Battle of Chorrillos
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| Battle of Chorrillos | |||||||
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| Part of War of the Pacific | |||||||
Troop movements at Chorrillos |
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| Belligerents | |||||||
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Republic of Chile |
Republic of Peru |
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| Commanders | |||||||
| General Manuel Baquedano | General Pedro Silva | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 4 infantry divisions 23.129 men[2] |
10 infantry divisions 19.000 men[3] |
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| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 3.107 between dead and wounded[4] | 8.000 cassualties[3]: 1.500 dead 2.500 wounded 4.000 prisioners |
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The Battle of Chorrillos, also known as the Battle of San Juan and Chorrillos, was the first of the two battles of the Lima Campaign during the War of the Pacific, and was fought on January 13, 1881. This battle is really a group of a smaller, yet fierce confrontations at the defensive strongholds of Villa, Chorrillos, San Juan, Santa Teresa, Marcavilca hill and Morro Solar. The Chilean army led by Gen. Manuel Baquedano inflicted a severe defeat to the Peruvian army commanded by Gen. Pedro Silva. The Chilean triumph eliminated the first defensive line guarding Lima, and almost obliterated the Peruvian army defending it.
After this battle, and because of the resistance made by Peruvian soldiers garrisoned in the town of Chorrillos, joined to the fact of several Chilean troops got drunk, the town was burned to the ground and abuses were committed to civilians.
Despite of this huge success, another battle had to be fought in order to the Chilean army could enter into the Peruvian capital city at Miraflores, two days later.
Contents |
[edit] Prologue
After the chilean victories at the battles of Tacna and Arica, the southern department of Perú was on Chilean hands. The Chilean government had no desire to continue the war. After all, the zone in dispute which started the conflict was under Chilean domain. The public opinion in Chile was divided. One side desired to end the war at Lima, and the other one wanted to end the conflict right then. This debate reached the Chilean Congress. Even José Miguel Balmaceda said: The peace is at Lima, and nowhere else[2]. This political and social climate forced both the Chilean government and high command to plan a campaign where the objective was to obtain an unconditional capitulation. Due to this, the peace talks at the Conference of Arica were futile. Meanwhile, Nicolás de Piérola, at that time the dictator of Perú, used this conversations to gather a massive army at Lima and its surroundings. It was obvious that the Chilean attack would came from the south, thus were set a long line of defense at Chorrillos and Miraflores, being advised by the engineers Gorbitz and Arancibia. The line of Chorrillos had 15 km. long from Marcavilla hill to La Achira, through the acclivities of San Juan and Santa Teresa.
[edit] Preliminary Situation
[edit] The Chilean Situation
During the second half of December, the Chilean Navy started to carry different divisions from Pisco and Paracas to Curayaco. Only the Patricio Lynch's Brigade took a land route. By December 21, the invasion convoy is at Chilca.
| “ | Since then there was no doubt than the Chileans intended to attack Lima from the south, which was confirmed after the landing at Pisco, passing through Cañete, commiting all kinds of abuse... | ” |
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—Andrés Cáceres. [5] |
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90 Cazadores a Caballo, led by Lt. Col. Ambrosio Letelier scout the terrain until they reach Lurín, finding no presence of Peruvian troops. Another 25 Cazadores, linked at Bujama with Lynch's forces which were marching from the south.
A massive troop disembarkment at Curayaco took place on December 22. The following day, Colonel Gana's 1st Brigade marches on Lurín valley, where some cavalry troops sustain a little fight with Peruvian soldiers, but by 07:00, the Chilean forces reached their objective, and by 11:00 entered in the town of San Pedro de Lurín.
On December 24, a small vanguard force formed by four infantry companies and 200 Cazadores marched to Manchay, from where goes to Pachacamac, in order to protect the bridge over there. Here, this force engages Peruvian troops in a fierce skirmish. On the 25, the 1st Brigade of Sotomayor's 2nd Division is sent to Pachacamac.
With the arrival of the 1st Brigade of the I Division, the entire Chilean army gathered about 23.935 soldiers, organized into four divisions by the War Minister José Fco. Vergara as it follows[6]:
The 1st Division, led by Patricio Lynch: It's 1st Brigade, led by Col. Juan Martínez, was formed by the 2nd Line, Atacama, Talca and Colchagua infantry regiments. The 2nd Brigade, commanded by Col. José D. Amunátegui had the 4th Line, Chacabuco and Artillería de Marina infantry regiments.
The 2nd Division of Col. Emilio Sotomayor: The 1st Brigade of Col. José Francisco Gana conformed by the "Buin" 1st Line, Esmeralda and Chillán Inf. regiments. The 2nd Brigade of Col. Orozimbo Barboza had the Lautaro and Curicó Inf. regiments, plus the Victoria Infantry Battalion.
The Col. Pedro Lagos' 3rd Division: It's 1st Brigade, led by Col Martiniano Urriola was configured by the Aconcagua Inf. Regt. and the Naval Inf. Bn. Franciaco Barceló's 2nd Brigade, formed by Santiago and Concepción infantry regiments, and the Valdivia, Caupolicán and Bulnes Inf. battalions.
The Reserve of Col. Arístides Martínez had the 3rd Line, Zapadores and Valparaíso infantry regiments.
Two companies of the Curicó Infantry Regiment with 300 artillery men were left here taking care of the wounded generated by the terrestrial march of part of the Chilean troops[6]. So, 23.129 men marched to Chorrillos on the afternoon of the 12. The Chilean forces reached it's destination by the night of the same day.
[edit] The Peruvian situation
Meanwhile the Chilean army landed on Curayaco and moved to Lurín, the Peruvian government movilized all men between 18 and 50 years, leaving the older than 50 years in a stationary reserve, whilst the younger formed the Line Army[3]. Hence, it was organized two Southern Armies at Tacna and Arequipa, one Centre Army and one Northern Army. Nicolás de Piérola ordered the farmers of the Lima Department to form a mobile column and beset the Chilean forces landed in any way they could, and serve as scouts.
When this contingents arrived at Lima, massed up around 25.000 men. 19.000 were sent to the first defensive line set at Chorrillos an the rest were put as a reserve at the second line of Miraflores.
The Peruvian forces defending the line at Chorrillos were under the command of Gen. Pedro Silva. The line stretched from the town of Chorrillos by the sea to Pamplona hill, extending itself in about 15 km long. This army deployed as listed below:
The I Army Corps (Miguel Iglesias), divided into three divisions: I North Division of Mariano Noriega, with the Nº 1 "Guardia Peruana", Nº 3 "Cajamarca" and Nº 5 Ayacucho "9 de Diciembre" battalions. The II North Division of Regino Cano had the Nº 7 "Tarma", Nº 9 "Callao" Inf. Bn. and Nº 11 "Libres de Trujillo" battalions. Lastly, the III North Division of Pablo Arguedas had the Nº 13 "Junín", Nº 15 "Ica" and the Nº 21 "Libres de Cajamarca" Bn.[7]
The II Army Corps of Belisario Suárez was divided into two divisions, the IV and V North Divisions of Buenaventura Aguirre and Cano.
The III Army Corps of Justo Pastor Dávila had two divisions, the ones of Cesar Canevaro and Merino. The Cáceres' IV Army Corps had three divisions. Ayarza's division had the Nº 61 "Lima", Nº 63 "Canta" and Nº 65 "28 de Julio" inf. battalions. The division of Pereira was formed by the Nº 73 "Pichincha", Nº 75 "Pisco" and Nº 77 "Lamar" battalions. Lorenzo Iglesias' division had the Nº 79 "Arica", Nº 81 "Manco Cápac" and Nº 83 "Ayacucho" battalions.
The Iglesias' I Corps guarded the right flank of the Peruvian line, followed by Cáceres' IV Corps. Right next to it was the Dávila's III Corps. The II Corps was placed in the rear as a reserve[3] The artillery deployed in the following positions: 4 Grieve-system cannons at Marcavilca hill and La Achira. 4 Vavasseur cannons at Chorrillos. At Villa, another battery of 4 Grieve cannons. On the Santa Teresa positions were 15 White, 4 Grieve, 4 Walgely steel pieces, 1 Armstrong and 1 Vavasseur. By the left, 12 Grieve, 4 White and two small Selay-system cannons. On the right of San Juan position were 8 Whites and 2 Grieve, then were sitted 12 Grieve. At Pamplona were 4 Grieve and 4 Vavasseur.
[edit] The attacking plan and defensive layout
The Chilean high command had two approaches about how to handle this battle. The first one, proposed by Col José Fco. Gana and supported by the War Minister in Campaign José Fco. Vergara was a flanking maneuver on the very left side of the Peruvian defense. The plan of General Baquedano was similar to the one used in Tacna. It consisted in pressing the attack simultaneously along the entire line of defense, avoiding the chance of one point of the line reinforcing the other and exploiting the fact than the defensive line was extense but thin. Baquedano's plan prevaled. Nevertheless, a previous skirmish at Ate confirmed that the plan of Vergara was possible.
The Peruvian strategy relied on their weapons superior range and the difficulties in climbing to engage the troops at the top of the hills. Their positions were strengthened by a system of trenches for shooters on the hill slopes and hidden devices such as land mines and booby traps[3].
[edit] The Battle
[edit] The Beginning. Operations on the Peruvian right flank
[edit] Marcavilca and Santa Teresa
At 04:00 on January 13th, the battle began when the sunrise showed the advancing Chilean forces. Lynch's Division engaged the troops of the right flank defensive line. The division was deployed from left to right as it follows: On the left, the Chacabuco and 4º Line regiments, followed by the Artillería de Marina Inf. Regt. Right next to this units were the Atacama and Talca regiments. On the right, were the 2nd Line and Colchagua regiments[6].
The Callao Bn. on the Villa sector was pushed back to Col. Iglesias' I Corps, which was forced to retreat to new positions at Marcavilca. Caceres' IV Army Corps attacked the I Division and because of that, Gen. Baquedano ordered the Chilean reserve, led by Colonel Arístides Martínez to reinforce Lynch's troops. This maneuver isolated the I Corps from the rest of the Peruvian army, breaking the defensive line as Iglesias' troops retreated from Marcavilca and regrouped at Morro Solar[2].
[edit] Maneuvers at the line center
[edit] San Juan
Whilst the I Division was fighting at Marcavilca, Sotomayor's II Division moved to the front and pressed the attack over the III Center Division. Peruvian Ayacucho and Libertad battalions were pinned down on their positions. When Gen. Silva saw these events, sent the Huanuco Bn. as a reinforcement, but it was outmanoeuvered, rejected and disbanded. Therefore, the Paucarpata Bn. was sent to aid the Huanuco, but at Granadal was drove back by the Chilean infantry and withdrew as well. The Canta Bn. was sent on an attempt to intensify the defense at these positions, but on their hesitating march watched how the Libertad Bn. collapsed and retreated, so this unit did the same.
Colonel José Francisco Gana's 1st Brigade marched onto and hammered the hills Papa and Viva el Perú. The "Buin" 1st Line Regiment took this positions with a bayonet charge[8], as the Esmeralda Regiment captured the banner of the Nº 81 "Manco Cápac" Bn. After this success, Gana's forces turned left and charged the IV Army Corps, which refolded, splitting the Peruvian line. Cannevaro's troops, which were holding up the attack, had no choice but to retreat. Hence, the defensive line was now fractured in two points and the battle was decided.
[edit] The Conclusion
[edit] Morro Solar
As the Peruvian line broke now at it's center and began to collapse, the troops of the Chilean left wing were sent to reinforce Lynch's forces which were sustaining heavy losses. On a controversial decision, Gen. Baquedano orders the exhausted I Division to make a frontal charge in order to eliminate the Peruvian position. The 4th Line Regiment took several losses on its attempt at Morro Solar[9]. Lynch sent the Atacama Regiment to aid Amunátegui's regiment. When the 2nd Brigade of Lagos' Division arrives, obliterates the Zepita, Jauja and Ancash battalions which had been dispatched to reinforce the troops at Morro Solar. The Caupolicán Battalion, plus the Santiago and Concepción regiments attacked from the south and six companies of the Aconcagua Regiment did the same from the north. When the Bulnes, Valdivia and Naval battalions reached this sector completing the encirclement, Iglesias surrenders ending the battle.
[edit] Chorrillos
During the night of the 13, several troops of the Barbosa's Brigade entered the town of Chorrillos, where Peruvian troops had garrisoned and presented resistance. Because of the fighting, the town burned and many Chilean soldiers committed abuses against the Peruvian civilians and themselves. Almost 200 soldiers died as a result of the fighting against their own companions. Heavily armed scout patrols were sent the next morning to bring back the scattered soldiers.
[edit] Aftermath
Both sides had exorbitant losses. The Chilean army had 3.107 troops dead or wounded, equivalent to 13% of its personnel. In this severe defeat the Peruvian army lost the Guardia Peruana, Cajamarca, Ayacucho "9 de Diciembre", Tarma, Callao, Libres de Trujillo, Junín, Ica and Libres de Cajamarca battalions at Morro Solar, the Zepita at Chorrillos and the Huanuco, Libertad and Ayacucho at San Juan. Besides, the Paucarpata, Jauja, Ancash, Concepción, Piura, 23 de Diciembre y Unión battalions had abundant losses[6]. All this adds up about 8.000 men[3], 87 cannons, 19 machine guns and 4 battalion banners.
[edit] Notes
- ^ Chisholm, Hugh (1911). The Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th ed., p. 276. OCLC 266598.
- ^ a b c Mellafe, Rafael; Pelayo, Mauricio (2004). La Guerra del Pacífico en imágenes, relatos, testimonios. Santiago, Chile: Centro de Estudios Bicentenario.
- ^ a b c d e f Basadre, Jorge (2000). La Verdadera Epopeya. Retrieved on 2008.
- ^ Army of Chile. Las Relaciones Nominales.
- ^ Andrés Cáceres. La Guerra del Pacífico, sus campañas. Lima, 1972.
- ^ a b c d Ojeda, Jorge (2000). La Guerra del Pacífico. Retrieved on 2008.
- ^ Supported by the coastal bateries led by Col. Arnaldo Panizo.
- ^ León García's official report, Commander of the Buin 1st Line Infantry Regiment
- ^ José Domingo Amunátegui (1885). "Arica" 4º de Línea.

