Artyom Shneyerov
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
| Artyom Shneyerov | |
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| Born | October 20, 1968 St. Petersburg, Russia |
|---|---|
| Residence |  Canada |
| Nationality | Canadian |
| Fields | Economist |
| Institutions | Concordia University (2007 - ) University of British Columbia (2002 - 2007) |
| Alma mater | Northwestern University(Ph.D.)
Vanderbilt University(M.A.) Saint Petersburg Polytechnical University(B.S.) |
| Known for | Game theory, Industrial organization, Econometrics |
Artyom Shneyerov is a microeconomist working at Concordia University in Montreal,Canada. His current research is in the fields of Game theory, Industrial organization and applied Econometrics. His list of contributions to these and other areas of economics includes the following:
- In his paper "An empirical study of auction revenue rankings: the case of municipal bonds"[1], he introduced an approach for the estimation of counterfactual revenues in a common value auction without the need to identify model primitives. He has shown that for any given reserve price, equilibrium bids from first-price auctions can be used to identify the expected revenues in Vickrey auction with the same reserve price. In addition, he has derived an explicit bound on expected revenue for English auctions. His approach is based on the revenue ranking theorem of Milgrom and Weber.[2] He has applied these results to municipal bond auctions in California. This paper is discussed in a handbook of industrial organization.[3] His approach has been further developed recently by Xun Tang (University of Pennsylvania)[4].
- Jointly with Mark Satterthwaite,[5] obtained a number of results about convergence to perfect competition of dynamic matching and bargaining games.[6] These games are often used to provide a foundation for the perfect competition hypothesis, one of the basic concepts in economics. They are also used frequently in search models of labor economics.[7] Most dynamic matching and bargaining models in the previous literature assumed full information.[8][9] This means that in a given meeting, the buyer knows the minimum the seller is willing to accept for the item, and the seller knows the maximum the buyer is willing to pay. This assumption is often violated in reality. Satterthwaite and Shneyerov have shown that the dynamic matching and bargaining market is nevertheless approximately competitive as the time between matches becomes progressively small. Stephan Lauermann at the University of Michigan is currently working to extend their approach to more general environments.[10]
- Has also done early work on the measurement of income inequality.[11][12] In "Path Independent Inequality Measures", he and James Foster introduced inequality measures that are decomposable into within and between group components. These measures have been recently applied more broadly than income inequality, e.g. to selection into and across lending contracts in Thailand.[13]
[edit] Working papers
The following papers contain recent unpublished research by Artyom Shneyerov:
- "Convergence to Perfect Competition of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete information and Exogenous Exit Rate", with Mark Satterthwaite (Northwestern University)
- "Quantile-Based Nonparametric Inference for First-Price Auctions", with Vadim Marmer (University of British Columbia)
- "Bilateral Matching and Bargaining with Private Information", with Adam Chi Leung Wong (University of British Columbia)
- "The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of a Simple Bilateral Matching and Bargaining Mechanism", with Adam Chi Leung Wong (University of British Columbia)
- "What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach", with Vadim Marmer (University of British Columbia) and Pai Xu (University of British Columbia)
[edit] References
- ^ Shneyerov, Artyom (0335-12). "An empirical study of auction revenue rankings: the case of municipal bonds". The RAND Journal of Economics 37 (4): 1005-1022.
- ^ Milgrom, Paul R.; Robert J. Weber (1982-09). "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding". Econometrica 50 (5): 1089-1122. ISSN 00129682.
- ^ Hendricks, Ken; Robert H. Porter (2007). "An Empirical Perspective on Auctions", Handbook of Industrial Organization 3. Elsevier, 2073-2143. Retrieved on 2008-04-14.
- ^ Bounds on the Counterfactual Distribution of Revenues in Auctions with Reserve Prices, Northwestern University, Working Paper
- ^ The author of Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem
- ^ Satterthwaite, Mark; Artyom Shneyerov (2007-01-01). "Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition". Econometrica 75 (1): 155-200.]]
- ^ Richard Rogerson; Robert Shimer, Randall Wright (2005). "Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey". Journal of Economic Literature 43 (4): 959-988.
- ^ Rubinstein, Ariel; Asher Wolinsky (1990). "Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome". Review of Economic Studies 57 (1): 63-78.
- ^ Gale, Douglas (1987). "Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining". Journal of Economic Theory 43 (1): 20-54.
- ^ Stephan Lauermann (2008-01). "Price Setting in a Decentralized Market and the Competitive Outcomes"., Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. Retrieved on 2008-04-14.
- ^ Foster, James E.; Artyom A. Shneyerov (2000-04). "Path Independent Inequality Measures". Journal of Economic Theory 91 (2): 199-222. doi:.
- ^ Foster, James E.; Artyom A. Shneyerov (1999-07-18). "A general class of additively decomposable inequality measures". Economic Theory 14 (1): 89-111. doi:.
- ^ Ahlin, Christian; Robert M. Townsend (2007-02). "Selection into and across credit contracts: Theory and field research". Journal of Econometrics 136 (2): 665-698. doi:.
