Talk:Battle of France

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	Battle of France was one of the History good articles, but it has been removed from the list. There are suggestions below for improving the article to meet the good article criteria. Once these issues have been addressed, the article can be renominated. Editors may also seek a reassessment of the decision if they believe there was a mistake.
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Contents 1 old talk 2 lack infos 3 Possible bias 4 Stub? 5 Casualties 6 Map 7 A Map of the battle would do wonders. 8 Allied Intelligence and German Delays 9 Order of Battle 10 Consequences 11 Suicide Bombers? 12 Title not correct 13 Unattributed and controversial viewpoints 14 Italian Participation 15 Italians 16 Pictures 17 Sizes of Air forces 18 Possible push for FA? 19 Discrepancy regarding date of surrender of France in June 1940 20 GA review 21 POV 22 Historiography, French AT guns 23 Fall of Paris 24 GA Re-Review and In-line citations 25 Italian Casualties 26 FA 27 fake propaganda picture 28 Italy 29 French Air Force strength 30 Victory 31 Battle casualties and Disarmed Enemy Forces 32 May 14th air bombings 33 Historiography 34 Pic miscaptioned 35 reserve divisions 36 edit "Aftermath" 37 Why divisions instead of actual strengths? 38 Decisive Axis Victory? 39 Saar Offensive speculations 40 ending the Phoney War? 41 Too little info on the Luftwaffe's contribution 42 Defensive mentality 43 Polish units and OOB musings 44 Dutch Airforce 45 French air force losses 46 Surrender? 47 Operation Fall Rot and the issue of summary style 48 Good Article Reassessment 49 German material losses 50 "First historical use of blitzkrieg" 51 Armistice- June 22 or June 25? 52 Sedan Bombardment and Time frame 53 Dyle and Escaut

[edit] old talk

84.27.81.59, if you are consulting any references as you write it'd improve the article if those were listed. Wikipedia is trying to encourage that all-around with Wikipedia:Cite sources. By the way, you may want to create a username so you get a talk page and so on. 119 10:24, 21 Feb 2005 (UTC)

I'll expand the list of useful books.

MWAK--84.27.81.59 12:28, 25 Feb 2005 (UTC)

[edit] lack infos

The lack of information in this article seems to be a big hole in the series of articles on world War II Mintguy (T) 10:08, 20 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Yes, and some Information is quite doubtful. For instance that Keitel had a Panzergroup and actually was a frontline commander. Thats highly doubtful. I never heard or read that and i am quite familiar with WW2 history. --Holger1076 00:14, 20 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Keitel was serving in OKW at the time. Perhaps von Kleist was meant. 119 00:24, 20 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Yup, my mistake :oS

MWAK--84.27.81.59 14:51, 21 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Very big. I just copied over some stuff from Fall of France (which is now a redirect). Some of what it says is a bit simplistic, but writing and account of this is a serious undertaking. DJ Clayworth 20:28, 4 May 2004 (UTC)

Is "Case Yellow" really the same thing as the Battle of France? Case Yellow was the German plan for the invasion of France. And, as I recall, it was actually an early version of the German plan that wasn't actually used. We shouldn't be calling Case Yellow an equivalent name for the Battle of France. john k 05:20, 24 Sep 2004 (UTC)

"Case Yellow" (Fall Geib) was the name of the operation, just as Fall Weiß was the conquest of Poland and Fall Blau was the 1942 Eastern offensive. I've seen "Fall" in this context translated as "operation." It's as correct to call the "Battle of France" "Case Yellow" as it is to call the "Battle of Normandy" "Operation Overlord." There were different plans for Fall Geib, but the name of the operation remained the same. I think "Battle of France" is the most neutral way to describe what happened. --ArminTamzarian 09:02, 30 Nov 2004 (UTC)

I'm getting rid of the bit about Hitler dancing the jig, as it has been definitively shown to be a hoax. 10 seconds of Googling can confirm. - Matt

[edit] Possible bias

I noted that listed as possible causes for the German victory was French "defeatism". I was wondering if there is any basis in this aside from anti-french sentiment so common in the US today. Harley peters

Well, the phenomenon is quite old and has been a part of most Polish history books since WWII. It is definitely not a recent idea. [[User:Halibutt|Halibutt]] 04:37, Dec 18, 2004 (UTC)

I think that if it were covered more in-depth, it would be more palatable. I agree that throwing the phrase "French defeatism" out there by itself stinks of anti-French bias, but from my understanding of the politics of the time, there is some ground to stand on that may be worth pointing out in this article provided that it is done in the context of facts and realities of French wartime politics. Adam Faanes 08:17, 10 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Yes, I also agree that this interpretation "stinks with bias". It is much more important to understand that 1) the allies were not prepared to fight a war in 1940 that had recently incorporated new technologies and ideas. The Germans had perfected their communication problems as well as the mobility problems which plagued the Schlieffen Plan in 1914. Additionally, Britain only half-heartedly came to the aid of France, and when it appeared that the outlook was not favorable, the British withdrew their air support in preparation for fighting another day - They had this advantage that the French did not.

In conclusion, defeatism is a ridiculous interpretation of these events. Britain had the advantage of distance, and the Channel (as well as its navy) provided a boundary that was sufficient enough to avoid being overrun as the French had, and the mistakes they made early on did not jeopardize their existance as it had for the French. The Allies expected to fight the war exactly as they had in World War I - not just the French - just as the Germans had expected 1914 to go the same way as it did in 1870. France's proximity did not allow for a second chance after this mistake had been realized. Defeatism is garbage, and no American knows what life is like when a war is being fought literally in their backyard, let alone the same continent. Please remove and preserve this article's integrity. --Hohenstauf 22:42, 10 July 2005 (UTC)

The first remarks were made when the article was very different from what it is now. Defeatism is now only mentioned as one of the more common explanations that have been given — and the article should of course reflect this historical fact, that it has indeed been used as an explanation, most often in France itself. But you show a little bias yourself by suggesting that the armies of the Entente (yes, it was still called this way then :o) were somehow less modernised than the German forces. This is in fact an extreme simplification of a very complex technological and tactical situation.

--MWAK 07:25, 11 July 2005 (UTC)

Yes, I agree. Their strengths were relatively the same and so on. I would consider improved communication a distinct edge for the Germans, however - even if earlier conclusions about Allied equipment have changed over the years. --Hohenstauf 11:10, 20 July 2005 (UTC)

On the strategic level, command & control on the French side were poor; but this was in part intentional, to give commanders more freedom. Ironically the, most certainly not intended, failure on the German side to exert strategic control allowed Guderian and Rommel to implement true Blitzkrieg tactics during a few crucial days.

On the tactical level it's true all German tanks were equipped with radio sets (though most had listening sets only), while French light tanks, with the exception of a single unit, had none.--MWAK 05:44, 21 July 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Stub?

Isn't this article a slightly longer stub? It gives no detailed info on the campaign. No battles, no plans, nothing but the simple statement that there was some fighting... Could anyone with some knowledge on the topic expand the article? [[User:Halibutt|Halibutt]] 04:39, Dec 18, 2004 (UTC)

I think for a start we should break the article up into different sections for the campaign. My recommendation would be

1. Background
2. Invasion of the Low Countries
   1. Battle of Sedan
   2. Battle of Gembloux
   3. Battle of Amiens
   4. Battle of Arras
   5. Operation Paula
   6. Fall Rot
   7. Fall Braun
3. Battle of Dunkirk
4. Fall of France
5. Aftermath

Oberiko 16:02, 4 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Heh - I should have read this first. I gave the article a shot, but you're quite right that this needs greater depth. I think that the article is now past being a stub, but certainly it lacks the depth that, for instance, Battle of the Bulge has. Your outline could certainly work to fill that - if you would like help on this, I'd certainly be interested.Adam Faanes 08:17, 10 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Wow, very nice job in rebuilding the article. I'll help where I can, but I'm already kind of stretched (still working on the Lorraine Campaign in between studies). Oberiko 13:24, 10 Feb 2005 (UTC)

I too like the new article, but there are a few major problems:

• It doesn't make very clear that operationally the German offensive had the nature of a counter-attack. The allied commanders didn't act hesitantly but very forcefully. They advanced as swiftly as the Germans in a modern motorized operation - but into friendly territory, wasting their fuel and readiness on gaining a position that proved to be inferior.

• It will suggest to some that Gamelin also tactically expected some kind of WWI attack. In fact he was fully aware the Germans would try to attempt a mechanized breakthrough - he just thought they would do so at Gembloux on a very narrow frontage following their own doctrine of Schwerpunkt. So he concentrated half of his armoured reserves at that sector. The possibility of an attack through the Ardennes was considered but rejected as it wouldn't fit a breakthrough by tanks.

• It doesn't mention the one decisive event of the whole campaign: the carpet bombing at Sedan, punching a hole in the French lines (and no, this was not done by Stuka's and tanks as all diagrams show...). So the decisive strategic surpise was that the Germans did not use tanks for the breakthrough itself - just for the strategic exploiting (the classic cavalry role!). And so Gamelin had been fatally right.

• It confuses the (attempted) attacks by 1, 2 and 3 DC with the later attack of 4 DC under de Gaulle on the 17th.

• It doesn't mention the fundamental difference of opinion between Guderian and Rommel on the one and the High Command on the other hand. The latter saw tanks simply as a means to conquer and protect enough room for the main body of infantry divisions to position itself favourably. The opinion of the two generals they didn't really understand themselves: at the time there was no clear concept of "Blitzkrieg" yet, neither at the High Command nor in the minds of Rommel and Guderian (read Achtung: Panzer! - or read it again). After the fact they would formalize it into a doctrine.

• It doesn't mention the counter-attacks at Amiens and Abbéville not making clear how crippling the materiel losses were that threw away the last chance for effective defense.

• It doesn't clearly differentiate between the two main phases of Fall Rot.

• It doesn't make clear how utterly surprising the German victory was: the defeat of an enemy that was numerically superior in men, artillery, tanks and motorised units - and that this could only have been accomplished because that enemy gave up its main strength: the advantage of the defender - by being too offensive! (which brings us back at point one :o)

Of course there are also some minor factual inexactitudes: e.g. the Allies were already cut off at the 20th.

MWAK--84.27.81.59 23:12, 13 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Naturally no one's saying this article is of featured calibre, but it's a much higher leap then it was before. You seem to be quite aware of the events during the Battle of France, considered helping out on it? Oberiko 00:39, 14 Feb 2005 (UTC)

It's certainly a much better article now - and very well written! The problem with my helping out is that I'm too aware of the events: I've been pushing a revisionist (or, as I like to call it, professional ;o) interpretation of this battle for over twenty years now, so I'm in serious danger of making it (my) POV - although over the years consensus has slowly shifted to my side. But I'll try to mention some indisputed facts - without patterning them too much...

MWAK--84.27.81.59 12:05, 14 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Also, no information is given at all on the war as it unfolded in the Netherlands and Belgium. Especially the Dutch defense was in many places relatively effective at stopping or seriously delaying the Germans (despite lack of equipment and training). The Grebbe for example held out to the end as did fortress Kornwerderzand (with the assistance of elements of the Dutch navy). These forces surrendered only after German threats that the massacre of Rotterdam would be repeated against other major cities (especially Amsterdam and Utrecht were mentioned). In the Netherlands it is generally believed that the German bombing of Rotterdam despite the city surrendering was NOT a failure or an error on the parts of the Germans but a deliberate show of force to get the Dutch forces they couldn't otherwise defeat without serious loss of life and time on their own side into submission.

Yes, we need separate articles for both the attack on The Netherlands (German invasion of The Netherlands) and the attack on Belgium (German invasion of Belgium in 1940). But some information is already given. :o) To describe these complicated and very interesting subcampaigns in the level of detail they deserve would, I feel, put too great an emphasis on events that in the end hardly influenced the general outcome.

To address some of your factual points: the Dutch Field Army had already been withdrawn to the New Waterline on the 14th, abandoning the Grebbeline. Still, it's true four of the nine Dutch divisions had seen no fighting at all. To call the Kornwederzand position a "fortress" perhaps stretches the meaning of the word too much, but that clever array of pillboxes blocking the Enclosure Dam was probably impregnable to the German 1st Cavalry Division attacking it. I'm personally convinced the bombardment of Rotterdam, whatever its tactical desirability, also had the nature of a planned terror attack. Also it's indisputable the Germans demanded the surrender of Utrecht, threatening to bomb the city itself even though the New Waterline ran east of it. Nevertheless the former has never been proven and in the latter case we shall never know what they would have bombed exactly. Though I fear the worst...

--MWAK 14:36, 5 May 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Casualties

I would like to revise the numbers that we currently have. The ~400K is the number given as total French persons killed during both the combat AND the following occupation. For the battle itself; 100K dead, and 200K wounded are the figures that I've found. Oberiko 12:55, 18 Feb 2005 (UTC)

You are correct. I will give some more exact numbers, though it should be stressed that they won't reflect the latest research - and thus roughly will suffer from the same systematic errors ;o).

MWAK--84.27.81.59 14:16, 18 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Sorry: only now I understand that you were referring to the first list. I think the creator of that one has simply made an error in his calculations: it should be 301,000 for all allies, in stead of 401,000. :o)

MWAK--84.27.81.59 14:25, 18 Feb 2005 (UTC)

And again I've made a mistake: not the first list was wrong, but the second, giving only 100,000 French wounded. So the total is about 401,000 for all allies, which then just happens to coincide with the total number of French casualties in the war.

MWAK--84.27.81.59 14:35, 18 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Polish losses: 1140 KIA, 4850 WIA: but on other pages i saw that one division alone had 5200 losses, so it would mean that 2nd (only two IIRC actually saw the battle) had not large losses. around 10.000 soldiers interned in Switzerland. 19-25.000 (saw different estimates) evacuated to UK. Basically, Polish army in the west had to be rebuilt almost from scratch for the second time after defeat in France 1940.. Szopen 10:31, 18 Mar 2005 (UTC)

No worries, you've done a great job with this article thus far to say the least. Oberiko 14:58, 18 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Thank you!

MWAK--84.27.81.59 11:33, 19 Feb 2005 (UTC)

British casualties ? Hello, the given number remains very mysterious as long as no explanation is given (68.000 dead ? - not possible, I think - 68.000 captured ? ... without wounded ? - without evacuated wounded ? - how much dead ?) Thanks, WernerE (german wiki) 24.2.2006

Very true, but without exact references it is all we can do...Obviously most of the German "missing" had been killed; but it is best to simply give the data and let people draw their own conclusions. Also you have forgotten that some German POW's did remain as 1,200 paratroopers were shipped from The Netherlands to England. --MWAK 10:37, 24 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Map

This article definitely needs a map. Even a contemporary map without campaign details would go a long way.

---

[edit] A Map of the battle would do wonders.

I think this article needs a map asap.--Idleguy 08:08, July 15, 2005 (UTC)

I second that! :o) I'd create one myself but I lack time and facilities :o(--MWAK 09:12, 15 July 2005 (UTC)

I added a number of maps. For those who are into military history, the maps at the US military academy are excellent, and are public domain[1]. --Goodoldpolonius2 16:58, 31 July 2005 (UTC)

Excellent maps! :-) --MWAK 19:18, 31 July 2005 (UTC)

The map at the very top right is wrong though. Army Group C did NOT commence the fatal attack, or any but diversionary attacks during the Battle ofFfrance. It was Army Group A (in the middle) that cut through the Ardennes.

Very true.--MWAK 09:53, 28 November 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Allied Intelligence and German Delays

I read in a book a few years ago (the book was a biography on Hitler written at the latest in the 80s but maybe as early as the early-mid 70s, I don't have it on hand currently) that the Allies had very specific intelligence on the planned German invasion, but did not take advantage of it because a) they had recieved the information many times before and the German attack didn't come, even though it was supposed to occur, but the weather prevented the Luftwaffe from doing its part so the invasion was delayed, reslting in a similarity to "The Boy Who Cried Wolf". and/or b) the Allies just did not use the information properly. I am not sure if this is true and if it is it should surely be included. If anyone ehas comments on this please give them.say1988 17:41, August 2, 2005 (UTC)

Dutch diplomats had contacts with dissident German officers who gave them the exact time of the start of the German offensive — each time that is, for the offensive was many times postponed. The Dutch then, despite their neutrality, informed the Entente. All this mattered very little. The offensive was hardly a surprise attack. Even if Gamelin had received the full German operational plan, it's doubtful whether he would have changed his dispositions much. What makes the campaign so special for us: its Blitzkrieg aspect, was not part of that plan! On the other hand even slight changes might have led to German failure because, if you model the campaign, such failure is the typical outcome anyway. The Germans were very lucky on many occasions: e.g. Guderian considered postponing the breakthrough attempt to 14 May because he feared not having enough infantry. If so, the counterattack would have been carried out by 3 DCR instead of 7 BCL and might well have reduced the bridgehead, leaving Heinz without sufficient means for a second try :o).

--MWAK 10:03, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

That explains everything I want to know, but some of that information should probably be included in the article, at least the delays in the origional plan, and maybe I just missed it when I read the article but I did not see any of that information.say1988 15:14, August 3, 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Order of Battle

Can anyone get a list of units that participated (at least from non-French armies because as far as I know pretty much the entire French army may have participated and if it did it is probably pointless listing all the units in teh French army). Also at least according to my history text a Canadian unit took part, the Hastings and Prince Edward regiment often referred to as the Hasty Ps. I dont know the size of the unit either, but as soon as it made contact with the Germans a General retreat was called in the area it was in and it left France (before Dunkirk) a day or two after it arrived. If any other information is available there. please post it. Thanks to all who will help.say1988 17:41, August 2, 2005 (UTC)

This site has many references to data about the Allied side: http://france1940.free.fr/en_index.html.; and this site: http://www.orbat.com/site/ww2/drleo/500_eto/_40-05_france.html has the orbats for four of the five major participants. This also shows that not only the entire French but also basically the entire Dutch, Belgian and German army took part — and almost all trained British units. The list includes about 300 divisions and many independent smaller units. --MWAK 09:09, 3 August 2005 (UTC)

I'd like to see some Order of Battle pages for the start of this battle. At this level it would probably make sense to show mostly division level and above, yes? How about a page for the Allies and another for the Axis? (C.f. List of orders of battle.) — RJH 22:22, 16 September 2005 (UTC)

Excellent idea!--MWAK 06:49, 17 September 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Consequences

Should this article have a final concluding section explaining the consequences of the fall of France? This was a major turning point in the War and had major implications for all pre-war strategies. I'll draft something, but would welcome any thoughts... Wiki-Ed 13:17, 11 August 2005 (UTC)

• Mmm, well Hitler was concerned about a two-front war and the conquest of Franch freed up most of his army for Barbarossa. It also provided coastal bases for U-boat operations, and provided a potential launching point for a potential invasion of England. The French colonies became a concern for England, and it took the French fleet out of action in the Mediterranean. Oh yes, it also cost England much of her army equipment, which was abandoned at Dunkirk and wouldn't be available for a devense against Seelowe. — RJH 22:16, 16 September 2005 (UTC)

And not to forget France and the Low Countries were an important asset in themselves with their modern industry, mines, strategic food, raw materials and oil stocks and labour force. Perhaps the most important consequence was that it gave Hitler the illusion Blitzkrieg made him invincible, tempting him to attack the Soviet-Union with a poorly equipped army, while the output of German war industry was too low to sustain a protracted war.--MWAK 06:49, 17 September 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Suicide Bombers?

The next morning, on the 14th, two French tank battalions tried to counter-attack but were repulsed by suicidal attacks with satchel charges by fanatical German combat engineers

Were these actually engineers who used risky (suicidal) tactics to destroy french tanks by planting charges on them (like the greasy socket charges in saving private ryan) or did they actually blow themselves up like suicide bombers? I would find the latter hard to believe, such things were generally not done by european soldiers. Of course there are examples of a few soldiers who were willing to sacrifice themselves for their comrades or the fatherland (a single prussian engineer blew himself up to create a breach in a danish fortification in the war of 1864), but the text implies large numbers of soldiers doing it. A clarification and source would be nice.

Admiral Darlan's promise to prevent the French fleet at Toulon from falling into German hands was not entirely upheld

What exactly does this referr to? The capture of french vessels at Toulon in 1942 would be out of place here, as the location of this sentence the text makes it sound as if french ships were handed to the Germans before British actions at Mers-el-Kebir. AFAIK this did not happen.

Nevfennas 10:44, 29 November 2005 (UTC)

Good questions! I'll try to answer them:

1. They were indeed suicidal attacks, not suicide attacks :o). However the entire passage has to be rewritten anyway: while writing it I was fooled by German propaganda. On 14 May at noon Stuka's bombed Chémery, though it was already taken. They killed several German officers among whom the commander of Pionierbataillon 43. To cover up the mistake they invented a Heldentod for him. I will detail and correct the account of the events of 14 May, as I have been much too imprecise.
2. Darlan gave Churchill his word that he would ensure the French fleet at Toulon was scuttled, should the Germans attempt to gain control over it. However article 8 of the armistice stipulated the Germans would control the fleet there. Of course in the latter case "control" meant "check whether it adhered to the armistice conditions", but the British saw the ambiguity as a serious danger, best remedied by sinking most of the French fleet.

--MWAK 09:27, 30 November 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Title not correct

Hi, The title for this article is incorrect as the content covers both the Battle of France and the Battle of the Low Countries. The battle of the Low Countries (Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland) is planned by the German military operation Case Yellow (Fall Gelb) while the battle of France, a successive offensive to Case Yellow, is planned by the German military operation Case red (Fall Red). Next, the current title gives the impression that independant countries Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland are part of France, which is not. A possible solution would be to change the title into The Battle of the Low countries and France or even better to split it into 2 articles; Operation Yellow (Battle of the Low Countries) and Operation Red (Battle of France). WO2 18:45, 4 January 2006 (UTC) Image:Palm.jpeg

Well, it's an existing convention to name the entire conflict (Fall Gelb and Fall Rot together) "The Battle of France". The title of this article simply reflects that normal usage; it's not an endorsement of it. An encyclopedia is not an authority; it's simply a mirror. However it would certainly be desirable to have a separate Fall Rot article, detailing the events in June :o)--MWAK 08:40, 5 January 2006 (UTC)

Ok, it is a piety that the historians forgot to provide reasonable details about the Low Countries in this offensive. Let's work to have a separate Fall Rot and Fall Gelb article to emphasize the military planning behind the main offensive to Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and France. Today Fall Gelb is rerouted to Battle of France. I propose to write an article on Fall Gelb and Fall Rot with an italic highlight in the beginning to the main article Battle of France. WO2 19:10, 5 January 2006 (UTC) Image:Palm.jpeg

This is English Wikipedia. Articles should use common English names. We have articles at Operation Barbarossa for Unternehmen Barbarossa and Operation Sealion for Unternehmen Seelöwe as these particular undertakings are known in English. But Case Yellow and Case Red (Fall Gelb and Fall Rot) are simply not in common usage in English. Commonly the two are known as the Battle of France. Blame Churchill if you like.

[edit] Unattributed and controversial viewpoints

Hi MWAK, this is JQ. I see that you reverted some of my changes and no big deal. I do believe the staffing vs. training issue regarding the "B" divisions is not accurately portrayed in this article, but it really is a small issue in the big scheme. However, lets look at one in particular passage:

Line 158 reads now:

• • Equipment imbalances. Contrary to popular opinion, often assuming that the Germans had a completely mechanized army, while the French only had WWI equipment, there was no general disparity of armament levels. It is generally acknowledged that in a pure battle of attrition, the Germans could not have won.

"Contrary to popular opinion"??? Who holds this opinion?

"It is generally acknowledged that in a pure battle of attrition, the Germans could not have won." Who acknowledges this?

Statements like this, maybe they are right, maybe not, but in all cases they need to be qualified with a reference or an explanation. How can we fix this passage so it is either referenced or qualified? - JQ 17:39, 29 January 2006 (UTC)

Sorry for answering so late: I was pondering on what response would be best; your edit has now forced me to make up my mind :o).

When referring to a "popular opinion", I was perhaps too ambiguous: what I meant was a "popular belief" among the greater part of the semi-informed public (the majority of humanity of course living happily along without being bothered by these issues). So I couldn't give a direct reference quote to that. We might of course, on a higher level, refer either to popular books perpetuating the myth in question or, on a higher level again, to serious publications lamenting it (both of which are quite numerous), but that would be beside the point. When stating "Contrary to popular belief, Caesar never said veni, vidi, vici" are we then supposed to proof that there is such a belief to begin with? Or could we simply work from a shared background knowledge — while tacitly suggesting to the reader who didn't share it, that he is invited to?

A similar ambiguity laid in my use of "generally" — but now I didn't refer to the semi-informed, but to the informed only. Then the question "Who acknowledges this?" becomes easy to answer. There is a true consensus among experts that in an ideal battle of attrition those qualitative advantages the Germans might have had, were in any case not enough to compensenate for the lack of numerical superiority needed to overcome the tactical advantage of the defender. I know of no writer holding the opposite point of view. In this case it might of course be functional to give a quote; and yet it would again be a bit beside the point.

Now as to explanation, you are absolutely right. The article really needs an analysis of the military potential of both sides. But this is a contentious issue; treating it in the level of detail that is needed to prevent it from misleading the reader would make it far too long for a short section in Historiography. And this is the reason I presented it as a simple contrast between the myth that only the Germans were modernly equipped and the (by experts) uncontested truth that there was a general parity in equipment levels. That there are many pitfalls is shown by your own edit: you state that both sides were numerically roughly equal in armour. That is fully in line with all scientific literature. But more recent works for and by armour enthusiasts clearly show that the number of tanks and self-propelled guns actually committed to battle by the Allies was about 50% larger. The French materiel reserves had not properly been taken into account; also not a single "scientific" publication gives the correct production numbers. The situation with the respective airforces is even more complex. So I basically shrank away from any detail. :o)--MWAK 14:45, 1 February 2006 (UTC)

Although I think the most recent edit is excellent and improves the article, I have to question the use of the term "main battle tank". I am not sure the concept existed at the time; if it did, none of the tanks then in use were so designated. Also, the majority of the tanks used by both sides were light tanks, not even mediums. I understand the general point being made, I just think we could make it a bit more accurately with slightly modified language. Sorry if I am nitpicking. DMorpheus 19:11, 1 February 2006 (UTC)

Dear MWAK and DMorpheus, thank you for the notes. MWAK, I'll have to get back to your note later this week as I'm snowed under until at least Friday afternoon and you make many points I should think on for a bit. DMorpheus, you are probably making a good and valid point. The specific tanks I was thinking of when I wrote of the MBT's were French: B-1bis and Souma's; British Matalida's; and German Pzkw-III, Pzkw-IV and Pskw-38t's. But I think your point is correct and if you feel a revision is in order just go to it and set the passage right. JQ 05:09, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

It's a tough call, frankly. I don't think it is necessary to the article to get into this issue at all; it is a narrow technical issue that had no major influence on the campaign. So one option is to simply remove any reference to tank quality. On the other hand, many popular histories make the claim that the German tanks were somehow better or more numerous. I believe this may be what MWAK was getting at. Even if that broad statement were true (and it isn't really) it doesn't automatically follow that it had any real importance in the campaign. But in the immediate post-campaign period, it was used by Allied sources such as Churchill to explain away the shocking collapse of the French Army. It's always useful to dispel a myth.

Maybe the issue should be set in that context. Both the "Fifth Column" and German tank superiority were myths created to explain the duller truth - that the German Army out-thought and out-maneuvered the French, without any "magic bullets". DMorpheus 15:17, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Italian Participation

Italian troop numbers are given as 700,000 here; the CommandoSupremo site says 300,000. I will try to find a reliable figure. The 32-Division count appears correct, but there is no direct way to work out the troop numbers from that. They fought only for the last 11 days of the campaign, on a minor front, and accomplished virtually nothing, so I am not sure this should really be labeled an "Axis victory". It is literally correct but gives a false impression nonetheless. DMorpheus 21:00, 27 February 2006 (UTC)

I tend to agree. As I already pointed out to Kurt, the real number of divisions partcipating is about sixteen (non-reserve divisions of 1st and 4th Army). What really happened was that the Italian troops approached the French main positions, overran some outposts and halted their advance when taking losses. The number of troops in western North Italy was higher than one would expect though, as there were many smaller units, see http://www.comandosupremo.com/France.htmland ; the units of 6th Army not allocated to the front armies were also in theatre and there was of course an extensive supply and training system. 300,000 is a good estimate for the front line units, 700,000 for the total of all soldiers present in theatre. --MWAK 08:16, 28 February 2006 (UTC)

THE ITALIAN FORCES (BATTLE OF THE ALPS): 4th Army (General Guzzoni) (Northern sector), with target Moutiers: 9 divisions and 3 alpine groups; 1st Army (General Pintor)(Southern sector), with target Nice: 13 divisions. Tot.: 315,000 Italians against 185,000 French (General Olry) who were behind a strong defensive line. Sources: Eddy Bauer, "Storia Illustrata".

[edit] Italians

The fact that Italians achieved little during the campaing does not change the facts. Italy was Germany's ally, one of the Axis, and France, Italy's enemy was defeated decisively, even if Italians achieved little during the campaing.

"halted their advance when taking losses" I disagree. Italians advance was hindered by weather conditions and the terrain.

Kurt Leyman

[edit] Pictures

I think the images of German troops marching through the Arch de Triumph and Hitler in front of the Eiffel Tower should be included in this article.Both images are very powerful in there meaning and are (I think) NPOV. One could see them as testments to German power or of the horror of the Nazi conquest. I found a great image of the German troops marching [here[2]] and I think they are in the public domain. This image would look great on the title page, I would put it up myself but I'm not sure how to do it. 1600 EST 25 April 2006 LCpl

You have to be near certain they are in the public domain; thinking it is not enough ;o).--MWAK 08:03, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

Ok here is one of Hitler in Paris from the National Archives and I an certain it is Public Domain [[3]] ) 1507 EST, 26 April 2006 LCpl

Here is a picture of Adolf Hitler in Paris that is already uploaded. I think it would look great as the main picture. If someone who knows how to put it in the article please free to do so.

1618 EST May 5, 2006 LCpl

[edit] Sizes of Air forces

Should the listed sizes of the air forces reflect the amount possessed by France, or the amount actually used? Also, which source provided the strengths that the battlebox lists? The Collapse of the Third Republic gives the sizes as 2700-3000 (Axis) and ~3700 (Allied, if all of the French planes are counted). --Nucleusboy 14:35, 6 May 2006 (UTC)

The Collapse of the Third Republic is a very poor and outdated source. There are many ways to measure these numbers and perhaps it is fundamentally undecidable which way to use. I know for a fact that there does not exist one published single source that gives accurate data on either planes or tanks. The battlebox should best be seen as a rough indication. Many more precise data can be found in the articles about the equipment used.--MWAK 06:42, 16 May 2006 (UTC)

But there is one thing to consider: even German wikipedia says, that the german Luftwaffe was not that superior in terms of numbers when attacking France, Belgium and the NL. Taken from article de:Westfeldzug 1940:

• Luftwaffe
  • modern class fighters (Bf 109, Bf 110): 1120 (900+220)
  • two-engine bombers (Do 17, He 111): 1200
  • dive-bombers (Ju 87): 320
  • assault aircraft (Hs 123): 45
  • => total strength = 2695 modern combat aircraft

• France (according to source Christienne/Lissaraque: Histoire de l'aviation militaire française. p 373 ff.)
  • modern class fighters (D.520, Hawk 75 / Curtiss P-36, Bloch MB.152): ca. 1000 (351+290+<500)
  • two-engine bombers: 1160, of which nevertheless only about 500 would be modern types (LeO 451, Amiot 350, Douglas DB-7, Martin 167)
  • dive-bombers and assault aircraft: ca. 100 (Br.691/693, Vought V-156, Loire-Nieuport LN.411)
  • => total strength = 1600 combat aircraft (counting only modern bombers)

This number is listing only the most modern aircraft of the armee de l'air, even not taking into account the large number of MS.406 fighters (more than 500), that despite of being old and inferior to german fighters scored the biggest amount of french air victories, a ca. 60 Caudron CR.714 fighters that had considerable victories in the hands of polish pilots, and nearly 3000 aircraft of elder types being in second line (Potez 63 series, Bloch MB.210, Bloch MB.131 Amiot 143, large numbers of reconnaissance aircraft). The German article says that a German commission was extremely surprised counting more than 6000 more or less intact aircraft, thousands more being produced in the factories.

• Great Britian
  • modern class fighters: 262
  • bombers: 135
  • => total strength = ca. 400 planes on the continent, being partially inferior to the German ones (Fairey Battle, Gloster Gladiator)

This small number however does not take into account the action of the bomber command aircraft based in Great Britian.

A more 100 planes that could be regarded as modern would come from the Belgian and Dutch air forces.

Regarding all this, Luftwaffe seems not to have been in such a superior position. The problem - as the German article continues - was that the French aircraft often 1. lacked spare parts, 2. lacked trained pilots, 3. were in a poor state of organization and - what may be the most important factor - 4. ofen were put into combat very slowly and carefully. Curiously the most modern units were drawn back to Northern Africa when Germans advanced quickly in the North of France.

There are some experts that the Armee de l'air was rather defeated by its own officers than by the german assault. See for example this link.

-- Hierakares 14:07, 26 August 2007 (UTC)

Well, are you not now comparing German organic strength with the total Allied matériel strength? Also those French planes lower in quality than the "most modern" had only a very marginal capability left. But you are certainly right in claiming that organisational differences were decisive. If the respective sortie rates would have been switched, the Luftwaffe would not have gained air superiority.--MWAK 19:22, 26 August 2007 (UTC)

Maybe we should include some of those facts in the article, which up to now draws a clearly favorite position of Luftwaffe in May 1940, especially in terms of material. I just wonder why other sources, especially the ones cited in german wiki, differ so much from the cited ones (especially E.R Hooton). The book "Kriegstagebuch der Wehrmacht" (book 2), p. 961, talks about 4737 German aircraft in Feb 1940, of which however only 3584 were in service condition (see for a copy of this on my user page). This includes all kinds of gliders, transport and reconnaissance aircraft. The number of 2935 allied aircraft given in the article can only refer to aircraft that was in fact ready for service. However, I wonder if this applies also to the german units. It rather seems to me, that the number 5638 counts all aircraft being in Luftwaffe inventory, not only the ones actually in disposition. Best regards -- Hierakares 09:34, 4 September 2007 (UTC)

Some of this might be made more clear by the discussion below in the "French Air Force strength" section. Certainly the number of 5638 is higher than the number actually committed. The Battle Box numbers always give but a rough indication of strength.--MWAK 18:29, 4 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Possible push for FA?

This is a tremendous article. If people can pile up some more footnotes and tweak a few other things, I see no reason this shouldn't be featured.UberCryxic 20:35, 3 June 2006 (UTC)

I would advise strongly against it. The article is really rather poor and incoherent and is in dire need of a complete makeover. Also for some strange reason articles tend to decline in quality when going through a FA-process :o).--MWAK 07:18, 4 June 2006 (UTC)

With enough work I think it could be made a FA.

LCpl 1424, 4 June 2006 (EST)

MWAK, I strongly disagree. This is a terrific article, very coherent, and certainly very detailed and comprehensive. All it really needs are footnotes.UberCryxic 19:10, 4 June 2006 (UTC)

No, it needs to be completely rewritten. I should know: I wrote most of it in the first place :o). Especially the section about the German planning distorts the facts very severely. In February 2005 I left most of it untouched, hesitating to open that particular can of worms. Also we should notice that the "Historiography" gives all kinds of data that should really be treated in separate sections about French and German equipment and tactical doctrine. But that is an even bigger can of worms. The problem is that recent research has falsified many popular notions about the battle and that present research is debunking even more. We are in the middle of a paradigm shift in our thinking about what happened in the beginning of WWII. As could be expected, it was the German side that got the most attention. That put me in a difficult position while expanding the article: if I treated the subject in a correct encyclopedic way, by giving in detail the different views about it, the German side of things would get a more modern, or "revisionist" account, while the French side would still be rather outdated because profound research there is just beginning to get published. This would create a totally unbalanced representation of events. So I went for a more superficial consensus view, leaving much vague with a lot of hidden "sap verb" and glossing over most areas of contention. I'm glad it made for a good narrative but it is more illusion than substance...--MWAK 07:02, 5 June 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Discrepancy regarding date of surrender of France in June 1940

Please see Talk:Armistice with France (Second Compiègne)#Timeline. --Mathew5000 19:13, 23 June 2006 (UTC)

I've fixed some errors--MWAK 20:59, 23 June 2006 (UTC)

[edit] GA review

The only GA concern is to review the tagging of the first two images. Lincher 17:27, 23 July 2006 (UTC)

[edit] POV

The Historiography section makes several controversial, rather revisionist statements that opposes or contradicts facts that have been put forth by mainstream historians for decades. Such statements I believe should be cited, and the people who are making these statements should also be mentioned. Its not so much the lack of neutrality (though the section does sympathize greatly with the French) as opposed to the lack of resources. Chubdub 10:23, 8 August 2006 (UTC)

See the Modern re-assessment of Agincourt for reference. It presents profound research from historical revisionists and cites who the information comes from. Chubdub 10:33, 8 August 2006 (UTC)

Yes, it's quite possible you're right. But to avoid an (equally possible) misunderstanding, could you indicate which (kind of) statements exactly you consider to be revisionist? It could be that the "facts" you refer to aren't hypotheses made by reputable historians but those to be found in popular literature, which happens to be of an extremely poor quality on this subject. So statements like "There was no general equipment imbalance between Germany and France" or "There was no serious fifth column activity" might seem "revisionist" to someone who has only read popular historical works, but have really always been mainstream. --MWAK 06:54, 9 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Historiography, French AT guns

There is no mention in the Historiography section of the lack of adequate anti-tank weapons amoung the French infantry. They were equiped primarily with 25mm AT guns, which were useless against German tanks. Consequently the French infantry tended to melt away when attacked by Panzers. The French were well aware of this short coming before the war, and it was a major reason why over half of the French tanks were spread out all along the front, to provide support to the infantry. This resulted in the French tanks usually being outnumbered by the more concentrated German tanks. While the significance of this can be debated, I do not understand why it is not being mentioned at all. Madmax 8 August 2006

Maybe it's not mentioned because it may not be accurate. Let's look at the data.

Gun performance

25mm AT gun against armor sloped at 30 degrees from vertical: 35mm at 100 meters; 29mm at 500 meters.

47mm AT gun agaionst armor sloped at 30 degrees: 39mm at 100 meters, 33mm at 500 meters.

Armor protection

Pzkw-II ausf C (the most common German tank in May 1940): 16mm turret front, 14mm sides, near vertical.

Pzkw-III ausf E (best German tank in May 1940): 30mm turret front, sides, hull front and sides, near vertical.

Pzkw-IV ausf D (best-protected German tank in May 1940, at least from the front): 35mm turret front, 30mm hull front, 20mm hull sides, near vertical.

We can ignore the thinly-armored but common Pzkw-I; IIRC protection on the numerous 35(t)s and 38(t)s was similar to the Pzkw-III.

Draw your own conclusions, but I would say if the French Infantry "melted away" it wasn't because their AT weapons wouldn't do the job. "Tank panic" was common in many Armies in the blitzkreig era.

French tank deployment has been discussed at length, but consider that the vast majority of French tanks (all except the B-1bis and S35) had guns *worse* than the towed weapons cited above. So why would they be deployed to defend against German tanks?

Finally, I would also add that most of the combatants of WW2 devoted a high percentage of their tanks to Infantry support; the Germans were the sole major exception to this.

Armor data:

Gun penetration data can be found in lots of places. DMorpheus 18:19, 8 August 2006 (UTC)

I generally agree with DMorpheus's points — and like to make a few comments of my own:

1. The French 25 mm anti-tank gun was indeed adequate to destroy all German tanks frontally, as it showed by doing so on several instances. The German penetration data mentioned are even somewhat pessimistic as they were based on thick test plates (and those of the very powerful 47 mm probably simply wrong, see: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=79218&highlight=char :o). The problem was that there were sometimes too few available. It's true the 25 mm was easily deflected by sloped armour; but then the German tanks used a lot of vertical plates.
2. The fact that most French tanks were part of the Infantry, the Weapon, has deceived many into concluding that they therefore were mainly used for infantry support. This description of their function is however very ambiguous. Certainly the tanks weren't "divided among the infantry" as an organic part of infantry units, such as a division or even an army corps. They were specialised offensive breakthrough vehicles that were concentrated into independent armoured units acting as a reserve; some, as the Armoured Divisions, on the highest operational level; others as Groupements of brigade strength on army level. When effecting the breakthrough they obviously had to cooperate with infantry and artillery. The problem for the French in this was not so much that the ties between armour and infantry were too close, but to the contrary that they were too weak as the armoured units had little or no organic infantry and artillery component and higher level training with infantry units had been rare, so that in the war coordination proved to be too slow. Never was a decision made on the strategic level to divide tanks to protect infantry against German tanks. On several occasions some commanders would split armoured units to bolster the front line. They were probably right in assuming it was better to prevent an enemy breakthrough than to try counterattacking with the Infantry armoured units that were ill-equipped for the encounter fight.
3. Official German doctrine prescribed that the armoured divisions be used for the exploitation phase — not the breakthrough, that had to be executed by the Infantry. Although after 1936 many Infantry Independent Armoured Brigades had been raised for infantry support, the last of these had been disbanded after the Polish campaign, not inspired by some doctrinal insight that tanks should be concentrated into Panzerdivisionen but because the Infantry, then the dominant Weapon, hadn't much faith in tanks anyway. They, correctly, assumed that superior training would enable German infantry to break the enemy lines without armour support. Besides, the PzKpfw Is that had been made available were of little value. They waited for enough Sturmgeschütze to be build to give some really effective support. This also means that, contrary to popular accounts, the French doctrine had a larger emphasis on mechanisation than the German: both used armour for exploitation, but only the French for the breakthrough phase. And this again explains why German tank production lagged behind the French.
4. As a result in May 1940 German armour made relatively little contact with French infantry, considering the scale of the campaign. The fortified lines at Sedan and Monthermé were not broken by tanks but by infantry (in the first case crucially supported by carpet bombing). At Dinant there simply was no fortified line. In The Netherlands 9PD made almost no contact with Dutch troops. German armour avoided heavily defended zones if possible, so the quality of French anti-tank guns was basically irrelevant. If all French divisions would have been equipped with 72 90mm direct fire guns, the outcome would probably have been the same. On the one occasion in May where a fortified line was attacked however (against higher orders), it ended in failure: on 15 May 4PD was repulsed by the 47 mm guns of the 1st Moroccan Infantry Division, losing some 120 vehicles.

--MWAK 09:10, 9 August 2006 (UTC)

These are valid points, I don't agree with all of them, but they are interesting. However my point is not whether or not the AT guns really affected the campaign, but rather that many historians have CLAIMED they were a major cause of the French defeat, and thus they should be included in the Historiography section, perhaps along with a refutation. This has been done with many other claimed causes of the defeat. Madmax 9 August 2006

That is very different from your original comment, but no matter. If you have sources on this by all means include them, along with the facts above showing that poor-quality AT guns could not have been a contributing factor in the French defeat. DMorpheus 17:21, 9 August 2006 (UTC)

Sources will be easy to find :o). But this is just one of several typical mistakes made. The supposedly absent French anti-tank mines come to mind...--MWAK 17:55, 9 August 2006 (UTC)

I´d like to point out fe few things that should be changed.

Equipment imbalances:

It says “In armor protection and penetrating power of main armament many of the French and British tanks were actually superior to their German counterparts.” That´s not correct. The part about the armor protection is right, but not the one about the armament. French AFV were armed with four different guns:

1.The 25mm gun: Does not sound like much, but it could kill any german tank at distances up to 700 meters.

2.The 47mm gun: One of the most powerful Tank/AT-guns at that time. Killed german tanks at up to 1500 meters.

3.The 37mm gun SA-38: The typical 37mm gun, not as powerful as the 47mm, but unlike the 25mm it could fire HE shells.

4.The 37mm gun SA-18: Obsolete gun from WW1. It was ok for firing HE, but with a muzzle velocity of just 388 m/s it was totally useless against tanks.

And now guess what the most common gun was. For more detailed information take a look at what David Lehmann wrote on axishistory.com: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=90110&highlight=&sid=53858171aa54a8403aa96f254dd87b18

And one most important factors is not mentioned at all. The German tanks had three men turrets, while almost all of the French ones had one man turrets. As a result the commander/gunner/loader was totally overworked and could do neither of his jobs properly.

Poor strategy:

The forces General Gamelin sent noth to defend the Netherlands were his only reserves. As a result the French had to defend a frontage of several hundred kilometres without any mobile reserves. This was a flagrant violation of the french doctrine, but in spite of criticism form other high ranking Generals nothing was done to correct this mistake. Markus Becker 16:43, 13 August 2006 (CET) By the way, how do I add my name , date and time of the posting automatically?

To add your name automatically just type four tildes (four of these ~) at the end of your post. It makes for much better communication.

Now as to your points, I am sorry, the original language is not incorrect. Both the original sentence and your post make generalizations, while we should perhaps be more specific. It is certainly true that "many" British and French tanks had better firepower than many of their German counterparts. The French S35 and B-1 tanks, and any of the British cruisers, had guns that could penetrate any of the German tanks at long range (by 1940 standards). You are correct that the *most common* tank gun on the French side was the SA18 37mm, but that does not contradict the original sentence at all. You might want to add, as an aside, that some of the French light recon tanks such as the AMR series were armed only with rifle-caliber MGs. So your list of French tank guns is not complete.

What was the most common German tank gun? Was it not the 20mm on the Panzer II ?

As to the German tanks: Many had three-man turrets, but the majority did not. The most common German tanks in 1940 were the Panzer II, Panzer I, and the ex-Czech 35(t) and 38(t). The excellent Panzer III with its three-man turret was a distinct minority of tank types, with a few hundred available. Although it was probably the best tank on either side, it is no more accurate to generalize from the Panzer III to all German tanks than it would be to generalize from the B-1 to all French tanks. Even in June 1941 less than half the German tanks were Panzer IIIs. Likewise with the Panzer IV, only a few hundred were present.

To take the most common French tank gun, the SA18, and compare it to the most common German tank, the Panzer II, we see that, far from being useless, the SA18 firing APC can penetrate the frontal 16mm armor of the Panzer II at ranges beyond 500 yards, and can get a side penetration against the 14mm armor at 1000 yards. Compared to the most common tanks being fielded in 1941 or 1942, yes, the SA18 is pretty useless, but in 1940 it was not scrap metal.

As to the British tanks, the 2-pounder had better performance that the German or Czech 37mm, good enough to penetrate any of the German tanks at long range.

As for armor protection, again we are all generalizing. The tiny number of British Infantry tanks and the French cavalry S35 and battle tank B-1 were much better protected than any of the German vehicles of any weight.

Finally, of course, none of this was decisive, or even of great importance, in the campaign. DMorpheus 15:21, 13 August 2006 (UTC)

Nevertheless this sentence creates a wrong impression. Let´s concentrate on the modern tanks. As David pointed out the French had 2,300, the Germans had roughly 1,000. But while all of the modern german tanks had decent guns, almost 2/3 of the French did not. As far as the absolute numbers are concerned the French had even less decently armed Tanks than the Germans. So it should say “in penetrating power of main armament most of the French tanks were inferior to their german counterparts, except for obsolete tanks like Pz.I and II.” By the way, I don´t find this "~" on my keyboard. Markus Becker 80.143.102.241 17:23, 13 August 2006 (UTC)

Again I agree with DMorpheus — and again I'd like to add a few things :o):

1. David Lehmann wrote this in early 2002. He today perhaps would put a lesser emphasis on the material factors. Certainly he made some mistakes, as including the German command tanks and excluding the AMR 33 and 35s from the tank numbers just because they were called automitrailleuse; also it should be mentioned that the French had far larger materiel reserves than the Germans. The French had about 3700 modern tanks in France. When the campaign ended the allied forces had committed about 2300 AFVs with a reasonable anti-tank capacity to battle, the Germans less than 1300. The 37 mm SA18 was in itself of course a very poor gun to fight other armour, especially since many PzKpfw IIs had been uparmoured to 30 mm; however this depended strongly on the type of ammunition used; many of the cavalry 37 mm SA18 guns were modified to fire a superior type.
2. The sentence as you give it would be equally deceptive. The situation was that the majority of both French and German tanks was obsolescent and underarmed. However those French tanks that weren't were superior in firepower to their German counterparts (being the PzKpfw 35(t), 38(t), III and IV). They were slightly less in number: about 1000 to 1100, including materiel reserves. And to the French tanks we should add about 500 British and Belgian AFVs with 40 or 47 mm guns.
3. What you wrote about the strategy was as such completely correct, but partly implied by the text as it stands and certainly largely made explicit in what was written before. To speak in defence of Gamelin it should be added that he had good reasons to try to maintain a connection with the Dutch: he knew that when the Nazi regime hadn't collapsed in 1941 he would have to take the offensive himself. The prospect of assaulting the Siegfried Line frontally didn't appeal to him at all, so like Montgomery four years later he intended to go around the Westwall on its northern flank. For this it would be extremely convenient to already have a toehold on the northern bank of the Rhine. It's true that the article is deficient in the treatment of both the German and the French development of strategy. As it happens I'm writing a Dutch version which discusses these subjects more adequately and I hope to improve this one when I'm finished.--MWAK 18:10, 13 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Fall of Paris

This artical no longer mentiones the fall of Paris to the Wehrmacht on June 14th. I would also like to ask (again) for any PD pictures of German troops marching through the Arch de Triumph to be added to the artical for, "One could see them as testments to German power or of the horror of the Nazi conquest" LCpl 00:10, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

Ok how this for a decription-

On 14 June Paris, the capture of which had so eluded the German Army in the First World War, fell to the Wehrmacht, marking the second time in less then 100 years that Paris had be captured by Germany. LCpl 19:41, 8 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] GA Re-Review and In-line citations

Members of the Wikipedia:WikiProject Good articles are in the process of doing a re-review of current Good Article listings to ensure compliance with the standards of the Good Article Criteria. (Discussion of the changes and re-review can be found here). A significant change to the GA criteria is the mandatory use of some sort of in-line citation (In accordance to WP:CITE) to be used in order for an article to pass the verification and reference criteria. Currently this article does not include in-line citations. It is recommended that the article's editors take a look at the inclusion of in-line citations as well as how the article stacks up against the rest of the Good Article criteria. GA reviewers will give you at least a week's time from the date of this notice to work on the in-line citations before doing a full re-review and deciding if the article still merits being considered a Good Article or would need to be de-listed. If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact us on the Good Article project talk page or you may contact me personally. On behalf of the Good Articles Project, I want to thank you for all the time and effort that you have put into working on this article and improving the overall quality of the Wikipedia project. Agne 20:54, 25 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Italian Casualties

The Italian casualties in the battle of the Alps were 1,247 killed or missing and 2,631 wounded. Other 2,151 soldiers suffered freezing (source: Eddy Bauer, Storia controversa della seconda Guerra Mondiale - vol.2). The Italian soldiers took Lanslebourg and a part of Menton. The Italian attack started on June 21 and ended 4 days later. The armistice between Italy and France was signed on June 24, 1940 in Rome (Villa Incisa).

[edit] FA

I know the subject has already been broached, and im not gonna nominate it, but I think this is a great article that just needs some work in specific areas (ie copyedit/unencyclopedic tones). Im gonna go ahead and do as much as I can (although I am no expert on the area), and lets just see where it leads us. I will do it all piece meal as opposed to a few massive edits, so feel free to revert and I am sorry if any of my edits are inconsistent with points you are trying to make. Collaberator/collabtators welcome. --Gregorof/(T) 09:40, 4 November 2006 (UTC)

Yeah it definitely is a good article, but right now it needs heavy copyediting and citations, among other things.UberCryxic 16:57, 4 November 2006 (UTC)

OK will get on that too. --Gregorof/(T) 19:19, 5 November 2006 (UTC)

[edit] fake propaganda picture

i saw this guy in a video Divide & Conquer released in 1943 and directed by Frank Capra using various source including captured material.

1:the author of the picture is unknown

2:the date june 1940 is an estimation given after, since the author is unknown.

3:there was no american to take photograph in france by 1940 as the US did not joined its allies despite Churchills several demands.

In "Divide and Conquer" the video shows this very same guy waving at the French navy leaving Toulon (south france) for the french colonies (where the free french force will be soon organized). he probably had relatives leaving, no one knows hence an interpretation of his emotion is pure propaganda.

4:the place isn't paris but toulon (according to this footage from Divide & Conquer 1943). actually it is not surprising since in november 2005 when the riots rose in France there was a practical joke in France's media and people about CNN's map of france with a dozen cities names in the map and not a single one was in the right place, it was like los angeles for new york, chicago for san francisco and dallas for miami! not a local channel, the mighty CNN..! (look by yourself

5:these people are not here to welcome the germans but to tell adieu to the french navy leaving france

6:there was no one waving at the germans nor welcoming them when the ennemy entered paris: see this footage again from D&C.

Obviously this picture is used as anti-french propaganda and its caption is lies. i suspect the person who put it there to be francophobe and to use it in the article as an evidence of the supposed cowardice part of the French military victories (practical joke) which is supported by many ignorant kids. in this case i suggest this link from the article. as a consequence i've removed this picture to rename its caption (image info needs to be corrected as well) or to use another picture with verified source since as you can see a same unsourced document can be used to illustrate two opposite views!

• this is not the first time! i have already corrected a marxist propaganda picture falsely labelled as "demonstration in favour of Algerian Independence in 1960" (from "marxists.org") in the Algerian War of Independence article (discussion). actually the caption was a fake used a propaganda as the event portrayed in the picture was the exact opposite: a civil war scene involving French Algeria supporters (not pro-independence muslims) fighting with the French army. Shame On You 03:17, 21 November 2006 (UTC)

Seems like the right thing to do for me.UberCryxic 18:21, 21 November 2006 (UTC)

i've selected the following public domain picture from D&C that shows what really happened when the Nazi entered Paris in 1940

nazi parade in paris

Shame On You 18:38, 21 November 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Italy

More needs to be said about Italy's involvment in the Battle of France. Axeman89 19:06, 30 December 2006 (UTC)

[edit] French Air Force strength

There was however a materièl reserve of about 3000 aircraft on the continent this is incorrect. These figures were first published by former Air Minister Pierre Cot, who was in office from 1936 on. Cot's point was, basically, to prove that he provided the Armée de l'air with more than enough aircraft, and it was solely the commanders' fault if the Allies did not manage to establish air superiority during the campaign. As said on the French wiki Profondément touché par la défaite française de mai 1940, il essaiera durant sa vie entière d'en comprendre les raisons et de prouver que l'aviation n'est pas le principal artisan de cette défaite.

For a less biased account of the Armée de l'air strenght, we can use Patrick Facon's book as a source. I'll give it a try if nobody does. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by PpPachy (talk • contribs) 16:34, 26 January 2007 (UTC).

Read carefully: it doesn't say this was the French materièl reserve :o) That was about 2000 according to most sources. French operational strength was about 800-900. The numbers I gave are those of all Allies combined. However I agree that the most recent numbers should be mentioned, especially as those sources might well have confused total production numbers with actually available aircraft.--MWAK 17:57, 26 January 2007 (UTC)

We have to balance interpretations like this one by Kirkland:

Possibly because of their disenchantment with the government for using their service as a political toy, the aviators were unable or unwilling to believe that they might be provided with more than a handful of additional aircraft. Thus, when the director of aircraft production advised General Vuillemin, the chief of the air force, in January 1939 that 370 to 600 aircraft per month would come from French factories in 1940, the general said the air force required only 40 to 60. There were not enough aircrews or ground crews for a larger number, and to expand the training program would require the efforts of the entire strength of the air force. In March, Vuillemin agreed to accept 330 aircraft per month. However, even by using forty- to forty-five-year-old reservists to fly in first-line combat units, he could not fully man his units after mobilization. The availability of aircrews became the limiting factor on the number of units that Vuillemin could field, and the physical capacities of his aging pilots became the limiting factor on how frequently the aircraft would fly.

To keep from being buried under the flood of aircraft pouring from the factories, the air staff imposed multiple requirements for modifications, conducted complex acceptance inspections, and kept key components (guns, propellers, and radios) separated from the aircraft on which they were to be installed. Aircraft newly arrived from America were let in their crates. Still the air force received many more aircraft than it could man, and the air staff had to conceal the surfeit from prying parliamentary eyes by dispersing brand-new, combat-ready planes to remote airfields far from the battle zone.

To the contrary, if we go by Facon's interpretation, we have a reserve of just 500 planes :o).--MWAK 20:35, 26 January 2007 (UTC)

Kirkland amazes me, how can people take him seriously when he writes To keep from being buried under the flood of aircraft pouring from the factories, the air staff imposed multiple requirements for modifications, conducted complex acceptance inspections, and kept key components (guns, propellers, and radios) separated from the aircraft on which they were to be installed. Yes, of course, numerous authors have demonstrated how the Armée de l'air's management of new planes effectively acted a bottleneck between factories and operational units. However, there are multiple reasons for this, the most logical for me being the typically French military paranoia. Secret equipment such as radio sets, gunsights and obviously guns were not to be handled by untrustworthy and possibly communist civilians. But to argue that the Armée de l'air set up that bottleneck on purpose is just ludicrous. Vuillemin was painfully aware that his equipment was outdated! On the personnel side of things, of course, the Armée de l'air could not double its size overnight. Older reservists trained on biplanes failed to convert on the new generation of high wing-loading aircraft, and training programs set up after the declaration of war were simply too late for this phase of the war. For more references on the Armée de l'air of the time I suggest reading Ehrenghardt or Facon or Danel - unfortunately little decent stuff has been published in English on the subject. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by PpPachy (talk • contribs) 21:18, 11 February 2007 (UTC).

I can only agree. Indeed, from a quantative point of view French aircraft production was clearly too low: if the training facilities had been adequate they would have lost so many planes through accidents that it would quickly have depleted stocks. BTW, making outlandish claims about the French forces is quite common :o)--MWAK 12:03, 28 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Victory

It was an Axis victory, but more specifically it was a German victory, the Italians did not enter the war until it was clear that the Germans would win. --Philip Baird Shearer 08:04, 3 February 2007 (UTC)

All very true, but precisely because the German victory was more specific, it is more informative to say it was an Axis victory. For this implies in this context that Germany took part, whereas just saying that it was a German victory obviously doesn't imply Italy took part, a bit of information (often forgotten) which is then lost to the reader. That the German effort was more predominant probably doesn't need to be stressed ;o).--MWAK 08:58, 3 February 2007 (UTC)

As yet I am not persuaded by your line of argument, because it implies that every battle fought in World War II should be labeled either an Axis or Allied victory. I think that is far less informative than crediting the victory to the major participants. Obviously if there is a large proportion of the troops from more than one participating state than it should be labeled an Axis or Allied victory, but not otherwise. "Credit were credit is due" --Philip Baird Shearer 09:13, 3 February 2007 (UTC)

Well, firstly it isn't a matter of credit. It's not the task of an encyclopedia to say things like "Well done, Germany, for beating France". Secondly, if indeed in any battle troops from several nations actually participated, it is more informative to call the reader's attention to this, than only name the major participant, the identity of which will surely be abundantly clear from the article itself.--MWAK 11:35, 3 February 2007 (UTC)

The battle box is meant to be a summary of the article. So if it is abundantly clear from the article then the battle box should say the same thing. Another way of doing it is to count the casualties on both sides. If the number of dead of one of the participating forces is not a significant percentage of the casualties (on their side) then that is a fairly good indicator of how heavily engaged in a battle an ally was. In this case what % of the Axis forces casualties were made up of Italians? --Philip Baird Shearer 17:22, 5 February 2007 (UTC)

Well, when calling it an Axis victory the battle box would say the same thing, given that the context is known. Of course this depends on whether people even know what "Axis" means. I'm personally not very optimistic about this, so perhaps you'r e right when simply calling it a German victory ;o). But the matter is of little importance.--MWAK 18:25, 5 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Battle casualties and Disarmed Enemy Forces

I think the casualties give are incorrect. There is a difference between those captured in battle and those who fall into the hands of the adversary following surrender or mass capitulation. See ICRC Commentaries on the Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War Article 5 "Under the present provision, the Convention applies to persons who "fall into the power" of the enemy. This term is also used in the opening sentence of Article 4, replacing the expression "captured" which was used in the 1929 Convention (Article 1). It indicates clearly that the treatment laid down by the Convention is applicable not only to military personnel taken prisoner in the course of fighting, but also to those who fall into the hands of the adversary following surrender or mass capitulation.

So those French soldiers who fell into "hands of the adversary following surrender" are not casualties of the Battle of France and the numbers of casualties should only include those captured during the battle. --Philip Baird Shearer 17:33, 5 February 2007 (UTC)

Obviously they aren't casualties as such, as this term simply doesn't include those captured. I presume the battle box heading is "casualties" because "losses" could also include materièl losses. However I'm a bit puzzled by your reference to the convention, the point of its legal norms being precisely that although a distinction could be made between those captured during an immediate fight and those involved in a mass surrender, this distinction is irrelevant to the convention. This does not imply that distinction would, in contrast, be very relevant in other contexts. The real point is however that the number of 1.9 million is indeed the number of French soldiers actually taken prisoner until 25 June 1940. The almost four million men belonging to the French armed forces in metropolitan France that evaded capture are not included.--MWAK 18:13, 5 February 2007 (UTC)

Casualties should include those captured, but not those who fall into the hands of the enemy after a general capitulation. The point of quoting GCIII commentary is to show that the distinction does exist in laws of law (and is not a figment of my imagination), so only those captured during the battle should be included in the causality lists not others. I am not sure if the figure should include those captured after June 22, as that is when the article says the fighting stopped. However the article should make it clear that the figure is only those captured up to 25th. BTW what is the source that the numbers are those captured, and that it does not include those who fell into the hands of an enemy power? --Philip Baird Shearer 19:16, 5 February 2007 (UTC)

Well, the article is as yet wrong on this point: the fighting stopped only on 25 June. The Armistice conditions basically stipulated that Germany would not take the remnant prisoner, so there simply was no mass surrender in that sense :o). France was even treated rather harshly in this respect: Germany let go the entire Dutch army.--MWAK 07:40, 6 February 2007 (UTC)

The Germans did violate this specific point of the Armistice, as crews of the Maginot line who had resisted until the end were marched to captivity on July 2nd. PpPachy 09:24, 6 February 2007 (UTC)

This is indeed a notorious incident. Of course the Germans reasoned that in most cases the crews had been in violation of the Armistice themselves, simply by holding out a week beyond the date of its enactment ;o). Then again the crews refused to surrender just because they would go into captivity. There is a bit of a Catch 22 here--MWAK 10:24, 6 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] May 14th air bombings

The air effort above the Meuse Bridgehands around Sedan was almost entirely British, because the Armée de l'air only had approximately 30 bombers available this morning, due to losses of the 3 previous days, and general shortage of modern planes. Therefore the French bomber losses in the area are as follows: one LeO.451 (shot down by fighters) and one Amiot 143. All other bombers lost in the Area were British, Battles and Blenheims of the AASF, plus some Blenheims flying directly from England. It's unfortunate that, while Frieser has seriously researched some of his stuff, there are such weak points in his book. PpPachy 20:59, 11 February 2007 (UTC)

Very true...Thanks for the better info! But were the French fighter losses not very large that day?--MWAK 06:56, 12 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Historiography

I'm looking over the Historiography article, and for the life of me I can't understand why the term is in such widespread use (or misuse?) all over Wikipedia. From the article:

"Historiography is the study of the practice of history. This can take many forms, including the study of historical method and the historical development of history as an academic discipline. The term can also be used to refer a specific body of historical writing."

Now how is a discussion of the causes of the French defeat historiography? To me, this is merely the study of history, not the study of the study of history. It's not so meta. Am I wrong? Haber 13:55, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

Well, the section, if you go back to study its history :o), started as an attempt to put all kind of theories about the subject safely away under the nomer "Historiography" to hide the fact it was full of unbalanced points of view (now you know why). It then grew considerably — showing it was quite effective in this function :o). Of course a good article really shouldn't need such a section: cause cannot be seperated from effect and if the course of events is adequately described all questions about causality should be answered. However there is in this case indeed an enormous amount of interpretative literature about the subject with distinct phases and fashions, so this article would need a real historiography section. I've recently rewritten much of it, going from top to bottom and in the end I hoped to tackle this particular subject, throwing out those issues adequately decribed and restructuring with proper references those parts that are of a real historiographic nature. Keeping the old title until it is justified by the content would prevent a new one from obstructing the justification process ;o).--MWAK 18:11, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

I still think the content of the section doesn't exactly fit the Merriam-Webster [4] or Wikipedia's own definition of "historiography". However, if you're going to rewrite the section to fit the title then I guess that's just as good as rewriting the title to fit the section. Good luck! Haber 18:36, 22 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Pic miscaptioned

At least four men in this picture are obviously French, including the first of the line. More significantly, this picture isn't at all from Dunkirk, but was actually taken in Veules-les-Roses near St. Valéry-en-Caux. Hard to say from this one, but there are wider views of these prisoners with common background elements, for example here: [5]

(a different one was also published in Militaria Magazine hors-série n°31, Histoire & Collections, 1998, p. 73) By comparing these with both older and recent pictures of Veules-les-Roses as found [6] here, there is no doubt. PpPachy 00:05, 28 February 2007 (UTC)

[edit] reserve divisions

Germany did not have 45 Reserve Divisions, which is where the problem arises. Only the sixteen divisions of the 2nd Wave were once known as Reserve Divisions (as they were raised from Reserve regiments). The 20 Divisions of the 3rd wave were Landwehr (formed from Landwehr Regiments). etc. It is very hard for me to tell what those 45 reserve divisions in the West are supposed to represent, particularly if most would not see any real fighting. The term Reserve Divisions really had gone out of use in Germany by the time the war started. Which is why I assume these are the divisions in the Reserve of the OKH (including divisions in formation that number seems about right (39 + 9), though a number of these were not in the West).

By the way, there is no way for German forces to achieve the number of 93 front line divisions without counting the divisions of the 2nd and later waves (the first wave had 39 divisions, including the motorised ones, add 10 Panzer, 1 Cavalry and 3 Mountain (2 in Norway) which leaves you at 53 divisions).--Caranorn 12:22, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

Indeed they did not have the official designation "reserve division" and obviously the number of 93 is not the total of prewar active divisions — I hope that this is made quite clear by the text as it is. The number of 45 is debatable; Frieser e.g. uses the number 42. The total of the official OKH reserves, minus 22nd Luftlandedivision, is 39 but the OKH reserves also would be released in response from demands by the Army Groups to increase their operational reserve and had been given a possible destination beforehand. It is for this reason that I objected to the statement that they were in "Strategic Reserve". Not only did they not form a strategic reserve, they also weren't really committed in reponse to considerations on the deeper strategic level. Nevertheless I have to admit that the OKH reserves of course formally were in strategic reserve — though it is not a point, I feel, that should be stressed :o). I'll change the text to clarify.--MWAK 20:01, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

Okay I now understand your point. Interestingly enough both sides treated their supposedly strategic reserve (reserve of the OKH and reserve of the GQG) in a similar way, feeding it unit by unit into combat with little strategic planning.--Caranorn 20:50, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

Note, I believe more then 5 of those OKH reserve divisions were committed to the frontline armies and corps, but it's quite possible that few saw real action. But to get exact numbers I'd have to annalyse unit presence with the various field armies in June (Verbände und Truppen, though I believe a Schematische Kriegsgliederung of that date also survived), but I believe that would be borderline original research.--Caranorn 20:55, 16 March 2007 (UTC)

You're right: I was focussed too much on May :oS. In June the majority of them was in France and only a third was more or less kept out of the fighting. We'll change it again :o).--MWAK 07:04, 17 March 2007 (UTC)

[edit] edit "Aftermath"

Just a short but important note concerning the aftermath of the invasion. After the armistice was signed, France DID want to buy favor of Germany, in fact that's true. But it is absolutely wrong to call this passivity. The France of Vichy participated actively in antisemist actions and roundups such as the razzia of Vel d'Hiv in 1942 in Paris when thousands of Jews were arrested by the FRENCH police to be deported into concentration camps.

Finally, the state of France has accepted the fact of an ACTIVE collaboration with Germany, especially under Jacques Chirac as president. It was a long process which actually began in the late 80s with the first trials against French politicians who were accused of crimes against humanity they committed during the German occupation and this process is far from an end.

[edit] Why divisions instead of actual strengths?

In the battle box it tells how many divisions sides had. Great, but what has that to do with anything? It's the number of men, not divisions what matters. It's irrelevant not only about the strenghts, but also to comparison between the troops, since sizes of divisions can differ greatly. I'm remembering seeing numbers 3,1 million Axis vs 3,3 million French sometimes before, what about returning it to that or some else troop number? Wikinist 20:04, 28 April 2007 (UTC)

Well, the division number is of course at itself very relevant — you want to know how many manoeuvre units there were and doubling the size of a division by adding infantry will certainly not double its fighting power: apart from the operational aspect there's the simple fact that much of that power resides in its artillery. However, it is of course best to give both numbers. Immediately the problem poses itself which number to choose. All Allied soldiers in France and the Low Countries versus all Germans crossing the border? But then the Allied number is misleadingly high — above six million — and we have no good data on the German number. Or perhaps we should turn again to the divisions and count how many men are in them? But then the overall numbers are too low as relevant support troops are excluded — and anyway we have no good data using that criterion either. The usual solution has been to give all Germans "in the West" versus the complete BEF and Belgian and Dutch armies — and adding the French troops on the "North-East" front. The numbers obtained this way are still not very useful and will obscure two basic yet contradictory facts: on the one hand that the number of German fighting troops was higher than the Allied one; on the other hand that fewer Germans actually participated in the fighting. So put no faith in total numbers ;o).--MWAK 05:43, 29 April 2007 (UTC)

The divisions actually give a pretty good idea of the situation. There was little difference in the ration or rifle strength of French or German divisions (British were certainly also very similar in rifle strength, idem Belgian). The only major difference between the Germans and Allies is that the Allies had a large number of non divisional Artillery Regiments and smaller infantry formations (British MG battalions, French separate Infantry Regiments of various types etc.)... , but that didn't add much more fighting power. Though to note, the total numbers also seem to be listed in the infobox.--Caranorn 11:58, 29 April 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Decisive Axis Victory?

Shouldn't this be a decisive German Victory? As the only other Axis Power, Italy, did not declare war until 10th June with the decisive fighting already over, and even then made virtually zero impact on the campaign.

Dapi89 20:14, 1 May 2007 (UTC)

Just make it "Axis victory" and this problem goes away. Haber 21:19, 1 May 2007 (UTC)

No, it should be called a decisive victory, meaning the adversary capitulated.--MWAK 04:31, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

I'd definitelly agree on decisive with France, Belgium and the Netherlands mostly (all contributed to the war later on, but far less then in 1939/40) knocked out of the war.--Caranorn 12:11, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

So then do you want "German" or "Axis"? The French certainly thought the backstab was decisive, so I say let's leave it as "Decisive Axis Victory". Haber 12:55, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

Hi guys. My orginal question was not about the 'decisive' element but the swapping of 'Axis' for 'German' for the reasons I mentioned above!!! What say you?Dapi89 11:02, 5 May 2007 (UTC)

I have put in German for now, but I'm sure someone else will take it out.Dapi89 11:10, 5 May 2007 (UTC)

Actually no, makes sense, so I hope it stays that way.--Caranorn 11:45, 5 May 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Saar Offensive speculations

Just a quick note. I'm not sure where the number of 98 French Divisions comes from. I assume that these are all the French Divisions and Divisional Equivalents (fortress units) present in France at that date. Though even for that the number of 98 seems rather high. In any case, following the differentiation between Reserve and Regular (really between 1. Welle and successive mobilization classes) for the Germans I did the same for the French. The number of 28 are all the French Regular (d'active) Divisions formed by that date (actually I forgot the three Light Chasseurs and Infantry Divisions, but I'm unsure of their date of formation anyhow), regardless of their location within France. It should be noted that the vast mass of French Reserve Divisions were not operational by this date, the 2nd wave (Réserve B) ones weren't even fully combat ready by May 10 1940.--Caranorn 13:48, 12 May 2007 (UTC)

First of all, by mentioning Keitel's remark, I didn't mean I personally agree with his opinion :o). The point however, is undeniably often made in the literature, together with the analysis that only eleven German divions were active units, as an indication for the presumed true disparity of forces. The number of 98 seems to be given as the full number of every existing division in France. Shirer has the number of 85 for the North East, together with this picture of the situation in his Fall of the Third Republic:

The French had an overwhelming superiority in men, guns and tanks. Against their fully armed 85 divisions the Germans had 34, all but 11 of which were reserve units with little training and lacking adequate arms, munition and transport. All the Panzer divisions, all the motorized divisions, had been reserved for Poland. On September 10 some nine more reserve divisions were added but they would have been of little value against a serious attack.

In reality of course there was another active division present in the West outside of the direct Heeresgruppe C area and ten of the divisions were fully trained 2. Welle, probably the equal of any French infantry division in fighting power, so the number of useful divisions was at least 22. It's true that nominally the mobilised French divisions present had a majority of men having at some time in the past completed their training, but as you indicated, the B divisions really needed to be completely retrained — apart from the low fighting power inherent in the high average age of their conscripts. Even then we cannot conclude a 1:3 ratio was present (even when disregarding the low readiness problem) as only a limited French force could be deployed; 1:2 is more realistic, hardly "overwhelming", given the strength of the German fortification zone, in which tanks would have been of little value. A full-scale French offensive would probably not have attained a strategic breakthrough and only resulted in sacrificing hundreds of thousands of men for a limited territorial gain in the southern Rhineland. Maybe with the benefit of hindsight we might assume that Hitler would have squandered his ammunition reserves on reconquering the ground lost, perhaps fatefully delaying a 1940 offensive. This might have saved France in 1940, but not Poland in 1939 :o).

What we need is a good reference to balance Keitel's view...--MWAK 14:27, 13 May 2007 (UTC)

[edit] ending the Phoney War?

The article begins with "executed from 10 May 1940, which ended the Phoney War". What about the invasion of Norway? It was not phoney and it took place earlier. 85.227.226.168 16:05, 3 June 2007 (UTC)

Well, it ended the Phoney War in the main theatre. Scandinavia and the naval actions are just marginal, no? ;o)--MWAK 05:20, 4 June 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Too little info on the Luftwaffe's contribution

I think there should be more info on the aboves contribution. The article mentions the Blitzkrieg theory in one section and does not mention the Luftwaffe at all. I can find onlt two other references to its participation in the rest of the article. I will go about inputting more information on this subject as the Luftwaffe was a key component in the Blitzkrieg battleplan.Dapi89 18:34, 8 July 2007 (UTC)

Well, on the operational level, there was one point in the campaign where the Luftwaffe's actions were truly decisive: the breaking of the French front at Sedan. Also the surrender of the Dutch forces was brought about by the bombing of Rotterdam. In the other actions, they were one factor among many. They contributed, like armour, infantry and artillery did, but in contrast to the movements of army units on the ground, mentioning their effort in terms of the number of sorties made or tonnage of explosives dropped, would add too much detail to the very general description of events we are forced to limit ourselves to.

As regards the Luftwaffe forming part of Blitzkrieg theory, we have to be very careful. It was no part of an official Blitzkrieg doctrine as no such doctrine existed in the first place. The role of the Luftwaffe as "flying artillery" compensating the lack of artillery support caused by the armour executing very deep and swift strategic penetrations, was attributed to it by later writers, creating a sort of idealised version of what they thought Blitzkrieg should be like. At the time such deep penetrations were considered a radical, even subversive, idea and anyway, the artillery was expected too simply keep up as it indeed often did. Reading Guderian we never get the impression he somehow considered close air support to be a necessary condition for success (to him reconnaissance and battlefield interdiction seemed the most important roles for air power). During the actual events, it sometimes of course was. But this was more the exception than the rule: in practice, the more "deep" and fluid a battle was, the less the chance of any effective air support materialising would be, as radio communications were unreliable and target acquisition (not to mention bombing precision...) was very poor. It was not as if armour commanders constantly had a swarm of Stukas circling above their heads they could direct at will to immediately obliterate the enemy. In a really fluid battle you couldn't afford to sit waiting for the bombers to appear and perhaps hit anything relevant; on the other hand you really didn't need them as in those conditions you were supposed to defeat the enemy primarily by manoeuvre, not fire power. The main effect the Luftwaffe had after 15 May consisted in the disruption of transport and increasing the general fear and confusion.

A quite different question is that of the general air war. The article certainly should have a chapter about how the respective airforces fared while fighting each other.--MWAK 06:41, 9 July 2007 (UTC)

Well that last point was really the point I was making. The Luftwaffe's victory in the Skies and contribution to ground operations isn't really discussed in depth. It should be, it was decisive. The Luftwaffe did provide an air blanket over the Heer and Panzers and were responsible for the decimation of the Enemy airforces. The Stuka units were equipped with good air-to-ground communications and it was possible for commanders to "call up" and ask for assistance when they encountered heavy or large concentrations of enemy forces. This ability is well recorded in literature relating to the history of the Stuka Geschwaders. As you have mentioned Guderian did consider air-power as important, therefore it has to be said that air-power was a decisive element in the campaign, therefore certainly a major cog in the battle plan. Guderian as most Army commanders do, tend to play down the significance of air power. Rommel in particular was aware of this during the North African campaign. He became frustrated at the lack of co-operation between Luftwaffe and Army forces. The importance of air support became clear when the Wehrmacht began lose it from 1942 onwards. The main effort of the Luftwaffe was not so much the disruption of transport post May 15, but the continued suppression of enemy airpower and ground attack duties - of course related to the Blitzkrieg theory. The percentage of sorties that were direct ground support, i.e ground attack, is not really important, the disruption of supplies is just as critical. Dapi89 11:44, 9 July 2007 (UTC).

In any case it is a good thing this aspect is better treated :o). Of course the air cover provided, though important, should be seen in relation to the offensive power of the Allied tactical bomber force, which was rather limited. Perhaps you could add some data to the article about the relative sortie rates between the nations — and also some indication of average dayly total sorties by German Ju 87s would be very informative to the reader too!--MWAK 19:23, 9 July 2007 (UTC)

Agree with that, it must be included. Okay. I have considerable info on this.Dapi89 20:02, 9 July 2007 (UTC)

Ive added the requested info. I have a total number of Allied sorties for 10-15 May but am not sure were best to put it. I'll add some more on the final destruction of the Armee de l'Air during Fall Rot.Dapi89 22:17, 9 July 2007 (UTC)

This contribution was very valuable! Perhaps the sortie numbers could be put into a special chapter at the end, outling the performance of the main airforces, together with their victory and loss rates over the entire campaign. Exact numbers are precisely the thing an encyclopedia should offer! Or perhaps you might even consider to write a separate article about it?--MWAK 05:02, 10 July 2007 (UTC)

I had thought about this, but I didn't want to write a chapter of airforce stats and how they fought the air war, but rather to mold it with the other sections and relate it to the ground campaign as well. I also refrained as I have a habbit of adding too much info. I think this part would be best included at the end of the Fall Rot section. I also read somewhere that inputting statistics is against wiki policy.Dapi89 16:37, 10 July 2007 (UTC)

Well if an article would be become a purely statistical datalist, that would be a problem. But some nice tables wouldn't hurt.--MWAK 05:31, 11 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Defensive mentality

Copied from WP:RD/H for further processing. --Ghirla^-трёп- 14:23, 21 July 2007 (UTC)

Be careful of some of the details in the article on the Military History of France, Taraborn. The Maginot Line did not 'sucessfully hold off the German attacks in 1940': it was totally by-passed by Manstein's sweep to the west. Army Group C, the weakest of the three German battle formations, was specifically allocated to act as a decoy force, to pin down the enemy, and deflect from the offensive operations to the north-west of the line. Even so, the 1st, 7th and 16th German armies succesfully broke through the French defences at several points. By mid-June the fabled Maginot Line was just as porous as the rest of the French defences.

Maginot also has some wider relevance to your main question, being a concrete expression (literally!) of the 'defensive mentality' that had emerged in France in the 1930s. France had made a huge sacrifice during the Great War, at places like Verdun, which had bleed the country to near death. With a smaller population than Germany, the proportional losses were all the greater. The full realisation of the terrible cost only began to emerge in the 1920s. One response was to create the 'Maginot Shield'. Originally this was really only to safeguard the privinces of Alsace Lorraine, the point where it was always to be strongest, though it was later extended, to a highly ineffectual extent, all the way to the Channel. In essence it was a nineteenth century solution to a twentieth century problem, and one that created the illusion of invulnerability.

German tactics were, indeed, highly important in 1940; and it seems reasonably certain that a repeat of the old Schlieffen Plan would have succeeded just as brilliantly in 1940 as the offensive that was actually put in operation. Why? Was it because the German Army was stronger? No, it was not. It was because the Germans had learned the lessons of 1918, when their army had been broken in the west by a combination of infantry, armoured and air attacks, and the French had not. The German response was Blitzkrieg. In terms of the number of tanks at their disposal, they were no stronger than the French; but their armour was concentrated in Panzer Divisions, intended to operate independently from the infantry as a cutting spearhead, whereas French armour was spread loosely across the whole army, wasted in the task of infantry support. German airpower-particularly the Stuka dive bombers-was used in the form of aerial artillery, supporting ground advances by destroying enemy bases in the line of attack. The whole thing was devastatingly effective.

Finally, we should should not neglect the internal political divisions within France, which deepened in bitterness throughout the 1930s, and contributed to a defeatist mentality. Lacking political and military leadership of the highest order the Third Republic might be said to have willed itself to death, reflected very much in the attitude of men like Philippe Petain. Defeat was born on the inside. Clio the Muse 01:17, 18 July 2007 (UTC)

OK, allow me to comment :o):

1. There really was nothing "outdated" in 1940 about the concept of a fortification line. Building one was an efficient investment, one of the reasons the Germans too invested heavily in fortifications.
2. What however most certainly ís outdated in 2007 is the narrative that the silly French "didn't learn the lessons of 1918" whereas those perky Germans did. Both the French and the German tactical doctrines were modern offshoots of the 19th century Bewegungskrieg concept. The main difference was that the French emphasized planning, high levels of control and the use of armour, while the Germans put their faith in flexibility, high quality of command at the lower level and infantry. So basically 1940 was a battle of Bataille Méthodique against Auftragstaktik. Which method was best, strongly depended on the strategic situation. It is highly doubtful a frontal attack through central Belgium would have resulted in a decisive German victory. The French had thoroughly planned for such a battle, there would have been little room for German initiative and the unarmoured German infantry would have been very vulnerable given the high fire power density. The typical outcome would have been a battle of attrition, with the Germans sacrificing their best troops for a limited territorial gain. This consideration was of course precisely the reason Von Manstein devised a different strategy. Only this new strategy allowed for a chain of events that ended in something we today would describe as "Blitzkrieg". For the German High Command this was the unintended outcome however ; Blitzkrieg was not the official doctrine and Halder's changes to Von Manstein's plan would have precluded any Blitzkrieg to take place, were it not for the outright insubordination by the German armour commanders.
3. The fact that the French in 1940 committed more modern tanks to battle than the Germans did, even though their army was a third smaller, has always been very embarrassing to the theory that the German Army would have been organised according to the Blitzkrieg concept. To explain it away recourse is made to caricature, what we may call the Concentration Myth: the Germans deliberately concentrated their tanks into armoured divisions whereas the French distributed theirs among the infantry. The real explanation is very simple: the German Army as a whole, contrary to the French, didn't consider tanks to be all that important. They believed in the superb training of their elite infantry units. That was why so few tanks were built in the first place. These were nevertheless divided among the Panzertruppe, the Infantry and the Cavalry. But the infantry armoured brigades were disbanded in 1939 without too much protest as they were equipped with inferior light vehicles anyway and the Cavalry Light Divisions were renamed armoured divisions. But this was mainly for organisational reasons — a lack of trained tank crews, reducing overhead — and did not reflect some fundamental doctrinal change. And is it true the French did not concentrate their tanks? Not really. Ultimately about 2000 modern French tanks would be employed by mechanised or motorised units of divisional strength, including the matériel reserves allocated, against 2700 German tanks. Not that great a disparity. And even the independent armoured brigades, the sixteen Groupements, were allocated at army level and often fought alongside the armoured divisions. Normal infantry units never had an organic armour component.
4. In reality the Germans won because they deconcentrated and the French concentrated — not tanks but trucks. Many German trucks were divided among the regular infantry divisions and this gave them a superior tactical mobility in the encounter fight. The French in fact had a larger number of special motorised divisions than the Germans!
5. Yes, many French were defensive and defaitist. But defaitism was the prevalent attitude in Germany also: people and army command were very pessimistic about the situation. The defender usually wins but the Germans had no choice but to attack. And Germany had no lack of internal divisions also, with the chief of staff carrying a revolver to shoot the head of state if necessary! Hitler was not a strong war leader but a neurotic, anxious and insecure amateur, who at times was close to ruining the entire campaign. And if France would have had a strong leadership, what exactly could it have done differently? Does political strength confer the magical ability to predict the enemy strategy? Also it should be remembered that the decision to advance into central Belgium was taken for offensive reasons, to make possible a large Allied offensive in 1941, for which purpose it was planned to triple the number of armoured divisions.--MWAK 19:44, 21 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Polish units and OOB musings

Please see my question at Talk:Order of battle for the Battle of France.-- _{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus | talk}  19:07, 31 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Dutch Airforce

Actually looking at the article once more I find that claim of 144 Dutch Combat Aircraft. I had mistakenly interpreted the airforce to have only some 63 airplanes of which 43 were certainly monoplanes ([7]). Now that I've looked at that site once more I find there were 77 additional aircraft under the Inspector of Military Aircraft adding up to 150 (so almost identical to the book source), but none of those seem to be operational combat aircraft. I will leave it to someone else to decide whether it's worthwhile mentioning the majority of planes as biplanes or not (listing the 63 combat planes might be of greater importance).--Caranorn 21:30, 8 August 2007 (UTC)

Just checked the Belgian Airforce, this only seems to list combat (fighter, bomber, reconnaissance and observation) aircraft (the number roughly adds up to those listed under this link [8]) and ignore training aircraft. Does the booksource for the Dutch Airforce provide a breakdown that would allow applying a same standard here?--Caranorn 21:36, 8 August 2007 (UTC)

Most of the planes under the administration of the inspectorate were more or less operational — and you have forgotten the Navy planes. So if we include all military aircraft present, the majority of these indeed consisted of biplanes. Nevertheless, it seems incorrect to stress this point too much as it suggests that most of the dogfights were between aircraft of an extreme technological inequality, whereas in fact the core of the Dutch fighter squadrons was equippped with relatively modern planes.

As regards the "stalemate" issue: though I personally tend to agree with Rex that this was a decisive cause for the bombing, the problem is that the literature is not in consensus about this subject. So in the very short section we must by necessity dedicate to it, it would be incorrect to make such a clear choice.--MWAK 06:06, 9 August 2007 (UTC)

No matter with which the core figher core was equiped, this article talks about the destruction of the Dutch airforce, and a 'mere' 332 sorties , well who flew those sorties? The modern ones or the aiforce as a whole? If the literature is not in concensus, then it's very simple; provide both/multiple views.Rex 09:24, 9 August 2007 (UTC)

You have to understand the vast majority of combat sorties does not result in any combat. Planes take off, fly around and land — having achieved nothing. Most of the Dutch aircraft being shot down were easy prey by the mere fact they were reconnaissance aircraft or light bombers. That they were also biplanes made them, if anything, less vulnerable because such a configuration increases manoeuvrability.

Of course we could give both views but then the question arises why we would need to mention this aspect at all in such a short account if its relevance is contended... I really have to make good on my promise to finish the Battle of the Netherlands article :o).--MWAK 10:44, 9 August 2007 (UTC)

I understand the concept of sorties, and I'd rather be in a spitfire than a Fokker D1. The idea that biplanes were superior in combat vs the German fighters strikes me as total and complete nonsense. Of course it should be mentioned. If every contested matter would be left out because of that, we'd have very little to talk about would we?Rex 11:19, 9 August 2007 (UTC)

Well, the Fokker D.I is a WW1 plane. However, until the middle of the thirties combat aircraft would often be biplanes; the last models were not all that bad — at least not as bad as Fokker D.I :o) — compared to the German fighters. Obviously I do not claim that biplanes were superior in combat. However, your point seems to be that, while normal Dutch fighters were not biplanes, most Dutch aircraft in action in May 1940 were of this type and that therefore this fact merits mention in order to point out the Dutch technological inferiority. My point is that those biplanes weren't fighters but reconnaissance aircraft/light bombers that had no chance whatsoever in a dogfight against German fighters, nor could outrun them and that thus could only survive by refusing battle; and that being a biplane certainly helps to achieve this because it makes a plane more manoeuvrable. The bit of speed these underpowered aircraft would have gained by having been built in a monoplane configuration would have availed them nothing.

The contested interpretation of the Bombing of Rotterdam certainly should be discussed; but it has its natural place in the subarticles. I've tried to keep the account of this article as close to consensus as possible, as it would have to be tripled in length if it was unfolded along both all the many traditional and revisionist views. Of course the section about the Netherlands is only a tiny part of this problem, but every bit helps ;o).--MWAK 12:20, 9 August 2007 (UTC)

Just to answer the question posted by Rex Germanus, between 10 May - 14 May the Dutch flew 195 Fighter sorties, 115 Recon sorties whilst just 22 bomber missions took place. of the 144 aircraft that were in service, 125 were serviceable. Of 110 lost in combat, 72 were destroyed in air-to-air combat, the others on the ground claiming 38 German aircraft in return. It is unclear, and I don't believe there is a source, that can tell us how many sorties were flown by which aircraft. The 332 sorties mentioned are only for the ML, and not any other branch of the armed forces. The 144 number is a front line strength number for combat aircraft only.Dapi89 17:09, 9 August 2007 (UTC).

[edit] French air force losses

Dapi89 was looking for French aviation losses for the campaign, so here are figures from J. & P. Martin's Ils étaient là: l'armée de l'Air septembre 39 - juin 40, Aéro-Editions, 2001, ISBN 2-9514567-2-7:

Armée de l'air losses, frontline units, from 3rd sept. 1939 to 24th June 1940

	to NME aircraft	to AAA	by accident	total
Fighters	353	45	69	467
Bombers	73	93	60	226
Recon.	94	62	45	201
Total	520	200	174	894

Armée de l'air only - Aéronautique navale not included. Local defense patrol, foreign based, training or non-combatant units not included. Aircraft destroyed on the ground or abandoned not included. Detail by aircraft type available. PpPachy 20:10, 9 August 2007 (UTC)

I already had these but thanks anyway. I didnt think it appropriate for the article. But perhaps they should be included as well as a complete break down of the total number of sorties by each type (I mean fighter/ bomber etc). The total number of losses included in the Fall Rot section do include captured and abandoned machines that were initialy combat ready.Dapi89 13:59, 10 August 2007 (UTC).

By the way it seems this author has not got the exact figures correct. The losses he presents from September '39 to Jun '40 are lower than the ones lost during the battle of May-Jun 1940! Hooton Luftwaffe at war: Blitzkrieg in the West on p90 and Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarague in A History of french Military Aviation p360-361 both state that the French lost 174 to AA Fire. The exact numbers should be mentioned. When losses are concerned I'm always suspicious of exact numbers like "200" which prompts me to check, especially losses.

The total estimtes included are substantially higher than the ones quoted here. The figure of 520 lost in combat apperas to far too low. Counting thos lost in air-to-air combat, destroyed on the ground and captured (all of which should be included) amounts to 1,100, of which 700 were on the ground. 420 were lost too all causes alone in the first nine days.Dapi89 16:31, 10 August 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Surrender?

"France formally surrendered to the German armed forces on 25 June in the same railroad car at Compiègne that Germany in 1918 had been forced to surrender in. "

This isn't correct, is it? France didn't sign a surrender, it signed an armistice providing for its country's continued independence, yes? For that matter, Germany also had signed an armistice in 1918, I believe. Pirate Dan 20:45, 20 August 2007 (UTC)

In principle you're right. However, the armistice also entailed the capitulation of all surrounded troops. Indeed in 1918 also Germany signed an armistice. The continued independence of France was implicit in the armistice, but might also have been in a full capitulation: there is no necessary connection.--MWAK 05:45, 21 August 2007 (UTC)

There is no "surrender document " as was written in a previous version. It's much more than a semantic problem. If a surrender document had been signed, this was a "capitulation" of the French Army in France, which implied that the french gvt, army etc could fight in Africa,in GB, on seas etc. To the contrary, the new authorities of France (Petain and his clique) choose an "armistice" signed by a government, not the Army, which implied there will be no more French fighting, which was the Nazi objective.(contrib off-Wiki by a French friend)--Mrg3105 (talk) 09:13, 20 December 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Operation Fall Rot and the issue of summary style

There is a separate article, Operation Fall Rot, which I'd redirect to the June: Fall Rot, France section of this article, except that:

• That would create a number of double redirects to be fixed
• More importantly, this article (Battle of France) is just too long. It would make more sense to shorten the June: Fall Rot, France section and use the "main" template to direct readers to a separate article, and to do the same for other parts of this article as well.

I've got other priorities, so I'm not going to do anything on this except post it here as a suggestion and perhaps a starting point for discussion of the length of the article. -- John Broughton (♫♫) —Preceding signed but undated comment was added at 17:09, 13 October 2007 (UTC)

Yes, the present inadequacy of Operation Fall Rot might almost induce one into turning it into a redirect and, yes, some reflection will convince anyone that it would be even better if the Fall Rot article would be longer than the section in this article. The way forward is however to lengthen the Fall Rot article, not to shorten this one.

The subject matter of Battle of France is extraordinarily complex and controversial. We might condense the article but this will seriously decrease intelligibility. Worse, if the level of detail is insufficient, people will no longer be able to understand how modern research has changed the scientific consensus about the course of events. They will immediately begin to adapt the résumés to make them conform to more popular views, starting an endless series of edit wars. Also, with enough detail we can give a narrative largely consisting of uncontested facts that doesn't need a constant commentary about how these are interpreted according to the different schools of thought. Should we make the sections more or less like excerpts we would for reasons of NPOV be forced to indicate how the several sides: traditional, popular, professional, revisionist, tend to conclude what "really happened in short". The result would only be marginally shorter — and a confusing jumble of opinion, lacking the fact that this opinion is about.

In time, the several subarticles: Battle of the Netherlands, Battle of Belgium, Sedan, Dunkirk, Fall Rot, The Italian Invasion, The Air War of 1940, German Strategy, Allied Strategy, The Order of Battle etc., etc. will all reach a size of 70 Kb or so — and then this one will not seem so long.--MWAK 19:36, 13 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Good Article Reassessment

This article has been reviewed as part of Wikipedia:WikiProject Good articles/Project quality task force for GA sweeps. I think the article currently doesn't meet the requirements of the Good article criteria concerning sourcing. Although the article is well-sourced in many areas, other areas are lacking. For that reason, I have listed the article at Good article reassessment to get a better consensus on the article's status. Issues needing to be address are listed there. Please join the discussion to see how the article could be improved and prevent delisting. If you have any questions about the reassessement, leave me a message on my talk page and I'll get back to you as soon as I can. Regards, --Nehrams2020 06:34, 15 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] German material losses

Does anyone have good data for this, and sources?--Mrg3105 (talk) 00:50, 17 December 2007 (UTC)

I do concerning the Luftwaffe, I have added all that I feel is appropriate, but I have more detailed info - losses between certain dates, air fleets ect.Dapi89 (talk) 14:37, 1 January 2008 (UTC)

I have corrected German tank losses for the Battle of Hannut. French claims of 160 tanks were massively incorrect. The Germans had control of the battle field and repaired many. German losses actually stood at 50 tanks, while the French lost 91. Citations and source were added.Dapi89 (talk) 02:32, 13 January 2008 (UTC)

Those were not French claims, but represent the actual drop in German combat-ready tanks. So the German side initially "lost" about 160 tanks and the French about a hundred. Afterwards the Germans were able to recover many of their tanks. Some could be repaired quickly enough to again participate in the campaign, others were eventually rebuilt by the factory and about fifty (not an exact number) were total losses.--MWAK (talk) 08:49, 13 January 2008 (UTC)

49 were destoyed. These numbers have been added using the War diaries of the 3&4 PDs. The French military claimed to have destroyed all of the 160 battle damaged/destroyed tanks, the source says "claimed". The number of combat-ready tanks the PDs lost is unknown for certain. This seems a similar trend for the battle of 15 May. The article text quoted the Germans as losing 120 tanks, when in fact (according to the war diary) it was just 42 damaged and totally destroyed Dapi89 (talk) 10:36, 14 January 2008 (UTC).

Yes, but saying "the French claimed" suggests the number refers to some contemporary kill claim. The most we can say is that current French descriptions of the event tend to emphasize the fact that many German tanks were put out of action, whereas the Germans tend to call attention to the fact most were eventually repaired :o) (in fact more than I originally indicated: the 49 number is including the future factory repairs). The 15 May loss number of 42 is however that of all tanks that were destroyed or were irreparable by the Army field workshops (in the last case they were sent back to the factory). So tanks initially disabled but still able to be put in working order by the troops were not included. For example, if a PzKpfw IV was many times hit by a 25 mm gun with as a result the driver killed, the cupola sheared off decapitating the commander and the rest of the crew abandoning the vehicle, the French may justifiably count this as a "kill", but the German statistics would not put it down as a "loss" as the salvaged vehicle would be repaired by the field workshop. To estimate the number of disabled tanks for 4PD on 15 May, we have to consider the fact that of about 230 extant vehicles (down from an original 304) only 137 were combat-ready. The percentage of non-ready tanks was double that of 3PD, suggesting that apart from the 42 becoming (at least for the time being) useless wrecks, an equal number was disabled but reparable in the field, bringing the total (temporary or otherwise) tank loss of that day at about ninety.--MWAK (talk) 12:56, 14 January 2008 (UTC)

I realise this, I did add the figures and note pointing this out! My point was that 160 were not "lost" as the original text seemed to say. This of course suggests to the reader 160 German tanks were totally destroyed (the same with the 15 May action), which tends to overly credit the French. I just felt clarification was needed here. I also believe French losses here were overly exaggerated. Of the 121 tanks lost, some were simply abandoned and destroyed by air-attack. Therefore a breakdown of losses is required here too Dapi89 (talk) 14:52, 14 January 2008 (UTC).

I agree. Perhaps also somewhat more emphasis should be laid on the direct fluctuations in fighting power. I'll try to compromise all the different aspects.--MWAK (talk) 13:27, 15 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] "First historical use of blitzkrieg"

Inaccurate. The first historical reference to blitzkrieg principles put in practice was the high mobility-minded Mongol invasion of Khwarezmia. Robert Greene's work, The 33 Strategies of War, references it in detail when speaking on the speed-and-suddenness blitzkrieg strategy itself, and therein comparing it to the events of 10 May - 5 June 1940. --Chr.K. (talk) 06:38, 22 December 2007 (UTC)

We can go back even much further in history to find principles of Blitzkrieg. But there is a major school of thought that claims this campaign was the first instance of the real thing. The section of course needs major rewrite.--MWAK (talk) 08:31, 22 December 2007 (UTC)

Well Historian Basil Liddell Hart concluded "Poland was a full demonstration of the Blitzkrieg theory", and Liddell Hart was an advocate of the fast moving limited war in the 1920s. I have added that text and citation to the Polish Campaign articleDapi89 (talk) 13:27, 23 December 2007 (UTC).

[edit] Armistice- June 22 or June 25?

I can't seem to find when exactly the armsitice was signed, it seems without question that the cease fire started on June 25 but I keep finding both June 22 and 25 as the date on which the actual armistice was signed, the article on the armistice lists both dates (!) and I've looked through several books only to find one book contradicting the other. The National Arcives web site indicated that the picture of Hitler in Paris was taken on June 23 [[9]], leading me to think that the armistice was already signed when the picture was taken LCpl (talk) 21:45, 9 January 2008 (UTC)

The armistice with Germany was signed on 22 June, 18:50 local time. Artikel 23 stipulated it would go into effect six hours after the signing of an armistice with Italy, which took place on 24 June at Rome, 18:35 French time. On 0:35, 25 June, it thus became effective.--MWAK (talk) 22:08, 9 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Sedan Bombardment and Time frame

The Luftwaffe flew more sorties over the Kerch area in the same time frame. The eight hour claim is a rough estimate. The Kerch action was heavier, in bombload and sorties: in about the same time. The current claim in the article that it was the heaviest bombardment of the Luftwaffe during the entire war is not correct. Dapi89 (talk) 18:21, 11 April 2008 (UTC)

Yes, I underestimated the concentrated effort the Luftwaffe could still make in 1942...:o). However, "intense" (as opposed to "heavy") also has a spatial dimension: wasn't the target area at Kerch considerably larger?--MWAK (talk) 06:44, 12 April 2008 (UTC)

It doesn't look like it. The literature I have states this was made over the Arma Eli fort and surrounding area only! Dapi89 (talk) 11:38, 12 April 2008 (UTC)

I have added it back in. The Luftwaffe made considerably more sorties over similar sized areas at Stalingrad, Sevastopol, and Kerch. But it is not clear how many were combat missions. Dapi89 (talk) 20:49, 14 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Dyle and Escaut

The article says that Gamelin wanted to adopt the Dyle Plan from the start, but proposed the Escaut Plan as a "first step". What is the source of this? It would probably be a good idea to give an in-line reference, as some sources seem to contradict this version of events, for example, the article Dyle Plan says "Gamelin was initially against this plan because it seemed more risky than the "E (Escaut) Plan"". --Martynas Patasius (talk) 16:38, 30 May 2008 (UTC)

The Dyle Plan statement is an incorrect interpretation of what Jackson says on page 28 of his The Fall of France: "Because it involved moving less far from the French frontier, the former was less risky than the latter". Jackson never claims that this — in itself obviously correct assertion — was the personal motive of Gamelin. It is very clear that Gamelin from the very beginning preferred a French advance as far east as possible — ideally to Liège — and that the initially proposed Escaut Plan was seen as the minimal reaction to a German invasion of Belgium: a set of limited countermeasures both allies could be expected to agree on, that could be executed without much preparation and thus might serve as a basis for further planning. This plan in fact included the provision that, if the situation allowed, the Dyle Line should be reached. However, the issue is complicated by the fact that French intelligence in October predicted that Belgian defences would collapse immediately and as a result Gamelin temporarily estimated that an advance limited to the Scheldt was, regrettably, the only feasible option. However, in November he readjusted his opinion of the Belgian preparedness. Obviously he always remained aware that the Dyle Plan carried a certain risk. As indeed many sources simplify the matter in a misleading way ;o), I'll enhance the level of detail (with proper citation) and change Dyle Plan.--MWAK (talk) 06:44, 31 May 2008 (UTC)