Abdul Rahman Abdul Abu Ghiyth Sulayman

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Abdul Rahman Abdul Abu Ghiyth Sulayman
Born: 1979 (age 28–29)
Ta'iz, Yemen
Citizenship Yemen
Detained at: Guantanamo
ID number: 223
Conviction(s): no charge, held in extrajudicial detention
Status enemy combatant
Casio F91W, in daily alarm mode.  The watch is currently set to ring an alarm, and flash its light, at 7:30am.
Casio F91W, in daily alarm mode. The watch is currently set to ring an alarm, and flash its light, at 7:30am.

Abdul Rahman Abdul Abu Ghiyth Sulayman is a citizen of Yemen, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo detainee ID number is 223. American intelligence analysts estimate he was born in 1979, in Ta'iz, Yemen.

Contents

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV.  The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.       The neutrality of this section is disputed.  Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007)Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.
Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.[2][3] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.[4]

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdul Rahman Abdul Abu Ghiyth Sulayman's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 12 October 2004.[5] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a The detainee is a member of the Taliban.
  1. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan in March 2001.
  2. The detainee went to Afghanistan to join the Taliban.
  3. The detainee stayed at a Taliban house while in Quetta, Pakistan.
  4. The detainee was reportedly trained on the PK machine gun and 82mm mortar.
  5. The detainee was captured with a model F91W Casio watch.
  6. The Casio watch, model F-91W has been used in bombings that have been linked to Al Qaeda and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices [sic] .
b The detainee participated in military operations against the United States and its coalition partners.
  1. The detainee was on the front lines fighting in Afghanistan during the bombing campaign.
  2. The detainee was captured in Pakistan.

[edit] Transcript

Sulayman chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[6] On March 3, 2006, in response to a court order from Jed Rakoff the Department of Defense published a nine page summarized transcript from his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[7]

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[8]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings.[9] The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abdul Rahman Abdul Abu Ghiyth Sulayman's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 7 April 2005.[10] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee was recruited by Abu Khalud to travel from Yemen to Afghanistan via Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan in March 2001. Khalud arranged for the detainees travel and provided him with 100 United States dollars. Khalud also mentioned the Jihad in Afghanistan, particularly, the fight against Masood.
  2. Ibrahim ((Balaalawi)), aka Abu Khulud, was a facilitator in Taiz, Yemen. Abu Khulud migrated to Afghanistan with his family in 1997. Abu Khulud swore bayat to Usamma Bin Laden and returned to Yemen in 2000 and was jailed for suspected involvement in the USS Cole bombing. Abu Khulud returned to Afghanistan circa April 2001 and swore bayat to Usamma Bin Laden a second time. Abu Khulud also attended Khalden camp and was in charge of the Kandahar guesthouse.
  3. While in Quetta, Pakistan, the detainee went to the Dfter house, which his recruiter identified as a Taliban house.
  4. The detainee traveled to Kabul where he stayed in the house of Hamza al Qaiti.
  5. The Hamza Qaiti guesthouse was owned and operated by al Qaida.
  6. After the United States began bombing operations in Afghanistan, the detainee traveled to "waiting points" which were staging areas behind the front lines where final preparations were made prior to going to battle.
b. Training
  1. The detainee became familiar with the Kalishnykovs in Yemen where he did some target practice.
  2. The detainee was reportedly trained on the PK machine gun and the 82 mm mortar.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee was identified from a 2000 video of Tarnak Farms, as a trainer in 82mm and 120 mm mortars. This individual also recalls seeing the detainee at the Bagram front, Afghanistan in May-June 2001.
  2. A senior al Qaida lieutenant stated that the detainee looked familiar to him, but he was unable to recall identifying information.
  3. The detainee was identified as a Taliban prison guard who used torture techniques on inmates under his control.
  4. The detainee's name and alias appear on a list of al Qaida members that was discovered on a computer hard drive seized during raids on al Qaida safe houses in Pakistan.
  5. The detainee's alias (Muhsin al Ta'zi) was found on a document associated with the London based Islamic Observation Center, which listed 76 individuals who were fighting with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
  6. The Islamic Observation Center located in London, England is headed by a well-known Sunni extremist, who propagandizes widely for extremist and terrorist organizations.
  7. The detainee was identified as an al Qaida spokesman and was part of Usama Bin Laden's entourage in January 2002 during the escape from Tora Bora.
d. Intent
  1. The detainee was on the front lines fighting in Afghanistan during the bombing campaign.
  2. The detainee was captured with a model F-91W Casio watch.
  3. The Casio watch (model F-91 W) has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.
  4. The detainee stated to the guards that he knows Kung Fu and that he is a Taliban soldier.
e. Other Relevant Data
When the detainee turned himself over to the Pakistanis, he did not have his passport.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee stated he did not go to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban. His purpose was to find a wife and get a house.

b.

The detainee denied any association with Usama Bin Laden, al Qaida, the Taliban or the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001.

c.

If released from U.S. custody, the detainee stated he would like to go back to Yemen, secure some type of employment, and start a family.

[edit] Enemy Combatant Election Form

According to the Enemy Combatant Election Form filled out by Sulayman's Assisting Military Officer Sulayman did not choose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[11] Summarized transcript (.pdf)], from Abdul Rahman Abdul Abu Ghiyth Sulayman's Administrative Review Board hearing - pages 197-198</ref> His Assisting Military Officer told his Board that the translator who accompanied him told him that he confirmed he spoke the same language as Sulayman. His transcript does not record his Assisting Military Officer commenting on his demeanor.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Abd Al Rahman Abdu Abu Aghayth Sulayman's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 4 August 2006.[12] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee was recruited to travel to Afghanistan to search for a wife and a job. The detainee was told that if he traveled to Afghanistan, he would be able to find a bride and the Taliban would provide him with a house. The recruiter also mentioned the jihad in Afghanistan.
  2. According to the detainee, the recruiter was receiving money from the Taliban.
  3. The recruiter arranged for the detainee to travel to Afghanistan by airplane via Karachi, Pakistan. The recruiter also gave the detainee 100 United States Dollars.
  4. The detainee acquired a passport one month before departing to Afghanistan. The detainee's reason for acquiring the passport was to travel to Saudi Arabia to look for work.
  5. The detainee departed Yemen in March 2001. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Dubai, United Arab Emirates and then went to Karachi, Pakistan. From Karachi, Pakistan, the detainee then proceeded to Quetta, Pakistan where he went to the Daftar Taliban to join the Taliban.
  6. The Taliban moved the detainee from Quetta, Pakistan to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  7. Once in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee was directed to travel to Kabul, Afghanistan to find a house. The detainee was told to go to the al Qaeity house [sic] .
  8. The detainee went to the al Qaeity [sic] house. The detainee remained there for at least eight months while waiting to get his own house.
  9. The detainee has stated that during his stay at the al Gati guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan, he made two trips towards the fighting lines north of Kabul.
b. Training
The detainee claimed to have received no formal training at any camp, but was instead trained by a Pakistani in an area in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee was trained on the use of the PK machine gun and 82 millimeter mortar.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee was reported to have been seen with Usama bin Laden in the Tora Bora, Afghanistan region.
  2. The detainee has been identified as an al Qaida spokesman in Usama bin Laden's entourage.
  3. The detainee's name was found on computer equipment that was confiscated during a raid on an alleged al Qaida residence, in Pakistan.
  4. The detainee's name was found on a chart on computer equipment that was connected to an al Qaida operative. The chart listed the names of captured mujahedin.
d. Other Relevant Data
  1. The Hamza Qaiti guest house has been identified as a safe house that was owned and operated by al Qaida.
  2. The detainee withdrew from his position at the front line on 12 November 2001, due to a large attack from the Northern Alliance.
  3. The detainee decided to leave Kabul, Afghanistan for good around December 2001.
  4. The detainee headed north to the front lines when bombs began to fall near Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee and other traveled to the area of Bagram, Afghanistan.
  5. The detainee left Bagram, Afghanistan when the front lines were attacked. The detainee traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan and then towards Peshawar, Pakistan. The detainee traveled to the Pakistan border through a mountainous region where he remained for one month. Finally, after the detainee arrived in Pakistan, villagers turned him in to the Pakistan police.
  6. An individual has identified the detainee as the interrogator that tortured him while the Taliban imprisoned him in Afghanistan.
  7. The detainee was transferred to United States custody on 2 January 2002, in Kohat, Pakistan.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee claims that he never fought for the Taliban.

b.

The detainee has denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

c.

The detainee has denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

d.

The detainee denied any knowledge of planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.

[edit] References

  1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
  3. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
  4. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
  5. ^ OARDEC (12 October 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Sulayman, Abdul Rahman Abdul Abu Ghiyth pages 41-42. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-05-05.
  6. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summarized Statement pages 23-31. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-05-05.
  7. ^ "US releases Guantanamo files", The Age, April 4, 2006. Retrieved on 2008-03-15. 
  8. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
  9. ^ Army Sgt. Sarah Stannard. "OARDEC provides recommendations to Deputy Secretary of Defense", JTF Guantanamo Public Affairs, October 29, 2007. Retrieved on 2008-03-26. 
  10. ^ OARDEC (7 April 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Sulayman, Abdul Rahman Abdul Abu Ghiyth pages 72-74. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-05-05.
  11. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summary of Administrative Review Board Proceedings of ISN 223 pages 197-198. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-05-05.
  12. ^ OARDEC (4 August 2006). [? Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Sulayman, Abd Al Rahman Abdu Abu Aghayth] pages 43-45. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-05-05.