallpox article. The paragraph above contains much the same information. WBardwin 04:47, 24 Mar 2005 (UTC)

I added a {{fact}} tag to a portion of this text, which seems confused or confusing. The article mentions inoculation with chickenpox being met with suspicion, and that chickenpox was as dangerous to Native Americans as smallpox was. This may have been the case; but I was unaware that exposure to chickenpox conferred any immunity to smallpox, which the article now suggests is the case. Was cowpox intended? - Smerdis of Tlön 16:22, 1 March 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Scary Choice

I really think pulmonary anthrax is an ideal choice for use in biological attacks. It is airborn and can have a mortallity rate of up to 90%! Biological weapons can be/are very scary. Subphreeky 17 July 2005

Read "Biohazard" and "Hot Zone" some time. The really scary agents are in the filovirus catigory and form hemorragic fevers. Militarizing Anthrax to acheave the particulate sizes and dispersion techneques in order to sufficently attack a large civilian population is a massive endevor. Spreading a readily transmissable virus like hemorragic Dengue Fever or Ebola Zaire is much more "low tech" and involves fewer rescorces and personnel. -NBCD Chief

May I suggest looking at the declassified literature about weaponized anthrax, and, for that matter, open literature about filovirus infection? While strict isolation with respiratory protection is the standard of care for viral hemorrhagic fevers, it is not clear what experience there has been in weaponizing them. Some of the data that Ishii, commander of Unit 731, traded for immunity did involve Korean hemorrhagic fevers, probably hantavirus although the presentation there is different than in the American Southwest. Ken Alibek did mention the Soviets had worked on hemorrhagic viruses relatively recently.
The US weaponized VEE, but there was not a great deal of experience with other viruses when the program was shut down. Dengue, which does not always appear in hemorrhagic form -- the much better known form is a miserable seven-day self-limiting "breakbone fever" -- was considered, but Q fever (Coxiella burnetti infection) was selected as a primarily incapacitating agent comparable to non-hemorrhagic dengue, but much easier to grow and weaponize. Howard C. Berkowitz 11:07, 2 November 2007 (UTC)

Anthrax was a bust for the US biological program. In the end no one could say the ID50 was 8,000 spores/person, 23,000 spores/person, 50,000 spores/person, or 100,000 spores/person. At least with tularemia there was reproducible evidence with human test subjects. The value of anthrax was extrapolated from experiments with monkeys and a handfull of accidental cases. Even after the incident in Sverdlovsk and the Anthrax letters of 2001 the question of anthrax infectivity appears poor at best. A WWII memo on how no one had become infected by anthrax at the pilot plant, QA department or Vigo plant with anything more than a cutaneous sore left a question of the value of anthrax with researchers. Reid Kirby 20:35 S, 27AP08. —Preceding comment was added at 01:35, 28 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Chronological List

Hello

I am considering compiling a list of Bio war incidents, I am looking for input on the proper name:

  • Chronology of biological warfare
  • Timeline of biological incidents

There could be several other choices, let me know what you think.

Yummy123 20:59, 1 August 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Anti-Plant Agents

Improved the section on "attacking plants" to be more encyclopedic (covers both herbicides and plant diseases) and related it to actual biological warfare efforts. --Reid Kirby 16:37, 16 August 2005 (UTC)

[edit] No mention of AIDS biowarfare theories?

I am wondering why there isn't even a casual mention of biowarfare theories involving the AIDS virus inside this article? Did you know nobel prize winning scientists have alleged that and there is a significant amount of information available? Would it be ok with the regular editors of this article if info on AIDS and biowarfare theories is added to this article? zen master T 04:45, 30 September 2005 (UTC)

can you be more specific- which nobel laureate claimed HIV and bio-warfare connection? Was it really a scientist? The only nobel laureate I can think of claiming this would be mr. Nelson Mandela Xmort 03:45, 31 December 2005 (UTC)

See the pejoratively titled AIDS conspiracy theories article which lists 2 Nobel laureates -- more than a handful of other scientists have various alternative origin theories too. zen master T 03:53, 31 December 2005 (UTC)

No one watches this talk page? zen master T 01:06, 5 October 2005 (UTC)

Maybe add a link to the 'Aids Conspiracy Theories' page? Rakim
I added the AIDS theories article to the category. That should cover it. Mirror Vax 05:18, 31 December 2005 (UTC)


[edit] Nixon sentence

The United States maintains a stated national policy of never using biological weapons under any circumstances since November 1969 President Nixon.

What does this mean? Did Nixon create the policy? This is a bad sentence. I'm not changing it because I'm not sure what it means to say exactly. Someone who does please rewrite it. If no one changes it, I'll just delete the reference to Nixon, since it doesn't make any sense as written. Torgo 01:54, 28 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Typhus in World War II

A link to the following article should be added: ...Even though it must be expected that the figures given in this report might be exaggerated, the fact that Polish underground fighters caused some casualties to the German occupational forces is indubitable, and even though such guerilla warfare against an occupational power is illegal, one cannot blame the Poles morally for waging such a war against what they conceived to be an illegal occupation. What is of interest here is the penultimate page of this report, which lists under "3. Activities of retaliation":

"Typhoid fever microbes and typhoid fever lice: in a few hundred cases"

Aspects of Biological Warfare During World War II -- contributed unsigned by 198.54.202.82 (11:54, 15 June 2006)

Typhus and Typhoid fever are two distinct diseases, but this article doesn't seem to understand the difference. The quotation above accurately reflects the web site quoted. I would say it is not dependable enough, without reference to another source. WBardwin 21:48, 15 June 2006 (UTC)

[edit] US Germ Warfare and Korea

The sentence that ends in "...though it is generally believed that such weapons were never used." Should be backed up by a source proving the most believe that such weapons where never used by the U.S. military. Also the sentence "This view was challenged by China and North Korea, who accused the United States of large-scale field testing of biological weapons against them during the Korean War (1950-1953)." is not completely accurate as more then just China and North Korea made such a claim. Their was even those in the US who claimed this also such as reporter named John W. Powell who supported the bio-weapons use claim in an article he wrote in the early 1950's, which led to the government attempting unsuccessfully to try him for sedition [2]. The statement "Their accusation is substantiated by Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman in 'The United States and Biological Warfare: secrets of the early Cold War and Korea' (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1998)." seems to contradict the claim that it is widely believed that such weapons were never used. Is this section trying to claim the majority of people live in denial over the claim despite it being substantiated or maybe the book is not believed by most to substantiate the claim to the degree the statement seems to claim? --Cab88 18:48, 8 July 2006 (UTC)

I think this paragraph should be removed. First, all references cited there are not accessible (they ask for a password), so a reader can not verify if these claims are supported by anything. Second, see this: [3]. It says: "The first effective disinformation campaign was during the Korean Conflict. This was a major Soviet disinformation campaign that generated media attention. The Americans were accused of going into Korean villages during the Korean conflict (1950–1953) and shooting villagers, or killing them with biological weapons and chemical warfare. In fact, the Soviets used anthrax in Korea to kill men, women, and children, and then blamed it on the Americans. An attempt is now underway with the Cold War History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, in Washington, DC, to counter this account, especially through the work of Katherine Weathersby who discovered that Soviet documents obtained through a Japanese researcher belied these rumors and accusations. The issue re-surfaced in the book United States and Biological Weapons: Secrets of the Early Cold War and Korea (Indiana University Press, 1999) by Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman. Endicott was the son of one of the men who helped to disseminate the disinformation campaign, James Endicott." Biophys 15:58, 16 March 2007 (UTC)
While I don't have links immediately at hand, declassified documents show that the only biological agent that the US had weaponized at the time of the Korean War was tularemia (Franciscella tularensis infection). As available at that time, the agent was prepared as a wet slurry with a 48-hour lifetime, flown refrigerated to a forward bomber base, and filled into cluster bomblets there. The North Koreans showed a great many objects that they claimed were associated with US BW, but none of them included the distinctive tularemia bomblet. They did show various ceramic containers and fabrics containing fleas, which were developed by Japanese Unit 731.
I am interested in the report about Soviet anthrax use in Korea. The Sverdlovsk incident, where there were a number of cases of anthrax in areas near an anthrax production facility that had an accident with filters, is well documented. Howard C. Berkowitz 11:00, 2 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Treatments

I corrected the "5% sodium hypochlorite solution" comment in the "Protective Measures" section to reflect the modern standards per MCWP 3-37.3 w/change 1. I could flush out this section with more information, but it would just end up needing to have its own section. I am not exactly sure why there is a treatment section at all in an encyclopedic entry about bio Weapons in the first place - NBCD Chief

[edit] List of doomsday scenarios

Could use votes to save this article, thanks MapleTree 22:18, 28 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Natural Agents

Some of the agents listed above this heading are also naturally occuring. Anthrax, for example, occurs naturally in sheeps wool. Having this listing below the list of possible agents gives the idea that those agents not on the sub list are not naturally occuring. Ideas on how to clean this up? Dwade21 22:34, 24 January 2007 (UTC)

I wouldn't say Bacillus anthracis naturally occurs in wool. Yes, another name for anthrax is woolsorters' disease, but anthrax is a disease that kills sheep. Pasteur's first major project in immunization was for anthrax in sheep.
The fact that anthrax outbreaks, in various animal species, are reported about weekly, in worldwide public health mailing lists from the International Society for Infectious Diseases, does point out that buying cultures from reference centers is not the only way to obtain Select Agents of BW significance. Howard C. Berkowitz 10:53, 2 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Japanese Use of Biological Agents

However, new information has surfaced within the last decade, which alleges a more active Japanese usage. For example, firsthand accounts testify the Japanese infected civilians through the distribution of plagued foodstuffs, such as dumplings and vegetables. There are also reports of contaminated water supplies. Such estimates report over 580,000 victims, largely due to plague and cholera outbreaks. In addition, repeated seasonal outbreaks after the conclusion of the war bring the death toll much higher.

This section either needs to be footnoted with a reference to a credible source or else removed. It is irresponsible to make revisionist claims of "estimates" of over half a million people being killed and then not even bother to include a source for such dramatic claims. It's one thing to neglect references to facts that can be corroborated by checking any of the standard works on the subject but this is obviously well outside the scope of such cases.

UPDATE: Added the "weasel" tag to flag the section in question. Lexington50 08:25, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] CWC vs. BWC?

I was reading through the intro to the topic when I noticed that both Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons convention are used. "Note that using nonliving toxic products, even if produced by living organisms (e.g., toxins), is considered chemical warfare under the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention." I think this helps, but shouldn't Chemical Weapons Convention be a link like the BWC? It seems that if someone were researching toxins produced by organisms and they went here, they would be further interested in the CWC. Ninjablu 20:40, 23 May 2007 (UTC) ninjablu

Such toxins (e.g. botulinum toxin) are usually described in books about biological weapons, since they are produced in biological weapons facilities. About links - I do not know.Biophys 01:02, 24 May 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Identification of bioweapons

I think the first paragraph of this section should be changed. It's spoken in a first person US perspective rather than the encyclopedic perspectve that should be used on wikipedia. Just a thought maybe: I'm most likely talking utter rubish! Anonymous 20:34, 19 october 2007 (GMT)

No, you are totally right. The paragraph is POV and US-centric, and even referred to "our" line of defense. Ick. I think the whole paragrpah should probably be blanked, but for now I just got rid of the specific US-centric stuff and added a neutrality tag to the section. --Jaysweet 19:39, 19 October 2007 (UTC)
It's fair to say that, on a worldwide basis, there are certain consensus points on biodefense. See, for example, <http://www.promedmail.org> ProMED-mail is a program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases <http://www.isid.org>.
A fairly basic requirement, which certainly exists in no country, is a fully integrated information system, so that not just emergency first responder, but general clinical reports can, with privacy protection, enter a data base for pattern matching. Routine healthcare surveillance is a productive way of detecting covert bioterrorism, probably moe likely to reveal an incident than the necessarily small number of air impingers with ELISA equipment.
ELISA and the other methods mentioned are early warning methods, with many countries having a hierarchy of laboratories with increasing competence to do confirmatory tests. Some national laboratories are also regional reference laboratories for the World Health Organization. There are a finite number, admittedly growing, of laboratories properly equipped to analyze hazardous agents at Biosafety Level 4, which are certainly not limited to the US. Few regional laboratories are equipped to deal with the full range of bioweapons; only two, for example, have reference cultures of smallpox (Variola major); a larger but small number have the ability to sequence, quickly, a suspected virus and match it to known patterns within the reasonable scope of genetic variation.
There are situations that are still snarled in ethical and political areas. Not too long ago, there was an outbreak of Marburg Hemorrhagic Fever in Angola. While it was not suggested it was deliberately caused, the state of the art in dealing with such outbreaks is largely rigid quarantine, barrier nursing (e.g., "space suit"), and safe disposal of hazardous waste. Sadly, the local populace believed that the Doctors Without Borders team were interfering with traditional burial and other rituals. After a time, the medical teams were being attacked.
In such a circumstance, does the local government enforce quarantine, with lethal force if necessary? Should medical teams stay in a place where they need physical protection, while another location, several hundred miles away, welcomed the team for its local outbreak? I don't have answers for this, and there is no worldwide consensus. Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 15:12, 5 December 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Sourcing, agent coding

There really needs to be independent sourcing about both biological agent codes and weapon designations. I'm willing to look at verifiable evidence, but, for example, the agent codes, in several cases, are different from what I worked with in the seventies.

The "Big Five" also needs more sourcing, and a new stub article isn't quite enough. While the one citation does appear to be from a reputable source, from my personal experience, if I quote something that I wrote in a peer-reviewed article, I still try to add separate confirming sources. Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 15:39, 20 April 2008 (UTC)