Talk:Battle of Prokhorovka

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[edit] Numbers?

If the German strength is 200 tanks, then how did they lose 350 tanks + 70 damaged? I'm assuming that they were not wiped out, so either they must have had a larger force or these casualty figures are inflated.

[edit] Major rewrite

Tried to reflect the more recent research, in particular Töppel (unpublished M.A. thesis). He has used German and Soviet unit records for the analysis, and his thesis was written to address the mythology of the battle, in particular Rotmistrov and Paul Carell. Andreas 09:28, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

Let me have my doubts about the numbers. 700 / 800 is a more realistic figure provided by commanders. I'll try to dig out some numbers. But I don't trust this "modern research"... :( Grafikm_fr 09:58, 20 April 2006 (UTC)
It is not 'modern research', it is going back to unit records. It also depends on what you define as 'Battle of Prokhorovka'. Andreas 10:02, 20 April 2006 (UTC)
You're talking about an "unpublished M.A. thesis". While it is quite true that the traditional description of the battle is quite biased, it is not a single thesis that will contradict all the rest, including witnesses' statements (which were quite numerous). Grafikm_fr 18:20, 20 April 2006 (UTC)
That is correct, but in actual fact I believe that if you go through the recent published literature, you will find similar facts (e.g. in Nipe). The thesis should be available through inter-library loan, and it is using primary sources for both sides (German strength returns and Red Army unit records). While eye-witness records are fine, it should be remembered that Rotmistrov is hardly an unbiased observer, while the Germans on the spot (e.g. von Ribbentrop) saw it as a German victory. So the thesis is not contradicting all eye-witness accounts. Andreas 18:10, 21 April 2006 (UTC)
Oh, and 200 tanks on Soviet side as strength??? 8O Grafikm_fr 09:59, 20 April 2006 (UTC)
From my re-write: Together with the formations committed during the day, the total number of Soviet tanks in the battle probably reached 500. Andreas 10:02, 20 April 2006 (UTC)
Then this figure should go in the infobox. I mean come on, if you stop 500 tanks with just 200 (or at least prevent them from advancing), one calls it a tactical success :) Grafikm_fr 18:15, 20 April 2006 (UTC)
That's what it does at the moment. ;-) Andreas 20:59, 20 April 2006 (UTC)
Then I'm lost. The strength is inverted or what? *scratches head* Grafikm_fr 21:11, 20 April 2006 (UTC)
500 Russian tanks attack, 200 German stop them, German tactical success. Andreas 21:16, 20 April 2006 (UTC)
Yes, 500 RUSSIAN tanks attack, so why you list 500 under "Wehrmacht" and 200 under "Red Army"??? ^_^ Grafikm_fr 21:17, 20 April 2006 (UTC)
Because I made a mistake. Andreas 07:09, 21 April 2006 (UTC)
I thought so ^_^. Grafikm_fr 07:51, 21 April 2006 (UTC)
Oh, and IIRC (have to dig up the figure), the Soviets lost something like 75% of their attack force (which kinda upset Stalin), so 350-400 tanks lost out of 500 make sense...

[edit] Who won this battle?

I know the current conclusion is not going to be popular with some people, so I will try to explain it here. This article is about Prokhorovka, not the Battle of Kursk as a whole. It is clear that Kursk as a whole was a significant victory for the Red Army. I think authors such as Nipe who are trying to explain this away really make some major analytical mistakes. But for this particular battle, I find it very difficult to accept even the version of a Soviet operational victory. To me this was an unmitigated disaster for the Soviet side. 5th Guards Tank Army was thrown away in a pointless charge, with very little to show for it. If it had been used defensively, it would probably have extracted similar, if not more damage for the Germans, and probably suffering less itself. Essentially this battle destroyed the strength of the tank army, reducing its capability to contribute to the counter-offensive. That is not my view, but that of Ivan Konev, as stated in his memoirs. So, the Soviet side completely failed in its aim for the battle (destruction of the SS Panzerkorps), and suffered extremely high losses to a key formation in the process. That is not a victory. The idea that Prokhorovka made a major contribution to the German side calling off the battle can also be discounted, in my view. More important were the Mius offensive, Operation Kutuzov which had stopped the northern advance, and Sicily, all draining away reserves. Andreas 11:09, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

And before I get accused again of being a German POV pusher, have a look at my latest edit on Kamenets-Podolsky Pocket. Thanks. Andreas 11:13, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

Let me say I applaud your willingness to explain your edits here. I would only add one more consideration: that Prokorovka may have been a tipping point for the Germans. That is, the Orel counteroffensive, the inability to widen the southern penetration, and the loss up to 11 July did not result in a german decision to give up the offensive (at least in the south). But the effect of the entrance of 5th GTA into the battle on 12 july showed that, contrary to Manstein's assertions, they were not about to break through the last Soviet defenses. On the contrary, this showed that significant Soviet strength remained. Thus the sacrifice of a major part of the 5th GTA may not have been in vain. By the 15th, German units in the south had their warning orders to withdraw.
I think that is a decent argument, but the commitment of 5th Guards Tank Army could have been achieved without destroying it. Simply putting it in the way of the Germans without the stupid charge would have achieved the same effect - to let them know that the Red Army was not going to run out of formations anytime soon. Andreas 13:50, 20 April 2006 (UTC)
Your point that the situation in Orel was more important is well taken and I agree; I am simply saying Prokorovka may have provided that 'last straw' needed to get the germans to give it up.
Again, not a bad argument, but I am not convinced that it was necessary to destroy the army to achieve this. Andreas 13:50, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

Regarding my willingness to explain my reasoning here - I am aware that this is a very controversial subject, and I have long hesitated before making the revision of today. I would have preferred not to get involved here at all. But I think that the original article was doing too much to propagate old myths, and that is exactly what Wikipedia should not be doing. Andreas 13:51, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

Trouble is, it's not an unpublished thesis that will destroy it. While I share your evaluation of the outcome, I still have my doubts about the strength of armies involved. Grafikm_fr 17:59, 21 April 2006 (UTC)
If Paul Hausser gained the victory, why was he removed from command immediately after the battle? --Ghirla-трёп- 10:05, 23 July 2007 (UTC)
Could it not be argued that since the overall Kursk battleplan was to absorb and counterattack, that the battle was a strategic success for the Russians on the grounds that the Germans did not advance further? It almost certainly could have been done more cheaply, but so could much of the Eastern Front by Russia, and they did achieve their aim (overall), to stop the German advance. So it may be a tactical defeat but a strategic victory? Special:Contributions/82.153.119.14|82.153.119.14]] (talk) 20:30, 28 January 2008 (UTC)
This is one of these "keep it in context" questions. It has to be remembered that the 'battle' only became prominent from the German POV due to the engagement of so many panzer units. From the Soviet POV the battle was a tactical engagement within an operation that was itself an intermediate phase of an operation which was itself a part of a larger strategic plan. The inordinate attention Prokhorovka received is out of all proportion to the rest of the 'big picture'. In the strategic context the two German offensives were an abject failure since not only did they not achieve the strategic goal, or even reach operational objectives, but they failed to prevent a Soviet counter-attack, and when that counter-attack came, they were unprepared for halting it. Apparently someone at OKH did see the big picture. As I understand it Hitler was typically livid over the outcome, particularly because of the damage done to his new 'super' tanks--mrg3105mrg3105 22:13, 28 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Expand request

  • More info on particular combat events
  • Expand on reaction of German/Soviet leadership to the battle

Andreas 13:11, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Myth continued beyond the 80s, it seems.

I have the book "Campaign Series 16: Kursk 1943 - The tide turns in the east" by Mark Healy. It has the usual "point-blank-ramming-charging-huge german losses" type description of the battle...and it is from 1992! :) —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 62.201.89.96 (talk) 17:22, 17 December 2006 (UTC).

[edit] Major new sources need to be considered

OPERATION CITADEL volumes 1 and 2, by J. Restayn and N. Moller, published by JJFedorwicz in the past two years does a complete re-analysis of tank losses at Kursk and Prokhorovka. This is based entirely on original sources, and all the statistics are set forth. 72.134.154.5 14:33, 17 March 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Myth vs Reality section

This section is not really as dramatic as it has been written to sound. For instance in the 'myth' section it mentions the 'myth' that waves of T34s rushed to close engagements, and then in the 'reality' section it describes T34s and T70s rushing into close engagement. Both versions also mention that the soviets took much higher casualties than the germans. In fact if the 'myth' and 'reality' headings and sentences were removed it would very nearly read as a continuous piece of prose with no contradiction. Which parts of the 'myth' section are actually debunked and where are the references for the 'reality' section? I don't mean to be hostile to the editors involved, I am just a little confused about the course of the battle. 121.45.58.138 09:44, 3 June 2007 (UTC) 02:31, 16 October 2007 (UTC)


Kaptkirk 10/15/07 A real good book on Kursk: "KURSK..The greatest tank battle." by M.K. Barbier/ISBN :0-7603-1254-0 *2002 It backs up the lower numbers of tanks at Prokhorovka,with a order of battle and day by day break down of both fronts. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.88.120.113 (talk) 02:31, 16 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Losses

I suspect the losses given are what in Soviet literature known as "unrecoverable". The Red Army was able to recover a large number of the KOed tanks after the battle (and the Offensive) so they only counted complete write-offs.--mrg3105mrg3105 02:06, 7 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Almost 65 years later we still are discussing reliable numbers . . .

I find it intriguing that we are discussing reliable numbers almost 65 years after this battle occurred.

Can we ever come to what most will view as reliable numbers? Perhaps the reluctance of Soviet officials to make records available during the cold war contributes? With the current political atmosphere in Moscow, this may again block research. It is necessary for professional historians who value professional objectivity to take this on. Cool and rational analysis by clear minds so we can see through the fog of war and find a hard number even if it has to be heavily footnoted. Publications by interested parties only confuse the issue.

Even so, I find this article enlightening despite the anguish of the struggle.

What I need are figures which resolve the issues of what the Soviets and Germans meant by loses, such as tanks put out of action during the Battle of Prokhorovka (that is they could not carry on the action and were abandon), tanks recovered after the action, tanks repaired and put back on the field as apposed to tanks used for parts, and it must be clarified as to what is done with tanks on both sides that were say only disabled by a broken track, and easily repairable, but captured by the other side thereby rendering them completely lost. Who defines the terms by what is considered lost makes me despair of ever finding a definitive number.

TDurden1937 (talk) 23:39, 23 January 2008 (UTC)TDurden1937

The numbers are available and have been analysed extensively. However, this analysis is not available in English in its full form. They will be addressed as part of the revamp of the Eastern Front articles in due time.--mrg3105mrg3105 01:01, 24 January 2008 (UTC)