Battle of Geronium

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The Battle of Geronuim or Gerunium is part of the Second Punic War, where a large skirmish and an ambush took place in the summer and autumn of 217 BC respectively. The army of Hannibal, after winning the Battle of Ager Falernus, had marched north then east towards Apulia through Samnium. Hannibal was cautiously followed by the Roman army under the dictator Quintus Fabius Maximus, keeping with the "Fabian strategy". This policy was becoming unpopular in Rome, and Fabius was compelled to return to Rome to defend his actions under the guise of observing some religious obligations. Marcus Minucius Rufus, left in command, managed to catch the Carthaginians off guard near their camp in Geronium and inflict severe losses on them in a large skirmish. This “victory” caused the Romans, disgruntled with Fabius, to elevate Minucius to the equal rank of the dictator. Minucius took command of half the army and camped separately from Fabius near Geronium. Hannibal, informed of this development, laid an elaborate trap, which drew out Minucius and his army in detail, and then attacked it from all sides. The timely arrival of Fabius with the other half of the army enabled Minucius to escape after a severe mauling. After the battle, Minucius turned over his army to Fabius and resumed the duties of Master of Horse.

[edit] Strategic situation

After escaping from the trap of ‘’’Ager Falernus’’ by winning the Battle of Ager Falernus, Hannibal, with his army and spoils, marched east toward Apulia. Fabius, still committed to the delaying strategy, followed Hannibal cautiously, keeping to the high ground.

The Carthaginian navy had been raiding the coast of Italy. The Roman navy had also started what would become annual raids of the African coastline. In Iberia, Hasdrubal Barca had not mounted any expeditions against the Romans after his defeat in the naval Battle of Ebro River in the spring of 217 BC. Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus had been joined by his brother, Publius Cornelius Scipio with 8,000 reinforcements, raising the Roman army to 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. Both the brothers enjoyed proconsular rank, and through the treachery of a Iberian chieftain called Abilyx, had managed to gain control of Iberian hostages held by the Carthaginians.

[edit] Prelude

[edit] Carthaginian march through central Italy

After leaving ‘’’Ager Falernus’’’ through the pass of Callifae, Hannibal retracted his steps, moving east towards Apulia. The Carthaginian army, encumbered with plunder and herds of cattle, moved slowly, seeking a place to setup their winter quarters. Fabius and the Romans dogged the Carthaginians from a distance. Hannibal marched north to Venefram, rising concern in Rome that the city was his objective, then suddenly turned east into Samnium, then he crossed the Apenine Mountains, via the Pelignial plains into Apulia. Fabius followed, and when Hannibal made for the town of Geronium, Fabius set his camp at Larinum, 20 miles to the south^[1]. The Carthaginians had cut a swath of destruction in their march, ravishing farms and property, collecting provisions and prisoners as they moved.

[edit] Carthaginian camp in Apulia

Hannibal either took Geronium by assault after his terms had been refused^[2], or simply took possession of the town because the inhabitants had fled after burning the buildings, because part of the town wall had collapsed^[3]. The Carthaginians turned the town into a large granary to store their grain and house their herds, set up a camp outside the town to billet the army, and surrounded the town and the camp with a trench and palisade^[4]. Foragers then fanned out throughout the plain to harvest the corn while Carthaginians pastured their cattle and horses on the mountainside. 2/3 of the army was employed in these operations while the rest guarded the camp^[5].

[edit] Minucius in command

Fabius, leaving Minucius in charge with instructions to follow the ‘Fabian Strategy’, had journeyed to Rome to observe some religious duties, and possibly for some political bickering also, because of his unpopularity^[6]. Minucius, after a few days, moved down from the hills, and set up a new camp in the plain of Larinum to the north of Geronium, from where the Romans began harassing the Carthaginian foragers. Hannibal in response moved near the Roman camp from Geronium with 2/3 of his army, built a temporary camp^[7], and occupied a hill overlooking the Roman camp with 2,000 spearmen.^[8] The mobility of the Carthaginians were restricted as their cavalry horses were being rested.^[9] Minucius attacked and drove back the spearmen on the hill, and then moved his camp on top of the captured hill.

[edit] Skirmish

The Carthaginians, responding to the Roman move, reduced the number of their foragers for a few days, but eventually were forced to send out parties in increasing numbers for foraging. The Romans, seizing their chance, sent out light foot and horsemen to cut off and kill a large number of Carthaginian foragers, then moved in strength towards the Carthaginian camp itself. Hannibal, with his foragers under attack and his camp in danger of being dismantled, led out a sortie against the Romans.^[10] With only ⅓ of the army present^[11], and most of their cavalry absent, the outnumbered Carthaginians fought a small-scale battle not of his own choosing. Only the arrival of Hasdrubal (The Quartermaster General) with 4,000 foragers somewhat redressed the Roman advantage, and Minucius chose to withdraw to his camp.^[10] Minucius had inflicted a large number of casualties on the Carthaginians, and Hannibal now abandoned his temporary camp and withdrew to the original one at Geronium. This was the only time Hannibal had been drawn in large scale skirmishing and had surrendered the initiative to the enemy^[7] during the war.

[edit] Minucius rewarded by Roman Senate

The news of this skirmish was hailed in Rome as a great “Victory”, and a praetor named “Metellus” ^[12] or, according to other sources, G. Terentius Varro (the future consul for 216 BC) ^[13], proposed a bill to elevate Minucius to the equal rank of Fabius. The bill was promptly passed, giving Rome 2 dictators at once for the first time in history. Fabius, upon returning to the army, proposed that either he or Minucius command on alternate days, or split their army into 2 independent commands. Minucius,choosing to split the army, took legions number II & III, and 2 allied legions, and encamped 1 and half miles south from where Fabius had camped^[14], possibly on the site of Hannibal’s temporary camp^[15].

[edit] Hannibal's response

[edit] Carthaginian trap

Hannibal, when informed of the division of the Roman army, planned to entrap and destroy the one commanded by Minucius. The ground between the Carthaginian and Roman camps was flat, treeless and barren, with a low ridge midway between the camps. In the ground behind and beside the hill there were hollows and dead patches of land, where soldiers could hide without being noticed^[16].

Hannibal selected a picked body of 5,000 infantry and 500^[17] cavalry, and ordered them to conceal themselves in groups of 200/300 in the hollows and dead ground on the night before the battle. The skill and discipline of the Carthaginians is evident through their flawless execution of this potentially hazardous operation. At dawn, a contingent of Carthaginian light infantry took position on the hill in full view of the Romans.

[edit] Battle of Geronium

As Hannibal had anticipated, Minucius saw the Carthaginians deployed on the hill and promptly sent out his velites to drive them off. Hannibal in turn sent enough soldiers to fight the Romans to a stalemate. This caused Minucius to send out the Roman and Italian allied cavalry up the hill, which Hannibal immediately countered with his Numidian and heavy horsemen. The Roman cavalry, after skirmishing for a while, slowly began to give ground against their skilled opponents. Minucius, observing the situation, now called out his four legions and marched towards and then up the hill. Hannibal had also deployed his infantry and advanced to meet the Romans. The sequence and timing of events, all planned and orchestrated by Hannibal, did not give the Roman general any time to examine the ground or scout the area.^[18] Fabius, who was watching from his camp, called his army to arms but did not move out to help his fellow general.

Just as Minucius reached the hill and was moving up, the Roman cavalry broke and began to scatter. The Roman light troops, already hard pressed, were also driven back on the marching legions. At the moment of confusion, before the Romans could regain cohesion, the Carthaginians concealed in the hollows emerged and fell on the exposed flanks and rear of the Roman formation^[19]. Hannibal and his infantry struck the unbalanced Romans from the front before the shock of the ambush faded. Attacked from all sides, some of the Romans broke ranks and fled, while the others were surrounded and were fighting for their lives.

Fabius, “The Delayer”, delayed no longer. He marched out with his 4 legions and approached the battle. The fleeing Romans of Minucius’ army began to form up beside his legions, the Carthaginians between the army of Fabius and Minucius gave way, enabling Minucius and his soldiers to fall back and regroup beside the fresh troops. Both armies regrouped, but then Hannibal broke off the battle and retired to his camp, possibly because he did not wish to fight a battle of attrition against a still superior army.^[17] The Carthaginians had inflicted severe casualties on the Romans, and only the prompt action of Fabius had saved the Romans from another disaster.

[edit] Aftermath

Minucius, after the battle, turned over supreme command to Fabius, resuming his duties as the Master of Horse, and billeting his remaining troops with those of Fabius. Both Romans and Carthaginians then went to winter quarters, and no large actions were fought during the winter. After the term of Fabius as dictator expired, the army was turned over the incoming consuls. Hannibal had again demonstrated his skill in reading the character of his opponent and devising a tactical plan to take full advantage of the situation.

[edit] Trivia

• Hannibal is said to have remarked “That cloud on the mountains has broken in storm at last!” ^[20]when he saw Fabius approaching with his army. Fabius had been unmoved despite all the provocations of Hannibal had cooked up to entice him into battle during his tenure as dictator.
• Minucius, after his rescue, had hailed Fabius as his father, and had instructed his troops to treat the troops of Fabius as their patrons.^[21] Fabius, for his part, did not humiliate Minucius for the debacle.
• Hannibal had tried all kinds of provocations to get Fabius to fight, he had even spared the property of Fabius while devastating all else, to cast doubts about him. Fabius, when he found out during a prisoner exchange that Hannibal held 247 people more than the Romans did, and the Senate had declined to fund their ransom, had sold part of the property to ransom the prisoners^[20], and then had refused to accept any money from the freed prisoners.
• The Fabian Policy of following Hannibal around but refusing battle had become so unpopular that the Romans named Fabius Hannibal’s “paedagogus,” after a certain class of slave who followed a Roman child to school carrying his books.^[21]

[edit] References

[edit] Bibliography

• Bagnall, Nigel (1990). The Punic Wars. ISBN 0-312-34214-4. 
• Cottrell, Leonard (1992). Hannibal: Enemy of Rome. Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-306-80498-0. 
• Lazenby, John Francis (1978). Hannibal's War. Aris & Phillips. ISBN 0-85668-080-X. 
• Goldsworthy, Adrian (2003). The Fall of Carthage. Cassel Military Paperbacks. ISBN 0-304-36642-0. 
• Peddie, John (2005). Hannibal's War. Sutton Publishing Limited. ISBN 0-7509-3797-1. 
• Lancel, Serge (1999). Hannibal. Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 0-631-21848-3. 
• Baker, G. P. (1999). Hannibal. Cooper Square Press. ISBN 0-8154-1005-0. 

[edit] Further Reading

• Dodge, Theodore A. (1891). Hannibal. Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-306-81362-9. 
• Warry, John (1993). Warfare in the Classical World. Salamander Books Ltd. ISBN 1-56619-463-6. 
• Livius, Titus (1972). The War With Hannibal. Penguin Books. ISBN 0-140-44145-X. 
• Delbruck, Hans (1990). Warfare in Antiquity, Volume 1. University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0-8032-9199-X. 
• Lancel, Serge (1997). Carthage A History. Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 1-57718-103-4.