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I've added the basics for this author, who is cited in many reference sections of Wikipedia pages. I've linked a few - can someone use a 'software robot' to add the rest? --GwydionM 21:33, 2 January 2007 (UTC)
[edit] To Fowler&fowler
Would you two please explain what was the reason for your last change? It seemed perfectly good to me.--GwydionM (talk) 17:19, 17 February 2008 (UTC)
- Maddison's work is highly controversial and his book The World Economy: Historical Statistics has been criticized in many circles. Here are excerpts (in compressed format) from reviews by various scholars, beginning with one by Brian Haig (Australian National University); the last sentence of which is a withering assessment of Maddison's Australian statistics:
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... "Maddison's estimates seem to be full of such indirect estimates, or simple assumptions. He seems to have a passion for believing figures once they are written down, no matter how they were estimated, and often prefers his own estimates or those of others without much explanation or justification. However, national income estimates are 'fragile'. Difficulties discussed by estimators include: the impossibility of identifying and measuring realistically the output of service industries; the lack of a framework for estimates before the 20th century as provided, for example, by population estimates needed to ensure consistency; and limitations of price series due to inadequate price data and index number problems (Wilson, 1946); (Deane and Cole, 1962; p. 4).
On Australian estimates, Maddison is apparently dissatisfied with Butlin's estimates (Butlin, 1962), as well as my own, and has constructed a new series by joining the two estimates at 1910 for some unknown reason. Perhaps the intention is to have a bet each way. He makes no attempt to reconcile the estimates (which are not congruent), so his series can best be described as a hotch potch of inconstant estimates ...
Maddison does not explain why he prefers my series to Butlin's before 1910, and Butlin's after 1910, apart from a reference to problems of estimation that are common to both series ... Maddison ignores, or is unaware of, the extensive criticism of Butlin's figures, by national accountants and economic historians, published in various Australian and overseas journals. Reference to other estimates described in Studenski (1958) shows Butlin's estimates to be probably the most criticized series in the history of national accounting, and probably the most unreliable.
Maddison is also careless with references. He states, for example, that 'Butlin did not take his price indexes from the shelf', whereas Butlin (1962; p. 454) stated that he had used 'available price series'. He believes the industrial prices given by Sheregold in his chapter on 'Prices and Consumption' in Vamplew (1987) complement Butlin's price series, but they are, in fact, identical. He considers McLean to have added to available prices for deflating value added, but McLean's paper deals only with retail prices, considered by Butlin as irrelevant for the purpose. On my estimates, he states that I rejected Butlin's estimates en bloc and made two specific criticisms. In fact I did not criticize Butlin's overall results, but simply commented that 'My estimates are put forward as an alternative series', 'they also have limitations, and for this reason they are checked against the historical record'. Nor did I make the criticisms Maddison contends I made ...
Finally, a reference should be made to the work of Sir Timothy Coghlan, the real pioneer of historical estimates, who compiled historical series of real income for New South Wales from the early 1820s to 1900. Coghlan considered the only true measure of real income was real wages, and he rejected the use of real product, because the series did not reflect the effect of overseas events on domestic income, including capital inflow and changes in the terms of trade. Roland Wilson in the 1940s (in the earlier cited reference) also rejected the use of real GDP in preference to series of real wages. Stiglitz has recently pointed out that real wages, another and possibly better measure of material welfare, declined over the post 10 years in the USA, and this despite an increase in real GDP per capita of some 1.9 per cent a year from 1991-2002. Maddison's results (based on Butlin's figures) are completely different to Coghlan's series, and by the standards of Australian official statisticians, they are inaccurate and irrelevant as a measure of Australian real income in the 19th century."
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This article needs balance more than anything else. A Wikipedia article or list should not be based on one idiosyncratic work. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:00, 12 August 2007 (UTC)
Here are excerpts of the review of Maddison's earlier book: Caldwell, John C. (Sept. 2002). "Reviewed Work(s): The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective by Angus Maddison", Population and Development Review, Vol. 28, No. 3., pp. 559-561.
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Having just coauthored an examination of the empirical basis for historical population estimates (Caldwell and Schindlmayr 2002), I wondered about the quality of the economic estimates. Our article concluded that the near consensus on population figures since 1650 rested essentially on the work of Walter Willcox, first published in 193 1 and drawing heavily for the earlier years of that period on contemporary estimates of uncertain origin mostly gathered together by Johann Siissmilch in the eighteenth century. There is now an even more shakily based agreement on population estimates over the last 2,000 years. Of those participating in this effort, Maddison has curiously elected to follow closely the work of McEvedy and Jones (1978), a highly derivative compilation, perhaps solely because they present their work in the context of modern national borders and dates suited to his approach.
Maddison seems more concerned with providing estimates in "a common currency" than with the derivation of the basic economic measures. Parity purchasing power is provided by conversion into 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars (i.e., US dollars in that year). In contrast, the explanation of the derivation of his basic economic measure (GDP per capita) for the thousand years up to AD 1000 is given in a page (pp. 259-260). The explanation refers readers to his earlier work on China (Maddison 1998), which concluded that there was little evidence of change in its level of prosperity over the first millennium and that the rest of Asia and the Roman Empire were probably not dissimilar. Economic growth estimates for the period 1500-1820 derive for much of the world from a wide range of sources on agricultural change, levels of urbanization, and prosperity. For Europe, recent modifications by Kuznets (1973) are employed. For both periods the conclusions often rest on assumptions about rates of growth of per capita income; this introduces a dangerous circularity because the purported significant findings are then often those of economic growth.
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Fowler&fowler«Talk» 17:47, 12 August 2007 (UTC)
And excerpts from a review by W. W. Rostow of a still earlier work by Maddison: "Reviewed Work(s): Phases of Capitalist Development. by Angus Maddison," The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 45, No. 4. (Dec., 1985), pp. 1026-1028.
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Maddison is a committed, even belligerent advocate of macroeconomic analysis and deplores the kind of sectoral disaggregation insisted on, for example, by Schumpeter and by me. This affects both his view of economic history and his analysis of the two phases into which he divides the period since 1950. With respect to the latter, for example, it leads him grossly to underestimate the role of falling basic commodity prices from 1951 to the mid-1960s and the consequent lift of almost 20 percent in OECD terms of trade. Because he redoubtably refuses to identify leading sectors, he misses the role of the automobile, durable consumer goods, and related industries in the extraordinary growth of Western Europe and Japan in the Golden Age, as well as the deceleration of those sectors (and rise in the marginal capital-output ratio) from the mid-1960s. For the same reason, he misses the emergence in the mid-1970s of a new round of technologies now revolutionizing manufactures and agriculture as well as services: the microcomputer, genetic engineering, the laser, new industrial materials, and so forth. In short, I would assess Maddison's analysis of his final two phases as quite incomplete.
This excessive macroeconomic bias also causes him to mis-date, in my view, the beginning of what he calls the capitalist era at 1820 rather than, say, the mid-1780s; although he refers uneasily to the 1780s (p. 29) as the interval when the British took over the productivity lead from the Dutch. (By that time the technological race was, in fact,no longer between the Dutch and the British but between the French and the British.)
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Fowler&fowler«Talk» 18:19, 12 August 2007 (UTC)
Finally, excerpts from W. J. MacPherson's review: "Reviewed Work(s): Class Structure and Economic Growth. India and Pakistan since the Moghuls by Angus Maddison." The Economic Journal, Vol. 82, No. 328. (Dec., 1972), pp. 1470-1472.
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MOST historians would be diffident at tackling India and Pakistan since the Moghuls in little more than 160 pages. Not so Maddison, already the author of several excellent "instant" comparative growth studies. He ranges in time from the days of Akbar to the recent disintegration of Pakistan; in subject from caste to the five-year plans; in area from Kashmir to Kerala. The penalty is superficiality or, in his own words, the treatment of certain topics in "a somewhat brusque and summary fashion." ... Caste, for example, is too facilely dismissed as an obstacle to growth, its precise impact on factory performance and labour mobility is not examined. Morris's criticism of the dogma on caste is relegated to a footnote, there is no reference to Lambert's Poona survey and the role of the joint family is far more complex than Maddison allows. For the non-specialist, however, this is an invaluable review of Indian economic history, much superior to books in the same genre, avoiding crude criticisms of the Raj and suitably cynical about governments since Independence.... He is weaker on demography, unduly stresses the harmful effects of the " drain " and exaggerates over-valuation of the rupee as the cause of falling exports from 1913 to 1937 (p. 60) ...
... The political historian may complain that a chapter of only four and a half pages is devoted to nationalism. But in this serviceable introduction to Indian development, with its select up-to-date bibliography, Maddison again demonstrates his qualities of conciseness, dexterity with dubious comparative data and comprehensibility if not comprehensiveness.
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W. J. MACPHERSON Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge.
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And, here is Judith Brown (Beit Professor of Commonwealth History, University of Oxford) on Maddison:
"But over one basic trend there is major academic controversy and little likelihood of resolution until much more research has been done. One scholar (Maddison) hazarded successively estimates of a 3 per cent increase, a 16.6 per cent increase, and a 28.9 per cent increase in crop output between 1893 and 1946; and this was a period when population increased by 46 per cent. If this was true Indian's food resources would have been cut dramatically. In the absence of evidence of such a drastic cut perhaps a more realistic estimate is that in the early twentieth century at least, when the population explosion really began, agriculture output rose roughly in line with population."
I think words like "important" etc. should be removed. It is not clear that his work is considered "important;" it certainly is considered controversial. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 18:59, 17 February 2008 (UTC)
